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This paper is a review of scholarship found in the pages of The Pacific Review over the last 30 years. It does so in three ways: (1) it highlights issues in the theory and practice of the international relations, strategic studies, political culture and political economy of the Asia Pacific region. (2) It looks at change in the region over time by an analysis of the shifting fortunes of the major regional powers, namely Japan, China and Indonesia and the challenges they, and China in particular, post to US regional hegemony. (3) It looks at regional process reflected in the fate and fortunes of the regional integrative project in the key policy domains of trade, finance and the environment. The paper concludes with a reflection on the strains on the regional political and economic orders by the rise in nationalist politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A 'majoritarian turn' identified by scholars of Asian democracy in the 1990s saw the rise of mixed-member majoritarian electoral systems and more centripetal party competition across both Northeast and Southeast Asia. In this paper, we argue that since the 2000s, the institutional pendulum has shifted, with more consensual approaches to democracy appearing to better represent key identity cleavages of gender, ethnicity, and territory—a trend evident not just in East Asia but South Asia as well. This new 'Asian model' typically involves increasing the proportional components of existing electoral formulas and grafting gender quotas, multiethnic party lists, and quasi-federal elements onto ostensibly majoritarian state structures. We show that these reforms have, as intended, mostly increased female and ethnic minority representation and decentralized governance structures. At the same time, however, these de jure changes are not associated with de facto political development in terms of greater democratic quality, counter to theoretical expectations. Indeed, democracy has declined across most of Asia at the same time as its democratic institutions have become more consensual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of emerging donors has unleashed new political contests over aid policy, some of which have occurred at the domestic level. This article locates the special edition's analysis of these contests within the existing literature on emerging donors, draws out the key findings of included papers, and considers their implications for policy. It argues that domestic contests have had significant influence over aid policy in both emerging and established donors, the agendas at work have varied from case to case reflecting countries' different political economies, and aid policies represent a ‘work-in-progress’ rather than an expression of immutable models. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

AbstractThe economic rise of developing Asia has given impetus to debates over the geographic orientation, strategy, organisation, and collaborative relationships of the Australian aid programme. This paper examines these debates, Australian government responses, and the politics underlying these responses. It points to, among things, the different ways in which the Labor Party and the Liberal–National Coalition have dealt with these issues, reflecting their different constituencies and foreign policy philosophies. The paper also assesses the future trajectory of Australian aid policy, in particular, the extent to which it is embracing the Chinese model of aid. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Is the harmonization of financial regulatory regimes possible in East Asia? Focusing on corporate governance, which many see as a critical part of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and which is also seen as unresponsive to calls for change, this paper argues that such harmonization is possible, but that it will not be according to the standards advocated by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and other international organizations. At present, actors generally feign compliance with these international rules and standards. The pattern of noncompliance is reflective of two types of regulatory models at work in East Asia, which correspond to democratic and nondemocratic regimes. The manner by which these political institutions mediate the influence of key actors determines corporate governance outcomes. Three cases illustrate the key dynamics: Singapore (nondemocracy), South Korea (democracy), and pre- and post-World War II Japan (change from nondemocracy to democracy). By identifying the key actors that determine regulatory outcomes, this paper points to a more realistic regulatory framework. This alternative framework is a compromise between the standards advocated by international organizations and the domestic political realities of East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the 1990s Multilateral Development Banks created accountability mechanisms (AMs) that allowed people affected by development projects redress. Currently undertheorized, this paper examines how and why the Asian Development Bank (ADB) created an AM, and whether the AM serves its purpose to hold the ADB to account and to provide ‘fair hearing of the views of the affected group’. This article argues that the ADB created anewAM because of institutional isomorphism,borrowingthe idea of the AM from the World Bank as a result of coercive and mimetic isomorphic processes. Further, that the ADB introduced a mechanism ill-suited to the pre-existing (old)organizational culture of the ADB, which is based on consensus and hierarchical rule-following in the context of ADB operations to further economic growth while upholding state sovereignty. Despite its restructure and recent review, the mechanism's weakness was revealed through a stand-off between China and the AM over an investigation begun in 2009 (creating something ‘blue’). The paper concludes that the AM's ability to serve its purpose will remain hampered as long as ADB maintains consensus around economic growth and state sovereignty over providing recourse to affected people. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

