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This paper examines when parties listen to interest groups and adopt their input. Interest group information can help parties bolster their positions, and by taking their input into account, parties show that they are responsive to the groups’ interests which can increase their appeal to their constituents. Listening to interest groups can, however, also repel voters who disagree with the groups’ positions. This paper argues that party and issue-level characteristics affect whether the benefits of listening to interest groups exceed the costs. Examining more than 25,000 party-interest group observations on 88 Norwegian policy proposals and using a text reuse approach to measure interest group influence, the findings indicate that public salience, party issue emphasis, interest group coalitions, and government status affect parties’ propensity to listen. This implies that interest groups can be a pertinent source of information for parties under certain circumstances which affects the link between voters and parties.

Party membership seems to lose relevance for political careers in many established democracies. Increasing numbers of parties are recruiting non-members as candidates. Yet, what are the implications of a lack of long-term party membership for party cohesion? In this paper, I argue that pre-parliamentary party membership is in fact crucial for cohesion. Using data from the Comparative Candidate Survey and voting behavior of ca. 2,000 MPs of the German Bundestag on free votes from 1953 to 2013, I examine the effect of length of previous party membership and the age of joining the party on indicators of party cohesion. Examining free votes allows for credibly controlling alternative explanations of unified voting behavior. Results are in line with expectations generated from social identity theory and underscore the importance of party membership for party cohesion. The paper concludes with a discussion on the findings’ implications in light of recent developments in parties’ candidate recruitment.

Published on 1 May 2020 This essay introduces a collection of papers dealing with the responsive–responsible dilemma of party government. The political developments surrounding the Eurozone crisis attest that the duties of government and the demands of political representation may at times be in sharp contrast with one another. In such contexts, it becomes hard for parties in government to combine responsiveness with responsible policy-making. Late Peter Mair theorized this phenomenon as the increasing bifurcation between the growing complexity of governing in a world of interdependence and the need to respond to often polarizing electoral demands. The key question is whether and how in such contexts parties find the balance between their representative and governing duties. The papers included in this special issue deal with this question in the context of the Eurozone crisis and present evidence about parties’ behavior, rhetoric, and policy outputs. In introducing the contributions here, we illustrate how this collective endeavor helps advance the debate on the major challenges to contemporary representative democracy. More specifically, we first discuss how the framework of the responsive–responsible dilemma helps understanding contemporary political developments. We then critically reflect on the distinction between responsiveness and responsibility. Finally, we present how each individual contribution approaches the question of how parties manage the tension between electoral incentives and governmental duties.

The issue positions of political actors are often ambiguous, resulting in uncertainty on the part of voters. Such ambiguity constitutes a challenge to representation, as it prevents voters from getting a clear understanding of parties’ positions. Ironically, despite growing interest in the concept, the concept itself is remarkably ambiguous: different studies use different conceptualisations of ambiguity, which hampers theory integration. This paper proposes a three-dimensional conceptualization of ambiguity: party positions are ambiguous to the extent that parties deemphasize them, remain vague or inconsistent on them. A review of 103 studies establishes the prevalence of these three dimensions in the literature, shows that most studies focus on a single dimension, and reveals lacunae in the current research on ambiguity. Based on the three-dimensional conceptualisation, the paper then develops a preliminary framework on the causes of ambiguity, outlines key gaps in the literature and suggests promising avenues of theory development.

While the subject of populism receives increasing scholarly attention from both political scientists and criminologists, so far these two bodies of literature have existed mostly in isolation of each other. This paper aims to connect them by investigating whether parties that political scientists describe as populist are likely to evince positions on criminal justice that criminologists describe as populist. Relying on a secondary data analysis comparing mainstream right-wing and populist right-wing parties for 131 elections in 24 countries since 1973, this paper concludes that the populist right on average expresses slightly more support for penal populism than the mainstream right, but that its positioning is crucially shaped by considerations relating to issues of immigration and multiculturalism. These findings suggest that most contemporary populist parties on the right primarily pursue a nativist agenda and will only invoke penal populism when it fits this overall strategy.

This paper investigates the effect of macro-economic conditions on partisan policymaking through an analysis of novel data on the fulfilment of 2412 Italian pledges. Are parties able to produce ideologically driven policies even during economic downturns? And how does the economic context affect parties’ capacity to fulfil their pledges? In this paper, I contend that the interaction between macroeconomic conditions and the policymaking process is more complex than it is usually depicted and cannot be restricted to the constraints, financial above all, engendered by a recession period. Results from binary logistic regressions indeed suggest that parties do maintain a certain room for manoeuvre to influence the governing agenda in times of crisis. Even though in some cases pledge fulfilment is severely affected by deteriorations of economic conditions, parties are still able to carry out a large share of their programmatic priorities. Moreover, the economic situation mostly challenges left-leaning governments.

