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The paper aims at identifying similarities and differences between two different ways of using the word "true", on the one hand when it is used to refer to a property of what we say or believe, here called "words' truth", on the other when it is used to refer to a feature of things in general (as when we say "he is a true friend"), here called "things' truth". I will point out how such similarities and differences may be usefully described starting from the feature of truth called "transparency" which is often considered as exclusively pertaining to words' truth. The upshot of the paper will be that Aquinas was right in considering the two kinds of truth as species of the unique genus "adaequatio rei et intellectus", but that this conclusion can be reached without any commitment to the ideology (in the Quinean sense) of the correspondence theory of truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The investigation of concept of "true" and "false" has long privileged in contemporary philosophy apophantic truth, that is, the truth of dicta (sentences or propositions). To which entities, though, beyond dicta, the predicate 'true' pertains? This paper sheds a light on the less frequently investigated cases where we speak of a truth of things, or res. We say, for instance, that a 17 euros banknote is not a true banknote, or that a true soldier ought to be brave. The paper, thus, distinguishes, beside the concept of de dicto (apophantic) truth, the concept of de re truth and two of its subspecies: eidological truth and idiological truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Truth is not only a semantic notion, because it can involve our whole being, both intellectual and emotional. The emotional character of the truth determines its relevance for us. In this paper I will first discuss Ronald de Sousa's theory of emotional truth and the idea of the appropriateness of emotions in relation to judgment. Secondly, I will deal with Meinong's conception that emotions have both an evaluative and a cognitive character, allow us to know what the world is like, and consequently are related to truth. Truth then turns out to be a value. If something is valuable to me, it stirs an emotion. That is why truth is capable of attracting feelings. Emotional truth is that truth which attracts a justified knowledge-feeling. This is the basis on which we might develop an aesthetics of concepts whereby theories, in order to be established, need not only to be regarded as true but to produce an emotional involvement of the subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to analyze the problems that religious truth, particularly Christian truth understood as an event, poses to the category of de re truth. How does the conception of truth 'as event' stand phenomenologically in relation to the contemporary analytical debate on truth? Statements in the catechism such as "true God and true man" referring to Jesus, or the same words attributed to Jesus in John's gospel (14:6) such as "I am the way, the truth or the life" how can they be understood in relation to the category of recently called 'dual character concepts'? Is there a difference between the notion of 'true warrior' and that of 'true God'? When is a person appropriately categorized as a true man? When is a person appropriately categorized as a true God? What is the relationship between faith and truth? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]