High economic growth rates, the revolution in telecommunications and the end of the Cold War have brought about rapid and profound changes to the domestic as well as regional environments of Northeast Asian governments. The maritime sphere, where increasingly militarized state boundaries delineate political authority and economic activities link increasingly interdependent communities therein, bears high significance for the study of regional cooperation. This paper looks at how the maritime sphere of Northeast Asia is represented in common political and academic discourses of international relations. It finds that maritime affairs are firmly cast in the language of national security, and that empirical evidence against perceived threats and related security imperatives is often neglected if not completely ignored. The paper argues that the maritime space, due to its special character, has become the stage on which the consequences of modernity appear particularly strong. The relentless quest to develop and control the ocean clashes with the notion of the sea as a space of global trade and communication flow. At the same time, the ocean as an entity itself is excluded from the discourse because it is irreconcilable with the conception of the international system of sovereign territorial units. As a result, the maritime sphere is seen as a dividing element between nations rather than a connecting element, and salient environmental problems of the maritime space remain low on political and academic agendas. This is also a consequence of mainstream methods of political science that continue to reproduce discourses of territorial division and fail to offer alternative approaches suitable for the study of contemporary Northeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New bilateral and multilateral arrangements emerged after the Asian financial crisis in the areas of financial assistance, financial regulation, and exchange rate stabilization. Strikingly, however, very few such arrangements emerged at the regional level. This paper argues that (1) the success of bilateral and international arrangements was the result of policy preference compatibility among East Asian countries and (2) the countries' policy preferences can be explained as a function of their financial system features (securities-market-based or bank-credit-based) and external balance positions (capital-dependent or capital-sufficient). Although this framework cannot predict whether countries will agree on a particular policy proposal, it can explain the diversity of their proposals, the likely lines of conflict, the nature of their compromises, and why certain proposals succeed (or fail) even without the strong support (or opposition) of major powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the evolution of APEC and the rejection of Japan's 1997 AMF proposal reflect a failure of Japanese and US leadership. Not only have the two countries failed to exercise either individual or shared regional leadership. Instead, both have used their considerable structural power negatively to block the other's proposals for regional collective action, rather than positively to exercise leadership. After developing the concepts of leadership and blocking power, the paper provides case studies of the APEC and AMF. It concludes that if a post-hegemonic US no longer has the willingness and/or the ability to undertake collective action single-handedly, and if in a post-Cold War world neither the US nor Japan has sufficient incentives to bridge their differences and sacrifice some interests to achieve a unified stance, then continued stalemate and under-supply of regional collective goods can be expected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effects and expressions of norm compliance in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 'unintended consequences' arising from such compliance. This is done through an analysis of ASEAN's responses in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) efforts in the Typhoon Haiyan disaster and in the search for missing flight MH370. It argues that the lethargic ASEAN responses in the Haiyan disaster and the uncoordinated search efforts for missing flight MH370 are unintended outcomes arising from norm adherence specifically to the norms of 'respect for sovereignty' and 'consensual decision-making' which constrained the range of ASEAN responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at the impact of the economic crisis on security discourses and understandings in the Asia-Pacific, in particular on the earlier 'emerging consensus' that: (1) multilateral dialogue is security-enhancing; (2) consensus-building is better than institution-building; (3) security needs to be seen in comprehensive terms; and (4) regional security depends on a continuing US military presence. It argues that the crisis has provided an opportunity for the practice and, to a lesser extent, the theory of regional security to be (re)debated and (re)interpreted in certain ways, and that this is serving to strengthen some elements of the regional security consensus and weaken others. While it remains too early to make any final judgement, it appears that the direction of change overall is more backwards than forwards, favouring traditional rather than new or critical security approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through an examination of East Asian economies, this paper proposes two new capitalist ideal types: family market economies and state market economies. In contrast to coordinated and liberal market economy types, the new capitalist ideal types proposed here display alternative forms of hierarchical coordination. These ideal types are also genuinely novel models of capitalism because they exhibit distinct and stable institutional structures and comparative advantages. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Amid growing alarm over the rising atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases, increasing attention is being given to ‘geo-engineering’ technologies that could counteract some of the impacts of global warming by either reducing absorption of solar energy (solar radiation management (SRM)) or removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Geo-engineering has the potential to dramatically alter the dynamics of global climate change negotiations because it might cool the climate without constraining fossil fuel use. Some scholars have expressed concern that certain states may be tempted to act unilaterally. This paper assesses the approach that China is likely to adopt towards governance of SRM and the implications this holds for broader international climate negotiations. We survey Chinese public discourse, examine the policy factors that will influence China's position, and assess the likelihood of certain future scenarios. While Chinese climate scientists are keenly aware of the potential benefits of geo-engineering as well as its risks, we find that no significant constituency is currently promoting unilateral implementation of SRM. China will probably play a broadly cooperative role in negotiations toward a multilaterally governed geo-engineering programme but will seek to promote a distinctive developing world perspective that reflects concerns over sovereignty, Western imperialism and maintenance of a strict interpretation of the norm of common but differentiated responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper explores the phenomena of environmental coordination within Northeast Asia. I initially frame the discussion around claims that China is a pollution haven for its neighboring countries, and I look for evidence in the domestic and regional environmental institutions which challenge China's pollution haven status. I find that that there is a science and technology-based epistemic community in Northeast Asia which provides an important theoretical response to counter the pollution haven hypothesis. As well, given its strong science and technological output, Japan is poised to assume leadership of the Northeast Asian environmental regime for at least the short- to medium-term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the current and prospective implications of Asia's energy consumption revolution for regional stability. Adopting a comparative and historical approach, I argue that Japanese energy