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In this article we study the social dynamic of temporal partitioning congestion games (TPGs), in which participants must coordinate an optimal time-partitioning for using a limited resource. The challenge in TPGs lies in determining whether users can optimally self-organize their usage patterns. Reaching an optimal solution may be undermined, however, by a collectively destructive meta-reasoning pattern, trapping users in a socially vicious oscillatory behavior. TPGs constitute a dilemma for both human and animal communities. We developed a model capturing the dynamics of these games and ran simulations to assess its behavior, based on a 2×2 framework that distinguishes between the players' knowledge of other players' choices and whether they use a learning mechanism. We found that the only way in which an oscillatory dynamic can be thwarted is by adding learning, which leads to weak convergence in the no-information condition and to strong convergence in the with-information condition. We corroborated the validity of our model using real data from a study of bats' behaviour in an environment of water scarcity. We conclude by examining the merits of a complexity-based, agent-based modelling approach over a game-theoretic one, contending that it offers superior insights into the temporal dynamics of TPGs. We also briefly discuss the policy implications of our findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Establishing and maintaining mutual cooperation in agent-to-agent interactions can be viewed as a question of direct reciprocity and readily applied to the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Agents cooperate, at a small cost to themselves, in the hope of obtaining a future benefit. Zero-determinant strategies, introduced in 2012, have a subclass of strategies that are provably extortionate. In the established literature, most of the studies of the effectiveness or lack thereof, of zero-determinant strategies is done by placing some zero-determinant strategy in a specific scenario (collection of agents) and evaluating its performance either numerically or theoretically. Extortionate strategies are algebraically rigid and memory-one by definition, and requires complete knowledge of a strategy (the memory-one cooperation probabilities). The contribution of this work is a method to detect extortionate behaviour from the history of play of an arbitrary strategy. This inverts the paradigm of most studies: instead of observing the effectiveness of some theoretically extortionate strategies, the largest known collection of strategies will be observed and their intensity of extortion quantified empirically. Moreover, we show that the lack of adaptability of extortionate strategies extends via this broader definition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The digital economy is now the expected norm for economic development, warranting strategic importance for enterprise digital transformation. Nonetheless, enterprises have a lengthy journey to embark upon for digital transformation. On the one hand, resource-based demands pose a significant challenge due to the development characteristics of the initiative; on the other hand, excessive emphasis on economic gains may result in severe environmental issues. Therefore, this paper examines whether green innovation, which combines environmental and economic benefits, can effectively address the above dilemma. The study includes all A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020 as the research sample, and empirically investigates the impact of green innovation on enterprise digital transformation and its mechanism based on resource-based view. The study concluded that (i) green innovation has a significant positive impact on corporate digital transformation performance, exhibiting asymmetric effects. The robustness tests confirmed the validity of the findings. (ii) Enterprises that actively engage in green innovation can effectively reduce their financial constraints, enhance their operational capacity, and enable the efficient allocation of resources, thereby promoting digital transformation within the enterprise. (iii) There is a regional imbalance in the conversion of green innovation performance into economic performance. The aforementioned results offer fresh insights for investigating the connection between green innovation and digital transformation. Additionally, these findings hold significant implications for the discourse on the synergistic advancement of the environment and economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global, spatially interpolated climate datasets such as WorldClim and CHELSA, widely used in research, are based on station data, which are rare in tropical mountains. However, such biodiversity hotspots are of high ecological interest and require accurate data. Therefore, the quality of such gridded datasets needs to be assessed. This poses a kind of dilemma, as proving the reliability of these potentially weakly modelled data is usually not possible due to the lack of stations. Using a unique climate dataset with 170 stations, mainly from the montane and alpine zones of sixteen mountains in Tanzania including Kilimanjaro, we show that the accuracy of such datasets is very poor. Not only is the maximum amount of mean annual precipitation drastically underestimated (partly more than 50%), but also the elevation of the precipitation maximum deviates up to 850m. Our results show that, at least in tropical regions, they should be used with greater caution than before. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely known how the human ability to cooperate has influenced the thriving of our species. However, as we move towards a hybrid human-machine future, it is still unclear how the introduction of artificial agents in our social interactions affect this cooperative capacity. In a one-shot collective risk dilemma, where enough members of a group must cooperate in order to avoid a collective disaster, we study the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a hybrid population. In our model, we consider a hybrid population composed of both adaptive and fixed behavior agents. The latter serve as proxies for the machine-like behavior of artificially intelligent agents who implement stochastic strategies previously learned offline. We observe that the adaptive individuals adjust their behavior in function of the presence of artificial agents in their groups to compensate their cooperative (or lack of thereof) efforts. We also find that risk plays a determinant role when assessing whether or not we should form hybrid teams to tackle a collective risk dilemma. When the risk of collective disaster is high, cooperation in the adaptive population falls dramatically in the presence of cooperative artificial agents. A story of compensation, rather than cooperation, where adaptive agents have to secure group success when the artificial agents are not cooperative enough, but will rather not cooperate if the others do so. On the contrary, when risk of collective disaster is low, success is highly improved while cooperation levels within the adaptive population remain the same. Artificial agents can improve the collective success of hybrid teams. However, their application requires a true risk assessment of the situation in order to actually benefit the adaptive population (i.e. the humans) in the long-term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the current process of social and economic development, the cost of living and property management is continuously increasing. In order to maintain the normal operation of property management and provide high-quality services, it is necessary to adjust the property fees reasonably. If the property fees cannot be adjusted for a long time, it will have a detrimental impact on the development of the community. However, the traditional regulatory model has failed to accurately define the quality of property services, leading to information asymmetry and a lack of trust between the two parties, resulting in a deadlock in property fee adjustments. With the rise of intelligent management, a new direction for property fee adjustments has been provided. This article first analyzes the pricing dilemma under traditional regulation through game theory. Then, based