377 results on '"PHILOSOPHERS"'
Search Results
2. Predicative subject matter.
- Author
-
Plebani, Matteo and Spolaore, Giuseppe
- Subjects
- *
ABOUTNESS (Library science) , *PHILOSOPHERS , *PREDICATE (Logic) , *ASPECT (Grammar) , *SENTENCES (Grammar) - Abstract
The notions of subject matter and aboutness have been objects of considerable attention among philosophers over the last few years. Current theories of subject matter take sentences to be the primary bearers of subject matter: "sentences have aboutness properties if anything has" (Yablo, Aboutness, Princeton University Press, 2014). However, some subsentential expressions can also be thought of as being about something. Moreover, it appears that the subject matters of sentences depend in a systematic way on the aboutness properties of their subsentential components. In this paper, we focus on the question of what predicates are about. We provide an account of predicative subject matter in which subject matters are assigned to predicates in a natural way, and which can be smoothly integrated with some existing accounts of sentential subject matter. We also argue that the notion of predicative subject matter is a worthy object of study, both within the current debate on subject matter and in its own right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
3. Reply to my critics.
- Author
-
Comesaña, Juan
- Subjects
- *
PHILOSOPHERS , *REASON , *DECISION making - Abstract
The article respond to the critiques and discussions raised by philosophers, John Hawthorne, Mark Schroeder, and Roger White regarding the author's book. It addresses various philosophical arguments, including the concept of evidence and its relationship to rational decision-making. It further aims to clarify and defend the author's ideas in response to the criticisms received from these philosophers.
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
4. Guidance and mainstream epistemology.
- Author
-
Fantl, Jeremy
- Subjects
- *
THEORY of knowledge , *JUSTIFICATION (Ethics) , *PHILOSOPHERS , *HIERARCHY (Linguistics) , *SOCIAL media - Abstract
According to one prominent critique of mainstream epistemology, discoveries about what it takes to know or justifiedly believe that p can't provide the right kind of intellectual guidance. As Mark Webb puts it, "the kinds of principles that are developed in this tradition are of no use in helping people in their ordinary epistemic practices." In this paper I defend a certain form of traditional epistemology against this "regulative" critique. Traditional epistemology can provide—and, indeed, can be essential for—intellectual guidance. The reason is that, in many cases, how you should proceed intellectually depends on what you already know or justifiedly believe: how you should treat counterevidence to your beliefs, for example, can depend on whether those beliefs count as knowledge. Therefore, to get guidance on how to proceed intellectually, it will often be essential to be able to figure out what you know or justifiedly believe. And to do that it will often be helpful to try to figure out what it takes to count as knowledge or justified belief in the first place. To do this is precisely to engage in mainstream epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
5. Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.
- Author
-
Botin, Marcelino
- Subjects
- *
LOGICAL positivism , *DUALISM , *PHILOSOPHERS , *PHILOSOPHY , *ONTOLOGY - Abstract
Russellian physicalism is becoming increasingly popular because it promises to deliver what everybody wants, realism and physicalism about consciousness. But Russellian physicalists are not the first to swear on "the promise", standard Type-B physicalism is a less fanciful view that also claims to give everything and take nothing. In this paper, I argue that our hopes should not be placed on Russellian physicalism because, unlike Type-B physicalism, it cannot explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties without weakening its physicalist credentials. The revelation challenge shows that Russellian physicalism is either committed to an anti-realist and self-defeating view of phenomenal concepts or it is physically unacceptable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
6. The iterative solution to paradoxes for propositions.
- Author
-
Whittle, Bruno
- Subjects
- *
PARADOX , *PHILOSOPHERS , *PHILOSOPHY , *METAPHYSICS , *HIERARCHY (Linguistics) - Abstract
This paper argues that we should solve paradoxes for propositions (such as the Russell–Myhill paradox) in essentially the same way that we solve Russellian paradoxes for sets. That is, the standard, iterative approach to sets is extended to include properties, and then the resulting hierarchy of sets and properties is used to construct propositions. Propositions on this account are structured in the sense of mirroring the sentences that express them, and they would seem to serve the needs of philosophers of language and metaphysicians who rely on such propositions. The resulting account has limitations, comparable to those faced by the iterative approach to sets, but it is argued to be in important ways preferable to others that have been proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
7. A new defense of Tarski's solution to the liar paradox.
- Author
-
Sher, Gila
- Subjects
- *
LIAR paradox , *PHILOSOPHY , *MATHEMATICS , *PHILOSOPHERS , *NATURAL languages - Abstract
Tarski's hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox is widely viewed as ad hoc. In this paper I show that, on the contrary, Tarski's solution is justified by a sound philosophical principle that concerns the inner structure of truth. This principle provides a common philosophical basis to a number of solutions to the Liar paradox, including Tarski's and Kripke's. Tarski himself may not have been aware of this principle, but by providing a philosophical basis to his hierarchical solution to the paradox, it undermines the ad-hocness objection to this solution. Indeed, it contributes to the defense of Tarski's theory against other objections as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
8. Unrestricted quantification and ranges of significance.
- Author
-
Schindler, Thomas
- Subjects
- *
PHILOSOPHY , *SEMANTICS , *TYPE theory , *PHILOSOPHERS , *LANGUAGE & languages - Abstract
Call a quantifier 'unrestricted' if it ranges over absolutely all objects. Arguably, unrestricted quantification is often presupposed in philosophical inquiry. However, developing a semantic theory that vindicates unrestricted quantification proves rather difficult, at least as long as we formulate our semantic theory within a classical first-order language. It has been argued that using a type theory as framework for our semantic theory provides a resolution of this problem, at least if a broadly Fregean interpretation of type theory is assumed. However, the intelligibility of this interpretation has been questioned. In this paper I introduce a type-free theory of properties that can also be used to vindicate unrestricted quantification. This alternative emerges very naturally by reflecting on the features on which the type-theoretic solution of the problem of unrestricted quantification relies. Although this alternative theory is formulated in a non-classical logic, it preserves the deductive strength of classical strict type theory in a natural way. The ideas developed in this paper make crucial use of Russell's notion of range of significance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
