Search

Fortune telling is a widespread phenomenon, yet little is known about the extent to which people are affected by it-including those who consider themselves non-believers. The present research has investigated the power of a positive fortune telling outcome (vs. neutral vs. negative) on people's financial risk taking. In two online experiments (n1 = 252; n2 = 441), we consistently found that positive fortune telling enhanced financial risk taking particularly among men. Additionally, we used a real online gambling game in a lab setting (n3 = 193) and found that positive fortune telling enhanced the likelihood that college students gambled for money. Furthermore, a meta-analysis of these three studies demonstrated that the effect of positive fortune telling versus neutral fortune telling was significant for men, but virtually absent for women. Thus, positive fortune telling can yield increased financial risk taking in men, but not (or less so) in women., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Interpersonal trust is an important source of social and economic development. Over decades, researchers debated the question whether and how public institutions influence interpersonal trust, making this relationship a much-discussed issue for scientific debate. However, experimental and behavioral data and insights on this relationship and the underlying psychological processes are rare and often inconsistent. The present set of studies tests a model which proposes that institutional trust indirectly affects trust among unrelated strangers by enhancing individuals' feelings of security. Study 1 (survey on trust in a broad spectrum of state institutions), Study 2 (nationally representative data from 16 countries), and Study 3 (experimental manipulation of institutional trust) provide convergent support for this hypothesis. Also, the results show that the effect remains consistent even after controlling for individual dispositions linked to interpersonal and institutional trust (Study 1 and 3) and country level indicators of institutional performance (Study 2). Taken together, these findings inform and contribute to the debate about the relationship between institutions and interpersonal trust by showing that when institutions are trusted, they increase feelings of security, and therefore promote interpersonal trust among strangers., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

People often consider themselves as more moral than average others (i.e., moral superiority) and present themselves as more moral than they actually are (i.e., moral hypocrisy). We examined whether feelings of moral superiority-as a manifestation of self-enhancement motives-motivates people's hypocritical behavior, that is, their discrepant moral performances in public versus private settings. In three studies (total N = 1,151), participants distributed two tasks (one favorable and one unfavorable) between themselves and an anonymous partner, with the option of using an ostensibly fair randomizer (e.g., a self-prepared coin). We found that when experiencing feelings of moral superiority (vs. non-superiority), people, especially those who highly identified with moral values (Studies 1 and 2), were less likely to directly give themselves the favorable task, but they were not less likely to cheat in private after using the randomizer (Studies 1 to 3). Both self-enhancement motives and moral identity have implications for hypocritical behavior, by motivating public moral appearances but not private moral integrity., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Because punishments are expected to give offenders what they deserve proportionally to the severity of their offenses, the punishment of an entire group because of the misdeed of a few of its members is generally considered as unfair. Group entitativity might increase support for such collective punishment, because members of highly entitative groups are perceived as more similar and interchangeable. We designed three experiments comparing support for third-party collective punishment of low versus high entitative groups. As comparison base-rate, we included conditions in which participants punish an individual wrongdoer (Experiments 1 & 2). Results show that although support for individual punishment is higher than support for collective punishment, this difference was reduced (Experiment 1) or absent (Experiment 2) when the group was highly entitative. Experiment 3 replicated the increasing effect of group entitativity on support for collective punishment. We conclude that group entitativity increases the likelihood of an entire group being treated as a single unit, facilitating collective punishment when a few group members commit an offense.

Social hostility is seldom expressed overtly. More often than not, individuals try to get their hostile message across without risking violent altercations. However, subtle and relatively covert hostility is not easy to research. We suggest a novel way with the SoMi paradigm, a social decision making task that offers participants the opportunity to be socially mindful or socially hostile by leaving or limiting choice to others. Sampling a general population we find that, relative to friends and strangers, foes are indeed met with greater social hostility (Study 1). Focusing on the highly competitive environment of youth soccer, we find that rival team members elicit social hostility, whereas teammates elicit social mindfulness (Study 2). We conclude that social mindfulness and social hostility play a subtle role in the dynamics of interpersonal and/or intergroup relationships, in which leaving or limiting choice is one of the subtle ways to express benevolent versus hostile intentions; the SoMi paradigm may thus be helpful in identifying which way the ball rolls.

Corruption poses one of the major societal challenges of our time. Considerable advances have been made in understanding corruption on a macro level, yet the psychological antecedents of corrupt behavior remain largely unknown. In order to explain why some people engage in corruption while others do not, we explored the impact of descriptive social norms on corrupt behavior by using a novel behavioral measure of corruption. We conducted three studies to test whether perceived descriptive norms of corruption (i.e. the belief about the prevalence of corruption in a specific context) influence corrupt behavior. The results indicated that descriptive norms highly correlate with corrupt behavior--both when measured before (Study 1) or after (Study 2) the behavioral measure of corruption. Finally, we adopted an experimental design to investigate the causal effect of descriptive norms on corruption (Study 3). Corrupt behavior in the corruption game significantly drops when participants receive short anti-corruption descriptive norm primes prior to the game. These findings indicate that perceived descriptive norms can impact corrupt behavior and, possibly, could offer an explanation for inter-personal and inter-cultural variation in corrupt behavior in the real world. We discuss implications of these findings and draw avenues for future research.