security anxieties worked to reinforce regional alignment patterns in East Asia for nearly two decades following the Shanghai communiqué, thereby strengthening regional stability. Conversely, the post-Cold War period has seen in China and India's rise the emergence of Asian energy super-consumers that are not formally aligned with the United States, but that are increasingly dependent on imported energy supplies to fuel their industrialization. This newfound dependence on energy imports has seen both countries follow Japan's longstanding example in securitizing energy as a policy issue. In the context of an already more contested Asia, this trend towards energy securitization has aggravated regional tensions and will continue to do so unless greater efforts are undertaken bilaterally, regionally and globally to foster more effective forms of energy cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Criticism of the Bush administration's policies in East Asia is hardly common fare. Roseate colors certainly pervade the picture painted by defenders of Bush's policies toward Asia who argue that relations between the US and that region have never been better. This paper shows to the contrary that the Bush administration politicized wide swaths of public policy, including foreign relations, in an effort to create a permanent Republican electoral majority. That effort created a host of failures in America's Asian relations. The article focuses on three central problems: excessive militarization of American foreign policy; economic mismanagement; and a unilateralism that distanced the US from the rising Asian regionalism. The failures are not irreversible however and a change in administration has the potential to revitalize cross Pacific ties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the issue of disputes in the South China Sea and posits fishery cooperation as a resolution of these disputes. Three major points relating to disputes in the South China Sea are analysed in the first section. Several theories and practices are introduced and discussed to evaluate the feasibility of using them as the basis for a practical resolution to the conflicts. The author suggests that determining the ownership or jurisdiction over the islands and waters in the South China Sea is not essential at this stage. In fact, claimant states can derive greater benefits in the South China Sea through cooperation in the management and conservation of fishery resources. Ultimately, the experience of fisheries cooperation can be extended to other fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue explores how and to what extent 'hybridity' informs national policy, doctrines, and military transformation in Asia. The introduction engages with three preliminary issues as a way to set the broader analytical context. It reviews the concept of 'hybrid warfare' to make the case that versions of this notion have long been a feature of regional strategic thinking and practice. It similarly argues that maritime geography has had an impact on how 'hybrid' courses of actions in the region have been conceptualised, notably in regards to 'grey zone' operations. Lastly, it reviews the question of how to engage with the issue of the effectiveness of such strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article questions two widely accepted claims on long-term food insecurity in Asia, the world's (heterogeneous) region with the largest number of undernourished individuals. The first claim is that food production may not grow as fast as the pace of population growth in Asia, which will reach 5 billion by 2050. The second claim is that an unstoppable emergence of a middle class in Asia will dramatically change the composition of food demand. On the first claim, the region's contribution to high and volatile international food prices is well known, but Asia's potentially positive contributions toward future price uncertainty and productivity growth are much less cited. On the second claim, the changing composition of future food demand in the region will depend on the extent that poverty reduction effectively leads to middle class expansion, which it is not an automatic process, and its extent still remains to be seen. Past evidence teaches us that poverty reduction on its own will not do the job of eradicating hunger, nor will only increasing food production. The jury is still out, but doomsday predictions are not necessarily justified. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This introductory article provides rationales and contextual background for the special issue which examines how weak states in Asia actualise and exercise their agency in the twenty-first century regional or global environments. The article opens with a consideration of why attention is drawn to the agency of the weak. Weak states are often treated as 'objects' of international politics rather than 'subjects', and their foreign policy actions are commonly taken to be 'reflexive' of external constraints, such as fluctuations in the balance of power in the international system. We disagree with this view. We argue that weak actors can demonstrate varieties of agency regardless of their position in the international system in terms of material capabilities. To clarify this point, the article reflects on the changed and changing global and regional environments and order. Rather than seeing them through the lens of great power politics and its signature concept of 'polarity', the article offers an alternative notion, namely a 'multiplex' world, and identifies the key nature of order therein: multiplicity and fluidity. Both material and normative power have already and continue to become fragmented, decentralised, and dispersed within and across states. While emphasising that such a multifaceted and fluid world opens up a wide avenue of agency for weak actors, this article also notes that the weak has varieties of agency as potentials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stretching a third of the way around the globe, the Asia Pacific is the world's most populous region. Yet, it remains the sole region without a human rights court or commission, and without a human rights treaty. The notable absence there of a human rights mechanism based on such institutions is often explained away by reference to the region's size and heterogeneity, the constituent states’ reluctance to interfere in the affairs of others, and the existence of rivalries. Whilst agreeing that there is no inter-governmental initiative that looks set to change the present state of affairs in the Asia Pacific, this article places the spotlight on another model of creating a regional human rights mechanism, that is, the unique and burgeoning Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions. Specifically, it assesses the prospects for Japan, Taiwan and China – three key regional players whose membership of the Forum is still outstanding – to create domestic human rights bodies that eventually join. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An introduction to the journal is presented in which the author explains the issue's focus on East Asian food insecurity, noting such topics as population growth, urbanization, and the globalization of food production and distribution.

