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Party membership seems to lose relevance for political careers in many established democracies. Increasing numbers of parties are recruiting non-members as candidates. Yet, what are the implications of a lack of long-term party membership for party cohesion? In this paper, I argue that pre-parliamentary party membership is in fact crucial for cohesion. Using data from the Comparative Candidate Survey and voting behavior of ca. 2,000 MPs of the German Bundestag on free votes from 1953 to 2013, I examine the effect of length of previous party membership and the age of joining the party on indicators of party cohesion. Examining free votes allows for credibly controlling alternative explanations of unified voting behavior. Results are in line with expectations generated from social identity theory and underscore the importance of party membership for party cohesion. The paper concludes with a discussion on the findings’ implications in light of recent developments in parties’ candidate recruitment.

Published on 1 May 2020 This essay introduces a collection of papers dealing with the responsive–responsible dilemma of party government. The political developments surrounding the Eurozone crisis attest that the duties of government and the demands of political representation may at times be in sharp contrast with one another. In such contexts, it becomes hard for parties in government to combine responsiveness with responsible policy-making. Late Peter Mair theorized this phenomenon as the increasing bifurcation between the growing complexity of governing in a world of interdependence and the need to respond to often polarizing electoral demands. The key question is whether and how in such contexts parties find the balance between their representative and governing duties. The papers included in this special issue deal with this question in the context of the Eurozone crisis and present evidence about parties’ behavior, rhetoric, and policy outputs. In introducing the contributions here, we illustrate how this collective endeavor helps advance the debate on the major challenges to contemporary representative democracy. More specifically, we first discuss how the framework of the responsive–responsible dilemma helps understanding contemporary political developments. We then critically reflect on the distinction between responsiveness and responsibility. Finally, we present how each individual contribution approaches the question of how parties manage the tension between electoral incentives and governmental duties.

This paper addresses the electoral consequences of the German government’s anti-nuclear power policy shift after the Fukushima accident. Building on a cost-benefit framework and insights from political psychology, the theoretical analysis anticipates that the policy shift could not earn governing parties additional votes but could avoid vote loss. Utilizing data from multiple surveys and employing simulation techniques, the evidence demonstrates that voters, in particular incumbents’ supporters, became more skeptical of nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster. At the same time, governing parties’ supporters were particularly eager to perceive a credible change in the government’s nuclear power stance. As a consequence, governing parties did not garner additional votes but inhibited their supporters from voting for other parties and thus avoided vote loss. Generally speaking, the novel approach proposed in this paper is suitable for shedding light on electoral effects of parties’ policy shifts that have thus far gone unnoticed.

In the aftermath of the 2009 national elections in India a number of commentators observed that Indian party politics is a dynastic affair. Why is this the case? This paper claims that absence of a party organization, independent civil society associations that mobilize support for the party, and centralized financing of elections has led to the emergence and sustenance of dynastic parties in India. The paper assesses the impact of dynastic parties and shows that not only are party systems more volatile when parties are dynastic but more important, dynastic parties serve to make the political system less representative.

How does an authoritarian past shape voters’ left-right orientation? Recent studies investigate “anti-dictator bias” in political ideology, where citizens in a former right-wing (left-wing) dictatorship may display a leftist (rightist) bias in their ideological self-identification. In this paper, I provide evidence for a “pro-dictator bias” where citizens hold ideological positions close to those of the dictator, depending on their experiences prior to transition. In countries with high economic growth under dictatorship and without violent ruling party ouster, authoritarian successors could continue mobilizing the popular base and invoke positive sentiment on the past in democratic elections. Such positive sentiment can facilitate individual ideological orientation close to the ideological label of the former dictatorship. I test this hypothesis by combining individual- and country-level data covering 1985 to 2018 from 48 countries. I demonstrate that voters in countries with high economic growth during dictatorship and without violent party exit are more likely to have pro-dictator bias in ideology. I further show that voters in former developmental states show pro-dictator bias from the history of economic growth and more peaceful transition. The findings emphasize the role of pre-transition features in shaping alternative legacies on voter attitudes in post-authoritarian societies.