This paper assesses how parties strategically vary their populist positions in party competition. The useful conceptualization of populism as a matter of degree has been established by previous studies. However, we know little about the conditions that drive parties to alter their degree of populism and, importantly, whether this varies between mainstream and populist parties. This paper analyzes the impact of vote and office loss on parties’ populist position-taking. It draws upon German and Austrian parliamentary debate speeches from the 1990s until 2018. Populism is measured using a dictionary method, an automated text analysis approach. The results show that parties react to contextual incentives by altering their degree of populism. Mainstream and populist parties are more populist when in opposition. Electoral losses affect mainstream and populist parties less clearly. The contribution of this paper is to integrate research on populism with a theoretical framework on party competition.

The polarization of political parties in the United States is a well-documented phenomenon. This paper considers polarization of the judicial branch and relates it to the evolution of the parties. In this paper we define polarization specifically as movement from a modal distribution (of votes, attitudes, or decisions) to a bimodal distribution along a liberal-conservative spectrum over time. Using data compiled from 90,000 United States District Court decisions published in the Federal Supplement between 1934 and 2008, we find that the judiciary began to polarize in the 1960s and has remained polarized. We consider a number of competing explanations for the polarization of the district courts, including a top-down view that emphasizes presidential power and a bottom-up view that focuses on the sorting of elites that form the pool of potential judges.

Our paper addresses why a moderate presidential candidate would select an extreme running mate, as was the case in the 2012 US presidential election. To address this question, we designed a one-dimensional policy game in which a moderate challenger uses their vice-presidential candidate as a policy tool to alter the median voter participating in the election. Our main conclusion is that the median voter is altered through a mobilization effect, by increasing own party turnout through the convincing of the more extreme segment of a party to participate in the election, rather than altering the voter’s decision to vote for a particular candidate. This decision function only has a marginal effect on independent voters. Our conclusion is in line with recent empirical advances in the literature and our paper aims to more formally ground these advancements in theory. We developed a set of comparative statics to apply the theory of running mate selection more broadly, germane beyond the case of the 2012 presidential election used to frame this topic. Our model also determines the optimal difference between the platforms of a challenger and their vice-presidential candidate.

This paper addresses the electoral consequences of the German government’s anti-nuclear power policy shift after the Fukushima accident. Building on a cost-benefit framework and insights from political psychology, the theoretical analysis anticipates that the policy shift could not earn governing parties additional votes but could avoid vote loss. Utilizing data from multiple surveys and employing simulation techniques, the evidence demonstrates that voters, in particular incumbents’ supporters, became more skeptical of nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster. At the same time, governing parties’ supporters were particularly eager to perceive a credible change in the government’s nuclear power stance. As a consequence, governing parties did not garner additional votes but inhibited their supporters from voting for other parties and thus avoided vote loss. Generally speaking, the novel approach proposed in this paper is suitable for shedding light on electoral effects of parties’ policy shifts that have thus far gone unnoticed.

In multi-level systems, state-wide parties are faced with particular challenges. Competing in elections on multiple levels of the polity, such parties juggle the desire for national recognizability and the need to be responsive to regional particularities. In this paper, I reflect on the delegation model of multi-level party politics, which is a theoretical perspective of great importance in the literature, arguing that the accuracy of the model depends on two critical assumptions. Based on these theoretical considerations, I develop the model further and apply it to the case of the two main Spanish state-wide parties, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and the Partido Popular (PP). More specifically, the programmatic positions of their regional branches are analyzed, and it is shown that the framework manifestos issued by the national party organizations shape these to a large extent. While this case is used to illustrate the illuminating potential of the extended delegation model, the paper is similarly attentive to the limitations of the model and also hints at the implications for our conception of democracy in multi-level systems.

In the aftermath of the 2009 national elections in India a number of commentators observed that Indian party politics is a dynastic affair. Why is this the case? This paper claims that absence of a party organization, independent civil society associations that mobilize support for the party, and centralized financing of elections has led to the emergence and sustenance of dynastic parties in India. The paper assesses the impact of dynastic parties and shows that not only are party systems more volatile when parties are dynastic but more important, dynastic parties serve to make the political system less representative.

The literature on Western European parliaments has long pointed to an increase in non-legislative activities, including questions to the minister and interpellations; however, it has struggled to explain this development. This paper argues that the explanation ought to be sought in the increased importance of issue competition among political parties in Western Europe. Political parties are increasingly competing over which issues should dominate politics. In issue competition, non-legislative activities are attractive for opposition parties, because governments must respond to the issues the opposition wants to focus on. The paper thus argues that the key to understanding the development of activities in Western European parliaments is to bring parties and theories of party competition into the study of these activities. The argument is tested and supported by showing that the growth in non-legislative activities in Western Europe is universal as well as by demonstrating how the content of questions to the minister in Denmark reveals a clear issue competition pattern.

