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Behavioral change has been increasingly recognized as a means for combating climate change. However, being concerned about climate problems and knowing the importance of individual actions in mitigating them is not enough for greater adherence to a more sustainable lifestyle. Psychological barriers such as (1) finding change unnecessary; (2) conflicting goals; (3) interpersonal relationships; (4) lack of knowledge; and (5) tokenism have been proposed as an explanation for the gap between environmental attitudes and actions. Yet, so far, this hypothesis has remained untested. This study aimed to assess if psychological barriers moderate the association between environmental attitudes and climate action. A sample of Portuguese individuals (N = 937) responded to a survey measuring climate change beliefs and environmental concerns as an index of environmental attitudes, a scale of self-reported frequency of environmental action, and finally, the dragons of inaction psychological barrier scale. Our participants revealed generally elevated positive environmental attitudes. These attitudes were positively and moderately related to greater self-reported frequency of environmental action in areas such as reusing materials, reduced consumption of animal products, water and energy saving, and airplane use, but not driving less. Critically, the association between attitudes and behavior was negatively moderated by psychological barriers for the reuse, food, and saving domains, but not for driving or flying. In conclusion, our results corroborate the assumption that psychological barriers can partly explain the attitude-behavior gap in the climate action domain.

There is a growing interest in specifying the mechanisms underlying refreshing, i.e., the use of attention to keep working memory (WM) contents accessible. Here, we examined whether participants' visual fixations during the retention interval of a WM task indicate the current focus of internal attention, thereby serving as an online measure of refreshing. Eye movements were recorded while participants studied and maintained an array of colored dots followed by probed recall of one (Experiments 1A and 1B) or all (Experiment 2) of the memoranda via a continuous color wheel. Experiments 1A and 2 entailed an unfilled retention interval in which refreshing is assumed to occur spontaneously, and Experiment 1B entailed a retention interval embedded with cues prompting the sequential refreshment of a subset of the memoranda. During the retention interval, fixations revisited the locations occupied by the memoranda, consistent with a looking-at-nothing phenomenon in WM, but the pattern was only evident when placeholders were onscreen in Experiment 2, indicating that most of these fixations may largely reflect random gaze. Furthermore, spontaneous fixations did not predict recall precision (Experiments 1A and 2), even when ensuring that they did not reflect random gaze (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1B, refreshing cues increased fixations to the eventually tested target and predicted better recall precision, which interacted with an overall benefit of target fixations, such that the benefit of fixations decreased as the number of refreshing cues increased. Thus, fixations under spontaneous conditions had no credible effect on recall precision, whereas the beneficial effect of fixations under instructed refreshing conditions may indicate situations in which cues were disregarded. Consequently, we conclude that eye movements do not seem suitable as an online measure of refreshing.

Binary classification has numerous applications. For one, lie detection methods typically aim to classify each tested person either as “liar” or as “truthteller” based on the given test results. To infer practical implications, as well as to compare different methods, it is essential to assess the diagnostic efficiency, such as demonstrating the number of correctly classified persons. However, this is not always straightforward. In Concealed Information Tests (CITs), the key predictor value (probe-irrelevant difference) for “truthtellers” is always similar (zero on average), and “liars” are always distinguished by a larger value (i.e., a larger number resulting from the CIT test, as compared to the zero baseline). Thereby, in general, the larger predictor values a given CIT method obtains for “liars” on average, the better this method is assumed to be. This has indeed been assumed in countless studies, and therefore, when comparing the classification efficiencies of two different designs, the mean difference of “liar” predictor values in the two designs were simply compared to each other (hence not collecting “truthteller” data to spare resources). We show, based on the meta-data of 12 different experimental designs collected in response time-based CIT studies, that differences in dispersion (i.e., variance in the data, e.g. the extent of random deviations from the zero average in case of “truthtellers”) can substantially influence classification efficiency–to the point that, in extreme cases, one design may even be superior in classification despite having a larger mean “liar” predictor value. However, we also introduce a computer simulation procedure to estimate classification efficiency in the absence of “truthteller” data, and validate this procedure via a meta-analysis comparing outcomes based on empirical data versus simulated data.

Messages to promote health behavior are essential when considering health promotion, disease prevention, and healthy life expectancy. The present study aimed to examine whether (1) positive and negative goal-framing messages affect message memory and behavioral intention differently in younger, middle-aged, and older adults, (2) framing effects are mediated by interest in health (health promotion and disease prevention) and emotion regulation (cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression), and (3) mediation effects differ between positive and negative frames. Participants (N = 1248) aged 20 to 70 years were divided into positive and negative frame conditions. Framing demonstrated interactive effects on message memory; all age groups showed higher recognition accuracy in the positive than the negative frame. The accuracy of younger adults was higher than that of older adults in the negative frame, while older adults showed higher accuracy than younger adults in the positive frame. Additionally, recognition accuracy was higher in the positive frame, as participants had higher interest in health promotion and used cognitive reappraisal more frequently. Contrariwise, emotion regulation and interest in health promotion did not have significant effects on memory in negative frames. Moreover, regardless of the message valence, age did not influence behavioral intention directly but was mediated by interest in health and emotion regulation, while the older the participants were, the higher their interest in health, resulting in higher intention. For emotion regulation, intention increased with higher reappraisal scores and decreased with increasing suppression. Our results suggest that interest in health and emotion regulation should be considered when examining the relationship between age and goal-framing for health messages.