Political parties are increasingly confronted with electoral volatility. However, the support for some parties is more stable than that of others. Although it has been established that parties’ links to civil society stabilised their electorates in the period until the 1980s, it has not yet been investigated whether such links still fulfil this function in our volatile age. In this paper, we argue that traditional party connections, as well as links to modern day civil society organisations, continue to tie voters to parties. Using a novel dataset covering 149 parties in 29 elections in 14 West European countries, we establish that parties with stronger links to civil society do indeed have a more stable support base. This relationship holds for parties of the left and right. Our results demonstrate that parties’ societal embeddedness continues to play a role in understanding party competition in the 21st century.

The growing importance of religious conservatives within the Republican Party is one of the most interesting aspects of evolving party coalitions in the USA. However, their identification has proved to be difficult because of different operational definitions of religious conservatives. In this paper, an alternative operational definition is posited, identifying conservative Republicans for whom religion is an important part of their lives. The paper proceeds by using this definition to estimate the number of religious conservatives in the mass electorate, and their political distinctiveness compared to other Republicans. While the definition used in this paper is a broad one, it is demonstrated that in terms of voting behavior and issue preferences, a `religious' conservative Republican is qualitatively distinct from a `secular' conservative Republican.

The analysis of Latin American party systems should be supplemented by the analysis of ideological blocs in order to enhance comparability and to revive the study of the content of party politics in the region. This paper presents a new set of data that makes the analysis of Latin American blocs possible for the first time. The data cover 166 20th-century elections in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The paper also describes indicators of four party-system characteristics--Mean Left- Right Position, Left-Right Polarization, Adjusted Bloc Volatility, and the Effective Number of Blocs. The data confirm some of the conventional wisdom about Latin American party systems, but also put them in clearer comparative perspective. The evolution of these four characteristics in each country shows that party systems are not merely passive reflections of what the voters want, nor are they simply monuments to political engineering or the skill of party strategists. Rather, they are the product of a continuously evolving interaction among all these forces. Political scientists must be willing to go beyond typologies and use appropriate analytic tools in order to grapple with the dynamic diversity found in Latin American party systems. (NOTE: Some of the data used in this paper are tentative or incomplete, and subject to change

This paper takes a number of theories that have been used to analyse government formation in West European parliamentary democracies and applies them to the government formation process in Japan after the 1996 general election. These models underline the continuing importance of the LDP in the government formation process, despite the loss of its overall majority. The application of government formation models to the Japanese case also highlights the weakness of the typical assumption that sees parties as unitary actors. The paper thus concludes with some speculations as to how this assumption might usefully be relaxed to incorporate party factions, splits and fusions and thereby generate more dynamic models of the making and breaking of governments.

If we want to know what is happening to political parties today, the answer depends in part on how we define the term `party' and in part on the time frame used for analysis. In this paper we focus on parties as voting coalitions in the US House and the Senate over the last 40 years. To assess the ideological placement and cohesiveness of each party in the House and Senate, we use adjusted scores issued by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Our adjustment corrects for changes in the ADA's scale from year to year. The analysis is carried out by focusing on each of the four main regional factions comprising the parties. The cross-chamber comparisons for the Republicans show a high degree of stability with respect to ideological placement and cohesiveness; eastern Republicans maintain a more liberal stance throughout the period of analysis. For Democrats in both chambers there has been a liberal shift in recent years and an increase in cohesiveness overall; the southern Democrats are distinctively more conservative than the rest of the party, although less so in recent years. Both of the `outlier' factions (eastern Republicans and southern Democrats) unexpectedly display less cohesiveness than do the mainline factions of their respective parties. The paper concludes with some discussion of why this may be the case, what the future holds for outlier cohesiveness, and implications for responsible parties in the United States.

This paper represents part of an ongoing attempt to understand the nature of party formation and change in electoral democracies. The original goal was to account for the weakness of East European parties and party systems. This remains an important topic because weak parties are thought to be indicative of weaknesses in the democratic regimes themselves. Finding the theories of area specialists lacking, the author turned to traditional theories of party formation and change, which were created to explain these phenomena in the western setting. These theories, combined with the contextual insights provided by area specialists, provide considerable leverage on the question of party formation and change in Eastern Europe. In this paper, the author attempts to develop and provide evidence in support of a theory of party formation based on political choice in which actors operate not in a vacuum, but in a context that both constrains and provides resources for agency.