9. Causal inference from clinical experience.
- Author
-
Tabatabaei Ghomi, Hamed and Stegenga, Jacob
- Subjects
- *
PHILOSOPHY of medicine , *CAUSAL inference , *EVIDENCE-based medicine , *PHYSICIANS , *PHILOSOPHERS , *INFERENCE (Logic) - Abstract
How reliable are causal inferences in complex empirical scenarios? For example, a physician prescribes a drug to a patient, and then the patient undergoes various changes to their symptoms. They then increase their confidence that it is the drug that causes such changes. Are such inferences reliable guides to the causal relation in question, particularly when the physician can gain a large volume of such clinical experience by treating many patients? The evidence-based medicine movement says no, while some physicians and philosophers support such appeals to first-person experience. We develop a formal model and simulate causal inference based on clinical experience. We conclude that in very particular clinical scenarios such inferences can be reliable, while in many other routine clinical scenarios such inferences are not reliable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
10. Remembering and relearning: against exclusionism.
- Author
-
Álvarez, Juan F.
- Subjects
- *
MEMORY , *PHILOSOPHERS , *ARGUMENT , *INTUITION - Abstract
Many philosophers endorse “exclusionism”, the view that no instance of relearning qualifies as a case of genuine remembering, and vice versa. Appealing to simulationist, distributed causalist, and trace minimalist theories of remembering, I develop three conditional arguments against exclusionism. First, if simulationism is right to hold that some cases of remembering involve reliance on post-event testimonial information, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Second, if distributed causalism is right to hold that memory traces are promiscuous, then remembering does not exclude relearning. Finally, if trace minimalism is right to hold that vicarious experiences sometimes produce the minimal traces that ground remembering, then remembering does not exclude relearning. While advocates of these theories might incorporate additional conditions designed to accommodate exclusionism, the only reason they can appeal to in favor of doing so is intuition: neither the fundamental components of the theories nor the empirical results on which they are based provide a reason to endorse exclusionism. An investigation of exclusionism thus raises metaphilosophical questions, so far overlooked in philosophy of memory, about the appropriate role of intuition in theorizing about remembering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
11. On group background beliefs.
- Author
-
Lauffer, Nathan
- Subjects
- *
BELIEF & doubt , *JUSTIFICATION (Ethics) , *SKEPTICISM , *PROPOSITION (Logic) , *GENERALIZATION , *PHILOSOPHERS , *ACCEPTANCE (Psychology) - Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the following claims are jointly inconsistent: (1) that an agent's justification for belief, if it's constituted by evidence, depends on the profile of her background beliefs, (2) that whether or not a group believes a proposition is solely dependent on whether the proposition is jointly accepted by its members, and (3) that prototypical group beliefs are justified. I also raise objections to attempts to resolve the tension by retaining (2) and (3). The upshot is a novel objection to the Joint Acceptance Account of group belief since it seems to be accompanied by a kind of skepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
12. Definition.
- Author
-
Elgin, Samuel
- Subjects
- *
PUZZLES , *ESSENTIALISM (Philosophy) , *LOGIC , *PHILOSOPHERS , *RESEARCH - Abstract
This paper presents a puzzle about the logic of real definition. I demonstrate that five principles concerning definition—that it is coextensional and irreflexive, that it applies to its cases, that it permits expansion, and that it is itself defined—are logically incompatible. I then explore the advantages and disadvantages of each principle—one of which must be rejected to restore consistency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
13. Seeing-as, seeing-o, and seeing-that: Author:.
- Author
-
Overgaard, Søren
- Subjects
- *
PHILOSOPHERS , *KINSHIP , *RESEARCH , *THEORISTS , *EXPERIENCE - Abstract
Philosophers tend to assume a close logical connection between seeing-as reports and seeing-that reports. But the proposals they have made have one striking feature in common: they are demonstrably false. Going against the trend, I suggest we stop trying to lump together seeing-as and seeing-that. Instead, we need to realize that there is a deep logical kinship between seeing-as reports and seeing-objects reports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
14. Taking motivating reasons’ deliberative role seriously.
- Author
-
Wang, Levy
- Subjects
- *
PHILOSOPHERS , *DELIBERATION , *MOTIVATION (Psychology) , *EXPLANATION , *INTUITION - Abstract
A motivating reason is a reason an agent acts for. There are two pre-theoretical intuitions about motivating reasons that seem irreconcilable. One intuition suggests that motivating reasons are factive, and the other says the opposite. As a result, a divide exists between philosophers, each side prioritizing one intuition to the detriment of the other. In this essay, I present the deliberate theory of motivating reasons and defend the second intuition that motivating reasons are non-factive. To do this, we must understand motivating reasons’ role in our deliberation. I show that non-factive motivating reasons are compatible with the underlying role which gives rise to the intuition of reasons’ factivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
15. Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias.
- Author
-
J. Latham, Andrew, Miller, Kristie, Tarsney, Christian, and Tierney, Hannah
- Subjects
- *
BELIEF & doubt , *PHILOSOPHERS , *METAPHYSICS , *PHENOMENOLOGY , *REASON - Abstract
Empirical work has lately confirmed what many philosophers have taken to be true: people are 'biased toward the future'. All else being equal, we usually prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. According to one hypothesis, the temporal metaphysics hypothesis, future-bias is explained either by our (tacit) beliefs about temporal metaphysics—the temporal belief hypothesis—or alternatively by our temporal phenomenology—the temporal phenomenology hypothesis. We empirically investigate a particular version of the temporal belief hypothesis according to which future-bias is explained by the belief that time robustly passes. Our results do not match the apparent predictions of this hypothesis, and so provide evidence against it. But we also find that people give more future-biased responses when asked to simulate a belief in robust passage. We take this to suggest that the phenomenology that attends simulation of that belief may be partially responsible for future-bias, and we examine the implications of these results for debates about the rationality of future-bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