The positive uses of the Internet by civil society groups, research ­institutes, governments and other entities interested in promoting Asia-Pacific community building and cooperative security regimes have been studied and ­appreciated. The paper begins with a discussion of regional Internet diffusion patterns and the associated increase in Internet incidents. In the wake of 11 September 2001 and recent analysis of the 'dark side' of the Internet and networks, it then examines some of the destructive ways Internet technologies are being used by actors in the Asia-Pacific region. It provides examples from the patterns of Internet conflict involving a quadral relationship among four nodes, uncivil society, civil society, government and business as well as the pattern of conflict within each of the nodes. Finally, it looks at three topic areas - national security agendas, the making of security policy and the regional security dialogue process - that deserve further attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Russia both have interests in bordering Central Asia. China's thirst for energy has seen its footprint expand rapidly in the region relative to that of Russia, Central Asia's historical hegemon. With the two powerful neighbors’ history of competition and conflict, the shift in relative influence between them risks a resurgence of bilateral rivalry. Referencing the scholarly literature on strategic rivalry, this article examines how energy relations have helped shaped the trajectory of China-Russian relations in Central Asia, particularly after the shock that came with the collapse of oil and gas prices in 2008-2009. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on South Asia's role in China's Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative. Given the saliency of this MSR enterprise as part of ChinesePresident Xi Jinping’s “One-Belt-One-Road” strategy, how this ambitious scheme impacts China’s relations with South Asian states along the MSR’s route, i.e. India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh, merits investigation. The fate of the MSR will be determined by China’s relations with these states, since South Asia is in the middle of major sea-lanes between East/Southeast Asia and Middle East/Europe. The study examines the intentions and executions of China’s MSR projects in South Asia, evaluates the political and economic calculations of participating in the MSR for regional states, and identifies actions taken by them that can decide the initiative’s success. Politically, reactions of South Asian states to the MSR are explained as: fear of expanding Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean for India; and attempts by which Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh use China to counteract possible domination by India. Economically, two MSR pathways for South Asian states are analyzed: increases in Chinese infrastructure investments; and expansion in South Asia-China trade; both of which are reducible by loans owed to China, or “strings”/conditions attached. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last 30 years, East Asia has progressed from virtually no intergovernmental arrangement in the 1980s to exclusive financial regionalism supported by strong centripetal forces in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998), but this move has not yet produced coherent regional financial architecture. This article examines the evolution of Asia's regional financial architecture of the last three decades and discusses factors that have promoted and inhibited Asia's efforts toward financial regionalism. Since the Global Financial Crisis (2008–2009), the centripetal forces that aided the region's defensive regionalism have weakened, and the crisis has moved the region to seek multiple sources of financial stability from global to regional. On the one hand, given its export-promotion strategy, East Asia still relies heavily on the global financial architecture, and the region's US dollar dependence continues. On the other hand, the Global Financial Crisis has triggered China to seek reform in global financial order and some alternative solutions. For the latter, its monetary authority actively engages in internationalization of its currency, Renminbi, and promotion of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. In this environment, coherent financial regionalism for East Asia is yet to emerge, as East Asian governments continue to search for monetary and financial stability. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the last 30 years, environmental challenges in the Asia-Pacific have gone from sitting at the margins of political discourse to featuring prominently in academic and policy debates about institutional capacity, economic sustainability and regional futures. Those challenges are extensive: they include loss of biodiversity and species, land degradation and deforestation, water pollution and scarcity, drought, wildlife smuggling, ozone depletion, other forms of atmospheric pollution, and climate change. This article explores regional responses to environmental challenges through a global governance lens. It examines the ways in which vertical and intergovernmental arrangements have been supplemented by institutions and networks that reflect horizontal and transnational approaches. It reveals that this has been an uneven process, with coherence and fragmentation equally represented. In its focus on the two key subregions of Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, it shows how environmental cooperation has been implicated in a crisis of regionalism and caught up in states’ efforts to demonstrate that governance can still be effective in the absence of binding multilateral agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