In this analysis, we examine the effect of party-voter linkages on executive and legislative influence over policymaking in democracies throughout the world. We expect committees in legislatures with programmatic parties to have more power over the public policymaking process than committees in legislatures with clientelistic parties. We also expect executives in countries with programmatic parties to have less power over the public policymaking process than executives in countries with clientelistic parties. Using data from the Varieties of Democracy Dataset and controlling for relevant factors, we find support for our expectations. The results of this paper shed light on how party linkages to constituents can affect executive and legislative influence over policymaking.

In spite of the growing academic interest in party law in Latin America, we still lack a comprehensive account of how party regulatory frameworks evolved from the time of transitions to the present. This paper aims to fill this gap. In doing so, it makes a double contribution to the field of party regulation. On the one hand, it systematizes, for the first time, all the reforms adopted in Latin America over the last four decades. On the other hand, it introduces a theoretical innovation by using the concept of normative paradigms to analyze a process of legislative change. The main argument of this article is that a permissive paradigm was gradually but overwhelmingly replaced by a prescriptive approach, which conceives parties as semi-state institutions. This shift sheds light on the changing linkages between parties and the state in Latin America.

Existing analyses of opposition pre-electoral alliance formation in electoral autocracies neglect their coordinated election campaigns against incumbent autocrats. This paper argues that opposition alliance joint campaigns can increase the salience of the anti-regime cleavage, signal mutual compromise, and highlight the positive material and policy gains voters will reap following regime defeat. Together, they persuade ideologically and ethnically disparate opposition supporters to engage in the cross-party strategic voting necessary to maximize opposition vote share and their chances of winning. Empirical findings from Malaysia’s historic 2018 general elections support the theory’s propositions. A pre-electoral survey experiment estimates that an opposition alliance’s joint campaigns increases cross-party strategic voting by about 10 percentage points among opposition voters. Field interviews and ethnographic observation during the election campaigning revealed the diverse methods and mechanisms of joint campaigns. Malaysia’s Pakatan Harapan opposition alliance eventually prevailed through a combination of joint campaigning against a flailing incumbent.

Government formation in multiparty systems requires election winners to strike deals to form a coalition government. Do voters respond and how do they respond to coalition government deals? This paper examines the short-term consequences of coalition government formation on voters in European democracies relying on survey panel data and original content analysis of coalition agreements. It tests theoretical expectations that deal with both the actual and perceived ideological shifts parties make when joining coalition deals as well as the effect of a much simpler heuristic cue based on preferences. The findings indicate that coalition deals have consequences on party preferences, but voter perceptions play a much stronger effect than the actual content of coalition deals. These results have important implications for our understanding of public opinion and provide important insights into the current difficulties and challenges of government formation and representative democracy.

The conventional view of Africa’s political parties holds that they are organizationally weak, with little presence at the grass roots. Yet, few studies are based on systematically collected data about more than a handful of parties or countries at any given point. In this paper, we attempt to remedy this situation, by focusing on one crucial aspect of party organization – the local presence that enables political parties to engage with and mobilize voters during and between elections – and developing the first systematic, survey-based measure of the extent of this presence across 35 countries. We draw on a wide variety of data to demonstrate the validity and reliability of this new index, and in the process showcase its ability to be calculated at a number of different levels. Finally, we illustrate its utility by applying it to a key substantive question in the literature.

Does party ambivalence, that is, simultaneously evaluating positively more than one political party, decrease turnout? The extant literature on this question is limited to the American case, and findings are rather mixed. Using the data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project, this paper provides a first large-scale comparative analysis of the ambivalence-turnout nexus in 46 countries. Based on two different ambivalence measures, I show that party ambivalence is more prevalent in multiparty systems and that a substantial portion of citizens are ambivalent. Moreover, ambivalence, on average, reduces turnout by at least 4.5 percentage points across countries. Importantly, however, this is not the case for every country. Whether ambivalence decreases voter turnout is conditioned by macro-level factors. More specifically, ambivalence tends to dampen turnout in (1) polarized contexts, (2) parliamentary systems, (3) voluntary voting countries, and (4) less fragmented systems.

Populist parties foment discontent with the establishment. Previous studies explored whether sentiments of discontent and protest can predict populist voting. In this paper, we argue that past electoral protest in a community, rather than merely a sense of discontent, is a good predictor of new populist lists and their electoral support. We explore this connection using blank voting, a measure that allows a systematic and unbiased evaluation of protest at the municipal level. We first test our theory on the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S). Controlling for economic and demographic variables, we demonstrate that in municipalities with high blank vote in previous elections, the probability of new M5S lists and M5S vote share were higher. Testing the generalizability of our theory using cross-national populism data, we show that past protest in the form of blank/null voting is a strong predictor of the level of populist rhetoric in a political system.

