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How do electoral institutions affect primary competition and legislative behavior? This paper examines the understudied electoral rule known as ballot access laws, advancing the novel theory that denying ballot access to minor candidates forces these outsiders into major parties. I find that in American states that adopt high ballot access thresholds experience higher rates of ideological heterogeneity and primary competition, and those that reduce their thresholds experience a reduction in heterogeneity and competition. Using an original dataset on state-level changes to ballot access thresholds from 1990 to 2018, I find that an increase in the number and types of primary competition leads to an increase in heterogeneity within both party caucuses. This paper adds to the literature on legislative behavior and electoral institutions, demonstrating institutions' role in shaping electoral competition and the ideology of those represented in office. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite considerable progress in the study of party switching, scholarly interest in institutional constraints explicitly designed to limit or penalise inter-party mobility remains limited in the literature. This paper contributes to the emerging scholarship on party switching and legal institutional constrains by assessing the effectiveness of the new anti-defection regulations introduced in the Italian Senate starting from 2018. To evaluate the impact of this intervention, we develop two quasi-experimental research approaches that take advantage of the bicameral structure of the Italian Parliament and the fact that the anti-defection regulations were only implemented in the Senate and not in the Chamber of Deputies. Our results indicate that anti-defection regulations failed both to limit inter-party mobility and the formation of new legislative parties. However, they were effective in influencing the timing of party switching, concentrating it in the phases of government formation and dissolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The impact of party primaries on turnout at the meso level has been particularly under-researched. Thus, the aim of this paper is to explore the determinants of turnout on party primaries by employing an original dataset comprising over 300 selection processes of candidates and leaders in Spain from 1991 to 2021 at both the national and regional level. One of our main findings suggests, in line with what has been affirmed by previous literature, a positive impact of competitiveness on turnout. We also find some contradictory effects of ideology on turnout: as expected most left-wing parties have better turnout averages than right-wing parties, but turnout is higher in primaries organised by right-wing parties. In addition, the type of primaries and the (online-offline) format of the event also appear to be a relevant factor shaping participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to explain why some anti-systemic parties come to power while others remain as permanent opposition or disappear over time. The evidence is sought from the comparative analysis of the socialist Workers' Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi, 1961-1971, permanent opposition) and the pro-Islamic Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, 1983-1998, in power). In particular, the parties are compared and contrasted in terms of their organizational style, leadership structure, and linkage with the voters. The paper argues that while the TIP built a loose and vertical local organization, the RP had a strong grassroots organization cemented through Islamic ideology. Second, while the RP had an unchallenged leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, the TIP had a fragmented leadership resulting from multiple ideological conflicts which undermined the efficiency of the decision-making process and its implementation. Finally, while the TIP was a textbook example of a programmatic party under the guidance of socialist ideology, the RP heavily relied on the distribution of clientelist resources – mostly emanating from its control in the municipalities and central government – to address voters. Overall, the RP took advantage of these strategies to rapidly extend its voter base beyond core voters, particularly in metropolitan areas, while the TIP largely remained restricted to narrow constituencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does politics impact happiness? This paper evaluates how being a political "winner" or "loser" – whether one's preferred party controls government or not – is linked to multiple measures of life satisfaction. Using Gallup survey data on self-reported well-being for Democrats and for Republicans within the U.S. states for 2008–2016 (a time period when party control of government changed in several states) and a difference-in-difference model with two-way fixed effects, I find consistent evidence that citizens report lower levels of well-being when the opposing party controls state government. The substantive effect is particularly large for Democrats living in Republican controlled states. Conversely, there is little evidence that citizens' well-being is boosted when their own party controls state government. These findings have important implications for our understanding about how partisan competition and election outcomes can impact subjective well-being and further highlight the significance of negative partisanship for American public opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We know that political parties play a crucial role in the electoral processes of established democracies. However, we know much less about how this role fades away. In this paper, we study the case of Chile, a country that, until a few years ago, was cited as an example of a stable and institutionalized party system. We study how the phenomenon of independent candidates has shaken the national party system. We use two separate strategies to study this phenomenon. First, we measure the marginal effect of the independent label, compared to other party labels, using a conjoint experiment. Our findings show