As regions become more institutionalized, they are characterized by two competing trends. First, key regional institutions can become hub institutions that act as transmitters of a comprehensive set of norms. Second, as regional institutions increase in number, regions themselves are liable to become more fragmented. How these trends have played out is explored in two key regions, the Americas and the Asia-Pacific. It is concluded that regions are not static entities but are ever-changing structural arrangements. Hub institutions can be challenged and the consequences can be significant as regions gain in importance on the international stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines conditions under which states in East Asia engage in the development of regional institutions. It assumes that crucial external events and shocks, which produce specific historical breakpoints – critical junctures – constitute a significant breakpoint at which the regional states willingly elevated a path to develop regional institutions to a new level. The analysis of the development of regional institutions for a free trade area and food stock for emergency revealed that regional states in East Asia changed their views on the evolving reality created by external shocks and such changes led to the creation of new regional institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the past, studies on inclusive development involve mainly the perspective of equitable distribution of economic and societal outputs. This study, however, takes a different approach and analyses the potential roles of regional coordination mechanisms (RCMs), specifically universities and research council's networks within Southeast Asia, in disseminating the innovation-related activities for inclusive development or Innovation for Inclusive Development (IID). The literature on innovation intermediaries within the realm of innovation systems studies was used to establish the framework of the study. The findings indicate that RCMs have a huge potential role to play. However, due to a number of reasons, including lack of funding support, lack of attention and commitment to IID, weak engagement with industry and non-governmental organisations, the implementation of the IID activities was rather poor. As a whole, the study argues that current approaches are not well positioned and it is fragmented preventing the effective use of RCMs despite their potentials for IID efforts. The study attributes this to the systemic failures in the regional coordinating systems. In enhancing the role of RCMs in IID, this study recommends the promotion of IID platform, the leveraging of non-government organisations and industry as well as energising the Southeast Asia engagement in promoting IID. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses Macau's casinos as an example for accumulation by dispossession, in which they serve to transfer wealth from Mainland China to Macau and the casinos' foreign investors. They also represent a model for economic development and this model has migrated to Singapore, where it also operates as a form of accumulation by dispossession. By requiring citizens to pay an entrance fee, Singapore's casinos explicitly appropriate other people's money. The efficacy for the use of casinos as economic development is interrogated here because Macau's casino experience has emerged as a model for economic development in Asia beyond simply Singapore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing explanations for the emergence of human rights on the political agenda in ASEAN focus either on the role of external pressure on ASEAN member states to ‘do something’, or on the way those states copied the form, but not the function, of other regional organisations such as the EU. Both approaches tacitly acknowledge that given the strong preference for intergovernmental governance displayed by ASEAN, regardless of interpretations, that it was states that drove the institutionalisation of rights forwards. Through examining in detail the causes and consequences of the Vientiane Action Programme this article disagrees with that assertion. At crucial moments before and after 2004 it was the Working Group for the Establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, a track III actor, which both inserted human rights into ASEAN discussions and forged the link between protecting those rights and the continuing success of ASEAN's security goals. Through understanding the role of the Working Group as a norm entrepreneur, assisting in the localisation of human rights standards, this article suggests that existing explanations of ASEAN institutionalisation need to be revised to include a wider range of political dynamics than previously were acknowledged. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

East Asian governments have long recognized that national security must incorporate a reduction of their vulnerability to the disruption of essential imports. The rapid economic growth of China and India has intensified competition for increasingly scarce resources, elevating resource security once again to the top of the international agenda. Issues that were previously regarded as ‘technical’ have been ‘securitized’ as state elites perceived possible conflicts over availability and pricing of natural resources as threats to national security. International institutions have the potential to contribute to the defusing of tensions over the supply of commodities by providing, through various means, assurances regarding the behaviour of partners. Only the global institutions concerned with commodities trade, the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), have legally binding arrangements and the authority to impose sanctions on states that fail to comply with their obligations. But both have weaknesses: the IEA's membership is limited; the WTO's rules relating to raw materials trade are far from comprehensive. Most of the regional institutions in this field seldom go beyond information exchange or the setting of aspirational targets. At the bilateral level, government attempts to enhance resource security through minerals chapters in preferential trade agreements have had little success. Bilateral investment treaties are the only instances of cooperation at the sub-global level that incorporate legally-binding provisions. The cooperation on resources issues in which countries have engaged has reflected the core characteristics of Asia-Pacific bilateral and regional intergovernmental institutions. The shallowness of cooperation reflects perceptions on the part of state elites that their interests in the resources sector are best served by national rather than collective action and that current cooperative arrangements fail to provide sufficient incentives to prevent states from succumbing to opportunistic behaviour in the event of a short-term clash of interests. The potential gains to be made from a cooperative approach to resource security remain largely unrealized. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Private equity has had a short but eventful history in East Asia, characterized first by US firm dominance and then by a nationalistic backlash. This article charts these earlier patterns, but argues that significant developments have taken place since the early 2000s, which have strengthened the position of private equity capital in the Asian political economy. As private equity deal-making has returned to Asia, new linkages have been formed between US private equity funds and local private equity players. Of particular importance have been US–Asian joint ventures, Asian nationals returning to domestic firms from US private equity houses and supportive local elites in the banking and pension fund sectors. The significance is two-fold. First, the spread of private equity has been founded on interdependent relationships between US actors and local actors, which have more successfully grounded the private equity industry in national political economies than its origins in the Asian crisis period. Second, despite the relative localization of Asian private equity, industry practices are still largely shaped by the US model of private equity and the merger and acquisition activity that it entails, rather than a distinct Asian private equity model. The findings of the article contribute to calls that have been made for research on the changing global economy that comprehensively integrates domestic and international levels of analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

