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In this paper, we explore the evolution of vaccination behavior in the SIR model. Among the participated individuals, a proportion of ρ individuals choose conformist-driven updating mechanism to update their strategies, while the rest of 1 − ρ individuals update strategies with payoff-driven updating mechanism. Our results show that conformists have rare effect on vaccination if the cost is pretty small except the moderate proportion of conformists, where conformists on the boundary play a leading role on epidemic prevention. While for medium values of cost, an excess of conformists conduces to infectious diseases diffusion. • Payoff-driven and conformist-driven individuals coexist in the population. • Cost of vaccination induces different effect of conformist determined. • A moderate proportion of conformist can improve vaccination level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Information exchange has a significant influence on human behaviour decision-making. To explore the impact of the information exchange mechanism on the evolution of cooperative behaviour on the complex networks, we establish two-layer interdependent networks. Individuals have a certain probability of having information exchange with individuals on another network. In detail, when individuals residing on different networks are connected by links, the update of strategies not only depends on their own payoffs, but also depends on the strategy selections of the corresponding nodes and neighbours on the other network. Numerous simulations reveal that high cooperation level can be achieved for a large coupling probability and intermediate heterogeneity. Counter-intuitively, cooperation is not always promoted by the expansion of information sources. Our study thus enhances the understanding of the evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks. • We explore the effect of information exchange for the evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks. • Information exchange is a double-edged sword for cooperation. • Large coupling density warrants strongest location synchronization effect for cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]