Expert surveys have become increasingly popular among political scientists. One of the problems of using surveys (of any sort) to estimate party positions is that respondents can be influenced by their subjective political views. As a consequence, experts may give biased responses, and such (ideological) bias may affect certain parties more than others. In this paper, we use the latest expert survey of Benoit and Laver (2006) to unfold the ideal points of the respondents to the survey. By employing the estimated ideal points, we show that in almost 16 percent of the cases analyzed, there is evidence of an ideological bias in the experts’ placements of parties along the left—right dimension, especially among right-wing parties (but not necessarily extreme-right parties). We examine two methods designed to generate less biased estimates. The first one is directly based on a regression technique, while the second is based on the negligibility of ideological bias in experts’ answers to more specific policy questions. The paper concludes by examining the consequences of these findings for empirical research.

What determines the credibility of opinion polls, and for whom? Opinion polls assessing voting intention are an increasingly prominent aspect of pre-election media discourse, yet they often vary in terms of their estimations, who conducted the poll, and where the poll is ultimately published. This research note considers the determinants of pre-election poll credibility when citizens are exposed to conflicting polls, contributing to a growing field which considers the subjectivity with which partisan-relevant information is perceived in polarised contexts. Using a conjoint analysis in Turkey, this paper produces strong evidence that polls are perceived differently across partisan lines. Whereas government supporters rely almost exclusively on a poll’s result, opposition supporters place considerably more weight on the media source when determining poll credibility.

Parties face a dilemma when confronted with shifting public opinion or changing rival parties’ issue positions: while ignoring ongoing changes could lead to electoral losses, position shifts on a salient issue might be perceived as flip- flopping and alienate supporters. This paper proposes a model combining positional and framing approaches in order to understand how parties can shift their position on a specific issue without losing face. The empirical analysis of rhetoric-based estimates of party strategies draws upon a corpus of 8790 press releases issued by Swiss parties between 2007 and 2016 on the issue of migration. The results show that parties, rather than bluntly shifting their opinion on the issue, prefer to draw the public’s attention toward another set of frames that allows for a different position. These results have important implications for our understanding of parties’ competition on issues, as well as for the literature on mass-elite linkages.

How does an authoritarian past shape voters’ left-right orientation? Recent studies investigate “anti-dictator bias” in political ideology, where citizens in a former right-wing (left-wing) dictatorship may display a leftist (rightist) bias in their ideological self-identification. In this paper, I provide evidence for a “pro-dictator bias” where citizens hold ideological positions close to those of the dictator, depending on their experiences prior to transition. In countries with high economic growth under dictatorship and without violent ruling party ouster, authoritarian successors could continue mobilizing the popular base and invoke positive sentiment on the past in democratic elections. Such positive sentiment can facilitate individual ideological orientation close to the ideological label of the former dictatorship. I test this hypothesis by combining individual- and country-level data covering 1985 to 2018 from 48 countries. I demonstrate that voters in countries with high economic growth during dictatorship and without violent party exit are more likely to have pro-dictator bias in ideology. I further show that voters in former developmental states show pro-dictator bias from the history of economic growth and more peaceful transition. The findings emphasize the role of pre-transition features in shaping alternative legacies on voter attitudes in post-authoritarian societies.

This paper analyses the dramatic reduction in the numbers of white southern Democrats in the US House of Representatives since 1992. After 30 years of gradual erosion as a political force on Capitol Hill, the decline in white southern Democratic numbers has markedly accelerated during the 1990s. Georgia's House delegation includes not a single white Democrat, and Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina had only one as of 1998. Moreover, in many of the southern US House districts that they continue to hold, white Democrats are clinging onto office by precarious electoral margins. The reduction in southern white Democratic members became noticeable in the 1992 elections and escalated in the 1994 national Republican landslide. The underlying movement continued in 1996 despite a national trend toward the Democrats in the House elections. In this paper, several hypotheses of this decline are tested: (1) redistricting and the creation of majority-minority districts following the 1990 census; (2) retirement of white Democratic incumbents; (3) increasing levels of campaign spending by Republican challengers; and (4) Republican realignment. We find that a combination of race-based redistricting and the overwhelming success of GOP candidates in open-seat elections combined with favorable partisan tides to produce the southern Republican majorities of 1994 and 1996. We conclude that this is the culmination of a process of secular realignment, and there are no indications that this reversal of fortune for the Democrats will change anytime soon.