on the theory of "Smart regulatory", it proposes the idea of constructing a "Smart regulatory" platform and explores the feasibility of this model using game theory and Matlab simulations. The study found that the "Smart regulatory" platform can resolve information asymmetry and encourage both parties to cooperate in the game. After the establishment of the platform, property fee adjustments are influenced by government supervision, government penalties, and the magnitude of property fee increase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In evolutionary game, aspiration-driven updates and imitation updates are the two dominant game models, and individual behavior patterns are mainly categorized into two types: node player and link player. In more recent studies, the mixture strategy of different types of players has been proven to improve cooperation substantially. Motivated by such a co-evolution mechanism, we combine aspiration dynamics with individual behavioral diversity, where self-assessed aspirations are used to update imitation strategies. In this study, the node players and the link players are capable to transform into each other autonomously, which introduces new features to cooperation in a diverse population as well. In addition, by driving all the players to form specific behavior patterns, the proposed mechanism achieves a survival environment optimization of the cooperators. As expected, the interaction between node players and link players allows the cooperator to avoid the invasion of the defector. Based on the experimental evaluation, the proposed work has demonstrated that the co-evolution mechanism has facilitated the emergence of cooperation by featuring mutual transformation between different players. We hope to inspire a new way of thinking for a promising solution to social dilemmas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Physical activity questionnaires (PAQs) are a popular method of monitoring physical activity, although their validity is usually low. Descriptions of physical activity levels in questionnaires usually rely on physical responses to physical activity. Therefore, we hypothesised that the validity of PAQs would be higher in the more physically fit group of participants. To test this, we conducted a validation study with 179 adults whom we divided into three fitness groups based on their cardiovascular fitness and age. Participants were measured for one week using the UKK RM42 accelerometer and self-reported their physical activity using IPAQ-SF, GPAQ, and EHIS-PAQ. We analysed the differences between fitness groups in terms of validity for each PAQ using ANOVA. We also performed an equivalence testing to compare the data obtained with the PAQs and the accelerometers. The results showed a significant trend toward higher validity for moderate to vigorous physical activity from the low to high fitness group as assessed by GPAQ and IPAQ-SF (low, intermediate and high fitness group: 0.06–0.21; 0.26–0.29; 0.40, respectively). The equivalence testing showed that all fitness groups overestimated their physical activity and underestimated their sedentary behaviour, with the high fitness group overestimating their physical activity the least. However, EHIS-PAQ was found to agree best with accelerometer data in assessing moderate to vigorous physical activity, regardless of fitness group, and had a validity greater than 0.4 for all fitness groups. In conclusion, we confirmed that when using PAQs describing physical responses to physical activity, participants' fitness should be considered in the interpretation, especially when comparing results internationally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous work has demonstrated that people are more willing to sacrifice one person to save five in a foreign language (FL) than in their native tongue. This may be due to the FL either reducing concerns about sacrificial harm (deontological inclinations) or increasing concerns about overall outcomes (utilitarian inclinations). Moreover, proficiency in a foreign language (FL) may moderate results. To test these possibilities, we investigated the moral foreign language effect (MFLE) in a novel sample of Russian L1/English FL speakers. We employed process dissociation (PD)—a technique that independently assesses concerns about rejecting harm and maximizing outcomes in sacrificial dilemmas, and we assessed measures of objective and subjective foreign language proficiency and of dilemma comprehension. Results replicated the pattern of increased acceptance of sacrificial harm in FL demonstrated in earlier studies, but a PD analysis showed no evidence of increased concerns for utilitarian outcomes in a FL; instead, this pattern was driven by reduced concerns regarding sacrificial harm. However, people who reported better dilemma comprehension in the FL demonstrated both stronger deontological and utilitarian responding, and people with higher objective proficiency displayed stronger utilitarian responding in the FL than those with lower proficiency. These findings show that utilitarian inclinations are affected by reading dilemmas in a foreign language mainly in low-proficiency speakers, and that while emotional concerns for sacrifice are reduced in FL, better comprehension can increase such concerns as well as concern for outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cirrhigaleus comprises a small genus of rare barbel-bearing dogfish sharks with distributions in limited regions of all oceans. Generic validity and taxonomic status of some species are upon controversies by morphological and molecular evidence that often suggest reallocation of Cirrhigaleus species into the genus Squalus. Particularly, the roughskin spurdog C. asper exhibits intermediary morphological characteristics within Squalidae that requires clarification. In the present study, a phylogenetic approach was undertaken to test the correct generic placement of C. asper using novel and revised morphological characters. We performed maximum parsimony analysis of 51 morphological characters of the internal (e.g., neurocranium, clasper cartilages, pectoral and pelvic girdles) and external anatomy applied to 13 terminal taxa. Cirrhigaleus represents a valid genus and it is supported by eight synapomorphies: high number of monospondylous vertebrae; medial nasal lobe supported by fleshy core and innervated by the buccopharyngeal branch of the facial nerve; neurocranium with greatest width across nasal capsules; one facet and one condyle in the puboischiadic bar for articulating with the basipterygium; two intermediate segments between the basipterygium of the pelvic fin and the axial cartilage of the claspers; five terminal clasper cartilages; and posterior medial process of the puboischiadic bar absent. Cirrhigaleus asper is sister-species to a small clade comprising C. barbifer and C. australis which is supported by one synapomorphy, presence of conspicuous cusplets in the dermal denticles. Cirrhigaleus barbifer, C. asper and C. australis are redescribed herein and the neotype of C. barbifer is designated. A key to Cirrhigaleus species is also given and the inner relationships within Squalus is tentatively discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Avoiding losses from long-term trend reversals is challenging, and trend-following is one of the few trading approaches to explore it. While trend-following is popular among investors and has gained increased attention in academia, the recent diminished profitability in equity markets casts doubt on its effectiveness. To clarify its cause and suggest remedies, we thoroughly examine the effect of market conditions and averaging window on recent profitability using four major stock indices in an out-of-sample experiment comparing trend-following rules (moving average and momentum) and a machine-classification-based non-trend-following rule. In addition to the significant advantage of trend-following rules in avoiding downside risks, we find a discrepancy in the optimum averaging window size between trend direction phases, which is exacerbated by a higher positive trend direction ratio. A higher positive trend direction ratio leads to poor performance relative to buy-and-hold returns. This discrepancy creates the dilemma of choosing which trend direction phase to emphasize. Incorporating machine-learning