that candidates who are presented as independents have a significant increase in their probability of being chosen. Second, we measure whether this electoral effect relates to party identification. We find that respondents show low animosity towards independent candidates and high animosity towards traditional parties. Furthermore, a majority of the studied population can be classified as negative partisans. These findings suggest that the recent emergence of independent candidates is a result of negative views on parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central theme emerging from recent research on party competition is that political actors sometimes remain deliberately opaque in their communication. This phenomenon has been investigated under labels such as position-blurring, ambiguity, issue clarity or ideological clarity. In this paper we propose a distinction between two concepts that are sometimes conflated in this literature: ambiguity and vagueness. While ambiguity means that there is substantial variance in parties' positional signals, vagueness denotes political statements that are non-committal in terms of the policy action to be taken or the outcome to be achieved. We explore the co-variation of these two dimensions and their relationship to issue ownership and government status using manifesto data produced by the Austrian National Election Study. These data are unique in that they provide detailed positional information as well as information on policy commitment (election pledges). We show that the two dimensions are uncorrelated and have opposite relationships with issue ownership (vagueness positive, ambiguity negative). We conclude that analyses of position-blurring in party competition should take different strategies of non-clarity in party communication into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What determines party strategies in the short run during election campaigns? In this paper, I highlight a novel aspect of party behavior pertaining to the connection between election programs and actual campaign statements issued by party elites in the media. I argue that party leaders may feel compelled to fine-tune their rhetoric and stances during campaigns and thus deviate from their party's election programs. Nonetheless, their ability to conduct ad-hoc adaptations is limited. The theory I propose posits that two features of party organizations will determine if party leaders can engage in short-term inconsistencies. First, membership-dominated parties will be less likely to be inconsistent because their leaders will fear alienating (the strong) party members and getting punished as a result. Second, parties with strong societal integration—those that maintain strong ties with society and an extensive network of local branches—are more likely to indulge in ideological inconsistency because they establish close bonds with voters based on problem-solving rather than broad ideological principles. I test these dynamics in 14 European democracies between 1972 and 2017 and find strong empirical support. The findings show that intricate party organizations and robust connections with normal citizens influence parties' short-term strategies during election campaigns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foundational studies of political behavior find that university education facilitates the development of political attitudes and shapes socialization outcomes. But in unconsolidated democracies where identity is politically salient and ethnic political parties dominate, education may play a different role in shaping mass politics. In this paper, we develop a framework for understanding the consequences of political party intervention in annual university elections, a common feature of university life in the Middle East and the Global South. We draw on pre- and post-election surveys at the American University of Beirut in Lebanon to argue that ethnic political parties rely on partisan students to act as "party agents" who mobilize unaffiliated students through intensive peer-to-peer contact. Using a conjoint experiment embedded in both survey waves, we show that the university elections increase support in hypothetical national elections for in-group political elites and, to a lesser extent, ethnic political parties. By locating the university as an understudied site of competitive and contentious politics, our findings contribute new insights regarding the role of education in shaping political attitudes. We show that the persistence of ethnic political power can be attributed in part to party activity in less obviously political arenas that have not been systematically studied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of the democratic character of the European Union (EU) has been a center-point of decades of political research. An important critique suggests that the development of the European political arena is still incomplete, with European parliamentarians primarily orienting themselves to national issues and politicians, implying a problematic mismatch between the political arena and their policy jurisdiction. Research has however been limited by methodological difficulties of capturing the level of Europeanization of the political arena. This paper contributes a novel method for measuring Europeanization by studying interactions between the European Parliament to their national parliamentarians on Twitter in 15 EU countries. Contrary to expectations in the literature, we find substantial Europeanization of the political arena. The level of Europeanization furthermore varies greatly across countries and political groups. This has important implications on the debate on EU's democratic deficit, as communication across different levels of parliament indicates democratic debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of 'thin' anti-establishment supply assess mainly the extent of populist messages. This paper analyses the diversity of thin contestation beyond just populism. I conduct a content analysis of 142 social media campaigns by anti-establishment (AEPs) and conventional parties during 23 elections across Europe 2010–2019. We find that in addition