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Deepfakes raise various concerns: risks of political destabilization, depictions of persons without consent and causing them harms, erosion of trust in video and audio as reliable sources of evidence, and more. These concerns have been the focus of recent work in the philosophical literature on deepfakes. However, there has been almost no sustained philosophical analysis of deepfakes from the perspective of concerns about honesty and dishonesty. That deepfakes are potentially deceptive is unsurprising and has been noted. But under what conditions does the use of deepfakes fail to be honest? And which human agents, involved in one way or another in a deepfake, fail to be honest, and in what ways? If we are to understand better the morality of deepfakes, these questions need answering. Our first goal in this paper, therefore, is to offer an analysis of paradigmatic cases of deepfakes in light of the philosophy of honesty. While it is clear that many deepfakes are morally problematic, there has been a rising counter-chorus claiming that deepfakes are not essentially morally bad, since there might be uses of deepfakes that are not morally wrong, or even that are morally salutary, for instance, in education, entertainment, activism, and other areas. However, while there are reasons to think that deepfakes can supply or support moral goods, it is nevertheless possible that even these uses of deepfakes are dishonest. Our second goal in this paper, therefore, is to apply our analysis of deepfakes and honesty to the sorts of deepfakes hoped to be morally good or at least neutral. We conclude that, perhaps surprisingly, in many of these cases the use of deepfakes will be dishonest in some respects. Of course, there will be cases of deepfakes for which verdicts about honesty and moral permissibility do not line up. While we will sometimes suggest reasons why moral permissibility verdicts might diverge from honesty verdicts, we will not aim to settle matters of moral permissibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A series of recent papers raises worries about the manipulative potential of algorithmic transparency (to wit, making visible the factors that influence an algorithm’s output). But while the concern is apt and relevant, it is based on a fraught understanding of manipulation. Therefore, this paper draws attention to the ‘indifference view’ of manipulation, which explains better than the ‘vulnerability view’ why algorithmic transparency has manipulative potential. The paper also raises pertinent research questions for future studies of manipulation in the context of algorithmic transparency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores artificial intelligence (AI) ethics from an Islamic perspective at a critical time for AI ethical norm-setting. It advocates for a pluralist approach to ethical AI benchmarking. As rapid advancements in AI technologies pose challenges surrounding autonomy, privacy, fairness, and transparency, the prevailing ethical discourse has been predominantly Western or Eurocentric. To address this imbalance, this paper delves into the Islamic ethical traditions to develop a framework that contributes to the global debate on optimal norm setting for designing and using AI technologies. The paper outlines Islamic parameters for ethical values and moral actions in the context of AI's ethical uncertainties. It emphasizes the significance of both textual and non-textual Islamic sources in addressing these uncertainties while placing a strong emphasis on the notion of "good" or "maṣlaḥa" as a normative guide for AI's ethical evaluation. Defining maṣlaḥa as an ethical state of affairs in harmony with divine will, the paper highlights the coexistence of two interpretations of maṣlaḥa: welfarist/utility-based and duty-based. Islamic jurisprudence allows for arguments supporting ethical choices that prioritize building the technical infrastructure for AI to maximize utility. Conversely, it also supports choices that reject consequential utility calculations as the sole measure of value in determining ethical responses to AI advancements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about the opposite of judgement and calculation. This opposition has been a traditional anchor of critiques concerned with the rise of AI decision making over human judgement. Contrary to these approaches, it is argued that human judgement is not and cannot be replaced by calculation, but that it is human judgement that contextualises computational structures and gives them meaning and purpose. The article focuses on the epistemic structure of algorithms and artificial neural networks to find that they always depend on human judgement to be related to real life objects or purposes. By introducing the philosophical concept of judgement, it becomes clear that the property of judgement to provide meaning and purposiveness is based on the temporality of human life and the ambiguity of language, which quantitative processes lack. A juxtaposition shows that calculations and clustering can be used and referred to in more or less prejudiced and reflecting as well as opaque and transparent ways, but thereby always depend on human judgement. The paper clearly asserts that the transparency of AI is necessary for their autonomous use. This transparency requires the explicitness of the judgements that constitute these computational structures, thereby creating an awareness of the conditionality of such epistemic entities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent developments in AI and robotics enable people to create personalised digital duplicates – these are artificial, at least partial, recreations or simulations of real people. The advent of such duplicates enables people to overcome their individual scarcity. But this comes at a cost. There is a common view among ethicists and value theorists suggesting that individual scarcity contributes to or heightens the value of a life or parts of