16. Can redescriptions of outcomes salvage the axioms of decision theory?
- Author
-
Baccelli, Jean and Mongin, Philippe
- Subjects
- *
AXIOMS , *DECISION theory , *EXPECTED utility , *INCOMPLETENESS theorems , *PHILOSOPHERS - Abstract
The basic axioms or formal conditions of decision theory, especially the ordering condition put on preferences and the axioms underlying the expected utility (EU) formula, are subject to a number of counter-examples, some of which can be endowed with normative value and thus fall within the ambit of a philosophical reflection on practical rationality. Against such counter-examples, a defensive strategy has been developed which consists in redescribing the outcomes of the available options in such a way that the threatened axioms or conditions continue to hold. We examine how this strategy performs in three major cases: Sen's counterexamples to the binariness property of preferences, the Allais paradox of EU theory under risk, and the Ellsberg paradox of EU theory under uncertainty. We find that the strategy typically proves to be lacking in several major respects, suffering from logical triviality, incompleteness, and theoretical insularity (i.e., being cut off from the methods and results of decision theory). To give the strategy more structure, philosophers have developed "principles of individuation"; but we observe that these do not address the aforementioned defects. Instead, we propose the method of checking whether the strategy can overcome its typical defects once it is given a proper theoretical expansion (i.e., it is duly developed using the available tools of decision theory). We find that the strategy passes the test imperfectly in Sen's case and not at all in Allais's. In Ellsberg's case, however, it comes close to meeting our requirement. But even the analysis of this more promising application suggests that the strategy ought to address the decision problem as a whole, rather than just the outcomes, and that it should extend its revision process to the very statements it is meant to protect. Thus, by and large, the same cautionary tale against redescription practices runs through the analysis of all three cases. A more general lesson, simply put, is that there is no easy way out from the paradoxes of decision theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
17. Two grounds of liability.
- Author
-
Tadros, Victor
- Subjects
- *
SELF-defense , *RESPONSIBILITY , *MANIPULATIVE behavior , *DEONTOLOGICAL ethics , *PHILOSOPHERS - Abstract
This essay argues that culpability and responsibility are independent notions, even though some of the same facts make us both responsible and culpable. Responsibility for one's conduct is grounded in the strength of the agential connection between oneself and one's conduct. Culpability for one's conduct is the vices that give rise to that conduct. It then argues that responsibility and culpability for causing a threat are each grounds of liability to defensive harm independent of the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
18. Manipulation and liability to defensive harm.
- Author
-
Renzo, Massimo
- Subjects
- *
MANIPULATIVE behavior , *DEFENSIVE wounds , *CRIMINAL liability , *PHILOSOPHERS , *WAR & ethics - Abstract
Philosophers working on the morality of harm have paid surprisingly little attention to the problem of manipulation. The aim of this paper is to remedy this lacuna by exploring how liability to defensive harm is affected by the fact that someone posing an unjust threat has been manipulated into doing so. In addressing this problem, the challenge is to answer the following question: Why should it be the case (if it is, indeed, the case) that being misled into posing an unjust threat by manipulation makes a difference to one's liability, as compared to being misled into doing so by natural events or by someone's honest attempt to persuade us? To answer this question, I first outline an account of manipulation and then use it to defend what I shall call the "Pre-emption Principle." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
19. Evidentialism in action.
- Author
-
Flowerree, A. K.
- Subjects
- *
PHILOSOPHERS , *DEBATE , *EPISTEMICS , *BELIEF & doubt - Abstract
Sometimes it is practically beneficial to believe what is epistemically unwarranted. Philosophers have taken these cases to raise the question are there practical reasons for belief? Evidentialists argue that there cannot be any such reasons. Putative practical reasons for belief are not reasons for belief, but (to use a distinction from Pamela Hieronymi) reasons to manage our beliefs in a particular way. Pragmatists are not convinced. They accept that some (or perhaps all) reasons for belief are practical. The debate, it is widely thought, is at an impasse. But this debate fails to address what is puzzling and interesting about the cases. By focusing on reasons for belief, the debate completely overlooks the role of action in relation to belief. We should be talking about the reasons for actions that shape our beliefs, which I will call belief management. I argue for three related theses: (1) the interesting cases that motivate the debate are about belief management; (2) Evidentialism is irrelevant to belief management; (3) agents have practical reasons to manage their beliefs with the aim of forming true beliefs. These reasons are categorical in nature and result in the tension of conflict cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
20. Does gratitude to R for ϕ-ing imply gratitude that R ϕ-ed?
- Author
-
Manela, Tony
- Subjects
- *
PHILOSOPHERS , *GRATITUDE , *REALIZATION (Linguistics) , *BENEFACTORS , *PROPOSITIONAL calculus - Abstract
Many find it plausible that for a given beneficiary, Y, benefactor, R, and action, ϕ, Y's being grateful to R for ϕ-ing implies Y's being grateful that R ϕ-ed. According to some philosophers who hold this view, all instances of gratitude to, or "prepositional gratitude," are also instances of gratitude that, or "propositional gratitude." These philosophers believe there is a single unified concept of gratitude, a phenomenon that is essentially gratitude that, and whose manifestations sometimes have additional features that make them instances of gratitude to as well. In this article, I show that view to be mistaken. I base my argument on two hypothetical cases, in each of which a beneficiary, Y, is grateful to a benefactor, R, for ϕ-ing, but not grateful that R ϕ-ed. Generalizing from those cases and other cases of gratitude, I argue that prepositional gratitude is the proper response to benevolence-motivated action and propositional gratitude consists in a beneficiary's judging a state of affairs to be valuable for himself and welcoming that state of affairs. Because not every instance of a benefactor's acting benevolently toward a beneficiary is something that beneficiary finds valuable for himself and welcomes, it is possible to be grateful to a benefactor for ϕ-ing but not grateful that she ϕ-ed. Prepositional gratitude and propositional gratitude can each occur without the other and are thus two distinct phenomena. I conclude by explaining the importance of accurately understanding the relationship between prepositional gratitude and propositional gratitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
