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The article discusses the theory of signs called teleosemantic which emphasizes conventional significance of linguistic forms that identify functions to convey meanings which introduced by Ruth Garrett Millikan, a well-known American philosopher. It was emphasized that mental representations could be understood in terms of natural meaning and purposes or functions. It was claimed that teleosemantic theory contains natural signs which use statistical regularities within local domains and conventional signs of language reproduced from perception. The author has explained that the puzzling varieties of meaning are due to the failure of defining the relationship between the sign and the thing signified.

The author reflects on the comments of Francois Recanati concerning further explanations about semantic project that identifies natural or intentional signs carrying natural or intentional information using conventional linguistics forms. She argues that sentences that are true for normal reasons have conveyed intentional and natural information. She also explains that existence of recurrent natural information involves a coincidence of sign with signified that recurs for a reason.

The author reflects on the perspective of Charles Taylor concerning the relationship between natural signs that signify without any intention or desire of the subject to communicate and intentional signs that signify signs designed in accordance with human or animal purposes. She assesses that intentional signs were interpreted based from predetermined semantic rules. She explains that natural signs are not conventional and voluntary without attribution to truth or falsehood.

The article discusses Ruth Garrett Millikan's views on intentional signs which are distinguished from locally recurrent natural signs with contents that are too disjunctive to satisfy the informational needs of sign-consuming creatures such as animals. It was informed that local natural signs contain information about every step along the channel connecting sign to signified while intentional signs have more sparse informational contents. The author has remarked that learning anything from such a signal would require organisms to have means of detecting the information bearing signal, the presence of a particular kind of information channel and the kind of semantic mapping function.

Focuses on the concept of intrinsic properties and natural relations. Assumption on the coherent concept of naturalness; Reliance on intuitive judgement; Involvement of negative existential derivative.

Focuses on the maximality and intrinsicality of border-sensitive properties. Dependence on the instantiation of an object; Absence of differentiating between pair of duplicates; Neutrality on the conception of naturalness.

Focuses on the definition of intrinsic in terms of modality and naturalness by Rae Langton and David Lewis. Application of independent accompaniment; Relation of intrinsic duplication; Problems of the definition.

Reports the disagreement on the disjunctive classification of property through judgements of relative naturalness. Implications of disjoining unrelated properties; Portrayal of weak intuition; Expression of bad disjunction.