to popular will and extra-political technocratic expertise, AEPs increasingly enacted exceptional political calling, depicted as necessary to revive 'true' formal-representative politics itself. Regression analysis shows that political vocation cues played an important auxiliary role in AEP mobilization strategies. On average, those AEPs across the political spectrum which used more political vocation messages performed better electorally ceteris paribus than those which used them less. Conventional parties instead did not universally benefit if they increasingly spotlighted thin messages. The salience of anti-establishment and populism-related rhetoric played a further role within particular AEP groups, but neither was significantly associated with stronger AEP performance altogether. In order to better understand recent political turbulence, it is therefore useful to account for more diverse thin contestation supply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does Green party electoral success lead to increased climate change commitment, and if so how? Drawing on a new OECD database on climate change outlays, we probe indirect influence from Green electoral success as mediated by inter-party competition, and direct mechanisms of influence from elected Green representatives. Our headline finding is that EU membership functions as a contextual catalyst for inter-party competition, with EU governing parties responding to Greens' strong electoral performance by increasing climate change outlays to appeal to environmentally motivated voters. We also find evidence that, both across the OECD cohort and the EU sub-grouping, Green coalition presence is associated with increased climate spending over a political cycle. While direct Green influence through coalition presence is widespread, indirect influence mediated by inter-party competition is conditional on EU membership. Findings fit with literature highlighting systematic difference between EU members' climate performance, and that of other advanced-industrialised states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this research, we explored how foundational issues can become subtext in political discourse by studying how statehood was debated in social media prior to two plebiscites in Puerto Rico. Historically in Puerto Rico, local parties are divided on this issue instead of along the more common conservative versus liberal division that is found in most parts of the United States. We collected the corpus of Twitter communication by members of Puerto Rico's Legislature for the term of 2017-2021. Using latent topic modeling techniques, we classified the political discussion along party lines. Surprisingly, statehood was not a major topic in our model when using the full corpus of data. However, when we filtered the data to include only those tweets discussing statehood and sub-sampled them by major party, the sub-topics within statehood communication became clear and coherent, as was the partisan divide. Ultimately, while there is a clear division about statehood between the parties, the issue has become so intrinsic to the political sphere in Puerto Rico that it no longer commanded significant attention in the political discourse during this period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many democratic societies, research has identified an increase in animosity between supporters of different political parties. While this phenomenon has been extensively examined among the general public, less research has explored the role of political elites in contributing to partisan hostility. This study aims to fill this research gap by analyzing instances where members of parliament (MPs) express negative sentiments toward representatives of opposing parties in legislative speeches. Specifically, we investigate which MPs within parties are driving elite rhetorical polarization. We hypothesize that MPs with less experience in parliament and less experience outside of party politics are more likely to contribute to polarizing speech due to stronger partisan identities. Analyzing Norwegian MPs' speeches between 1998 and 2016, we find support for these hypotheses. Our findings highlight intra-party differences in polarization and contribute new insights into the characteristics that shape polarizing rhetoric among political elites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Party system institutionalization (PSI) is regarded as a critical underpinning of democracy. However, the systematic study of PSI in democracies is constrained by weaknesses in existing measures, which are limited in coverage or comprehensiveness, and do not account for the latent nature of the concept, measurement error, and non-random missing data. This article presents a novel measure of PSI that uses a Bayesian latent variable measurement strategy to overcome extant measurement issues. The subsequent measure not only offers unmatched coverage and has demonstrated validity, but also exhibits more robust empirical associations with a range of outcomes related to the performance of democracy than existing measures. The measure should facilitate more integrated research on the causes and consequences of PSI in democracies around the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political parties around the world have made widely publicized efforts to improve women's representation in elected office. While many have investigated these efforts by focusing on gender dynamics during candidate recruitment and selection, party support for women after they are nominated remains somewhat under-analysed. We begin addressing this gap by asking if central party bodies provide women candidates with additional financial support during general election campaigns. Our study leverages population data capturing intraparty financial transfers within three major parties during the 2008 and 2011 Canadian federal elections (n =1845). The results demonstrate that parties, regardless of ideology, can and do support women candidates with additional campaign funds. However, support from the centre is not always consistent across time or competitive contexts. We conclude that if political parties are sincere in