a life. In this paper, we address this topic. We make five main points. First, that there is a plausible prima facie case for the scarcity threat: AI may undermine the value of an individual human life by making us less scarce. Second, notwithstanding this prima facie threat, the role of scarcity in individual value is disputable and always exists in tension with the contrasting view that scarcity is a tragedy that limits our value. Third, there are two distinct forms of scarcity – instrumental and intrinsic – and they contribute to value in different ways. Fourth, digital duplication technology may undermine instrumental scarcity, to at least some extent, but the axiological consequences of this are highly variable. Fifth, digital duplication technology does not affect intrinsic scarcity, and may actually heighten it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that individual propositional knowledge, as traditionally analyzed in terms of true-justified-ungettiered belief, does not require phenomenal experience. Accordingly, those who are satisfied with the traditional conception need to come to terms with the possibility that AI and other zombies that lack phenomenal experience possess knowledge. Alternatively, those who resist attributing knowledge to AI based on the assumption that knowledge requires phenomenal experience need to modify or replace the traditional conception of knowledge to incorporate this requirement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to virtue epistemology, the main aim of education is the development of the cognitive character of students (Pritchard, 2014, 2016). Given the proliferation of technological tools such as ChatGPT and other LLMs for solving cognitive tasks, how should educational practices incorporate the use of such tools without undermining the cognitive character of students? Pritchard (2014, 2016) argues that it is possible to properly solve this ‘technology-education tension’ (TET) by combining the virtue epistemology framework with the theory of extended cognition (EXT) (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). He argues that EXT enables us to consider tools as constitutive parts of the students’ cognitive system, thus preserving their cognitive character from technologically induced cognitive diminishment. The first aim of this paper is to show that this solution is not sufficient to solve the TET. Second, I aim to offer a complementary and more encompassing framework of tool-use to address the TET. Then, I apply it to the educational uses of ChatGPT as the most notable example of LLM, although my arguments can be extended to other generative AI systems. To do so, in Sect. 1.1, I present Pritchard’s framework of cognitive character and virtue epistemology applied in education, to which I am committed in this treatment. In Sects. 2 and 3, I respectively illustrate Pritchard’s (2014) solution to the TET, and I highlight the general limitations of his proposal. Thus, in Sect. 4.1 I characterize ChatGPT as a computational cognitive artifact using Fasoli’s (Fasoli, 2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts. In Sect. 4.2, I introduce my proposal, which combines Pritchard’s account of virtue epistemology with Fasoli’s (2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts to address the TET. Finally, in Sect. 5.1, I present some epistemically virtuous uses of ChatGPT in educational contexts. To conclude, I argue in favor of a multidisciplinary approach for analyzing educational activities involving AI technologies such as ChatGPT. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Singularitarianism is a view that is grounded in certain claims about the technological singularity. In this paper, I identify a trilemma that confronts singularitarianism. This trilemma may be characterized in terms of the following horns: the concept of a technological singularity having a literal sense, the concept of a technological singularity having a metaphorical sense, and the concept of a technological singularity having neither a literal nor a metaphorical sense (i.e., its being nonsensical). I will outline the unpalatable consequences that are associated with each of these three horns of the trilemma. I will also anticipate a few argumentative moves on behalf of singularitarianism and suggest why these moves may be insufficient. I will conclude by arguing that we have good philosophical grounds to defend an eliminativism about the concept of the technological singularity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Danaher and Nyholm (Philosophy & Technology 37:106, 2024) explore whether avatar technology makes humans less valuable by making them less scarce. They identify two forms of human scarcity, intrinstic scarcity and instrumental scarcity, and explore how each is impacted by avatar representation. Here I argue that avatars cannot make humans less scarce but that, nevertheless, the use of avatar technology can undermine the value of human uniqueness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a concern that the widespread deployment of autonomous machines will open up a number of ‘responsibility gaps’ throughout society. Various articulations of such techno-responsibility gaps have been proposed over the years, along with several potential solutions. Most of these solutions focus on ‘plugging’ or ‘dissolving’ the gaps. This paper offers an alternative perspective. It argues that techno-responsibility gaps are, sometimes, to be welcomed and that one of the advantages of autonomous machines is that they enable us to embrace certain kinds of responsibility gap. The argument is based on the idea that human morality is often tragic. We frequently confront situations in which competing moral considerations pull in different directions and it is impossible to perfectly balance these considerations. This heightens the burden of responsibility associated with our choices. We cope with the tragedy of moral choice in different ways. Sometimes we delude ourselves into