East Asia's renewable energy (RE) sector has grown faster than any other region's since the mid-2000s. It is argued that renewables formed an integral part of the region's new industrial policies and new developmentalism, which are founded on new configured forms of state capacity shaped in response to various challenges, primarily climate change, energy security, globalisation and global neo-liberalism. By studying the recent progress of East Asia's RE sector, we gain useful insights into these key developments in East Asia's political economy and the region's prospects for transition towards low carbon development. This analysis considers how and why different approaches to RE policy emerged in East Asia, to what extent the promotion and expansion of East Asia's RE sector is part of a new industrial policy paradigm and new developmentalism, and what the study of East Asian policies on promoting renewable energy can tell us about the region's broader approach to low carbon development. Although the promotion of renewable energy has been a fundamental part of East Asia's recent macro-development plans and new developmentalism generally, these same plans suggest that East Asian states will simultaneously continue to significantly promote high carbon and ecologically damaging industrial activities, thus undermining the low carbon credentials of East Asia's new developmentalism. The path to meaningful low carbon development will be very long and will take many decades to achieve. However, it is contended that by maintaining and improving their various forms of state capacity over time, the East Asian states will be well positioned to sustain the significant growth of their renewable energy sectors and thereby further strengthen the low carbon development orientation of their new industrial policies, macro-development plans and strategic economic thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The 'hub-and-spoke' alliance structure led by the United States was - and remains - a major feature of security politics in the Asia-Pacific. This article links its 'general interests' with the larger issue of the Asia-Pacific's evolving multilateral regional order. After reviewing the concept of 'hedging', the first section problematises the literature that treats the US-led alliances which constitute the hub-and-spoke system mainly as instruments for the competitive side of a hedging strategy. The second section observes that they go beyond being instruments of threat response to becoming a more complicated network of regional multilateral order-maintenance and order-building. The third section claims that the United States and its regional allies have been utilising the hub-and-spoke alliance structure as a hedge against an undesirable multilateral order emerging in the region. The fourth section examines those arguments with reference to the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the Six Party Talks. The article concludes with some thoughts about what these findings mean for the future direction of the hub-and-spoke alliance structure in the Asia-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The gradual institutionalization of defence diplomacy is becoming an increasingly prominent and potentially important feature of security dialogue in the Asian region. This stands in marked contrast to Asia's recent history, where across the region multilateral defence or military interactions have traditionally been regarded with suspicion. This article examines the emergence of Asia's most prominent exercise in defence diplomacy: the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD). Within a relatively short space of time, this forum has developed into one of the most important opportunities for regional defence ministers and senior military officers to meet and exchange views on security issues. Yet despite its growing standing, the SLD has received virtually no scholarly attention. The article begins by reviewing the origins and development of the SLD, before outlining its operating modalities. It seeks to account for the apparent appeal of the SLD, measured in terms of its capacity to consistently attract high-level representation and favourable reviews. The article explores how the SLD might develop in the future and outlines some of the challenges it faces, including the rise of potentially competing mechanisms for defence diplomacy in East Asia. The article closes by outlining a number of areas for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has recently announced plans to develop greater regional integration and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Historically, Australian opinion, however, has expressed some anxiety about forging closer economic, political and security ties with Asia. Using trend data from the Australian Election Study and the Lowy Institute Poll, this article examines changes in Australian public opinion on closer engagement with Asia and whether the Australian public is likely to support the Rudd government's push towards developing deeper regional diplomacy. The article finds a shift in opinion since the 1990s with a younger generation of voters who are moderately supportive of Australia's engagement with Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interest among academics towards Hong Kong's global status has gradually waned since 1997. However, identifying Hong Kong's position on the international platform is essential if the Special Administrative Region's competitiveness is to be distinguished from that of regional rivals. The positioning challenge not only results from the sovereignty retrocession, but also from the rapid pace of globalization and the