wanting to reduce representational inequities, then consistently providing women candidates with additional financial support is another way of doing so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can junior coalition members overcome the costs of governing in a coalition? In this article, we argue that junior partners can use supranational and subnational political institutions as a venue for signaling disagreement with their coalition partners to mitigate the brand dilution that occurs in the coalition. To test this argument, we use roll-call data from the European Parliament (EP) from 1999-2009 to demonstrate that when intra-coalitional conflict increases, junior parties are more likely to defect from the prime minister's party. In addition, we find that while junior parties in general are no more likely to defect on votes focused on their owned issues, niche parties are more likely to defect from the PM's party on their owned issues as intra-coalitional conflict increases. Our results have important implications for junior party behavior and how multi-level politics can be used to strengthen party brands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers frequently rely on expert surveys to acquire information about political ideology and political parties, which they then use to explore a range of political phenomena such as proximity voting and satisfaction with democracy. Yet it is unclear whether experts and citizens place the parties similarly, which may have important implications for studies that rely on expert data. To what extent do citizens share expert views regarding political party placements? Using original data from Canada, we use multidimensional scaling techniques to examine and compare the responses of academic and journalist experts against a random sample of Canadians to a range of party placement questions. Our results suggest there is considerable variation between citizens and experts, and among specific subgroups of the general population. These findings have important implications for studies of party competition, voting behavior, and government responsiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although studies of political finance reform have become commonplace, many questions remain unanswered in this area. Studies of links between scandals and political finance reform have provided conflicting findings, while little is known about why incumbents force through self-serving reforms in some instances, but cooperate with rivals in others. The 'General Theory of Campaign Finance Reform' reconciles inconsistencies by situating reform processes within the context of party competition. Observing that this framework has not yet been empirically tested, this study undertakes a Congruence Analysis to apply the model to a 40-year period of Australian political finance reform. Hansard is used to document inter-party interactions, in conjunction with quantitative indicators of party competition, organization, and ideology, which outline the changing contexts of reform. Findings indicate that party competition, scandals, and changes in incumbency are influential drivers of reform, while ideological factors play an inconsistent role. Providing insights into causal processes of reform, this article bridges the gap between theoretical and empirical literature on political finance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populism is often seen as a threat to liberal democracy because of its rejection of constitutional constraints and emphasis on popular sovereignty. Others argue that populism is a corrective to mainstream politics and not necessarily anti-democratic. While the relationship between populism and democracy is widely debated in theory and empirically assessed by estimating the effect of populist rule, we analyse discursive references to democracy in election manifestos and tweets of populist radical right (PRRP) and populist radical left (PRLP) parties in seven Western European countries. By mapping populists' discourses on democracy across electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian dimensions, we find that PRLP elaborate a more coherent understanding of democracy (especially its participatory and egalitarian dimensions) and do not reject any dimension. PRRP hardly elaborate on any dimension except participation. PRRP appear as 'void' democrats with ambivalent and incoherent credentials, which at times reject and instrumentalise democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We add new insights to the party theory of parliamentary debate proposed in Proksch and Slapin's The Politics of Parliamentary Debate by combining a quantitative replication analysis of floor speeches with a qualitative explanation of the endogenous transformation of two institutions mediating elections and parliamentary speech in the Japanese Diet. Although the House of Representatives in Japan used a single non-transferable vote system with particularly strong personal vote-seeking incentives, our analysis based on a new dataset shows that, contrary to the theory's predictions, the pattern of speech activities among party leaders and backbenchers is close to that of Germany, which has a party-centered proportional representation system. Such seemingly contradictory results, however, can be consistently understood within the scope of the theory if we consider the patterns of endogenous change in the parliamentary system and party organization. These results highlight the potential for further development of the theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research advancing our understanding of partisan cognitive differences finds symmetrical partisan routes to epistemic hubris: intellectual identity and anti-intellectual affect. These researchers conclude that epistemic hubris is largely due to intellectual identity among Democrats and anti-intellectual affect among Republicans. I investigate whether these relationships are purely due to a greater prevalence of intellectual identity among Democrats and anti-intellectual affect among Republicans or if these constructs are particularly potent in producing epistemic hubris among those who identify with their