Data de publicació electrónica: 27-01-2021 This paper examines the effect of party primaries on women’s chances of winning a leadership contest in eight Western parliamentary countries since 1985. By doing so, we revisit an ongoing debate about a possible trade-off between the democratic values of ‘inclusion’ of party members and ‘representation’ of excluded groups that this type of selection method may involve. Using an original data set consisting of 608 candidates who participated in 168 leadership mixed-gender contests at the national or regional level, we show that female candidates perform worse under party primaries. This finding holds even after controlling for the type of candidate competing. We therefore sustain the argument that this leadership selection mechanism, in its current format, involves a trade-off between ‘inclusion’ and ‘representation’.

Despite a violent and extremist past, some armed rebel movements often abandon their arms and successfully contest power through elections. This paper seeks to understand the environmental factors that determine an insurgent successor party’s electoral success. Using first a cross-national analysis of insurgent successor party performance and then a subnational analysis of Salvadoran elections from 1994–2019, it is shown that the party’s ability to leverage identities forged during the war and organize its appeals along a highly polarized pro- and anti-government axis is crucial to electoral success. This is understood as an organizational capability, the capacity to oppose. At the national level, the existence of an authoritarian successor party increases the longevity of such polarization while subnationally levels of violence help to solidify the wartime cleavage as the most important for local politics.

Over recent decades, an increasing number of presidential candidates across the world have been nominated in primary elections. Yet, our understanding of presidential primaries outside of the U.S. remains very limited. This paper advances a theoretical argument linking presidential primary outcomes to the strategic behavior of subnational party elites, particularly those with the resources to mobilize primary voters in their regions. I provide support for this claim using an original dataset from the 2012 presidential primary of the Mexican Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), in which one of the candidates was very closely linked to (and informally endorsed by) the PAN leadership. The results show the levels of support for this candidate were higher in places with PAN officeholders. Additional evidence suggests this pattern is driven by PAN officeholders (1) investing resources into electoral mobilization and (2) tampering with the lists of registered voters.

Political parties in Western democracies with large immigrant populations have become increasingly interested in nominating immigrant-origin candidates. This paper investigates how contextual factors explain parties’ effort of immigrant representation. I argue that nominations of immigrant-origin candidates are shaped by parties’ strategic calculations weighing out potential vote gains among immigrant-origin voters compared to a potential native backlash. I contend that alien enfranchisement and liberal naturalization policies provide decisive incentives to nominate immigrant-origin candidates. In contrast, economic insecurity implies potential material threat perceptions generating a native backlash against immigrants, reducing the nomination of immigrant-origin candidates. Using a novel dataset on candidates in Switzerland, the analysis reveals that the political and economic contexts indeed determine the number of immigrant-origin candidates and their ballot position, particularly those of non-Western origin. These findings have significant implications for our understanding of strategic behaviors of political parties and the promotion of immigrant representation.

We start from the premise that the content of political competition is regularly remade by shifting contexts and by the strategic activity of political actors including parties. But while there are naturally thousands of potential issues on which politics can be contested, there are in practice and for good reasons ways in which structure and limits come to reduce the competition to more cognitively manageable and regularized divisions—in short, to issue dimensions. It is highly timely to return to these questions since, we argue, the social, political, and economic turbulence of recent years raises the possibility that the ideological structure of how parties present themselves to voters may be radically shifting. The papers in this special issue, therefore, each tackle an important aspect of the shifting character of the issues that underlie party competition in various European settings. In this article, we provide an overview of the relevant “state of the art” on issue dimensionality and how the subject is situated within the broad framework of understanding party competition.

This paper analyzes how factional conflict and intra-party organization affect a party’s likelihood of being involved in a ruling coalition. We focus on Italian parties (between 1946 and 2013) estimating their internal heterogeneity through quantitative text analysis of policy documents presented by factions during party congresses. The impact of inter-factional conflict has been investigated in interaction with intra-party rules showing that when the party leader is autonomous and can rely on powerful whipping resources to impose discipline, the party will credibly sticks to the coalition agreement, thereby reducing the negative effect of factional heterogeneity in coalition bargaining.