thinking the choices we make were not tragic (illusionism); sometimes we delegate the tragic choice to others (delegation); sometimes we make the choice ourselves and bear the psychological consequences (responsibilisation). Each of these strategies has its benefits and costs. One potential advantage of autonomous machines is that they enable a reduced cost form of delegation. However, we only gain the advantage of this reduced cost if we accept that some techno-responsibility gaps are virtuous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Luciano Floridi was not the first to discuss the idea of group privacy, but he was perhaps the first to discuss it in relation to the insights derived from big data analytics. He has argued that it is important to investigate the possibility that groups have rights to privacy that are not reducible to the privacy of individuals forming such groups. In this paper, we introduce a distinction between two concepts of group privacy. The first, the "what happens in Vegas stays in Vegas" privacy (in the following: WHVSV privacy), deals with confidential information shared with the member of a group and inaccessible to (all or a specific group of) outsiders. The second, to which we shall refer as inferential privacy, deals with the inferences that can be made about a group of people defined by a feature, or combination thereof, shared by all individuals in the group. We show why we unreservedly agree with Floridi that groups can have a form of privacy that amounts to more than the mere fact of being sets of individuals each of whom has individual privacy; moreover, like Floridi, we find it plausible that at least some groups (those satisfying our definition of type-a groups) may have a right to a species of group privacy (that is, WHVSV privacy) as groups (and not just as individuals who belong to those groups). However, by turning our attention to the context of big data analytics, we show that the relevant, new notion of group privacy is one of inferential privacy. We argue that an absolute right (either of individuals or groups) to inferential privacy is implausible. We also show that many groups generated algorithmically (those satisfying our definition of type-b groups) cannot be right holders as groups (unless they become type-a groups). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Risks connected with AI systems have become a recurrent topic in public and academic debates, and the European proposal for the AI Act explicitly adopts a risk-based tiered approach that associates different levels of regulation with different levels of risk. However, a comprehensive and general framework to think about AI-related risk is still lacking. In this work, we aim to provide an epistemological analysis of such risk building upon the existing literature on disaster risk analysis and reduction. We show how a multi-component analysis of risk, that distinguishes between the dimensions of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability, allows us to better understand the sources of AI-related risks and effectively intervene to mitigate them. This multi-component analysis also turns out to be particularly useful in the case of general-purpose and experimental AI systems, for which it is often hard to perform both ex-ante and ex-post risk analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Franke, in Philosophy & Technology, 37(1), 1–6, (2024), connects the recent debate about manipulative algorithmic transparency with the concerns about problematic pursuits of positive liberty. I argue that the indifference view of manipulative transparency is not aligned with positive liberty, contrary to Franke’s claim, and even if it is, it is not aligned with the risk that many have attributed to pursuits of positive liberty. Moreover, I suggest that Franke’s worry may generalise beyond the manipulative transparency debate to AI ethics in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Should we be worried that the concept of trust is increasingly used when we assess non-human agents and artefacts, say robots and AI systems? Whilst some authors have developed explanations of the concept of trust with a view to accounting for trust in AI systems and other non-agents, others have rejected the idea that we should extend trust in this way. The article advances this debate by bringing insights from conceptual engineering to bear on this issue. After setting up a target concept of trust in terms of four functional desiderata (trust-reliance distinction, explanatory strength, tracking affective responses, and accounting for distrust), I analyze how agential vs. non-agential accounts can satisfy these. A final section investigates how ‘non-ideal’ circumstances—that is, circumstances where the manifest and operative concept use diverge amongst concept users—affect our choice about which rendering of trust is to be preferred. I suggest that some prominent arguments against extending the language of trust to non-agents are not decisive and reflect on an important oversight in the current debate, namely a failure to address how narrower, agent-centred accounts curtail our ability to distrust non-agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As highly intelligent autonomous robots are gradually introduced into the home and workplace, ensuring public safety becomes extremely important. Given that such machines will learn from interactions with their environment, standard safety engineering methodologies may not be applicable. Instead, we need to ensure that the machines themselves know right from wrong; we need moral mechanisms. Morality, however, has traditionally been considered a defining characteristic, indeed the sole realm of human beings; that which separates us from animals. But if only humans can be moral, can we build safe robots? If computationalism-roughly the thesis that cognition, including human cognition, is fundamentally computational-is correct, then morality cannot be restricted to human beings (since equivalent