Search

This article explores the so-called realistic theory of law and justice of the Spanish jurist Javier Hervada (1934-2020). Influenced by the Roman jurists and Thomas Aquinas, Hervada conceived law (ius) and right (derectum) as the right thing (res iusta). The article explains the Roman meaning of the word ius and the expressions ius suum and res iusta and it is concluded that falling into reductionism is a potential risk of this theory. The article also criticizes Hervada’s definition of lex as a rule or measure of law and right, and Hervada’s juridical approach to the idea of person. Ultimately, Hervada offers a theory of law based on the object of the virtue of justice. But law cannot be reduced to the object of a concrete virtue, nor can justice be only considered as a virtue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent book (The Force of Law), Frederick Schauer -American philosopher of law-, tries to justify a return to the original version of positivism in law: the one elaborated by Bentham and Austin, which reduces the law to imperatives with the threaten of a sanction in case of non-compliance. From this point of view, Schauer criticizes Hart and his followers, as well as the natural law thinkers, and proposes a positivist-reducing conception of law, but with a broader conception of "sanction". The autor of the article criticizes Schauer's view from many perspectives, mainly because the reductivism found in his ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the 60th Anniversary of the storied Hart-Fuller Debate, we would like to briefly revisit it to highlight some of its concerns and discussions in order to demonstrate how vivid they still are and may serve as a path to the Rule of Law, concluding on the importance of promoting fruitful argumentation on essential issues in Jurisprudence to enlighten the practice of Law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Procedural theories fail in thinking that is possible to explain validity of law without taking into account content matters. We should address practical reason from an epistemological approach and in its relation to desires, emotions and ends. Finnis articulates this question using Aquinas, Hume's position and even some critics of the humean explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the author begins by summarizing Luigi Ferrajoli's proposal on the philosophical foundation of fundamental rights. He later makes a critical analysis of the principal points. Mainly, the author studies the instrumental character of this founding strategy, its debatable logical coherence, its undeniable relativism, its limitations towards the subjects of rights and, finally, the impossibility to overcome, consistently, the positivist reductionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The convergence between the classical legal tradition, the enlightened and modern positivism around the notion of law is presented, assessing its teleology and the limits of its content in both a subjective and objective sense. The European Recommendation (2002) 12, which promotes the creation of the culture of citizenship based on democratic values of pluralism, equality and tolerance is also analyzed. This is followed by ah analysis of recent Spanish legislation on education, focusing on the Decrees that introduce the new subject of "Education for Citizenship and Human Rights". Finally the article concludes with a proposal consistent with the outlined principles that would ensure this type of civic education in freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]