Although post-communist party systems have shown signs of stabilisation in recent years, they are still susceptible to the emergence of new parties. Sikk (2012) and Sikk and Hanley (2014) have suggested that many of these challengers owe their success to a distinct winning formula, appealing to the public primarily on the basis of their ‘newness’ and antiestablishment credentials. However, to draw conclusions about the relative importance of newness in explaining the successes of these parties, it is necessary to understand the nature of their support among the electorate. Few empirical demand-side analyses of party support in the region explicitly address the newness thesis. This paper analyses support for Poland’s Palikot Movement, a party which rose to prominence in 2011 and for whom newness constituted a significant aspect of its electoral appeal. It shows that while the Palikot Movement attracted voters who disliked the other parties, support for the party was more clearly attributable to its distinct ideological profile rather than its claim to represent those dissatisfied with the actions of the political establishment.

This paper disentangles the relationship between election outcomes and satisfaction with democracy. As the first comparative study to employ a measure of satisfaction immediately before and after elections, we can be unusually confident that any changes we observe are attributable to election outcomes. Following previous work, we affirm that voting for parties that win more votes, more legislative seats, and more cabinet seats boosts satisfaction with democracy. In addition, we demonstrate for the first time that voters are sensitive to deficits in representation; satisfaction with democracy decreases when one’s party’s seat share falls short of its vote share.

This paper focuses on how characteristics of parties and party voters explain the styles of representation emphasised within parties. Styles of representation are defined at the party level as the proportion of representatives within parties who are partisans, delegates or trustees. Each style manifests due to different incentives related to the characteristics of their party and/or their party voters. The findings show that the main explanatory factors for the proportion of partisans are parties’ leadership control over nomination and party socialisation. The main determinant for the proportion of trustees is how often parties have been represented in government. For delegates the results are mixed, but it is indicated that a high proportion of party identifiers among party voters is related to a high proportion of delegates within parties.

This paper examines the effects of three main forms of campaign communication on voter turnout in the 2013 German Federal Election – party contact, the news media’s political coverage and everyday political discussions. Our study is innovative in that it uses panel data to reduce the problems of endogeneity and examines the impact of each information source controlling for the other two. The results show that media exposure via broadsheet newspapers is the strongest stimulus to turnout, followed by parties’ mediated electioneering efforts. We also find that under certain conditions, exposure to information sources can also demobilize voters.

This paper examines the consequences of the far-right in shaping foreign-born immigrants’ satisfaction with the way democracy works in their host country. It posits that while electorally successful far-right parties undermine democracy satisfaction, the magnitude of this effect is not uniform across all first-generation immigrants. Instead, it depends on newcomers’ citizenship status in their adopted homeland. The analyses using individual-level data collected as part of the five-round European Social Survey (ESS) 2002–2012 in 16 West European democracies reveal that the electoral strength of far-right parties in a form of vote and seat shares won in national elections is indeed powerfully linked to democracy satisfaction among foreign-born individuals. However, this relationship is limited to foreign-born non-citizens, as we have no evidence that far-right parties influence democracy attitudes among foreign-born individuals who have acquired citizenship in their adopted homeland.

The transformation of rebel groups into political parties has captured the attention of scholars of both conflict studies and of party transformation. In this paper we examine the question of rebel party image change by investigating the causes of name changes adopted by a rebel organization as it transforms into a political party after the end of a civil conflict. We develop an analytical framework based upon the extensive literature on party identity change in the West, and apply it to the name changes of rebel parties. Using an original data set of 54 former rebel organizations, we find that factors internal to the organization (such as the degree of inclusivity and the origins of the rebel organization) explain name change more than factors related to the post conflict environment.

This paper brings theoretical and empirical contributions to the scholarship on dimensions of politics in Europe. On the theoretical side it emphasizes the differences between Western and Eastern countries; we argue that while in Western Europe the main dimension of political conflict is the economic left-right, in Eastern Europe the main dimension is more likely to encompass cultural issues associated primarily with what in the Western literature is known as the secondary, social left-right. We trace the origin of the difference to the 1990s when parties in Eastern Europe chose to emphasize cultural issues to appeal to an electorate unfamiliar with capitalist economics and dissatisfied with the economic left associated with Communism and the economic right associated with painful reforms. To test this assertion we apply the Optimal Classification vote scaling method to an original dataset of over 24,000 votes from 22 European parliaments; the statistical tests support the hypothesis.

