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This study examines the influence of the reduction in value-added tax (VAT) rates in China during 2018 and 2019 on corporate financialization. By employing a difference-in-differences model and utilizing data from Chinese A-share listed companies between 2017 and 2020, we assess the effects of tax reduction policies. Moreover, it achieves this outcome through three main pathways: alleviating financing constraints, boosting fixed asset investment, and weakening corporate financial arbitrage motives. Further analysis demonstrates that the inhibitory effect of VAT rate reduction on corporate financialization is more pronounced for non-manufacturing companies, businesses reliant on the basic tax rate as their primary revenue source, companies with low intermediate input rates, and those with a strong ability to shift the tax burden. Additionally, debt financing costs play a crucial role in moderating the relationship between tax reduction policies and corporate financialization. The conclusions drawn from this study provide valuable empirical evidence that can contribute to the refinement of VAT reduction policies and the prevention and resolution of financialization at the micro-level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taxes on unhealthy foods and sweetened beverages, as well as subsidies to healthy foods, have become increasingly popular strategies to curb obesity and related non-communicable diseases. The existing evidence on the welfare effects of such fiscal policies is mixed and almost uniquely focused on tax schemes. Using the 2016-2017 Chilean Household Budget Survey, we estimate a censored Exact Affine Stone Index (EASI) incomplete demand system and simulate changes in purchases, tax incidence, and consumer welfare of three different policy scenarios: (1) a 5 percentage point additional tax on sweetened beverages (currently taxed at 18%) and a new 18% tax on sweets and snacks, (2) a healthy subsidy by zero-rating fruits and vegetables from the current 19% value-added tax, and (3) a combined (tax plus subsidy) policy. Under full pass-through of these policies, the combined scheme captures the incentives to switch purchases from both single-policy alternatives, resulting in a net welfare gain and subsidy transfer for the average Chilean household. In terms of welfare, low-income households strictly benefit from a combined policy, while high-income households experience a small consumer welfare loss, resulting in re-distributional effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]