The growing importance of religious conservatives within the Republican Party is one of the most interesting aspects of evolving party coalitions in the USA. However, their identification has proved to be difficult because of different operational definitions of religious conservatives. In this paper, an alternative operational definition is posited, identifying conservative Republicans for whom religion is an important part of their lives. The paper proceeds by using this definition to estimate the number of religious conservatives in the mass electorate, and their political distinctiveness compared to other Republicans. While the definition used in this paper is a broad one, it is demonstrated that in terms of voting behavior and issue preferences, a `religious' conservative Republican is qualitatively distinct from a `secular' conservative Republican.

In autocratic-leaning countries, the level of genuine public support for ruling parties and reasons driving it are often unclear. While such parties often rely on violence, electoral manipulation, and corruption to help maintain power, maintaining legitimate popularity is the ideal. Parties that emerged from national liberation struggles and other extraordinary events are thought to have developed strong branding and organizational structures. This paper tests the determinants of ruling party identification among Zimbabweans through seven geo-coded rounds of Afrobarometer data. First, genuine ruling party support is estimated to be exaggerated in public opinion surveys, but not insignificant. The ruling party’s base of support is centered in rural areas that experienced the greatest concentration of guerrilla activity during the liberation war. Respondents from the liberation generation are also more likely to support the ruling party, and view the party as tied to nationalism. The liberation war generated and solidified ruling party stronghold areas through democratic advantages such as nationalistic branding and robust party organization structures as well as autocratic tools such as the capture of traditional leaders, politicization of the military, and the use of violence against dissidents.

The design of election ballots can influence voters’ behavior. Features of the ballot are particularly important if they systematically harm the electoral chances of some groups. In Brazil, voters type the four or five-digit number of their chosen candidate into an electronic voting machine to cast a ballot. Some numbers have sequences that are easier to memorize and recall than others. I show that candidates with memorable numbers receive a boost in their vote share. Moreover, I demonstrate that women are less likely to be assigned memorable numbers. This paper highlights the importance of thinking thoroughly about the implications of seemingly innocuous characteristics of voting procedures.

Why do political parties implement primary elections? With multi-party elections firmly established, political parties in many young democracies have begun to democratize internally by adopting mass primaries. Previous work argues that parties institute primaries to select for high quality candidates, incentivize campaigning effort, and reduce intra-party conflict. In this paper, I theorize that parties also implement mass primaries to open up the political elite while protecting their most senior members. Consistent with this hypothesis, using original data from Botswana’s ruling party, I find that primaries facilitate a limited and controlled turnover, decreasing the likelihood of re-nomination of long-term incumbents in favor of political newcomers while still protecting senior ministers. Combined with qualitative and historical evidence, these results suggest that electorally successful political parties may implement mass primaries to replace unpopular and entrenched leaders.

Several theories have been created to explain party unity in Congress, but previous studies have generally assumed the same factors affect party unity for both parties. Given the differences between the two parties (the ideological heterogeneity of their electoral coalitions, how the party’s electoral coalitions view partisanship, etc.), this assumption may limit our understanding of the sources of party unity. In this paper, I test three theories of party unity (cartel theory, Conditional Party Government, and Strategic Party Government) on separate panels for the two parties. I find cartel theory helps explain party unity for both parties, but, unlike what has previously been argued, I find this is not entirely due to Reed’s Rules. I further find Conditional Party Government better explains party unity for the Republicans, while Strategic Party Government better explains party unity for the Democrats. I provide theoretical reasons for these findings and how they may impact future research.

Historically, ethnicity has been considered to play a fundamental role in voting behaviour in Africa. However, researchers on the issue have found contradictory conclusions. The most recent research concludes that the African voter is more rational than expected. Overall ethnicity seems to be less influential than theory used to suggest. Against this background, this paper analyses vote for governing party in Africa and presents evidence that the method and data set used will have an important influence upon the final result. The research takes form of a quantitative analysis making extensive use of survey data from 2005 to 2019. Results indicate that ethnicity, although not exclusively, is still an explanatory factor. At a glance, African vote is rationally ethnic.

The analysis of Latin American party systems should be supplemented by the analysis of ideological blocs in order to enhance comparability and to revive the study of the content of party politics in the region. This paper presents a new set of data that makes the analysis of Latin American blocs possible for the first time. The data cover 166 20th-century elections in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The paper also describes indicators of four party-system characteristics--Mean Left- Right Position, Left-Right Polarization, Adjusted Bloc Volatility, and the Effective Number of Blocs. The data confirm some of the conventional wisdom about Latin American party systems, but also put them in clearer comparative perspective. The evolution of these four characteristics in each country shows that party systems are not merely passive reflections of what the voters want, nor are they simply monuments to political engineering or the skill of party strategists. Rather, they are the product of a continuously evolving interaction among all these forces. Political scientists must be willing to go beyond typologies and use appropriate analytic tools in order to grapple with the dynamic diversity found in Latin American party systems. (NOTE: Some of the data used in this paper are tentative or incomplete, and subject to change

This paper takes a number of theories that have been used to analyse government formation in West European parliamentary democracies and applies them to the government formation process in Japan after the 1996 general election. These models underline the continuing importance of the LDP in the government formation process, despite the loss of its overall majority. The application of government formation models to the Japanese case also highlights the weakness of the typical assumption that sees parties as unitary actors. The paper thus concludes with some speculations as to how this assumption might usefully be relaxed to incorporate party factions, splits and fusions and thereby generate more dynamic models of the making and breaking of governments.