cognitive systems can be implemented in any medium). On the other hand, perhaps there is something special about our biological makeup that gives rise to morality, and so computationalism is effectively falsified. This paper examines these issues by looking at the nature of morals and the influence of biology. It concludes that moral behaviour is concerned solely with social well-being, independent of the nature of the individual agents that comprise the group. While our biological makeup is the root of our concept of morals and clearly affects human moral reasoning, there is no basis for believing that it will restrict the development of artificial moral agents. The consequences of such sophisticated artificial mechanisms living alongside natural human ones are also explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a commentary on ChatGPT and LLMs (Large Language Models) in general. It argues that this technology has matured to the point where calling systems such as ChatGPT “stochastic parrots” is no longer warranted. But it also argues that these systems continue to have serious limitations when it comes to reasoning. These limitations are much more severe than commonly thought. A large array of examples are given to support these claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethics plays a key role in the normative analysis of the impacts of technology. We know that computers in general and the processing of data, the use of artificial intelligence, and the combination of computers and/or artificial intelligence with robotics are all associated with ethically relevant implications for individuals, groups, and society. In this article, we argue that while all technologies are ethically relevant, there is no need to create a separate ‘ethics of X’ or ‘X ethics’ for each and every subtype of technology or technological property—e.g. computer ethics, AI ethics, data ethics, information ethics, robot ethics, and machine ethics. Specific technologies might have specific impacts, but we argue that they are often sufficiently covered and understood through already established higher-level domains of ethics. Furthermore, the proliferation of tech ethics is problematic because (a) the conceptual boundaries between the subfields are not well-defined, (b) it leads to a duplication of effort and constant reinventing the wheel, and (c) there is danger that participants overlook or ignore more fundamental ethical insights and truths. The key to avoiding such outcomes lies in a taking the discipline of ethics seriously, and we consequently begin with a brief description of what ethics is, before presenting the main forms of technology related ethics. Through this process, we develop a hierarchy of technology ethics, which can be used by developers and engineers, researchers, or regulators who seek an understanding of the ethical implications of technology. We close by deducing two principles for positioning ethical analysis which will, in combination with the hierarchy, promote the leveraging of existing knowledge and help us to avoid an exaggerated proliferation of tech ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We provide an underlying theory of argument by disanalogy, in order to employ it to show that cyberwarfare is fundamentally new (relative to traditional kinetic warfare, and espionage). Once this general case is made, the battle is won: we are well on our way to establishing our main thesis: that Just War Theory itself must be modernized. Augustine and Aquinas (and their predecessors) had a stunningly long run, but today's world, based as it is on digital information and increasingly intelligent information-processing, points the way to a beast so big and so radically different, that the core of this duo's insights needs to be radically extended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a death by suicide in the world every 40 seconds, and suicide is the second leading cause of death for 15-29-year-olds. Experts say that one of the best ways to prevent suicide is for those in distress to hear from people who care about them. Facebook is in a unique position—through its support for networks and friendships on the site—to help connect a person in these difficult situations with people who can support them. Connecting people with the resources they need is part of Facebook's ongoing efforts to help build a safe community inside and outside of Facebook. This article provides a brief overview of how Facebook's work to develop suicide prevention tools started and evolved, and the ethical considerations which surfaced during the process in the form of concrete product decisions around the implementation of these tools. This article is structured into three sections. Section 1 reviews what has been done in this space and lists and briefly describes other suicide prevention apps and tools. Section 2 describes Facebook's overall approach to suicide prevention. Here, we'll delve first into how that approach originated and how it was influenced by the external community's proactive interactions with Facebook, highlighting our unique position to help address the problem. Afterwards, we'll explain how that approach evolved, describing its various stages and iterations: understanding, reactive reporting, queue prioritization, and proactive reporting. This section describes the tools and resources Facebook has developed for people who may be at risk. Particular attention is devoted to the use of ArtificiaI Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) to detect posts or live videos where someone might be expressing thoughts of suicide. Section 3 will elaborate on the ethical questions addressed when developing our approach and when making concrete product decisions to implement our suicide prevention tools. In this last section, we'll expound the competing values and interests that were at stake during the product development process, and how we reached ethical balances between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]