Search

Moral philosophy plays a fundamental role, together with political philosophy and Jurisprudence, in Finnis' argument present in his two editions of Natural Law and Natural Rights, to answer the question of how natural rights are based on natural law. Finnis' explanation of natural law and its functioning is inspired in some relevant texts of Aquinas; however, the roots and reasonings of both authors are diverse here. The first edition presents a moral philosophy proposing the interaction between two types of principles: basic human goods and the requirements of one of them (practical reasonableness). The second edition introduces a new moral principle, called «integral human fulfillment», to moderate the interplay of the said principles. This work explains why the moral assumptions under the first edition were restrictive and shown the insufficiency for human goods to fill the teleological perspective of morality. Likewise, I explain the doctrinal evolution of the concept of integral human fulfilment in the author's work as well as the difficulties deriving of the introduction of the new moral «guide» (formally recognized from 1987 on), within an existing theory. I have focused on the following possibly problematic aspects of the new principle: the use of denominations with different meanings as synonyms (flourishing, fulfillment, realization.../end, objective, goal, good, not good, key premise, master principle of morality, ideal, precept...), its not precise comparison with the thomistic beatitudo imperfecta, its problematic assembling with the «evident» practical principles as explained in the first edition, the circularity of the system, and the possible doubts about the preceptive role of the ideal of the integral human flourishing, by assuming that it does not involve, necessariliy, the idea of an end. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the 60th Anniversary of the storied Hart-Fuller Debate, we would like to briefly revisit it to highlight some of its concerns and discussions in order to demonstrate how vivid they still are and may serve as a path to the Rule of Law, concluding on the importance of promoting fruitful argumentation on essential issues in Jurisprudence to enlighten the practice of Law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

La juridificación, entendida como invasión del mundo de la vida por el Derecho, ha sido objeto de crítica en los últimos treinta años. El trabajo parte de una exposición histórica de los procesos de juridificación, haciendo hincapié en la hiperregulación propia del Estado "del bienestar". A continuación se analizan las propuestas desjuridificadoras, poniendo de relieve algunos de sus inconvenientes. La última parte se dedica a la caracterización de algunas de las clases más relevantes --y recientes-- de juridificación. La desnaturalización del Derecho y la deconstrucción social que conllevan es criticada, proponiéndose una alternativa basada en consideraciones de subsidiariedad y promoción de la acción social. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]