This paper discusses a new group of parties that we term anti-establishment reform parties (AERPs), which combine moderate social and economic policies with anti-establishment appeals and a desire to change the way politics is conducted. We analyse the electoral breakthroughs of AERPs in central and eastern Europe (CEE), the region where AERPs have so far been most successful. Examples include the Simeon II National Movement, Movement for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) (Bulgaria), Res Publica (Estonia), New Era (Latvia), TOP09 and Public Affairs (Czech Republic) and Positive Slovenia. We examine the conditions under which such parties broke through in nine CEE states in 1997–2012 using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). We find five sufficient causal paths combining high or rising corruption, rising unemployment and party system instability. Rising corruption plays a key role in most pathways but, unexpectedly, AERP breakthroughs are more closely associated with economic good times than bad.

The literature on regionalist parties has traditionally focused on the origins of their electoral strength while their ideology remains an under-explored aspect of territorial party politics. This is surprising because for the question of whether decentralization ‘accommodates’ or ‘empowers’ regionalist pressure one needs to consider both. In this paper we single out the factors that increase the probability of adopting a radical (secessionist) as opposed to a moderate (autonomist) ideological stance, with a particular focus on the effect of decentralization. We make use of a large and original dataset, covering 11 countries, 49 regions, and 78 parties for the 1940s–2000s. Beyond the level of decentralization and decentralization reforms, we analyze the impact of two sets of factors: the first concerns regional identity and includes regional language, regional history and geographical remoteness; while the second concerns institutional/political variables which include voting systems, competition from statewide parties and from other regionalist parties, and office responsibility. We find that all variables matter for regionalist party ideology but with different effects across regional and national electoral arenas. We also find that level of decentralization and regional reform is significantly associated with radicalism, which suggests that policy success and accommodative strategies by statewide parties may lead to a polarization on the centre-periphery dimension.

First of all, this paper explores the rationale for internal party democracy, highlighting the ‘school for democracy’ argument. Second, it identifies three crucial processes as determinants for the level of intra-party democracy; a democratic process for the election of leaders, for the formulation of policies and for coalition making. The first is emphasized. Third, the quality of intra-party democracy in Bangladesh is analysed in terms of party leadership selection and the prevalent practice of dynastic rule. The overall finding is that the degree of internal democracy of political parties in Bangladesh is weak, due to the electoral parties’ weak organizations, strong centralization and prevalent informal decision-making processes controlled by a limited number of party elites (dynastic parties). This general result has important implications regarding the prospects of democratizing party politics and consolidating democracy in Bangladesh.

There is a rich literature in comparative politics discussing what makes democracies fragile and more likely to break down. The question has stimulated a substantial amount of research focusing on the fate of specific countries as well as on large cross-national comparisons over long periods of time. In the last decade several important works in political economy have advanced our understanding of some of the forces that systematically influence regime stability across countries. However, closer examination of the processes at work at the country-level indicates that some this literature’s claims are at odds with the historical evidence. In this paper, we revisit one historical event that has been repeatedly discussed by the literature on democratic breakdown: the rise and fall of Argentine democracy between 1916 and 1930. First, we demonstrate that socioeconomic factors do not furnish a convincing explanation for the 1930 coup. Next, we present an alternative explanation: we argue that the coup was the product of a polarizing political realignment that led to a legitimacy crisis. We examine our argument using estimates of Argentine legislators' latent preferences (ideal points) between 1916 and 1930. The roll call data analysis suggests that disputes over socioeconomic issues did not precipitate the breakdown of the regime. What mattered was the allocation of political power. These findings support the view that stable democracy requires that all major groups in society have a sufficiently large chance of being in power.

It is commonplace to see political parties as fundamentally constrained by public opinion. By contrast, this paper argues that party competition amplifies mass ideological polarization over public policy. Specifically, the investigation concerns the relationship between mass-level ideology and ethnic exclusionism (the call for harsh immigration policies). As party competition intensifies, this relationship strengthens. The party competition thesis is tested by performing a comparative study of Denmark and Sweden. Unlike their Danish counterparts, Swedish political parties have, most of the time, refused to take opposed stands on immigration policy. In effect, the empirical data show that the individual-level association between self-reported ideology and ethnic exclusionism is considerably stronger in Denmark than in Sweden. To investigate the party competition effect in depth, both longitudinal analyses and a cross-sectional analysis are performed. Data cover the period 1990-2008.