21. Reasonable expectations, moral responsibility, and empirical data.
- Author
-
Rudy-Hiller, Fernando
- Subjects
- *
PHILOSOPHERS , *NORMATIVE economics , *PREDICTIVE tests , *SOCIAL psychology , *BYSTANDER effect (Psychology) - Abstract
Many philosophers think that a necessary condition on moral blameworthiness is that the wrongdoer can reasonably be expected to avoid the action for which she is blamed. Those who think so assume as a matter of course that the expectations at issue here are normative expectations that contrast with the non-normative or predictive expectations we form concerning the probable conduct of others, and they believe, or at least assume, that there is a clear-cut distinction between the two. In this paper I put this widespread assumption under scrutiny and argue that it's mistaken: although predictive and normative expectations are indeed distinct, there is no sharp separation between them. On the contrary, predictive expectations can have a substantial bearing on normative expectations in two related ways: they can recalibrate what is reasonable to expect of agents when responsibility attributions are at stake and they can help to uncover previously undetected excusing conditions. I illustrate my claims with the famous bystander effect from social psychology and show that it yields predictive expectations that affect normative expectations in these two ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
22. Famine, affluence, and philosophers' biases.
- Author
-
Seipel, Peter
- Subjects
- *
PHILOSOPHERS , *OBJECTIVISM (Philosophy) , *SELF-interest , *DEBATE , *RELATIVITY - Abstract
Moral relativists often defend their view as an inference to the best explanation of widespread and deep moral disagreement. Many philosophers have challenged this line of reasoning in recent years, arguing that moral objectivism provides us with ample resources to develop an equally or more plausible method of explanation. One of the most promising of these objectivist methods is what I call the self-interest explanation, the view that intractable moral diversity is due to the distorting effects of our interests. In this paper I examine the self-interest explanation through the lens of the famine debate, a well-known disagreement over whether we have a moral obligation to donate most of our income to the global poor. I argue that objectivists should reduce their confidence that the persistence of the famine debate is due to the distorting influence of self-interest. If my argument is on target, then objectivists may need to supply a stronger explanation of moral disagreement to defend their view against the threat of moral relativism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
23. A fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction.
- Author
-
Nebel, Jacob M.
- Subjects
- *
PHILOSOPHERS , *HEDONISM , *PERMUTATIONS , *ANONYMITY ,POPULATION policy ethics - Abstract
According to the person-affecting restriction, one distribution of welfare can be better than another only if there is someone for whom it is better. Extant problems for the person-affecting restriction involve variable-population cases, such as the nonidentity problem, which are notoriously controversial and difficult to resolve. This paper develops a fixed-population problem for the person-affecting restriction. The problem reveals that, in the presence of incommensurable welfare levels, the person-affecting restriction is incompatible with minimal requirements of impartial beneficence even in fixed-population contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
24. Are thought experiments "disturbing"? The case of armchair physics.
- Author
-
Schindler, Samuel and Saint-Germier, Pierre
- Subjects
- *
EXPERIMENTAL philosophy , *PHILOSOPHERS , *VIOLENCE , *PHYSICS experiments - Abstract
Proponents of the "negative program" in experimental philosophy have argued that judgements in philosophical cases, also known as case judgements, are unreliable and that the method of cases should be either strongly constrained or even abandoned. Here we put one of the main proponent's account of why philosophical cases may cause the unreliability of case judgements to the test. We conducted our test with thought experiments from physics, which exhibit the exact same supposedly "disturbing characteristics" of philosophical cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
25. A defense of the very idea of moral deference pessimism.
- Author
-
Lewis, Max
- Subjects
- *
RESPECT , *PESSIMISM , *AVERSION , *PHILOSOPHERS , *ADVICE - Abstract
Pessimists think that there is something wrong with relying on deference for one's moral beliefs—at least if one is morally mature. Call this no deference. They also tend to think that what explains our aversion to cases of moral deference is the fact that they involve deference about moral claims. Call this moral explanation. Recently, both no deference and moral explanation have come under attack. Against no deference, some philosophers offer purported counterexamples involving moral advice. I argue that proponents of this objection face a trilemma depending on how they spell out the details of their counterexamples. Against moral explanation, some philosophers offer debunking explanations of our aversion to moral deference. They present cases of non-moral deference that are troubling and argue that the feature that explains our aversion to this non-moral deference also explains our aversion to moral deference. I argue that none of these explanations (nor their conjunction) can explain all troubling cases of moral deference and that they face objections of their own. I conclude that we should be optimistic about the prospects of moral deference pessimism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
26. Experimental philosophy and the fruitfulness of normative concepts.
- Author
-
Lindauer, Matthew
- Subjects
- *
ETHICS , *POLITICAL philosophy , *EMPIRICAL research , *EXPERIMENTAL philosophy , *PHILOSOPHERS - Abstract
This paper provides a new argument for the relevance of empirical research to moral and political philosophy and a novel defense of the positive program in experimental philosophy. The argument centers on the idea that normative concepts used in moral and political philosophy can be evaluated in terms of their fruitfulness in solving practical problems. Empirical research conducted with an eye to the practical problems that are relevant to particular concepts can provide evidence of their fruitfulness along a number of dimensions. An upshot of the argument is that philosophers should not only engage with but must also be involved in conducting experimental studies that examine the practical roles that normative concepts can play. Rather than just clearing the way for philosophical work to be done, the argument has the further implication that empirical research will be required to advance at least some important debates in moral and political philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
27. Animals and the agency account of moral status.
- Author
-
Wilcox, Marc G.
