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Academic journals provide a key quality-control mechanism in science. Yet, information asymmetries and conflicts of interests incentivize scientists to deceive journals about the quality of their research. How can honesty be ensured, despite incentives for deception? Here, we address this question by applying the theory of honest signaling to the publication process. Our models demonstrate that several mechanisms can ensure honest journal submission, including differential benefits, differential costs, and costs to resubmitting rejected papers. Without submission costs, scientists benefit from submitting all papers to high-ranking journals, unless papers can only be submitted a limited number of times. Counterintuitively, our analysis implies that inefficiencies in academic publishing (e.g., arbitrary formatting requirements, long review times) can serve a function by disincentivizing scientists from submitting low-quality work to high-ranking journals. Our models provide simple, powerful tools for understanding how to promote honest paper submission in academic publishing.

This study investigates PhD candidates’ (N = 391) perceptions about their research environment at a Dutch university in terms of the research climate, (un)ethical supervisory practices, and questionable research practices. We assessed whether their perceptions are related to career considerations. We gathered quantitative self-report estimations of the perceptions of PhD candidates using an online survey tool and then conducted descriptive and within-subject correlation analysis of the results. While most PhD candidates experience fair evaluation processes, openness, integrity, trust, and freedom in their research climate, many report lack of time and support, insufficient supervision, and witness questionable research practices. Results based on Spearman correlations indicate that those who experience a less healthy research environment (including experiences with unethical supervision, questionable practices, and barriers to responsible research), more often consider leaving academia and their current PhD position.

Recent work suggests that people evaluate target stimuli within short and flexible time periods called evaluation windows. Stimuli that briefly precede a target (forward primes) or briefly succeed a target (backward primes) are often included in the target's evaluation. In this article, the authors propose that predictable forward primes act as "go" signals that prepare target processing, such that earlier forward primes pull the evaluation windows forward in time. Earlier forward primes may thus reduce the impact of backward primes. This shifting evaluation windows hypothesis was tested in two experiments using an evaluative decision task with predictable (vs. unpredictable) forward and backward primes. As expected, a longer time interval between a predictable forward prime and a target eliminated backward priming. In contrast, the time interval between an unpredictable forward primes and a target had no effects on backward priming. These findings suggest that predictable features of dynamic stimuli can shape target extraction by determining which information is included (or excluded) in rapid evaluation processes.