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This paper compares post-transition Philippines and Indonesia, examining the ways in which authoritarian practices survive and are shaped by regime transition. It examines the transition process in each case, to identify the problems of management and control that regime elites set for themselves in the post-dictatorship period. It is argued that Philippine elites set out to disaggregate and domesticate an already mobilized opposition movement, while the Indonesian authorities strove to keep similar popular politics from mobilizing. The paper then considers how these political objectives find expression in the structuring of two important institutional fields - the electoral and policy making processes - concluding with an examination of how these considerations influence patterns of repression. In particular, the paper also investigates whether repression targets primarily proscribed modes of activity, or sets out to threaten and intimidate proscribed organizations and people. Differences in electoral and policy processes, as well as in patterns of repression, demonstrate the ways in which authoritarianism can survive regime transitions and can undermine the promise of democracy in the post-dictatorship period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indonesia is often regarded as the natural leader of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in light of its geographical dimensions, large population, strategic position and natural resources. The country has felt entitled to a position of leadership and has generally been recognized by the other ASEAN members as first among equals. While the de facto leadership of Indonesia has traditionally been accepted as conventional wisdom, little attention has been given to the extent to which Jakarta has actually succeeded in exercising leadership in ASEAN and how its attempt to do so has been perceived by the other Southeast Asian states. The paper explores this question by focusing on Indonesia's ability to provide international public goods in the areas of security and economics, engage in conflict management and promote institution building. It argues that the country has sought to establish a stable and autonomous security environment, to conduct conflict meditation efforts in the Cambodian conflict and the South China Sea disputes, and to develop institutional mechanisms to promote security, democracy and human rights among other issues. Still, Indonesia's leadership in ASEAN has been incomplete due to resistance from some members to its preference for an autonomous regional order and in recent years a democratic form of domestic governance. Its leadership has so far also been limited to the political and security spheres, leaving other sectors, like the economy, to others. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Is a higher degree of party and party system institutionalization positively correlated with the consolidation of democracy, defined here as the prevention of democratic breakdown? In order to answer this question, it is useful to compare different levels and types of institutionalization in three Southeast Asian electoral democracies. Institutionalized party systems are characterized, according to Mainwaring and Torcal, by 'stability of interparty competition.' Moreover, the distinction made by Levitsky ('value infusion' versus 'behavioural routinization') with reference to the institutionalization of individual parties will be employed. The empirical research of this paper finds that most Indonesian parties are better institutionalized than those in the Philippines and Thailand with reference to 'value infusion.' In addition, the interparty competition is more stable in Indonesia. Therefore, the probability of a collapse of the party system in the Philippines and Thailand is much higher. This, in turn, renders the democracies in these countries more fragile and prone to political crises or even sudden breakdowns. The early organizational consolidation of social cleavages, such as in Indonesia, enhances institutionalization. A few of the most important parties are socially rooted and have strong linkages to civil and/or religious organizations. Furthermore, the relationship between central and local elites appears to be essential: strong bosses or cliques undermine institutionalization in the Philippines and in Thailand, respectively. However, in recent years there has also been a tendency towards convergence. There are signs of regression in Indonesia, such that the future of the party system is open to question. This article calls for caution with respect to the stated causal relation between institutionalization and democratic consolidation, and it questions some aspects of the concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This analysis of the institutional design and actual performance of constitutional review in five newly democratized nations in East Asia shows that during the last two decades the judiciary has come to play an increasingly important political role in South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia. Constitutional courts in these three countries are more active in counterbalancing executive and legislative power than ever before. This however contrasts with the experiences of Thailand and Mongolia where constitutional courts were unable to fulfill a similar function. The discussion for potential explanations for this cross-national variance in court performance supports the critique in parts of the scholarly literature against purely institutional, cultural and structural explanations. Rather, the degree of political uncertainty and diffusion of political power are critical determinants for understanding why politicians comply with court judgments, or attempt to marginalize justices. In addition, the relationship between institutional support, compliance and the area of judicial review matters. In this regard, one lesson of the East Asian comparison is that a too early introduction of review of separation of power conflicts could actually make things worse, by threatening the court's authority and marginalizing its influence. This represents a danger often neglected in the democratization literature that claims judicial control of horizontal accountability mechanisms would necessarily help to consolidate democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Terrorism has become a challenge to which Southeast Asian studies need to respond. This article scrutinizes political and economic developments in regard to democracy and poverty in Southeast Asia, in particular the degree of change, and studies their influence on terrorism. The main question being asked here is whether external support for political and economic development could contribute to the Southeast Asian battle against terrorism. At the same time, this article seeks ways in which the international community, especially Europe, could support and participate in Southeast Asian efforts to address the root causes of terrorism. Finally, a global quantitative analysis of relevant factors is undertaken, and global conclusions are related to the developments and processes observed in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia. On the basis of the analysis, it can be established that some of the root causes of terrorism are indeed related to poverty and the lack of democracy. While it is clear that terrorist strategies to address these grievances by targeting innocent civilians are unacceptable, grievances related to poverty and the lack of democracy are perfectly legitimate. It seems that in order to inhibit individual terrorist motivations, democratization of political systems would do some good. However, the main economic and political grievances that are associated with the growth of terrorism are related to transnational communities. Thus, while Southeast Asian countries should continue to develop and democratize, they should also work together with the international community to democratize the international structures of governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite global trends towards military reform characterized by processes of professionalization and democratization, militaries in Southeast Asia have continued to play prominent roles in domestic politics since 11 September. This suggests that wider patterns of global military reform have not had as great an impact on the control, capacity and cooperative functions of armed forces in Southeast Asia as they may have elsewhere. In order to explore why the security sector reform agenda has had so little impact in the region, we investigate recent patterns of civil–military relations in Southeast Asia by focusing on the experiences of four of the region's militaries: Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. We argue that the security sector reform agenda is informed by a predominantly North American approach to civil–military relations based on a number of core assumptions that do not reflect Southeast Asian experiences. Hence, we ask whether the reform agenda itself could be modified to better suit the Southeast Asian context. We suggest that although the regional military sector has not reformed along a ‘Western’ path it is nonetheless possible to see other types of, and potential for, reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]