associated parties. I present observational evidence that partisanship conditions the influence of anti-intellectual affect on epistemic hubris but do not find that partisanship conditions the influence of intellectual identity. Based on these findings, we can expect Red America's increasing anti-intellectualism to contribute to increasing epistemic hubris. More broadly, I provide empirical support for understanding intellectual identity and anti-intellectualism as distinct concepts based on their differing relationships with other fundamental political concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory of promissory representation (Mansbridge, 2003) proposes that voters select parties based on the pledges they made during the campaign. The elected parties then fulfill their promises and at the next election, voters reward or sanction the parties based on their pledge-fulfillment record. However, a fundamental assumption of promissory representation remains to be tested. If voters use party pledges to decide which party to vote for, they need to know which party made which pledges. To test the degree of awareness of citizens to party pledges (a factor we dub pledge awareness), we included a module in the 2019 Canadian Election Study (CES) that tasks citizens to associate correctly six pledges found in the different electoral platforms with their respective parties. We find that while citizens may not know all six pledges included in our study, nonetheless, the most frequently selected answers to our pledge awareness questions are the correct ones. We also find that party identification and the information resources at the disposal of citizens play a large role in the citizen's capacity to succeed at this matching task. Our study indicates that respondents tend to be more aware of the pledges made by the party they identify with, and well-informed respondents are more aware of pledges made by the other parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Labour policies have large impacts on gender equality in the workplace. While political parties play critical roles in policy making, it remains unclear if party-level women's representation impacts labour policies. Therefore, this study examines the relationship between women's representation in intra-party leadership and party policy positions on gender equality in employment. The analyses of 1,955 political parties in 169 countries from 1970 to 2019 find that a higher proportion of women in intra-party leadership results in the party taking stances more likely to favor gender equality in employment. Even among the parties we would expect to be the least women-friendly, a greater representation of women in intra-party leadership has positive influence. More women in leadership means stronger party support for gender equality regardless of ideological party placement. Furthermore, the findings also suggest that women party leaders have greater impacts on labour policies when a party leadership has greater decision-making power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior studies have shown that electoral rules fail to determine the number of parties in new democracies due to the uncertainty of voters and politicians about which parties are viable. Latin American democracies, where electoral volatility has generally remained high and party institutionalization low, have been a primary example of this phenomenon. We argue that even in shifting political environments the fragmentation of the party system is likely to become consistent with the permissiveness of electoral rules and the level of social diversity as voters and party leaders accumulate experience with elections and the rate of electoral regime change declines. We find support for these propositions analyzing an original dataset on Latin American democratic elections. This article contributes to research on electoral systems and political parties by identifying the conditions under which equilibrium electoral outcomes can be expected after a transition to democracy in unstable institutional settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the influence of electoral manifestos on the online communication of electoral candidates. Our study addresses electoral candidates' conflict between party discipline and individual issue prioritisation. Building on the salience framework, we examine the thematic congruence between manifestos and online communication. Moreover, we test which issues are emphasised during the 2017 German federal election campaign. To this end, we created an original topic dictionary based on party manifestos. Applying the dictionary, we classify 143,969 tweets by 797 candidates. Our analyses demonstrate that manifestos shape the online communication of electoral candidates substantially. The findings show that electoral candidates of left–wing parties focus on core issues over time. Our results not only highlight the authority of party leadership, but also suggest that politicians do not tap the whole potential of online communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What happens to an Islamist party after moderating its behaviour and ideology? Existing work on Islamist parties has elaborated the varied causes of moderation. Yet, the mixed findings do not capture the full range of Islamist dynamics. This article draws on a multiyear, interview-based study of the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda to interrogate the process of intraparty change after moderation. Islamist parties face a two-level problem with external and internal trade-offs. I argue that the intraparty characteristics that enable moderation may also contribute to undermining a party's institutional structure and identity as it responds to an uncertain political context. These findings bring processual evidence from Islamist parties into broader explanations of party change and highlight the ongoing effects of moderation, not just its causes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classic spatial theory expects parties to converge on the same ideological position given certain assumptions. Many of these assumptions fail to hold in most countries, which may account for