Search

This article provides an overview of Anja Jauernig's book on Kant's critical idealism, specifically focusing on his ontological doctrine of two layers of reality. Jauernig argues that Kant believes our mind cannot actively generate the data necessary for representing appearances and instead relies on receiving sensations from things in themselves. The author highlights that empirical objects depend on our cognitive abilities and possess genuine empirical reality. Jauernig proposes two conditions for the existence of empirical objects: they must adhere to Kant's formal conditions of objecthood and be grounded in things in themselves. The article also raises concerns about the accessibility of empirical reality, suggesting that Kant's perspective may lead to skepticism. The text delves into Jauernig's argument regarding the existence and persistence of empirical objects in relation to transcendental reality, discussing the epistemic and ontological gaps between transcendental regularities and phenomenal regularities, as well as the reliability of inferring the existence of external objects based on internal mental states. The author also questions the concept of a "properly direct" grounding relationship and proposes that the formal conditions of experience may be the sole determinant of genuine experience and empirical reality. Overall, the article explores the skeptical concerns and limitations of Jauernig's argument. [Extracted from the article]

The author discusses several arguments that support the theory of constrastivism. He examines how such arguments were challenged in different ways through published criticisms of constrastivism and outlines its theoretical advantages. However, the author asserts that despite the theoretical benefits of the theory, there are compelling reasons that made it false.

The article focuses on the principles formulated by Dickie, Schroeder and Stalnaker about practical knowledge. It mentions on the objections formulated by Dickie that knowledge is propositional while he defends on the anti-intellectualism of skilled action. It adds that ascription of knowledge is also the result of shifting components and is usually if the highest importance.

The article presents the author's insights on the book "Know How," by Jason Stanley, which is the defense of a thesis that Stanley calls intellectualism. The author states that most of the discussion in epistemology presupposes an intellectualist conception of knowledge wherein knowledge is justified true belief. Furthermore, the putatively Fregean or neo-Fregean notion of a mode of presentation by Gottlob Frege, as Stanley explains it, is discussed.

Section 1 articulates a genus-species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Equivalently: In cases of knowledge, S's success in believing the truth is attributable to S's ability. That idea is then applied to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. Section 2 asks what it would take to turn the genus-species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary and sufficient conditions. That question is raised in the context of an important line of objection against even the genus-species claim; namely, that there is no way to understand the attribution relation so that it does all the work that it is supposed to do. Section 3 reviews several extant proposals for understanding the attribution relation, and argues that none of them are adequate for answering the objection. Section 4 proposes a different way of understanding the relation, and shows how the resulting view does resolve the objection. Section 5 completes the new account by proposing a way to understand intellectual abilities. Section 6 briefly addresses Barn Façade cases and lottery propositions. Section 7 briefly addresses a question about the scope of knowledge; in particular, it shows how the new view allows a neo-Moorean response to skepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports that there is a common epistemic standard for assertion and practical reasoning. An assertion may be criticised as rude, immoral, imprudent, or irrelevant. Both assertion and practical reasoning may be further criticised on the ground that one is not in a sufficiently good epistemic position to assert the proposition.

In this article the author comments on views given on his article on knowledge by acquaintance. The author says that the objectual knowledge is knowledge by acquaintance, where acquaintance needs an encounter in experience that allows for a good look at the thing. He also says that knowledge has a nature which partly involves knowledge by acquaintance.

The article focuses on fallibilism, epistemic possibility and concessive knowledge attributions (CKA). The author mentions that if knowing requires believing on evidence that entails what is believed, then they have hardly any knowledge at all. It stresses that the near-universal acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology is because denying that one can know on the basis of non-entailing evidence seems not an option if they are to preserve the very strong appearance that they do know many things. It mentions how author Jason Stanley defended fallibilism against the Lewisian worry that openly fallibilistic speech is incoherent.

The article reports on whether John Locke's theory of Knowledge is inconsistent or not. It states that there is a brain-teaser to the heart of Locke's theory of knowledge since he defines it as nothing but the perception of the connexion agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any ideas. The inconsistency is that if the official definition of knowledge is correct, the sensitive knowledge is impossible, and if it is possible, then the official definition of knowledge must fall. The strategy of Locke is to acknowledge the philosophical force of the external world skepticism, at the same time insisting on its practical ineffectuality on the rational soul.

Descartes is often thought to bifurcate sensory experience into two distinct cognitive components: the sensing of secondary qualities and the more or less intellectual perceiving of primary qualities. A closer examination of his analysis of sensory perception in the Sixth Replies and his treatment of sensory processing in the Dioptrics and Treatise on Man tells a different story. I argue that Descartes offers a unified cognitive account of sensory experience according to which the senses and intellect operate together to produce a fundamentally imagistic representation of the world in both its primary and secondary quality aspects. At stake here is not only our understanding of the cognitive structure of sensory experience but the relation of sense and intellect more generally in the Cartesian mind. The deep bifurcation in the Cartesian mind is not between the sensory perception of primary and secondary qualifies but between sensory perception and purely intellectual perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]