The internet offers opportunities for political mobilization that parties are under-exploiting. Drawing on the rational choice approach to party behaviour, this paper builds an argument for why this is the case. I argue that if parties are not using new media to mobilize support, it is because the benefits of using it are uncertain while there are very certain costs – communicational and organizational – involved in the decision. I also argue that party characteristics shape incentives to use the internet for political mobilization and hence help to account for observed differences in party behaviour online. Using evidence from parties in Spain and Catalonia, the study finds that parties that are large, in opposition, non-programmatic, and non-bureaucratic tend to have greater incentives to use the internet for political mobilization, both because they expect to get the largest benefits and to pay the minimum costs from online mobilization.

This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing the strategic interaction between Islamists – pragmatic and dogmatic – and the regime when Shari’a-based issues are negotiated. I advance the new notion that pragmatists might be responsive to the Islamist electorate. Within the framework I generate the hypothesis that, if the regime promotes substantive reforms and the Islamist electorate supports them, then the internal cohesiveness of Islamist parties is weakened. In the case of Family Code reforms in Morocco, empirical analysis confirms that Islamists' change of strategy in 2003 – from opposing to not opposing the reforms – was due to changed preferences within the electorate in favour of reform. This change in preferences was matched by deep divisions within the Islamists of the Parti de la Justice et du Développement and had dramatic repercussions upon the internal cohesiveness of the party.

This paper assesses the extent to which party systems are nationalized in four federations. In doing so, the research addresses two questions. First, is dual accountability operational across decentralized countries, or do sub-national voters turn to national cues as a means to economize in a complex information environment? By bringing a cross-national dataset to bear on this question, we are able to provide insight into where and why dual accountability might operate. Second, what explains variation in the extent to which party systems are nationalized across countries and time? We build on previous literature to suggest a number of factors likely to impact the extent of nationalization. We examine those factors in the context of provincial-level elections in Argentina, Canada, Germany and the United States. Using national and sub-national economic data, we find little evidence of dual accountability in any of our countries. We find that economic performance matters little for regional electoral outcomes, and where it does, sub-national outcomes reflect national rather than sub-national conditions. More important are the roles of partisan relations across levels of government and election timing. Sub-national co-partisans of the nationally governing party lose votes, particularly as the time from the most recent national election grows. The strength of these effects varies across our cases in predictable ways.

Left—right is a convenient tool for summarizing the complexities of voter—party linkages in a manner that is comparable across contexts and that avoids the pathologies of preference aggregation in higher dimensions. Yet several reasons exist to believe that left—right is increasingly incapable of summarizing political behavior: the inability of left—right to capture policy concerns beyond economics and religion; the accumulation of new issue concerns over time; pressures for policy convergence stemming from the globalization of the world economy; and the decline of social cleavages that historically structured vote choice. This paper shows that parties are indeed talking about a growing number of issues, they are converging on the left—right scale, and the ideological cues they are sending to voters are growing increasingly ambiguous. Social democratic parties have in particular been affected by these trends.

How do voters respond to individual worries about the employment situation in elections? This paper examines the effect of issue salience of the employment situation on voter choice. Drawing theoretical insights from the partisan salience of issue voting theories, I argue that voters who previously supported parties on the right are likely to change their political allegiance to support a center-left party when they think the employment issue is one of the most salient issues in the election. Furthermore, I argue that middle income voters are more likely to respond to an increasing salience of the employment issue than other groups are. These theoretical arguments are tested against the post-crisis 2002 Korean presidential election survey data. The empirical evidence from the Korean case suggests that structural reforms of the economy and neoliberal economic policies can evoke particular voting patterns in the voters.

Research on democratic government is currently hampered by the fact that, while theoretical work usually hypothesizes multidimensional policy spaces, empirical researchers have failed to reach a consensus on which dimensions characterize West European policy spaces (apart from the left-right dimension). In this paper, I present evidence that the expert ratings of political parties from Laver and Hunt's (1992) expert survey and the coding of party manifestos undertaken by the Comparative Manifestos Project both suggest the existence of three common dimensions in West European democratic systems: left-right, `social control', and post-materialism. I also show that these dimensions are not characteristic of just a few systems but rather divide parties significantly in most or all of the 16 countries examined.