into trend-following is effective for alleviating this dilemma. We find that the profit-maximizing averaging window realizes the level that best balances the dilemma and suggest a simple guideline for selecting the optimum averaging window. We attribute the sluggishness of trend-following in recent equity markets to the insufficient chances of trend reversals rather than their loss of profitability. Our results contribute to improving the performance of trend following by mitigating the dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze how parties respond programmatically to populist parties in power abroad. Political parties often copy the policies of governing parties in other countries–a phenomenon that contributes to waves of transnational policy diffusion. We report the first large-scale comparative study showing that populist parties in government abroad trigger the opposite reaction: instead of inspiring emulation, their highly visible governing dilemmas provoke a policy backlash by parties in other states. We argue that dilemmas arise because populist parties confront unique and debilitating trade-offs between maintaining their anti-system posture and governing effectively, which make them electorally vulnerable. Other parties observe foreign populists' governing dilemmas and respond by distancing themselves in order to avoid these problems. We detect this "foreign populist backlash effect" using spatial econometric analysis, a method that allows us to estimate international policy connections between parties, applied to over 200 European parties' programmatic positions since the 1970s. Our findings illuminate parties' election strategies and show that this backlash effect constrains the spread of populism across Western democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Sacrificial dilemmas" are the scenarios typically used to study moral judgment and human morality. However, these dilemmas have been criticized regarding their lack of ecological validity. The COVID-19 pandemic offers a relevant context to further examine individuals' moral judgment and choice of action with more realistic sacrificial dilemmas. Using this context, the purpose of the present study is to investigate how moral responses are influenced by the contextualization of the dilemma (i.e., contextualized or not within the Covid-19 pandemic). By comparing two versions of one dilemma, Experiment 1 revealed that the more realistic version (the one contextualized within the Covid-19 pandemic) did not elicit more utilitarian responses than the less realistic version (the one not contextualized within the Covid-19 pandemic). In Experiment 2, we examined more specifically whether both the perceived realism of the dilemma and the plausibility of a utilitarian action influence moral responses. Results confirmed that the contextualization of the dilemma does not make any difference in moral responses. However, the plausibility of an action appears to exert an influence on the choice of action. Indeed, participants were more inclined to choose the utilitarian action in the plausible action versions than in the implausible action versions of the dilemma. Overall, these results shed light on the importance for future research of using mundane and dramatic realistic dilemmas displaying full information regarding a sacrificial action and its consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Identifying mechanisms able to sustain costly cooperation among self-interested agents is a central problem across social and biological sciences. One possible solution is peer punishment: when agents have an opportunity to sanction defectors, classical behavioral experiments suggest that cooperation can take root. Overlooked from standard experimental designs, however, is the fact that real-world human punishment—the administration of justice—is intrinsically noisy. Here we show that stochastic punishment falls short of sustaining cooperation in the repeated public good game. As punishment noise increases, we find that contributions decrease and punishment efforts intensify, resulting in a 45% drop in gains compared to a noiseless control. Moreover, we observe that uncertainty causes a rise in antisocial punishment, a mutually harmful behavior previously associated with societies with a weak rule of law. Our approach brings to light challenges to cooperation that cannot be explained by economic rationality and strengthens the case for further investigations of the effect of noise—and not just bias—on human behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Clinical clerkship programme in medical schools were developed to provide students with direct interactions with patients and observe clinical teachers in practice. However, professional dilemmas are prone to occur due to the nature of experiential learning. Several studies across different cultures showed that medical students responded differently towards professional dilemma. Aims: This study aims to explore how medical students respond to professional dilemmas occurred during their clinical clerkships and to what extent culture influences the responses. Method: A qualitative descriptive approach was used in this study. We conducted four focus group discussions with final year medical students who were selected using maximum variety sampling method. Thematic analysis was conducted following the transcription of the focus groups. Results: We identified the impact of dilemmas on students' emotions and concerns, students' responses towards professional dilemmas, and factors affecting responses to dilemmas in clinical clerkship, which confirmed that cultures played roles in how students responded towards professional dilemmas. Conclusion: This study has identified that culture, to some extent, influenced the way students responded to professional dilemmas. Therefore, it is paramount to develop a conducive and culturally sensitive educational environment and students' ability to learn from professional dilemma experienced in the workplace for developing their professional identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unprecedented growth of educated workforce following the economic development and diversity in workplace has widened the career choices of young people in Bangladesh. However, it intensifies a dilemma among the job seekers about determining their career goals, because career goals are often influenced by certain socio-demographic and cultural aspects. Hence, this cross-sectional study was designed to investigate the career choices of university students in Bangladesh and to identify its determinants. Administering a self-administered questionnaire (SAQ), data were collected from 422 students at a public university using the multistage stratified sampling. Data were analyzed by bivariate (chi-square) and multivariate (exploratory factor analysis and binary logistic regression) analyses. Findings suggest that the career choices of students vary regarding their gender, religion, and academic track. For example, female (AOR: 0.281; 95% CI: 0.144 to 0.547) and Muslim (AOR: 3.648; 95% CI: 1.765 to 7.542) students preferred public jobs, whereas students of commerce (AOR: 0.344; 95% CI: 0.144 to 0.820) went for private ones. Among socioeconomic issues, only the father's occupation had a substantial effect on career decisions (AOR: 0.347; 95% CI: 0.144 to 0.820). The career choice was also determined by the job prospects (AOR: 1.251; 95% CI: 1.161 to 1.347), preference of family (AOR: 1.238; 95% CI: 1.099 to 1.394), as well as job diversity (AOR: 0.879; 95% CI: 0.795 to 0.972). Based on the findings of this study, it is recommended that the government should address the trends and patterns of career choices of students through empirical research when formulating future educational and career-related policies in Bangladesh. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the outbreak of the global COVID-19 pandemic, social distancing has been known to everyone and recommended almost everywhere everyday. Social distancing has been and will be one of the most effective measures and sometimes, the only available one for fighting epidemics and saving lives. However, it has not been so clear how social distancing should be practiced or managed, especially when it comes to regulating everyone's otherwise normal social activities. The debate on how to implement social distancing often leads to a heated political argument, while research on the subject is lacking. This paper is to provide a theoretical basis for the understanding of the scientific nature of social distancing by considering it as a social dilemma game played by every individual against his/her population. From this perspective, every individual needs to make a decision on how to engage in social distancing, or risk being trapped into a dilemma either exposing to deadly diseases or getting no access to necessary social activities. As the players of the game, the individual's decisions depend on the population's actions and vice versa, and an optimal strategy can be found when the game reaches an equilibrium. The paper shows how an optimal strategy can be determined for a population with either closely related or completely separated social activities and with either single or multiple social groups, and how the collective behaviors of social distancing can be simulated by following every individual's actions as the distancing game progresses. The simulation results for populations of varying sizes and complexities are presented, which not only justify the choices of the strategies based on the theoretical analysis, but also demonstrate the convergence of the individual actions to an optimal distancing strategy in silico and possibly in natura as well, if every individual makes rational distancing decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Since December 2019, coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has spread rapidly across the world. During the pandemic, physicians in our hospital have had to respond both to the issue of treating the patients and the increasing domestic burden associated with social disruption. The purpose of this study was to assess how much the burden on our doctors, especially female doctors, was increasing. Material and methods: The Physicians' Career Support Committee in Sapporo Medical University conducted a questionnaire survey. The questionnaire inquired about a wide range of subjects with regard to working style and family life during the first and second waves of the COVID-19 pandemic, and was sent to all medical/dental physicians working in Sapporo Medical University. Results: A total of 266 (42.7%) physicians in our hospital responded to our questionnaire and the data for 264 data were analyzed. The total numbers of males, females, and others, including those who did not want to specify, were 178 (67.4%), 82 (31.0%), and 4 (1.5%), respectively. Among them, 62 (23.5%) and 23 (8.7%) answered that their domestic burden was slightly or markedly increased. The increase in the domestic burden showed a significant difference between genders (p = 0.04). Even after correction for background differences using multivariate analysis, being female (p<0.001), having child dependents (p<0.001), and treating COVID-19 patients (p = 0.03) were significantly related to an increased domestic burden. Regarding family style, 58.1% of the physician-fathers were from two-income families (i.e., families with both parents in employment), and they answered that their partner mainly cared for the children. In contrast, 97.3% of physician-mothers were from two-income families, and 94.6% of the physician-mothers had to take care of children by themselves. Conclusion: Physician-mothers are caught in a dilemma between an increased home burden and clinical duties in the hospital, with a significantly higher ratio than physician-fathers during the pandemic. As we showed, female doctors could have not continued their careers and take responsible positions in the same way as male doctors. This is a social risk in the timing of a crisis, such as a pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Crews operating remotely piloted aircrafts (RPAs) in military operations may be among the few that truly experience tragic dilemmas similar to the famous Trolley Problem. In order to analyze decision-making and emotional conflict of RPA operators within Trolley-Problem-like dilemma situations, we created an RPA simulation that varied mission contexts (firefighter, military and surveillance as a control condition) and the social "value" of a potential victim. We found that participants (Air Force cadets and civilian students) were less likely to make the common utilitarian choice (sacrificing one to save five), when the value of the one increased, especially in the military context. However, in the firefighter context, this decision pattern was much less pronounced. The results demonstrate behavioral and justification differences when people are more invested in a particular context despite ostensibly similar dilemmas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To function during social interactions, we must be able to consider and coordinate our actions with other people's perspectives. This process unfolds from decision-making, to anticipation of that decision's consequences, to feedback about those consequences, in what can be described as a "cascade" of three phases. The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (iPD) task, an economic-exchange game used to illustrate how people achieve stable cooperation over repeated interactions, provides a framework for examining this "social decision cascade". In the present study, we examined neural activity associated with the three phases of the cascade, which can be isolated during iPD game rounds. While undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 31 adult participants made a) decisions about whether to cooperate with a co-player for a monetary reward, b) anticipated the co-player's decision, and then c) learned the co-player's decision. Across all three phases, participants recruited the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), regions implicated in numerous facets of social reasoning such as perspective-taking and the judgement of intentions. Additionally, a common distributed neural network underlies both decision-making and feedback appraisal; however, differences were identified in the magnitude of recruitment between both phases. Furthermore, there was limited evidence that anticipation following the decision to defect evoked a neural signature that is distinct from the signature of anticipation following the decision to cooperate. This study is the first to delineate the neural substrates of the entire social decision cascade in the context of the iPD game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Driver behavior is considered one of the most important factors in the genesis of dilemma zones and the safety of driver-vehicle-environment systems. An accurate driver behavior model can improve the traffic signal control efficiency and decrease traffic accidents in signalized intersections. This paper uses a mathematical modeling method to study driver behavior in a dilemma zone based on stochastic model predictive control (SMPC), along with considering the dynamic characteristics of human cognition and execution, aiming to provide a feasible solution for modeling driver behavior more accurately and potentially improving the understanding of driver-vehicle-environment systems in dilemma zones. This paper explores the modeling framework of driver behavior, including the perception module, decision-making module, and operation module. The perception module is proposed to stimulate the ability to perceive uncertainty and select attention in the dilemma zone. An SMPC-based driver control modeling method is proposed to stimulate decision-making behavior in the dilemma zone. The operation module is proposed to stimulate the execution ability of the driver. Finally, CarSim, the well-known vehicle dynamics analysis software package, is used to verify the proposed models of this paper. The simulation results show that the SMPC-based driver behavior model can effectively and accurately reflect the vehicle motion and dynamics under driving in the dilemma zone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: It has been suggested that an increasing proportion of young adults in Japan have lost interest in romantic relationships, a phenomenon termed "herbivorization". We assessed trends in heterosexual relationship status and self-reported interest in heterosexual romantic relationships in nationally representative data. Methods: We used data from seven rounds of the National Fertility Survey (1987–2015) and included adults aged 18–39 years (18–34 years in the 1987 survey; sample size 11,683–17,675). Current heterosexual relationship status (married; unmarried but in a relationship; single) was estimated by sex, age group and survey year, with singles further categorized into those reporting interest vs. no interest in heterosexual romantic relationships. Information about same-sex relationships were not available. Results: Between 1992 and 2015, the age-standardized proportion of 18-39-year-old Japanese adults who were single had increased steadily, from 27.4 to 40.7% among women and from 40.3 to 50.8% among men. This increase was largely driven by decreases in the proportion of married women aged 25–39 years and men aged 30–39 years, while those in a relationship had increased only slightly for women and remained stable for men. By 2015, the proportion of single women was 30.2% in those aged 30–34 years and 24.4% in those aged 35–39 years. The corresponding numbers for men were 39.3% and 32.4%. Around half of the singles (21.4% of all women and 25.1% of all men aged 18–39 years) reported that they had no interest in heterosexual romantic relationships. Single women and men who reported no interest in romantic relationships had lower income and educational levels and were less likely to have regular employment compared to those who reported such an interest. Conclusions: In this analysis of heterosexual relationships in nationally representative data from Japan, singlehood among young adults had steadily increased over the last three decades. In 2015 around one in four women and one in three men in their thirties were unmarried and not in a heterosexual relationship. Half of the singles reported no interest in romantic relationships and these women and men had lower income and educational levels and were less likely to have regular employment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Currently, there is no satisfying answer to how cooperation arises rationally in a single-play prisoner's dilemma game with complete information. When player types are known, as well as payoffs and actions, economic analysis through payoff-optimizing computation does not provide a clear path for cooperation. We propose a new form of game–the 'expected' game–and illustrate its implications for theory and practice based on the prisoner's dilemma example. We prove that cooperation can be a rational choice for players in reality in such games defined by a weighted set of payoffs of two or more different reference games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The core problem in the distribution dilemma is the trade-off between equity and efficiency. With the development of socio-economic conditions, the optimal decision changes between equitable and efficient options. The methods for nudging decision-makers to make optimal decisions without changing the event are extremely important. This study used two laboratory behavior experiments to explore the impact of maxim information on the trade-off between equity and efficiency. The study explores whether stake levels and division schemes affect the nudging effect of the maxim in a Trade-Off Game (TOG). We found that participants were affected by maxim information in decision-making scenarios, and participants showed different equity preferences as the maxim information changed, without relevance of the stake level. Additionally, the nudging effect of the maxim only exists under the condition that the distributor's interests is not affected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature has shown that different types of moral dilemmas elicit discrepant decision patterns. The present research investigated the role of uncertainty in contributing to these decision patterns. Two studies were conducted to examine participants' choices in commonly used dilemmas. Study 1 showed that participants' perceived outcome probabilities were significantly associated with their moral choices, and that these associations were independent from the dilemma type. Study 2 revealed that participants had significantly less preference for killing the individual when the outcome probabilities were stated using the modal verb 'will' than when they were stated using the numerical phrasing of '100%'. Our findings illustrate a discord between experimenter and participant in the interpretation of task instructions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To understand the influence of user interface on task performance and situation awareness, three levels of user interface were designed based on the three-level situation awareness model for the 3-player diner's dilemma game. The 3-player diner's dilemma is a multiplayer version of the prisoner's dilemma, in which participants play games with two computer players and try to achieve high scores. A total of 117 participants were divided into 3 groups to participate in the experiment. Their task performance (the dining points) was recorded and their situation awareness scores were measured with the Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique. The results showed that (1) the level-3 interface effectively improved the task performance and situation awareness scores, while the level-2 interface failed to improve them; (2) the practice effect did exist in all three conditions; and (3) the levels of user interface had no effect on the task learning process, implying that the learning rules remained consistent across different conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Language is critical to coordination in groups. Though, how language affects coordination in groups is not well understood. We prime distributive and integrative language in a bargaining experiment to better understand the links between group outcomes and communication. We accomplish this by priming interests or positions language in randomized groups. We find that priming positions as opposed to interests language leads to agreements where controllers, subjects with unilateral authority over the group outcome, receive a larger share of the benefits but where the total benefits to the group are unaffected. In contrast to common justifications for the use of integrative language in bargaining, our experimental approach revealed no significant differences between priming interests and positions language in regards to increasing joint outcomes for the groups. Across treatments, we find subjects that use gain frames and make reference to visuals aids during bargaining experience larger gains for the group, while loss frames and pro-self language experience larger gains for the individual through side payments. This finding suggests a bargainer's dilemma: whether to employ language that claims a larger share of group's assets or employ language to increase joint gains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of how self-driving cars should behave in dilemma situations has recently attracted a lot of attention in science, media and society. A growing number of publications amass insight into the factors underlying the choices we make in such situations, often using forced-choice paradigms closely linked to the trolley dilemma. The methodology used to address these questions, however, varies widely between studies, ranging from fully immersive virtual reality settings to completely text-based surveys. In this paper we compare virtual reality and text-based assessments, analyzing the effect that different factors in the methodology have on decisions and emotional response of participants. We present two studies, comparing a total of six different conditions varying across three dimensions: The level of abstraction, the use of virtual reality, and time-constraints. Our results show that the moral decisions made in this context are not strongly influenced by the assessment, and the compared methods ultimately appear to measure very similar constructs. Furthermore, we add to the pool of evidence on the underlying factors of moral judgment in traffic dilemmas, both in terms of general preferences, i.e., features of the particular situation and potential victims, as well as in terms of individual differences between participants, such as their age and gender. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The availability of antibiotics presents medical practitioners with a prescribing dilemma. On the one hand, antibiotics provide a safe and effective treatment option for patients with bacterial infections, but at a population level, over-prescription reduces their effectiveness by facilitating the evolution of bacteria that are resistant to antibiotic medication. A game-theoretic investigation, including analysis of equilibrium strategies, evolutionarily stability, and replicator dynamics, reveals that rational doctors, motivated to attain the best outcomes for their own patients, will prescribe antibiotics irrespective of the level of antibiotic resistance in the population and the behavior of other doctors, although they would achieve better long-term outcomes if their prescribing were more restrained. Ever-increasing antibiotic resistance may therefore be inevitable unless some means are found of modifying the payoffs of this potentially catastrophic social dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many work and decision situations, realizing cooperation among individuals is important. However, decision making environments of individuals are far from stable, resulting in changes in task complexity and the social settings they encounter. We argue that past experiences with cooperative behavior can result in different cooperative norms and expectations about the behavior of others and will have an effect on an individual’s subsequent behavior in new situations. This study experimentally investigates these dynamics of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas and addresses the role of communication to provide empirical evidence about a cognitive mechanism that may lead to these spillovers. Specifically, the experimental design randomly assigns subjects to one type of repetitive interactions in the first social dilemma (single partner or different partners) and we then examine how this impacts the propensity to behave cooperatively in subsequent social dilemmas with unfamiliar partners (either single or different). Because of the variety in complexity of decision-making environments in practice, we do so by examining behavioral spillovers across three different social dilemmas that vary in difficulty to make cooperation successful. Our findings show that individuals cooperate more during initial interactions with a single partner. More importantly, this has positive spillover effects for subsequent behavior and communication, even to settings without repeated interactions with a single partner. However, environmental conditions affect the ability to transfer established norms of cooperation to subsequent interactions, as an initially learned cooperative norm is gradually replaced by a more competitive attitude when individuals start to interact with unfamiliar others in a setting in which cooperative success is more difficult to achieve. Our findings illustrate the power of repeated interactions for establishing and sustaining cooperation in other settings and enhance understanding of how cooperative decisions can be shaped by both incentives and the broader behavioral context of individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Collective action of resource users is essential for sustainability. Yet, often user groups are socioculturally heterogeneous, which requires cooperation to be established across salient group boundaries. We explore the effect of this type of heterogeneity on resource extraction in lab-in-the-field Common Pool Resource (CPR) experiments in Zanzibar, Tanzania. We create heterogeneous groups by mixing fishers from two neighbouring fishing villages which have distinct social identities, a history of conflict and diverging resource use practices and institutions. Additionally, we analyse between-village differences in extraction behaviour in the heterogeneous setting to assess if out-group cooperation in a CPR dilemma is associated with a community’s institutional scope in the economic realm (e.g., degree of market integration). We find no aggregate effect of heterogeneity on extraction. However, this is because fishers from the two villages behave differently in the heterogeneity treatment. We find support for the hypothesis that cooperation under sociocultural heterogeneity is higher for fishers from the village with larger institutional scope. In line with this explanation, cooperation under heterogeneity also correlates with a survey measure of individual fishers’ radius of trust. We discuss implications for resource governance and collective action research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cooperation is one of the most studied paradigms for the understanding of social interactions. Reciprocal altruism -a special type of cooperation that is taught by means of the iterated prisoner dilemma game (iPD)- has been shown to emerge in different species with different success rates. When playing iPD against a reciprocal opponent, the larger theoretical long-term reward is delivered when both players cooperate mutually. In this work, we trained rats in iPD against an opponent playing a Tit for Tat strategy, using a payoff matrix with positive and negative reinforcements, that is food and timeout respectively. We showed for the first time, that experimental rats were able to learn reciprocal altruism with a high average cooperation rate, where the most probable state was mutual cooperation (85%). Although when subjects defected, the most probable behavior was to go back to mutual cooperation. When we modified the matrix by increasing temptation rewards (T) or by increasing cooperation rewards (R), the cooperation rate decreased. In conclusion, we observe that an iPD matrix with large positive reward improves less cooperation than one with small rewards, shown that satisfying the relationship among iPD reinforcement was not enough to achieve high mutual cooperation behavior. Therefore, using positive and negative reinforcements and an appropriate contrast between rewards, rats have cognitive capacity to learn reciprocal altruism. This finding allows to infer that the learning of reciprocal altruism has early appeared in evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a proof of principle for the phenomenon of the tragedy of the commons that is at the center of many theories on the evolution of cooperation. Whereas the tragedy is commonly set in a game theoretical context, and attributed to an underlying Prisoner’s Dilemma, we take an alternative approach based on basic mechanistic principles of species growth that does not rely on the specification of payoffs which may be difficult to determine in practice. We establish the tragedy in the context of a general chemostat model with two species, the cooperator and the cheater. Both species have the same growth rate function and yield constant, but the cooperator allocates a portion of the nutrient uptake towards the production of a public good -the “Commons” in the Tragedy- which is needed to digest the externally supplied nutrient. The cheater on the other hand does not produce this enzyme, and allocates all nutrient uptake towards its own growth. We prove that when the cheater is present initially, both the cooperator and the cheater will eventually go extinct, hereby confirming the occurrence of the tragedy. We also show that without the cheater, the cooperator can survive indefinitely, provided that at least a low level of public good or processed nutrient is available initially. Our results provide a predictive framework for the analysis of cooperator-cheater dynamics in a powerful model system of experimental evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present tournament results and several powerful strategies for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma created using reinforcement learning techniques (evolutionary and particle swarm algorithms). These strategies are trained to perform well against a corpus of over 170 distinct opponents, including many well-known and classic strategies. All the trained strategies win standard tournaments against the total collection of other opponents. The trained strategies and one particular human made designed strategy are the top performers in noisy tournaments also. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evolutionary game theory predicts that cooperation in social dilemma games is promoted when agents are connected as a network. However, when networks are fixed over time, humans do not necessarily show enhanced mutual cooperation. Here we show that reinforcement learning (specifically, the so-called Bush-Mosteller model) approximately explains the experimentally observed network reciprocity and the lack thereof in a parameter region spanned by the benefit-to-cost ratio and the node’s degree. Thus, we significantly extend previously obtained numerical results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most theories of social exchange distinguish between two different types of cooperation, depending on whether or not cooperation occurs conditional upon the partner’s previous behaviors. Here, we used a multinomial processing tree model to distinguish between positive and negative reciprocity and cooperation bias in a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In Experiments 1 and 2, the facial expressions of the partners were varied to manipulate cooperation bias. In Experiment 3, an extinction instruction was used to manipulate reciprocity. The results confirm that people show a stronger cooperation bias when interacting with smiling compared to angry-looking partners, supporting the notion that a smiling facial expression in comparison to an angry facial expression helps to construe a situation as cooperative rather than competitive. Reciprocity was enhanced for appearance-incongruent behaviors, but only when participants were encouraged to form expectations about the partners’ future behaviors. Negative reciprocity was not stronger than positive reciprocity, regardless of whether expectations were manipulated or not. Experiment 3 suggests that people are able to ignore previous episodes of cheating as well as previous episodes of cooperation if these turn out to be irrelevant for predicting a partner’s future behavior. The results provide important insights into the mechanisms of social cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely acknowledged that data sharing has great potential for scientific progress. However, so far making data available has little impact on a researcher’s reputation. Thus, data sharing can be conceptualized as a social dilemma. In the presented study we investigated the influence of the researcher's personality within the social dilemma of data sharing. The theoretical background was the appropriateness framework. We conducted a survey among 1564 researchers about data sharing, which also included standardized questions on selected personality factors, namely the so-called Big Five, Machiavellianism and social desirability. Using regression analysis, we investigated how these personality domains relate to four groups of dependent variables: attitudes towards data sharing, the importance of factors that might foster or hinder data sharing, the willingness to share data, and actual data sharing. Our analyses showed the predictive value of personality for all four groups of dependent variables. However, there was not a global consistent pattern of influence, but rather different compositions of effects. Our results indicate that the implications of data sharing are dependent on age, gender, and personality. In order to foster data sharing, it seems advantageous to provide more personal incentives and to address the researchers’ individual responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this work, we study an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) on Barabási–Albert scale-free networks with limited player interactions, and explore the effect of interaction style and degree on cooperation. The results show that high-degree preference interaction, namely the most applicable interaction in the real world, is less beneficial for emergence of cooperation on scale-free networks than random interaction. Besides, cooperation on scale-free networks is enhanced with the increase of interaction degree regardless whether the interaction is high-degree preference or random. If the interaction degree is very low, the cooperation level on scale-free networks is much lower than that on regular ring networks, which is against the common belief that scale-free networks must be more beneficial for cooperation. Our analysis indicates that the interaction relations, the strategy and the game payoff of high-connectivity players play important roles in the evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks. A certain number of interactions are necessary for scale-free networks to exhibit strong capability of facilitating cooperation. Our work provides important insight for members on how to interact with others in a social organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Direct reciprocity is a major mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Several classical studies have suggested that humans should quickly learn to adopt reciprocal strategies to establish mutual cooperation in repeated interactions. On the other hand, the recently discovered theory of ZD strategies has found that subjects who use extortionate strategies are able to exploit and subdue cooperators. Although such extortioners have been predicted to succeed in any population of adaptive opponents, theoretical follow-up studies questioned whether extortion can evolve in reality. However, most of these studies presumed that individuals have similar strategic possibilities and comparable outside options, whereas asymmetries are ubiquitous in real world applications. Here we show with a model and an economic experiment that extortionate strategies readily emerge once subjects differ in their strategic power. Our experiment combines a repeated social dilemma with asymmetric partner choice. In our main treatment there is one randomly chosen group member who is unilaterally allowed to exchange one of the other group members after every ten rounds of the social dilemma. We find that this asymmetric replacement opportunity generally promotes cooperation, but often the resulting payoff distribution reflects the underlying power structure. Almost half of the subjects in a better strategic position turn into extortioners, who quickly proceed to exploit their peers. By adapting their cooperation probabilities consistent with ZD theory, extortioners force their co-players to cooperate without being similarly cooperative themselves. Comparison to non-extortionate players under the same conditions indicates a substantial net gain to extortion. Our results thus highlight how power asymmetries can endanger mutually beneficial interactions, and transform them into exploitative relationships. In particular, our results indicate that the extortionate strategies predicted from ZD theory could play a more prominent role in our daily interactions than previously thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the popularity of the notion that social cohesion in the form of dense social networks promotes cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemmas through reputation, very little experimental evidence for this claim exists. We address this issue by testing hypotheses from one of the few rigorous game-theoretic models on this topic, the Raub & Weesie model, in two incentivized lab experiments. In the experiments, 156 subjects played repeated two-person PDs in groups of six. In the “atomized interactions” condition, subjects were only informed about the outcomes of their own interactions, while in the “embedded” condition, subjects were informed about the outcomes of all interactions in their group, allowing for reputation effects. The design of the experiments followed the specification of the RW model as closely as possible. For those aspects of the model that had to be modified to allow practical implementation in an experiment, we present additional analyses that show that these modifications do not affect the predictions. Contrary to expectations, we do not find that cooperation is higher in the embedded condition than in the atomized interaction. Instead, our results are consistent with an interpretation of the RW model that includes random noise, or with learning models of cooperation in networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Dealing with insistent patient demand for antibiotics is an all too common part of a General Practitioner’s daily routine. This study explores the extent to which portable Immersive Virtual