- Subjects
- *
AGENCY accounts , *PHILOSOPHERS , *DUTY , *SELF-consciousness (Awareness) - Abstract
In this paper, I aim to show that agency-based accounts of moral status are more plausible than many have previously thought. I do this by developing a novel account of moral status that takes agency, understood as the capacity for intentional action, to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the possession of moral status. This account also suggests that the capacities required for sentience entail the possession of agency, and the capacities required for agency, entail the possession of sentience. Thus on this account sentient beings possess agency and agents possess sentience. If this is correct, it will show that an Agency Account of moral status can offer a plausible defence of the moral status of all sentient beings, something that previous Agency Accounts have not succeeded in doing. What is more, this account could establish that all sentient animals are not just moral status holders per se, but that they are owed pro tanto obligations regarding continued existence and liberty, similar in kind, though not always in strength, to those owed to humans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
28. The varieties of impartiality, or, would an egalitarian endorse the veil?
- Author
-
Bruner, Justin P. and Lindauer, Matthew
- Subjects
- *
FAIRNESS , *EQUALITY , *DECISION making , *EXPERIMENTAL philosophy , *PHILOSOPHY , *PHILOSOPHERS - Abstract
Social contract theorists often take the ideal contract to be the agreement or bargain individuals would make in some privileged choice situation (i.e., an 'original position'). Recently, experimental philosophers have explored this kind of decision-making in the lab. One rather robust finding is that the exact circumstances of choice significantly affect the kinds of social arrangements experimental subjects (almost) unanimously endorse. Yet prior work has largely ignored the question of which of the many competing descriptions of the original position subjects find most compelling. This paper aims to address this gap, exploring how attractive experimental subjects find various characterizations of these circumstances of choice. We find evidence suggesting that no one choice situation can fulfill the role that social contract theorists have hoped it would play. We also find that, contrary to what some prominent social contract theorists have expected, there is no robust relationship between an individual's ranking of distributive principles and their ranking of various descriptions of the original position. In conclusion, we discuss the broader implications of these results for political philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2020
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
29. Moral luck and the unfairness of morality.
- Author
-
Hartman, Robert J.
- Subjects
- *
RESPONSIBILITY , *ETHICS , *PHILOSOPHERS , *SKEPTICISM - Abstract
Moral luck occurs when factors beyond an agent's control positively affect how much praise or blame she deserves. Kinds of moral luck are differentiated by the source of lack of control such as the results of her actions, the circumstances in which she finds herself, and the way in which she is constituted. Many philosophers accept the existence of some of these kinds of moral luck but not others, because, in their view, the existence of only some of them would make morality unfair. I, however, argue that this intermediary approach is unstable, because either morality is fair in ways that rule out resultant, circumstantial, and constitutive moral luck (and this leads to moral responsibility skepticism), or morality is unfair in ways that permit the existence of those kinds of moral luck. Thus, such intermediary approaches lack the motivation that their proponents have long taken them to have. In the appendix, I point to ways in which morality is unfair concerning the scope of moral responsibility, moral obligation, moral taint, being a good or bad person, and flourishing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2019
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
30. A patchwork epistemology of disagreement?
- Author
-
Isaacs, Yoaav
- Subjects
- *
THEORY of knowledge , *PHILOSOPHERS , *MEMORY , *VISION , *BELIEF & doubt - Abstract
The epistemology of disagreement standardly divides conciliationist views from steadfast views. But both sorts of views are subject to counterexample—indeed, both sorts of views are subject to the same counterexample. After presenting this counterexample, I explore how the epistemology of disagreement should be reconceptualized in light of it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2019
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
31. The unique hues and the argument from phenomenal structure.
- Author
-
Wright, Wayne
- Subjects
- *
ELIMINATIVISM , *REALISM , *PHILOSOPHERS , *PLAUSIBILITY (Logic) - Abstract
Hardin's (Color for philosophers: unweaving the rainbow, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1988) empirically-grounded argument for color eliminativism has defined the color realism debate for the last 30 years. By Hardin's own estimation, phenomenal structure—the unique/binary hue distinction in particular—poses the greatest problem for color realism. Examination of relevant empirical findings shows that claims about the unique hues which play a central role in the argument from phenomenal structure should be rejected. Chiefly, contrary to widespread belief amongst philosophers and scientists, the unique hues do not play a fundamental role in determining all color appearances. Among the consequences of this result is that greater attention should be paid to certain proposals for putting the structure of phenomenal color into principled correspondence with surface reflectance properties. While color realism is not fully vindicated, it has much greater empirical plausibility than previously thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2019
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
32. Conflicting intentions: rectifying the consistency requirements.
- Author
-
Duijf, Hein, Broersen, Jan, and Meyer, John-Jules Ch.
- Subjects
- *
PHILOSOPHERS , *INTENTION , *ATTITUDE (Psychology) , *EXPECTATION (Psychology) , *GOAL (Psychology) - Abstract
Many philosophers are convinced that rationality dictates that one's overall set of intentions be consistent. The starting point and inspiration for our study is Bratman's planning theory of intentions. According to this theory, one needs to appeal to the fulfilment of characteristic planning roles to justify norms that apply to our intentions. Our main objective is to demonstrate that one can be rational despite having mutually inconsistent intentions. Conversely, it is also shown that one can be irrational despite having a consistent overall set of intentions. To overcome this paradox, we argue that it is essential for a successful planning system that one's intentions are practically consistent rather than being consistent or applying an aggregation procedure. Our arguments suggest that a new type of norm is needed: whereas the consistency requirement focuses on rendering the contents of one's intentions consistent, our new practical consistency requirement demands that one's intentions be able to simultaneously and unconditionally guide one's action. We observe that for intentions that conform to the 'own-action condition', the practical consistency requirement is equivalent to the traditional consistency requirement. This implies that the consistency requirement only needs to be amended in scenarios of choice under uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2019
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
33. To B- or not to B- a relation.
- Author
-
Pezet, Robert E.