The concept of institutionalization is widely employed but often poorly defined in the literature on political parties. This paper argues that `institutionalization' as it is frequently used encompasses a diverse set of meanings that are better thought of as conceptually distinct. The paper examines two phenomena that have been widely associated with institutionalization: `value infusion' and `behavioral routinization'. It uses the case of Peronism in Argentina, which is infused with value but poorly routinized, to demonstrate that these phenomena can vary independently. The paper argues that the failure to make these conceptual distinctions may pose serious problems for causal analysis. As an example, it shows how different conceptions of institutionalization lead to opposing arguments about the relation between institutionalization and the capacity of parties to adapt to changing electoral and policy environments. The paper then examines the distinction between formal and informal routinization with respect to political parties, arguing that many studies of political parties fail to incorporate informally routinized behavior patterns into their conceptions of institutionalization.

If we want to know what is happening to political parties today, the answer depends in part on how we define the term `party' and in part on the time frame used for analysis. In this paper we focus on parties as voting coalitions in the US House and the Senate over the last 40 years. To assess the ideological placement and cohesiveness of each party in the House and Senate, we use adjusted scores issued by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Our adjustment corrects for changes in the ADA's scale from year to year. The analysis is carried out by focusing on each of the four main regional factions comprising the parties. The cross-chamber comparisons for the Republicans show a high degree of stability with respect to ideological placement and cohesiveness; eastern Republicans maintain a more liberal stance throughout the period of analysis. For Democrats in both chambers there has been a liberal shift in recent years and an increase in cohesiveness overall; the southern Democrats are distinctively more conservative than the rest of the party, although less so in recent years. Both of the `outlier' factions (eastern Republicans and southern Democrats) unexpectedly display less cohesiveness than do the mainline factions of their respective parties. The paper concludes with some discussion of why this may be the case, what the future holds for outlier cohesiveness, and implications for responsible parties in the United States.

This paper represents part of an ongoing attempt to understand the nature of party formation and change in electoral democracies. The original goal was to account for the weakness of East European parties and party systems. This remains an important topic because weak parties are thought to be indicative of weaknesses in the democratic regimes themselves. Finding the theories of area specialists lacking, the author turned to traditional theories of party formation and change, which were created to explain these phenomena in the western setting. These theories, combined with the contextual insights provided by area specialists, provide considerable leverage on the question of party formation and change in Eastern Europe. In this paper, the author attempts to develop and provide evidence in support of a theory of party formation based on political choice in which actors operate not in a vacuum, but in a context that both constrains and provides resources for agency.

In this analysis, we examine the effect of party-voter linkages on executive and legislative influence over policymaking in democracies throughout the world. We expect committees in legislatures with programmatic parties to have more power over the public policymaking process than committees in legislatures with clientelistic parties. We also expect executives in countries with programmatic parties to have less power over the public policymaking process than executives in countries with clientelistic parties. Using data from the Varieties of Democracy Dataset and controlling for relevant factors, we find support for our expectations. The results of this paper shed light on how party linkages to constituents can affect executive and legislative influence over policymaking.

In spite of the growing academic interest in party law in Latin America, we still lack a comprehensive account of how party regulatory frameworks evolved from the time of transitions to the present. This paper aims to fill this gap. In doing so, it makes a double contribution to the field of party regulation. On the one hand, it systematizes, for the first time, all the reforms adopted in Latin America over the last four decades. On the other hand, it introduces a theoretical innovation by using the concept of normative paradigms to analyze a process of legislative change. The main argument of this article is that a permissive paradigm was gradually but overwhelmingly replaced by a prescriptive approach, which conceives parties as semi-state institutions. This shift sheds light on the changing linkages between parties and the state in Latin America.