Reality technology can help us gain an accurate understanding of the factors that influence a doctor’s response to the ethical challenge underlying such tenacious requests for antibiotics (given the threat posed by growing anti-bacterial resistance worldwide). It also considers the potential of such technology to train doctors to face such dilemmas. Experiment: Twelve experienced GPs and nine trainees were confronted with an increasingly angry demand by a woman to prescribe antibiotics to her mother in the face of inconclusive evidence that such antibiotic prescription is necessary. The daughter and mother were virtual characters displayed in immersive virtual reality. The specific purposes of the study were twofold: first, whether experienced GPs would be more resistant to patient demands than the trainees, and second, to investigate whether medical doctors would take the virtual situation seriously. Results: Eight out of the 9 trainees prescribed the antibiotics, whereas 7 out of the 12 GPs did so. On the basis of a Bayesian analysis, these results yield reasonable statistical evidence in favor of the notion that experienced GPs are more likely to withstand the pressure to prescribe antibiotics than trainee doctors, thus answering our first question positively. As for the second question, a post experience questionnaire assessing the participants’ level of presence (together with participants’ feedback and body language) suggested that overall participants did tend towards the illusion of being in the consultation room depicted in the virtual reality and that the virtual consultation taking place was really happening. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nature shows as human beings live and grow inside social structures. This assumption allows us to explain and explore how it may shape most of our behaviours and choices, and why we are not just blindly driven by instincts: our decisions are based on more complex cognitive reasons, based on our connectedness on different spaces. Thus, human cooperation emerges from this complex nature of social network. Our paper, focusing on the evolutionary dynamics, is intended to explore how and why it happens, and what kind of impact is caused by homophily among people. We investigate the evolution of human cooperation using evolutionary game theory on multiplex. Multiplexity, as an extra dimension of analysis, allows us to unveil the hidden dynamics and observe non-trivial patterns within a population across network layers. More importantly, we find a striking role of homophily, as the higher the homophily between individuals, the quicker is the convergence towards cooperation in the social dilemma. The simulation results, conducted both macroscopically and microscopically across the network layers in the multiplex, show quantitatively the role of homophily in human cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People often deviate from their individual Nash equilibrium strategy in game experiments based on the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game and the public goods game (PGG), whereas conditional cooperation, or conformity, is supported by the data from these experiments. In a complicated environment with no obvious “dominant” strategy, conformists who choose the average strategy of the other players in their group could be able to avoid risk by guaranteeing their income will be close to the group average. In this paper, we study the repeated PD game and the repeated m-person PGG, where individuals’ strategies are restricted to the set of conforming strategies. We define a conforming strategy by two parameters, initial action in the game and the influence of the other players’ choices in the previous round. We are particularly interested in the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, which is the well-known conforming strategy in theoretical and empirical studies. In both the PD game and the PGG, TFT can prevent the invasion of non-cooperative strategy if the expected number of rounds exceeds a critical value. The stability analysis of adaptive dynamics shows that conformity in general promotes the evolution of cooperation, and that a regime of cooperation can be established in an AllD population through TFT-like strategies. These results provide insight into the emergence of cooperation in social dilemma games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many situations red is associated with hazard and danger. As a consequence, it was expected that task-irrelevant color cues in online environments would affect risk-taking behaviors. This assumption was tested in two web-based experiments. The first study (N = 383) demonstrated that in risky choice dilemmas respondents preferred the less risky option when the displayed university logo was in red (versus gray); but only when both choice alternatives were at least moderately risky. The second study (N = 144) replicated these results with a behavioral outcome: Respondents showed more cautious behavior in a web-based game when the focal stimuli were colored red (versus blue). Together, these findings demonstrate that variations in the color design of a computerized environment affect risk taking: Red color leads to more conservative choices and behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a world in which many pressing global issues require large scale cooperation, understanding the group size effect on cooperative behavior is a topic of central importance. Yet, the nature of this effect remains largely unknown, with lab experiments insisting that it is either positive or negative or null, and field experiments suggesting that it is instead curvilinear. Here we shed light on this apparent contradiction by considering a novel class of public goods games inspired to the realistic scenario in which the natural output limits of the public good imply that the benefit of cooperation increases fast for early contributions and then decelerates. We report on a large lab experiment providing evidence that, in this case, group size has a curvilinear effect on cooperation, according to which intermediate-size groups cooperate more than smaller groups and more than larger groups. In doing so, our findings help fill the gap between lab experiments and field experiments and suggest concrete ways to promote large scale cooperation among people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated whether and why the use of a foreign language influences moral judgment. We studied the trolley and footbridge dilemmas, which propose an action that involves killing one individual to save five. In line with prior work, the use of a foreign language increased the endorsement of such consequentialist actions for the footbridge dilemma, but not for the trolley dilemma. But contrary to recent theorizing, this effect was not driven by an attenuation of emotions. An attenuation of emotions was found in both dilemmas, and it did not mediate the foreign language effect on moral judgment. An examination of additional scenarios revealed that foreign language influenced moral judgment when the proposed action involved a social or moral norm violation. We propose that foreign language influences moral judgment by reducing access to normative knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been a long-lasting pursuit to promote cooperation, and this study aims to promote cooperation via the combination of social stratification and the spatial prisoners’ dilemma game. It is previously assumed that agents share the identical payoff matrix, but the stratification or diversity exists and exerts influences in real societies. Thus, two additional classes, elites and scoundrels, derive from and coexist with the existing class, commons. Three classes have different payoff matrices. We construct a model where agents play the prisoners’ dilemma game with neighbors. It indicates that stratification and temptation jointly influence cooperation. Temptation permanently reduces cooperation; elites play a positive role in promoting cooperation while scoundrels undermine it. As the temptation getting larger and larger, elites play a more and more positive and critical role while scoundrels’ negative effect becomes weaker and weaker, and it is more obvious when temptation goes beyond its threshold. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]