- Subjects
- *
PHILOSOPHERS , *IDEOLOGY , *THEORY of knowledge , *REALITY - Abstract
In his seminal work, McTaggart (Mind 17(68):457-484, 1908; The nature of existence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1927) dismissed the possibility of understanding the B-Relations (earlier than, simultaneity, and later than) as irreducibly temporal relations, and with it dismissing the B-Theory of time, which assumes the reality of irreducible B-relations. Instead, he thought they were mere constructions from irreducible A-determinations (pastness, presentness, and futurity) and timeless ordering relations (his C-Relations). However, since, philosophers have almost universally dismissed his dismissal of irreducible B-relations. This paper argues that McTaggart was correct to dismiss the possibility of B-relations, and that would be B-theorists should be C-theorists and its concomitant commitment to the unreality of time. I do this by first elaborating C-Theory, noting that B-relations appear indiscernible from C-relations on close examination. This establishes an onus on B-theorists to distinguish B-relations from C-relations by elaborating the distinctively temporal character of the former. I then present a problem for the possibility of accommodating temporal character in B-relations. Following this, I question from whence derives our sense of the temporal character that purportedly resides in the irreducible B-relations. Finally, I extend the challenge against irreducible B-relations to a series of irreducible abstract temporal relations—so called Ersatz-B-Relations—modelled on them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2019
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
34. When propriety is improper.
- Author
-
Blackwell, Kevin and Drucker, Daniel
- Subjects
- *
DECISION theory , *EPISTEMICS , *THEORY of knowledge , *PHILOSOPHERS , *PSYCHOLOGY - Abstract
We argue that philosophers ought to distinguish epistemic decision theory and epistemology, in just the way ordinary decision theory is distinguished from ethics. Once one does this, the internalist arguments that motivate much of epistemic decision theory make sense, given specific interpretations of the formalism (for example, that epistemic utility functions be at least as psychologically real as ordinary utility functions are for decision theory). Making this distinction also causes trouble for the principle called Propriety, which says, roughly, that the only acceptable epistemic utility functions make probabilistically coherent credence functions immodest (expect themselves to be least inaccurate). We cast doubt on this requirement, but then argue that epistemic decision theorists should never have wanted such a strong principle in any case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2019
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
35. Predication and the Frege-Geach problem.
- Author
-
Reiland, Indrek
- Subjects
- *
PHILOSOPHERS , *PLATONISTS , *PREDICATE (Logic) , *PROPOSITION (Logic) , *SENSORY perception - Abstract
Several philosophers have recently appealed to predication in developing their theories of cognitive representation and propositions. One central point of difference between them is whether they take predication to be forceful or neutral and whether they take the most basic cognitive representational act to be judging or entertaining. Both views are supported by powerful reasons and both face problems. Many think that predication must be forceful if it is to explain representation. However, the standard ways of of implementing the idea give rise to the Frege-Geach problem. Others think that predication must be neutral, if we're to avoid the Frege-Geach problem. However, it looks like nothing neutral can explain representation. My aim in this paper is to present a third view, one which respects the powerful reasons while avoiding the problems. On this view predication is forceful and can thus explain representation, but the idea is implemented in a novel way, avoiding the Frege-Geach problem. The key is to make sense of the notion of grasping a proposition as an objectual act, where the object is a proposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2019
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
36. Introspective disputes deflated: the case for phenomenal variation.
- Author
-
Fink, Sascha Benjamin
- Subjects
- *
SKEPTICISM , *INTROSPECTION , *KINSHIP , *BELIEF & doubt , *PHILOSOPHERS - Abstract
Sceptics vis-à-vis introspection often base their scepticism on ‘phenomenological disputes’, ‘introspective disagreement’, or ‘introspective disputes’ (ID) (see Kriegel in Phenomenol Cogn Sci 6(1):115-136, 2007; Bayne and Spener in Philos Issues 20(1):1-22, 2010; Schwitzgebel in Perplexities of consciousness, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2011): introspectors massively diverge in their opinions about experiences, and there seems to be no method to resolve these issues. Sceptics take this to show that introspection lacks any epistemic merit. Here, I provide a list of paradigmatic examples, distill necessary and sufficient conditions for IDs, present the sceptical argument encouraged by IDs, and review the two main strategies (resolution and containment) to reject such a scepticism. However, both types of strategies are unsatisfactory. In order to save introspection from the looming sceptical threat, I advocate a deflationary strategy, based on either an ‘Argument from Perceptual Kinship’ or an ‘Argument from Ownership’. In the end, there cannot be any genuine IDs, for nothing can fulfil the reasonable conditions for IDs. What looks like IDs may instead be indicators of phenomenal variation. Debates that look like IDs may then arise even if introspection were a perfect method to know one’s mind. Thus, scepticism vis-à-vis introspection based on IDs rests on shaky grounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
37. Substitution in a sense.
- Author
-
Trueman, Robert
- Subjects
- *
METAPHYSICS , *PHILOSOPHERS , *SUBSTITUTION (Psychology) , *READABILITY (Literary style) , *PROPOSITION (Logic) - Abstract
The Reference Principle (RP) states that co-referring expressions are everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. On first glance, (RP) looks like a truism, but a truism with some bite: (RP) transforms difficult philosophical questions about co-reference into easy grammatical questions about substitutability. This has led a number of philosophers to think that we can use (RP) to make short work of certain longstanding metaphysical debates. For example, it has been suggested that all we need to do to show that the predicate ‘( ) is a horse’ does not refer to a property is point out that ‘( ) is a horse’ and ‘the property of being a horse’ are not everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. However, when we understand ‘substitution’ in the simplest and most straightforward way, (RP) is no truism; in fact, natural languages are full of counterexamples to the principle. In this paper, I introduce a new notion of substitution, and then develop and argue for a version of (RP) that is immune to these counterexamples. Along the way I touch on the following topics: the relation between argument forms and their natural language instances; the reification of sense; the difference between terms and predicates; and the relation between reference and disquotation. I end by arguing that my new version of (RP) cannot be used to settle metaphysical debates quite as easily as some philosophers would like. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
38. Philosophers should prefer simpler theories.
- Author
-
Bradley, Darren
- Subjects
- *
PHILOSOPHERS , *PHILOSOPHY methodology , *PHILOSOPHICAL theology , *NOMINALISM , *PLATONISTS - Abstract
Recent years have seen considerable attention paid to the methodology of philosophy. The puzzle is simple—if philosophy is not an empirical discipline, how can one philosophical theory be rationally preferred over another? One answer to this question is that we should apply the theoretical virtues. Foremost among these theoretical virtues is simplicity—so perhaps we should prefer simpler philosophical theories to more complex ones. Huemer (Philos Q 59:216-236, 2009) objects that the reasons to prefer simpler theories in science do not apply in philosophy. I will argue that Huemer is mistaken—the arguments he marshals for preferring simpler theories in science can also be applied in philosophy. Like Huemer, I will focus on the philosophy of mind and the nominalism/Platonism debate. But I want to engage with the broader issue of whether simplicity is relevant to philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