intensified competition from major cities in the Greater China Region. Instead of focusing on the much-researched topic of the direct competition between Hong Kong and Shanghai or Singapore, an exploration of Hong Kong's hitherto little-researched re-branding experience not only throws light on Hong Kong Special Administrative Region's policy orientation, but is also valuable in understanding how other cities in the region conducted similar exercises. This article reviews the overall evolution of the 'Asia's World City' (AWC) discourse as promoted by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region from 1997 to 2007. It starts by reviewing the international identity of post-colonial Hong Kong as background to the discourse, in order to reconstruct various theoretical assumptions that led to the re-branding exercise. The second section examines the purpose and evolution of the AWC campaign, and identifies the problems within the discourse. The concluding section focuses on the unrealized theoretical assumptions and other administrative and ideological constraints that the HKSARG faced in the exercise as a means to explaining the overall limited achievements of the campaign and proposes possible ways to remedy the shortcomings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why have ASEAN member states declared and why do they continue to declare their intention to enhance cooperation and devise projects when implementation lags behind their rhetoric? Why do they rhetorically commit themselves to cooperation, when they continue to stick to self-interested policies to the detriment of ASEAN's collective interest? And given these diverging practices, how likely is it that the objective of a more legalized and binding cooperation associated with the recently ratified ASEAN Charter is being implemented? This article draws attention to ASEAN's hybrid or dual character of international cooperation, consisting of the emulation of the European integration project and the persistence of deeper cultural strata of Southeast Asia's cooperation project that determine the limits of cooperation: Southeast Asia's social structure and political culture that have not produced those mechanisms that might facilitate international cooperation. If our explanation is correct that cooperation within ASEAN comes about as a simultaneous process of emulation and established cultural practices, we expect change only under specified conditions. Based on our argument and the theoretical literature on normative change, we identify and discuss in greater detail three potential outcomes of change: inertia, localization and transformation. The three modes make different predictions concerning change within ASEAN. Based on an analysis of the two major shocks with which ASEAN has had to contend in the last two decades, namely the Cold War in Asia and the Asian financial crisis, we argue that ASEAN's dominant response to major ideational challenges has been combinations of localization and inertia and has not been followed by a fundamental change of practice [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Northeast Asia is notable for the relative absence of regional institutions. The Six Party Talks could constitute an embryonic starting point for the development of such institutions. The path toward greater institutionalization is likely to begin in a modest fashion. Functional working groups on topics such as the environment, maritime transport, technical barriers to trade, road and rail links, and energy could provide the locus for integrating North Korea into the broader regional and global economies. Foreign ministries will inevitably take the lead in developing the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM), but meaningful economic achievements will require the involvement of other ministries. North Korea has proved problematic in this regard thus far. Moreover, given the importance of private-sector involvement in achieving sustainable economic development in North Korea, modalities will have to be developed to integrate private-sector actors when possible. The governments of the region, and particularly China and South Korea, may continue support on a bilateral basis as a hedge against North Korea's collapse or as inducements in the context of the nuclear talks. But the development of more permanent multilateral structures is unlikely until the nuclear issue is resolved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Security studies of East Asia focus on questions of inter-state war and peace, the distribution of power in the region, and the ways regional institutions mitigate the role of relative power balances and alliance structures. Debate on these issues has become increasingly sophisticated and has evolved theoretically, a process to which The Pacific Review has contributed by providing an important outlet for discussion of specifically Asian issues and by fostering the discussion of regional institutions. The security studies debate on East Asia, however, remains centred on examination of a relatively limited range of independent variables and security threats. Although the field has been redefined to include consideration of so-called 'non-traditional' security issues, work on East Asia has often made the case for non-traditional security studies largely on normative grounds. Further, much of the actual organized violence that has claimed and threatened lives, in particular the region's extensive civil conflicts and state violence against civilians, remains outside the purview of mainstream security studies of the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, international relations in the Asia-Pacific were characterized by an emphasis on security affairs. Following the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, this pattern has changed. In the early 21st century, policy makers in the region put emphasis on the deepening of economic relations. Both in trade and finance, new patterns of governance have emerged. The reasons are manifold. First, traditional security threats are not as important as they used to be. Second, the experience of 1997/98 as well as the current crisis have demonstrated that economic instability is of greater concern than security threats. Third, the economies of the Asia-Pacific are deepening their ties both at the level of production and with regard to investment flows. Despite these structural changes, the level of cooperation continues to be relatively low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A letter to the editor is presented in response to the article "The United States and Asia after Bush" by Michael J. Green published in the same issue.