why this prediction frequently fails to materialise. Due to a unique combination of institutions, Australia presents the best chance for the theory to work: all votes must flow to either of the two major parties, parties approximate unitary actors, and elections see turnout as high as any democracy. If convergence should happen anywhere, it should be in Australia, and many argue that Australian parties indeed fulfil this prediction. However, in contrast to much of the literature, we do not find Australian politics to be unusually centrist. Based on five measures of ideology, we do not find convincing evidence that Australia's party system is any more convergent than any other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How are ministerial portfolios distributed among coalition parties in Asian-Pacific democracies? Studies of power-sharing in Asia tend to focus on democratization processes rather than executive cabinets, although government coalitions occur regularly in the region. Using an original dataset of governments in 27 Asian-Pacific democracies from 1945 to 2018, I examine the bargaining advantage of the formateur party - the party managing the government formation process - over other parties entering government. We know from existing studies, mainly on Europe, that government parties holding larger shares of legislative seats receive larger shares of cabinet posts. I argue that portfolio allocation also depends on institutional context, and use the substantial institutional variation across countries in my dataset to test implications of this argument. I find that formateur parties have a greater advantage over coalition partners in presidential systems than in parliamentary ones, but that this advantage diminishes as political constraints facing the formateur increase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does democratic transition affect party polarization? While previous literature on party politics in post-transition environments describes a fragmented political system marked by multi-partism and the rise of weakly institutionalized parties, party polarization in young democracies is underexplored. We argue that democratic transition reduces party polarization by introducing a new set of parties which have not consolidated their issue positions yet. The ambiguity of party positions makes ideological attributes less salient and renders a less polarized party politics. To assess the impact of the party polarization in young democracies, we employ a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD). We use the Manifesto Project data on right-left positions of parties from 58 countries to measure party polarization and the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) data on regime transition to identify democratic transitions. Our findings suggest that party polarization on right-left issue position decreases on average, following the democratic transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although extensive research has analyzed the factors that moderate economic self-interest—the relationship between individuals' income positions and their preferences for redistribution—there is little crossnational research that analyzes the role of political parties. This article argues that political parties play a considerable moderating role in (de-)activating economic self-interest based on the polarization they display in their economic and cultural positions. By combining the World/European Values Survey, the World Income Inequality Database, and the Comparative Manifesto Project datasets, the analyses estimate the moderating effect of party polarization on economic self-interest. The results suggest that economic polarization enhances self-interest for the poor (respondents below the mean income), even when controlling for income inequality, but not for the rich. Moreover, cultural polarization also appears to reinforce self-interest for the poor, rather than supplanting it. The findings have important implications regarding ability for political parties to activate issues among the public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do members of parliament retire? In most parliamentary systems, a substantial number of MPs decide, before every election, not to run again. Though the decision to leave politics is essentially personal, a broader look at a large sample of MPs can reveal the existence of structural factors such as an uneven playing field or other sources of discrimination that could explain why certain individuals stay while others leave. A survey of the current literature indicates that the empirical work on this topic is almost exclusively focused on the US Congress. There is thus a need to conduct more research in other contexts to generate a more general explanation of why MPs leave politics on their own terms. The current literature suggests that the decision to leave could be explained by a complex combination of variables that are personal, partisan, and contextual. The purpose of this article is to better understand why sitting MPs decide not to run for re-election in parliamentary systems, focusing on three Westminster systems: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand since 1945. Various factors play a role, but our results suggest that as time passes, parliamentarians simply become less prone to seeking reelection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The party affiliation of cabinet ministers is a critical but neglected notion. While its application and theoretical centrality is indisputable in many research fields, explicit definitions are difficult to find, while operationalizations tend to rely on rudimentary categorizations. Departing from formulating a definition consistent with the party government model, we propose a flexible typology to categorize and rank variants of partisans both within and beyond consolidated parliamentary democracies. We show that the new approach can capture important unobserved dynamics well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using over 20,000 electoral slates from municipal elections in the Czech Republic, we document that in proportional representation electoral systems