Existing analyses of opposition pre-electoral alliance formation in electoral autocracies neglect their coordinated election campaigns against incumbent autocrats. This paper argues that opposition alliance joint campaigns can increase the salience of the anti-regime cleavage, signal mutual compromise, and highlight the positive material and policy gains voters will reap following regime defeat. Together, they persuade ideologically and ethnically disparate opposition supporters to engage in the cross-party strategic voting necessary to maximize opposition vote share and their chances of winning. Empirical findings from Malaysia’s historic 2018 general elections support the theory’s propositions. A pre-electoral survey experiment estimates that an opposition alliance’s joint campaigns increases cross-party strategic voting by about 10 percentage points among opposition voters. Field interviews and ethnographic observation during the election campaigning revealed the diverse methods and mechanisms of joint campaigns. Malaysia’s Pakatan Harapan opposition alliance eventually prevailed through a combination of joint campaigning against a flailing incumbent.

Government formation in multiparty systems requires election winners to strike deals to form a coalition government. Do voters respond and how do they respond to coalition government deals? This paper examines the short-term consequences of coalition government formation on voters in European democracies relying on survey panel data and original content analysis of coalition agreements. It tests theoretical expectations that deal with both the actual and perceived ideological shifts parties make when joining coalition deals as well as the effect of a much simpler heuristic cue based on preferences. The findings indicate that coalition deals have consequences on party preferences, but voter perceptions play a much stronger effect than the actual content of coalition deals. These results have important implications for our understanding of public opinion and provide important insights into the current difficulties and challenges of government formation and representative democracy.

The conventional view of Africa’s political parties holds that they are organizationally weak, with little presence at the grass roots. Yet, few studies are based on systematically collected data about more than a handful of parties or countries at any given point. In this paper, we attempt to remedy this situation, by focusing on one crucial aspect of party organization – the local presence that enables political parties to engage with and mobilize voters during and between elections – and developing the first systematic, survey-based measure of the extent of this presence across 35 countries. We draw on a wide variety of data to demonstrate the validity and reliability of this new index, and in the process showcase its ability to be calculated at a number of different levels. Finally, we illustrate its utility by applying it to a key substantive question in the literature.

Previous research into the relationship between income inequality and turnout inequality has produced mixed results, as consensus is lacking whether inequality reduces turnout for all income groups, low-income earners, or no one. Therefore, this paper builds on this literature by introducing supply-side logic, through the first individual-level test of the impact that income inequality (moderated by policy manifesto positions) has on turnout. It does so through multilevel logistic regressions utilizing mixed effects, on a sample of 30 advanced democracies in 102 elections from 1996 to 2016. It finds that higher levels of income inequality significantly reduce turnout and widen the turnout gap between rich and poor. However, it also finds that when party systems are more polarized, low-income earners are mobilized the greatest extent coupled with higher inequality, resulting in a significantly reduced income gap in turnout. The findings magnify the negative impacts income inequality can exert on political behavior and contribute to the study of policy offerings as a key moderating mechanism in the relationship.

Does party ambivalence, that is, simultaneously evaluating positively more than one political party, decrease turnout? The extant literature on this question is limited to the American case, and findings are rather mixed. Using the data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project, this paper provides a first large-scale comparative analysis of the ambivalence-turnout nexus in 46 countries. Based on two different ambivalence measures, I show that party ambivalence is more prevalent in multiparty systems and that a substantial portion of citizens are ambivalent. Moreover, ambivalence, on average, reduces turnout by at least 4.5 percentage points across countries. Importantly, however, this is not the case for every country. Whether ambivalence decreases voter turnout is conditioned by macro-level factors. More specifically, ambivalence tends to dampen turnout in (1) polarized contexts, (2) parliamentary systems, (3) voluntary voting countries, and (4) less fragmented systems.

Data de publicació electrónica: 17-03-2021 This paper explores an alternative mechanism for understanding the drivers of the nomination of women for elective office in single-member electoral systems. Previous research has generally examined two sources of gender-based politics: party ideology, with leftist parties being more female-friendly than rightist parties, and the strategic nomination of candidates depending on whether the party is expected to win or lose in the district, with women more likely to be used as ‘sacrificial lambs’ in hopeless contests. We argue that the nomination of male and female candidates across districts reflects an interdependence of party strategies – in particular, the actions of the main opposition party. We hypothesise that when the trailing party is not committed to gender equality, its equilibrium strategy in a given district is the nomination of a candidate of the same gender as that of the front-running party. Secondary data from 1,017 single-member Australian districts and more than 2,000 candidates from 2001–2019 confirm our hypothesis. We acknowledge support from the Australian Research Council Discovery Project [Grant Number: DP190101978], the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness [Grant number: CSO2017-85024-C2-1-P (AEI/FEDER)], and ICREA, under the ICREA Academia programme.