This article looks at the Chinese debate on economic security during the period between 1997 and 2004. The contemporary concept of economic security (jingji anquan, 经济安全) was first raised in the Chinese academic literature in 1997, partly as a reaction to the Asian financial crisis and partly due to the increasing role China began to play in globalization, the effects of which it increasingly felt as its economy became more integrated with that of the world. This article examines the emergence of the discourse on economic security within Chinese academic circles, and identifies the development of this concept in China between 1997 and 2004 prior to the ascendancy of the 'fourth-generation' leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is an attempt to provide a corrective to a marked Sinocentrism in contemporary debates on regional integration in Asia. In order to do so, firstly, as a heuristic device, a crucial distinction is made between 'regionalization', as involving multifaceted integrative socio-economic processes, and 'regionalism', defined as a form of identity construction akin to nationalism. Secondly, a degree of historical depth is proposed to better explain recent developments. Finally, throughout the article, an interdisciplinary approach is taken involving employing realist, historical/sociological institutionalist and constructivist perspectives in the area of international relations. The first two East Asian summits are contextualized in relation to various conceptualizations of an Asian Community over the last century or so. Particular attention is given to the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung as a watershed in this evolution. Varying conceptions of East Asia as part of a larger, transpacific regional entity (APEC) and in, and of, itself (East Asian Economic Group/ASEAN +3) are examined. In situating the first two East Asian summits five developments of significance are examined. These are: a continuing Japanese role in setting the regional agenda; the ambivalence of China's positioning vis-à-vis neighbouring countries; the re-entry of Central Asia in the Asian regional equation; India's 'return to Asia'; and efforts to maintain ASEAN's centrality in regional construction. These factors, it is argued, are militating towards a return to the Sino-Indic Asia of Bandung. It is thus suggested that notions of an Asian Community involving only Northeast and Southeast Asia are now rejoined by a concept of a Greater Asia. While the historical roots of this conception partly explain its salience, it nevertheless competes with other complementary - and antagonistic - definitions of an Asian Community of more recent lineage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2004 and 2006, proposals were made at APEC summits to establish a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). This was an essentially a reworking of an idea first raised in the mid-1960s to create a Pacific Free Trade Area, or PAFTA. Although the PAFTA initiative never advanced, it helped lay the first organizational foundations for regional economic community building in the Asia-Pacific. The recent FTAAP proposal thus brings us full circle to the antecedent origins of APEC itself. If realized, an FTAAP would also create a free trade zone that would encircle the Pacific Rim economy and thereby subsume the region's now large number of bilateral and sub-regional free trade agreements (FTAs) into one unified agreement. Yet there are many inherent problems with establishing an FTAAP. These broadly relate to deconstructing the preferentialism of existing bilateral and sub-regional FTAs, achieving a consensus on the technical policy content and ideational principles on which an FTAAP would be based, and addressing various geopolitical issues such as reconciling the formation of a pan-regional Asia-Pacific FTA with an already fragile multilateral trading system. Growing interest in a 'rival' East Asia Free Trade Area project presents another geopolitical challenge. In considering these and other questions, it is concluded that many obstacles will remain in the path to realizing an FTAAP, and that this may not actually be a desirable objective to pursue for some time yet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While other forms of transnational crime in the Asia Pacific have been securitized - that is, represented by policy elites and security actors as crucial or existential threats to national and regional security - transnational environmental crime has been un(der)securitized. It warrants little mention in regional security statements or the security concerns of individual countries. Yet the consequences of activities such as illegal logging and timber smuggling, wildlife smuggling, the black market in ozone-depleting substances and dumping of other forms of hazardous wastes and chemical fit the (in)security profile applied to other forms of transnational crime. This article surveys the main forms of transnational environmental crime in the Asia Pacific and assesses the 'fit' with a 'crime as security' framework. It shows that transnational environmental crime generates the kinds of 'pernicious effects ... on regional stability and development, the maintenance of the rule of law and the welfare of the region's people' that the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime identified as matters of serious concern. The analysis draws on securitization theory to understand the lack of a 'securitizing move' and to explain why security elites do not believe the problem warrants serious attention. The possibilities explored here include intellectual inertia, confusion about referent objects, institutional incapacity, mixed policy signals and the exclusion of environmental expertise from a closed community of security elites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After a temporary downturn in many Asian states after the 1997 Economic Crisis defence expenditures are rising again. Although most states put internal and transborder security issues at the top of their list of potential threats, an examination of recent trends in regional defence expenditure trends and weapons acquisition patterns belies this. Resources are being directed predominately toward externally oriented weapons systems such as fighter aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and missiles of all types. The dramatic accumulation of such potentially destabilizing weapons systems, particularly in Asia's traditional flashpoints, risks fuelling competitive arms processes throughout the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neo-realists often appeal to a presumed unity and harmony in political realism. This imagined wholeness, with a modest allowance for diversity, conveniently ignores the ambivalent and contradictory aspects of realist discourse. Why this is so has to do with the rationalist–positivist commitment to the notion that some deep structure that is autonomous, objective, extra-historical and extra-political underlies and unifies the realist tradition. Conversely, the writings of the late Michael Leifer on order and power serve as a compelling reminder that antinomies and tensions animate that tradition in ways many realists either downplay or simply ignore. Thanks to the open-ended ‘nature’ of Leifer's oeuvre , this essay argues, we find in it a basis for reflective examination of our own prior suppositions of realism as a tradition. Contra much of what stands for realism today, Leifer's work, when subjected to a deconstructive reading, demonstrates a commitment to dialoguing with the world of Asian security even as it contributes to its objectification, as evidenced in his ambivalent reflections on regional order and the balance of power in the Southeast Asian, East Asian as well as Asia-Pacific contexts. In that respect, Leifer's work draws critical attention to some of the metaphysical conceits of rationalist–positivist international relations theory and practice, which at times seems more interested in the pursuit of a purely instrumentalist control over an objectified reality rather than hearing what the ‘real world’ has to say in return. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]