political parties rank candidates on the slates systematically according to their valence, measured by educational attainment, and intra-party value, measured by political donations and membership. The observed patterns are consistent with market mechanisms where the party leaders benefit from the valence and intra-party value of candidates and offer slate positions (i.e. the probability of winning a mandate) in exchange. We show that candidates with high valence and those who possess more intra-party value are placed in better-ranked positions, despite the fact that candidates with more intra-party value, conditional on observables, tend to receive relatively fewer votes than candidates with low intra-party value. We further show that as a party expects to hold more council seats, the share of their candidates with higher intra-party value increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We demonstrate effects of political preferences on interpersonal interactions in the environment of the highly unstable and volatile party system of the Czech Republic. The effects of partisanship on interpersonal relations are compared to the effects of attitudes on a salient issue. Two experiments confirm the potential of political partisanship to affect the individual's ingroup preferences and outgroup biases, which can influence willingness to converse with others in the context of an unstable party system. In a conjoint experiment, dis/agreement on immigration has comparable effects on interpersonal interactions. Avoidance of interactions with out-partisans is amplified when out-partisans talk about politics often. The patterns of ingroup preferences and outgroup biases are replicated in a trust game experiment. Both partisanship and immigration attitudes influence how subjects interact with others. Given the political context, the study provides a hard test of politically motivated ingroup and outgroup biases stemming both from party and policy preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Issue salience is a fundamental component of party competition, yet we know little about when, where, or why parties' issue emphases converge or diverge. I propose an original operationalization of issue salience divergence, the extent to which parties' issue emphases differ from each other in an election, that generates values at the party-election and country-election levels. I leverage data from party manifestos to calculate scores for 2,308 party-election combinations of 381 unique parties in 426 elections across thirty European countries, the most comprehensive dataset to date. I find that issue salience divergence is generally low and has starkly decreased over time, but countries and parties differ substantially. As an initial step in understanding these differences, I propose and test initial expectations of how party and democracy age, electoral systems, and party type alter the incentives for divergent issue salience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent increase of democratic declines around the world – "the third wave of autocratization" – has sparked a new generation of studies on the topic. Scholars tend to agree that the main threat to contemporary democracy arises from democratically elected rulers who gradually erode democratic norms. Is it possible to identify future autocratizers before they win power in elections? Linz (1978) and Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) suggest that a lacking commitment to democratic norms reveals would-be autocratizers before they reach office. This article argues that the concept of anti-pluralism rather than populism or extreme ideology captures this. We use a new expert-coded data set on virtually all relevant political parties worldwide from 1970 to 2019 (V-Party) to create a new Anti-Pluralism Index (API) to provide the first systematic empirical test of this argument. We find substantial evidence validating that the API and Linz's litmus-test indicators signal leaders and parties that will derail democracy if and when they come into power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many Western parties have opened up the process of leadership selection in order to increase the party's attractiveness, but negative reactions of losers in such contests might undermine these efforts. It has extensively been documented that losers of elections or referendums become less supportive of the political system, but the question is whether such a winner-loser gap also occurs in the context of intra-party elections. We examine unique panel data collected before and after the leadership elections of the Flemish Christian-Democratic Party and Liberal-Democratic Party and investigate the difference in change in attitudes and behavior of party members who voted for the losing candidates and those who voted for the winner. Contrary to earlier research on candidate selection, we find that only decision acceptance differs between winners and losers, while there is no gap in support for the electoral process, party membership satisfaction, and members' activity within the party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Candidate selection is one of the most relevant tasks of parties and has important consequences for various aspects of political representation. While previous research has addressed many important aspects of the candidate selection process, we know little about the question of which candidate characteristics are preferred by party members. We address this research gap by conducting a conjoint experiment among more than 300 local party leaders in Germany. In the experiment, potential candidates differed on various important dimensions regarding their socio-demographic background, prior political experience, local roots, and work within the political party. We find that prior political experience and engagement within the party are the most important features. However, socio-demographic characteristics and deviation from the party line also matter. These findings have implications for theories of descriptive representation as well as the impact of decentralization on party cohesiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]