39. Grounding and the explanatory role of generalizations.
- Author
-
Roski, Stefan
- Subjects
- *
GENERALIZATION , *REASONING , *THOUGHT & thinking , *PHILOSOPHERS , *METAPHYSICS - Abstract
According to Hempel’s (Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays. The Free Press, New York,
1965 ) influential theory of explanation, explaining why some a is G consists in showing that the truth that a is G follows from a law-like generalization to the effect that all Fs are G together with the initial condition that a is F. While Hempel’s overall account is now widely considered to be deeply flawed, the idea that some generalizations play the explanatory role that the account predicts is still often endorsed by contemporary philosophers of science. This idea, however, conflicts with widely shared views in metaphysics according to which the generalization that all Fs are G is partially explained by the fact that a is G. I discuss two solutions to this conflict that have been proposed recently, argue that they are unsatisfactory, and offer an alternative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
40. Strange-but-true: a (quick) new argument for contextualism about ‘know’.
- Author
-
Dimmock, Paul
- Subjects
- *
CONTEXTUALISM (Philosophy) , *THEORY of knowledge , *PHILOSOPHY , *THOUGHT & thinking , *PHILOSOPHERS - Abstract
A powerful objection to subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) concerns various ‘strange-but-true’ (or “embarrassing”) conditionals. One popular response to this objection is to argue that strange-but-true conditionals pose a problem for non-sceptical epistemological theories in general. In the present paper, it is argued that strange-but-true conditionals are not a problem for contextualism about ‘know’. This observation undercuts the proposed defence of SSI, and supplies a surprising new argument for contextualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
41. How high the sky? Rumfitt on the (putative) indeterminacy of the set-theoretic universe.
- Author
-
Wright, Crispin
- Subjects
- *
HEISENBERG uncertainty principle , *REASONING , *PHILOSOPHERS , *THOUGHT & thinking - Abstract
This comment focuses on Chapter 9 of The Boundary Stones of Thought and the argument, due to William Tait, that Ian Rumfitt there sustains for the indeterminacy of set. I argue that Michael Dummett’s argument, based on the notion of indefinite extensibility and set aside by Rumfitt, provides a more powerful basis for the same conclusion. In addition, I outline two difficulties for the way Rumfitt attempts to save classical logic from acknowledged failures of the principle of bivalence, one specifically for his treatment of the set-theoretic case, the other of more general bearing but especially germane to the case of vagueness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
42. Constructing race: racialization, causal effects, or both?
- Author
-
Mallon, Ron
- Subjects
- *
RACIALIZATION , *SOCIAL constructionism , *PHILOSOPHERS , *CAUSAL logic - Abstract
Social constructionism about race is a common view, but there remain questions about what exactly constitutes constructed race. Some hold that our concepts and conceptual practices construct race, and some hold that the causal consequences of these concepts and conceptual practices also play a role. But there is a third option, which is that the causal effects of our concepts and conceptual practices constitute race, but not the concepts and conceptual practices themselves. This paper reconsiders an argument for the reality of race that grows out of the role of racial kinds in social scientific generalizations. It then uses recent work on the correlation of racial attitudes with behaviors to raise questions about the sufficiency, and perhaps also the necessity, of our concepts and conceptual practices in constituting constructed race, thus understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
43. Defending constituent ontology.
- Author
-
Yang, Eric
- Subjects
- *
ONTOLOGY , *DUALISM , *PHILOSOPHERS , *METAPHYSICS , *WHOLE & parts (Philosophy) - Abstract
Constituent ontologies maintain that the properties of an object are either parts or something very much like parts of that object. Recently, such a view has been criticized as (i) leading to a bizarre and problematic form of substance dualism and (ii) implying the existence of impossible objects. After briefly presenting constituent and relational ontologies, I respond to both objections, arguing that constituent ontology does not yield either of these two consequences and so is not shown to be an unacceptable ontological framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
44. Truth: explanation, success, and coincidence.
- Author
-
Gamester, Will
- Subjects
- *
DEFLATIONARY theory of truth , *EXPLANATION , *COINCIDENCE , *SUCCESS , *PHILOSOPHERS - Abstract
Inflationists have argued that truth is a causal-explanatory property on the grounds that true belief facilitates practical success: we must postulate truth to explain the practical success of certain actions performed by rational agents. Deflationists, however, have a seductive response. Rather than deny that true belief facilitates practical success, the deflationist maintains that the sole role for truth here is as a device for generalisation. In particular, each individual instance of practical success can be explained only by reference to a relevant instance of a T-schema; the role of truth is just to generalise over these individualised explanations. I present a critical problem for this strategy. Analogues of the deflationist’s individualised explanations can be produced by way of explanation of coincidental instances of practical success where the agent merely has the right false beliefs. By deflationary lights, there is no substantive explanatory difference between such coincidental and non-coincidental instances of practical success. But the non-/coincidental distinction just is an explanatory distinction. The deflationist’s individualised explanations of non-coincidental instances of practical success must therefore be inadequate. However, I argue that the deflationist’s prospects for establishing an explanatory contrast between these cases by supplementing her individualised explanations are, at best, bleak. The inflationist, by contrast, is entitled to the obvious further explanatory premise needed to make sense of the distinction. As such, pending some future deflationary rejoinder, the deflationary construal of the principle that true belief facilitates practical success must be rejected; and with it the deflationary conception of truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