Populist parties foment discontent with the establishment. Previous studies explored whether sentiments of discontent and protest can predict populist voting. In this paper, we argue that past electoral protest in a community, rather than merely a sense of discontent, is a good predictor of new populist lists and their electoral support. We explore this connection using blank voting, a measure that allows a systematic and unbiased evaluation of protest at the municipal level. We first test our theory on the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S). Controlling for economic and demographic variables, we demonstrate that in municipalities with high blank vote in previous elections, the probability of new M5S lists and M5S vote share were higher. Testing the generalizability of our theory using cross-national populism data, we show that past protest in the form of blank/null voting is a strong predictor of the level of populist rhetoric in a political system.

Are party members more radical than voters and party elites? This is the expectation according to May’s Law, which has faced significant challenges from recent scholarship. Utilizing several survey sources covering four levels of all Swedish parliamentary parties between 1985 and 2018, this paper shows that the Swedish case follows May’s propositions with some qualifications. The parties organized along the left-right dimension follow the pattern of the mid-level being more radical in this respect, while on a secondary GAL-TAN dimension the parties that organize along this dimension rather exhibit a pattern of elite polarization. Additionally, the relative order of groups within parties is stable over the considered time period, when party membership is sharply declining. This suggests that party members are not becoming less ideologically representative over time, while they are consistently more radical than respective parties’ voters and elites.

Data de publicació electrónica: 27-01-2021 This paper examines the effect of party primaries on women’s chances of winning a leadership contest in eight Western parliamentary countries since 1985. By doing so, we revisit an ongoing debate about a possible trade-off between the democratic values of ‘inclusion’ of party members and ‘representation’ of excluded groups that this type of selection method may involve. Using an original data set consisting of 608 candidates who participated in 168 leadership mixed-gender contests at the national or regional level, we show that female candidates perform worse under party primaries. This finding holds even after controlling for the type of candidate competing. We therefore sustain the argument that this leadership selection mechanism, in its current format, involves a trade-off between ‘inclusion’ and ‘representation’.

Evidence suggests that as public opinion towards immigration becomes more negative, so the descriptive representation of ethnic minority groups is increasingly restricted. Recently, some initial research into the causal mechanism hinted that this effect is driven by patterns of candidacy. This suggests that political parties are creating an ‘ethnic penalty’ of their own in the selection stage. This paper investigates the relationship between patterns of candidacy, party strategy, and public opinion in Great Britain from 1997 to 2019, and proposes that ‘punitive parties’ are strongly responsible for shaping the representational outcomes of minority groups. I find support for earlier suggestions that parties are increasingly likely to place ethnic minority candidates away from ‘winnable’ contests as anti-immigrant hostility rises. These findings are important for our conceptions of ethnic penalties, of party behaviour in selection processes, and for the study and cause of improving political representation.

Despite a violent and extremist past, some armed rebel movements often abandon their arms and successfully contest power through elections. This paper seeks to understand the environmental factors that determine an insurgent successor party’s electoral success. Using first a cross-national analysis of insurgent successor party performance and then a subnational analysis of Salvadoran elections from 1994–2019, it is shown that the party’s ability to leverage identities forged during the war and organize its appeals along a highly polarized pro- and anti-government axis is crucial to electoral success. This is understood as an organizational capability, the capacity to oppose. At the national level, the existence of an authoritarian successor party increases the longevity of such polarization while subnationally levels of violence help to solidify the wartime cleavage as the most important for local politics.

Measures of the proportionality of distributions are used across disciplines. ‘Disproportionality indices’ represent an application in politics, comparing the seat allocation in parliaments to the votes expressed for political parties. Disproportionality in elections is particularly high when many votes are expressed for parties not entering parliament; in some elections such ‘wasted votes’ add up to two-digit vote percentages. However, ‘wasted votes’ for small parties below the electoral threshold, as well as votes for non-partisan candidates, are often not listed in detail in election statistics, and are instead lumped together in residual categories such as ‘Others’ or ‘Independents’. This can hide major discrepancies between vote and seat distributions. This risks introducing systematic bias into the analysis of elections. This paper discusses several theoretically based methods to estimate indices of disproportionality for incomplete data, based on different theoretical scenarios concerning the distribution of votes and seats, and inspired by Taagepera’s method of ‘logical boundaries’. Empirical tests, relying on a dataset of 735 parliamentary elections worldwide, show that residual categories substantially affect indices of disproportionality. Several methods can considerably improve the measurement validity compared to the frequently used ‘naive’ procedures.

Over recent decades, an increasing number of presidential candidates across the world have been nominated in primary elections. Yet, our understanding of presidential primaries outside of the U.S. remains very limited. This paper advances a theoretical argument linking presidential primary outcomes to the strategic behavior of subnational party elites, particularly those with the resources to mobilize primary voters in their regions. I provide support for this claim using an original dataset from the 2012 presidential primary of the Mexican Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), in which one of the candidates was very closely linked to (and informally endorsed by) the PAN leadership. The results show the levels of support for this candidate were higher in places with PAN officeholders. Additional evidence suggests this pattern is driven by PAN officeholders (1) investing resources into electoral mobilization and (2) tampering with the lists of registered voters.