In their study of 12 Latin American countries, Mainwaring and Scully develop a framework to assess levels of party system institutionalization and explore the impact of the degree of party system institutionalization on democratic consolidation. In this paper, we provide a description of the levels of party system institutionalization in the African context. Employing three criteria adapted from the framework of Mainwaring and Scully, we systematically measure the level of party system institutionalization in 30 African countries. More specifically, we examine (1) regularity of party competition; (2) extent to which parties manifest roots in society; and (3) institutionalization, or the extent to which citizens and organized interests perceive that parties and elections are the means of determining who governs in the 30 countries. Our findings indicate that the level of party system institutionalization is generally lower in African countries than in those of Latin America. However, we find that the length of time during which a country has experience with democracy is an important factor in determining the level of party system institutionalization. The difference in performance between the five long-standing African democracies and those countries new to multipartyism was notable on all of the criteria.

Scholars generally believe that as inter-party competition intensifies, candidates and parties will need to spend more money to win votes. Cox and Thies (1998) extended this claim and argued that in electoral systems that require intra- as well as inter-party competition we also ought to observe a positive relationship between the intensity of intra-party competition and the level of individual campaign spending. They demonstrated such an effect for pre-1993 Japan. However, the relationship between political competition and campaign spending may be a function of the size of the constituency. In larger districts, candidates face far more competitors - from within their party and from other parties - and thus receive poorer information about the quality of the competition. As a result they may lack a basis for deciding whether to spend more or less. In this paper I extend and re-test the Cox and Thies hypotheses using electoral and campaign spending data from Brazil, which has much larger district magnitudes than Japan. In contrast to Cox and Thies, I find no relationship between the quantity of either intra- or inter-party competition and spending, and no relationship between the quality of inter-party competition and spending in large constituencies. However, I do find that candidates continue to respond to the quality of intra-party competition. These results qualify Cox and Thies's findings: in larger-magnitude candidate-centric electoral systems, candidates respond less to the pressures of inter-party competition, but continue to react to the pressures of intra-party competition.

This paper focuses on the relationship between the party central office and the party in public office in the relatively new democracies of Southern and East Central Europe. The analysis reveals that, although the party executives are strongly invaded by public office holders, it is, contrary to expectations, not the party in public office but the party central office that emerges as the most predominant of the two faces. It appears that party organizations in these new democracies are largely controlled from a small centre of power, located at the intersection of the extra-parliamentary organization and the party in public office. This phenomenon, it is argued, can probably be best explained as a device to increase party cohesion and to reduce the potentially destabilizing consequences that emerge from a context of weakly developed party loyalties and a general lack of party institutionalization.

In this paper we analyze the two conventional explanations of the Republican Party's adoption of supply-side economic philosophy in the 1977-81 period: first, that the position change was induced by the Sunbelt component of the party; and second, that the doctrinal shift was brought about by widespread concern with tax policy among the public and the Republican mass in particular. We reveal both arguments to be flawed and suggest that the party's advocation of large across-the-board tax cuts was the result of calculated and coordinated decisions by Washington elites within the party. We provide empirical and theoretical justification for a national elite-led explanation of this event. As a result, our study helps solidify contemporary scholarship that counteracts conventional wisdom in comparative politics and suggests that national American parties, at least when it comes to policy formation, can be relatively hierarchical institutions that shape as much as respond to mass and local behavior.

This paper develops models of minor-party mobilization and electoral success. Models are estimated with data from Australian Senate elections from 1922 to 1998. Existing literature and the Australian experience demonstrate that long-term minor-party activity is conditioned by election rules, economic conditions and other factors. Australian Senate elections have been conducted under a variety of election rules, and thus provide a rare opportunity for modelling the effects of variation in these forces on minor-party activity. Results demonstrate that minor parties mobilize more candidates and receive more votes when electoral rules reduce the proportion of votes necessary to win a seat. Economic decline is also found to increase the mobilization of minor-party candidates and increase voter support.

Why do politicians act in some countries as individual entrepreneurs, seeking a personal vote, and in others as team players soliciting a collective, party vote? This paper argues that different forms of electoral organization are determined by how electoral mechanisms, campaigning regulations and political finance laws structure the career prospects of politicians, as well as the logistical costs they face in communicating with voters.