45. Reasons for and reasons against.
- Author
-
Snedegar, Justin
- Subjects
- *
REASON , *PHILOSOPHERS , *DISJUNCTION (Logic) , *COMMONSENSE reasoning , *NEGATION (Logic) - Abstract
What an agent ought to do is determined by competition between reasons bearing on the options open to her. The popular metaphor of balancing or weighing reasons on a scale to represent this competition encourages a focus on competition between reasons
for competing options. But what an agent ought to do also depends on the reasonsagainst those options. The balancing metaphor does not provide an obvious way to represent reasons against. Partly as a result of this, there is a serious lack of work on reasons against. A simple view is that there is no problem here, since reasons against an option are really just more reasons for—in particular, reasons for certain alternatives. This simple view lets us maintain the balancing metaphor, and more importantly, it simplifies theorizing about the competition between reasons. This is because if it’s true, there is really just one kind of competition, the competition between reasons for competing options. This paper challenges the simple view, arguing against several ways of identifyingwhich alternatives to an option the reasons against it are reasons for. I also sketch a competing view, according to which reasons against are distinct from reasons for—these are two different normative relations. If this kind of view is correct, then our theory of the competition between reasons will need to recognize at least two kinds of competition: the one between reasons for competing options, and the one between the reasons for an option and the reasons against it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
46. The argument from almost indiscernibles.
- Author
-
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo
- Subjects
- *
TEMPERATURE , *PHILOSOPHERS , *ETHICS - Abstract
What I call the argument from almost indiscernibles is an argument, put forward by Robert Adams in 1979, for the possibility of indiscernibles based on the possibility of almost indiscernibles. The argument is that if almost indiscernibles are possible, indiscernibles are possible, but since almost indiscernible are possible, indiscernibles are possible. The argument seems to be an improvement over the mere appeal to intuitions, like that suggested by Max Black, that situations in which there are indiscernibles are possible, for the argument purports to give us a reason that indiscernibles are possible. In this paper I shall assess the argument by examining whether there is support for the conditional premise that if almost indiscernibles are possible, indiscernibles are possible. I shall argue that there are reasons to think that either the premise lacks support or almost indiscernibles are dispensable. If the premise lacks support, the argument does not establish the possibility of almost indiscernibles; if almost indiscernibles are dispensable, the argument is not needed to establish the possibility of indiscernibles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
47. Universal practice and universal applicability tests in moral philosophy.
- Author
-
Forschler, Scott
- Subjects
- *
ETHICS , *PHILOSOPHERS , *DEONTOLOGICAL ethics , *PHILOSOPHY , *CODES of ethics - Abstract
We can distinguish two kinds of moral universalization tests for practical principles. One requires that the universal practice of the principle, i.e., universal conformity to it by all agents in a given world, satisfies some condition. The other requires that conformity to the principle by any possible agent, in any situation and at any time, satisfies some condition. We can call these universal practice (UP) and universal applicability (UA) tests respectively. The logical distinction between these tests is rarely appreciated, and many philosophers systematically confuse them with each other. In practice, UP tests are more frequently used to defend deontological norms, while UA tests are used to defend consequentialist norms. Both conceptual argument and practical examples of their applications will show that UA tests are decisively superior to UP tests for grounding moral norms, casting greater doubt upon deontological theories which rely upon the latter unless they can reformulate their arguments using some version of a UA test. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
48. Parthood and naturalness.
- Author
-
Eddon, M.
- Subjects
- *
NATURALNESS (Linguistics) , *PHILOSOPHERS , *PHYSICS , *ISOMORPHISM (Mathematics) - Abstract
Is part of a perfectly natural, or fundamental, relation? Philosophers have been hesitant to take a stand on this issue. One reason for this hesitancy is the worry that, if parthood is perfectly natural, then the perfectly natural properties and relations are not suitably 'independent' of one another. (Roughly, the perfectly natural properties are not suitably independent if there are necessary connections among them.) In this paper, I argue that parthood is a perfectly natural relation. In so doing, I argue that this 'independence' worry is unfounded. I conclude by noting some consequences of the naturalness of parthood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
49. Essentialist explanation.
- Author
-
Glazier, Martin
- Subjects
- *
METAPHYSICS , *PHILOSOPHERS , *EXPLANATION , *HYDROGEN analysis , *NITRATES , *ATTITUDE (Psychology) - Abstract
Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in metaphysical explanation, and philosophers have fixed on the notion of ground as the conceptual tool with which such explanation should be investigated. I will argue that this focus on ground is myopic and that some metaphysical explanations that involve the essences of things cannot be understood in terms of ground. Such 'essentialist' explanation is of interest, not only for its ubiquity in philosophy, but for its being in a sense an ultimate form of explanation. I give an account of the sense in which such explanation is ultimate and support it by defending what I call the inessentiality of essence. I close by suggesting that this principle is the key to understanding why essentialist explanations can seem so satisfying. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
50. On the apparent antagonism between feminist and mainstream metaphysics.
- Author
-
Mikkola, Mari
- Subjects
- *
FEMINISTS , *METAPHYSICS , *PHILOSOPHERS , *METHODOLOGICAL individualism - Abstract
The relationship between feminism and metaphysics has historically been strained. Metaphysics has until recently remained dismissive of feminist insights, and many feminist philosophers have been deeply skeptical about any value that metaphysics might have when thinking about advancing gender justice. Nevertheless, feminist philosophers have in recent years increasingly taken up explicitly metaphysical investigations. Such feminist investigations have expanded the scope of metaphysics in holding that metaphysical tools can help advance debates on topics outside of traditional metaphysical inquiry (e.g. the nature of gender, sex, or sexuality). Moreover, feminist philosophers typically bring new methodological insights to bear on traditional ways of doing philosophy. Feminist metaphysicians have also recently begun interrogating the methods of metaphysics and they have raised questions about what metaphysics as a discipline is in the business of doing. In discussing such methodological issues, Elizabeth Barnes has recently argued that some prevalent conceptions of metaphysics rule out feminist metaphysics from the start and render it impossible. This is bad news for self-proclaimed feminist metaphysicians in suggesting that they are mistaken about the metaphysical status of their work. With this worry in mind, the paper asks: how does feminist metaphysics fare relative to 'mainstream' metaphysics? More specifically, it explores how feminist and 'mainstream' debates intersect, on what grounds do they come apart (if at all), and whether feminist metaphysics qualifies as metaphysics 'proper'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
Catalog
Discovery Service for Jio Institute Digital Library
For full access to our library's resources, please sign in.