This paper explores the diverging electoral impact of instigating high-hostility militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) on the votes shares of hawkish, right-wing and dovish, left-wing incumbents, respectively. More specifically, I propose that deploying troops electorally harms doves and benefits hawks. I test this hypothesis via two studies. Study-1 presents a macro-level analysis of an incumbent’s electoral performance in a dataset covering 389 elections in 27 democratic countries between 1950 and 2010. With the objective of capturing heterogeneity of individual voting behavior at the appropriate level, Study-2 scrutinizes cross-national survey results from Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) covering 19 elections in 6 democracies. Multilevel models across both studies concur that in times of conflict, voters become significantly less supportive of dovish, left-wing incumbents and slightly more so of hawkish, right-wing ones compared to times of peace. The results also suggest that doves lose particularly substantial support from their co-partisans and ideologically left leaners.

This paper looks at the development of an electoral gender gap over time, using, for the first time, actual ballot data collected in the Austrian state of Vienna. Vienna recorded female and male ballots separately in the years from 1954 to 1991. Firstly, using this unique design, we conclude that the traditional gender gap (males more left-leaning) existed up to 1969 and then changed into the modern gender gap (females more left-leaning), from that date. These results confirm the considerable literature based on survey data. As an alternative explanation for the observed pattern we explore the gender gap in voting for the central vs the flank parties. We can confirm survey-based findings that male voters support more extreme positions than female voters, and link this observation to the “social-harmony” gender gap.

Districted proportional systems give an edge to right-wing parties that are more popular in rural areas where district magnitude is small and large parties are mechanically advantaged. In this paper, we explore the role played by voters in this bias by looking at how ideology correlates with strategic voting. We analyze survey data from 44 elections in Western Europe and find that left-wing voters are more likely to support a party that is not viable ( p < 0.01), but once in this position they seem less likely to desert this party for one that is viable ( p < 0.1). Further, we find that this pattern is likely driven by the intensity of partisan preferences as left-wing voters are on average more attached to their favorite party and thus more reluctant to desert it ( p < 0.01). Our study thus demonstrates that the psychological effect of districted proportional systems amplifies the mechanical one in advanced industrial democracies.

Research on the electoral personalization of politics has stressed a trend towards a greater role of top prominent political figures (party leaders and ministers). This trend was described as centralized electoral personalization. Yet, this trend is merely one side of a more complex story. No leader attracts all voters’ support, and other candidates manage to stand out despite lower resources and visibility. Using a unique dataset of 47,239 actual ballot papers cast for the 2018 Belgian local elections, we show that candidates-level, lists-level and districts-level factors result in distinct preference voting behaviour. While these factors lead to unmistakable forms of (de-)centralized personalized forms of elections, we, furthermore, show that intermediary situations distinctively emerge. A significant number of ‘subtop’ candidates stand out among candidates, by attracting support from voters who do not support the mere leader of the list. This ‘oligarchized personalization’ would deserve greater attention in the literature.

The question of the democratic character of the European Union (EU) has been a center-point of decades of political research. An important critique suggests that the development of the European political arena is still incomplete, with European parliamentarians primarily orienting themselves to national issues and politicians, implying a problematic mismatch between the political arena and their policy jurisdiction. Research has however been limited by methodological difficulties of capturing the level of Europeanization of the political arena. This paper contributes a novel method for measuring Europeanization by studying interactions from the European parliament to their national parliamentarians on Twitter in 15 EU countries. Contrary to expectations in the literature, we find substantial Europeanization of the political arena. The level of Europeanization furthermore varies greatly across countries and political groups. This has important implications on the debate on EU’s democratic deficit, as communication across different levels of parliament indicates democratic debate.

Foundational studies of political behavior find that university education facilitates the development of political attitudes and shapes socialization outcomes. But in unconsolidated democracies where identity is politically salient and ethnic political parties dominate, education may play a different role in shaping mass politics. In this paper, we develop a framework for understanding the consequences of political party intervention in annual university elections, a common feature of university life in the Middle East and the Global South. We draw on pre- and post-election surveys at the American University of Beirut in Lebanon to argue that ethnic political parties rely on partisan students to act as “party agents” who mobilize unaffiliated students through intensive peer-to-peer contact. Using a conjoint experiment embedded in both survey waves, we show that the university elections increase support in hypothetical national elections for in-group political elites and, to a lesser extent, ethnic political parties. By locating the university as an understudied site of competitive and contentious politics, our findings contribute new insights regarding the role of education in shaping political attitudes. We show that the persistence of ethnic political power can be attributed in part to party activity in less obviously political arenas that have not been systematically studied.