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This paper argues that amid intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry, middle powers in East Asia have contributed towards regional peaceful change through the exercise of good regional citizenship, a concept which draws on and modifies from the more commonly known good international citizenship which is closely associated with middle powers. Specifically, good regional citizenship involves proactively strengthening inclusive multilateralism, enhancing the rules-based order, and contributing to bridging efforts in East Asia. The paper examines the good regional citizenship of two middle powers, namely Australia and Indonesia. It finds that while both countries have exercised good regional citizenship, their specific strategies or the outcomes of their initiatives on regional dynamics have varied as a result of their relations with the respective major powers and their general foreign policy approaches. Australia's good regional citizenship has supported the preservation of U.S. leadership in East Asia vis-à-vis the rise of other regional powers, while Indonesia's good regional citizenship has helped to narrow the gaps among regional actors through mechanisms led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper highlights the highly contingent and constrained possibilities for states concerned with gaining and maintaining economic and, relatedly, strategic advantage in East Asia in a world dominated by global value chains (GVCs) owned and controlled by transnational capital. While the reorganisation of production has given rise to new contender states such as China, challenging the economic and strategic positions of others, the ability for states to engage in non-market conforming behaviour designed to reduce technological dependence, accumulate reserves and embolden national positions against competitors is far more constrained than it once was. Prioritising the relative power and leverage of states operating in various contexts over time, three types of state are identified within contemporary East Asia: former developmental states under persistent competitive pressures compelling very different policy agendas to those that underpinned their respective development stories; a somewhat exceptional constrained "aspirant state", attempting mercantilist strategies to achieve strategic upgrading under the spectre of systemic exclusion and formidable domestic challenges; and, finally, relatively vulnerable "eke-out" competition states, attempting to leverage labour cost, geography and regulation to maintain economic relevance within the context of hyper competitiveness while also engaging in forms of quarantining and patronage. Our overarching argument is that the latitude to both pursue and leverage ES strategies common in the past is all but gone, even for the most powerful of contender states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For forty years, the East Asian regional order has delivered widespread peace and prosperity. That order faces possible upending by an economically and militarily more powerful China and a decreasingly robust and engaged United States. While accepting the possibility that such structural shifts could upend the regional order, this paper contends that three powerful counterweights are working to counter disruptive conflicts and to foster peaceful change, namely strong and rising economic interdependence, expanding institutionalization, and active preservation efforts by number of other Asian states, particularly the region's middle powers. This article analyzes the contribution of these three forces to creating the existing order and to their roles in its continuation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

East Asia offers a fertile ground for applying dominant theoretical perspectives in International Relations and understanding their relevance and limitations. As this region has seen much conflict and cooperation historically and is re-emerging as a key theater of great power competition in the 21st century even when states maintain high levels of economic interactions, our understanding of the regional order will be enhanced by the theoretical tools available in the larger mainstream IR perspectives. The existence of a peculiar regional order of no war, yet a number of simmering disputes (along with high levels of economic interdependence) can be characterized as cold peace which deserves an explanation. The paper applies two variants of realism—balance of power and hegemonic stability – and the key arguments in liberalism to analyze the cold peace in Northeast Asia and normal peace in Southeast Asia from a historical perspective. It finds both grand theoretical approaches have partial applications for understanding the East Asian order. A hybrid approach is more valuable to better explain regional order during diverse time periods and different sub-regions of East Asia. Although the presence of both hegemony and balance of power can prevent major wars for a period, they do not help resolve the pre-existing disputes. Deepened economic interdependence mitigates some spiraling tendencies as states fearful of losing too much economically do not escalate crises beyond a point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A dualistic-order thesis has been emerged as a widely-used concept to describe East Asia's regional dynamics. According to the thesis, the economic and security spheres of the region have become divorced from one other, whereby China and the United States dominate the economic and security realms, respectively. This paper demonstrates the deficiencies of this thesis, based on a comprehensive assessment of the economic and security developments in the region, as well as the strategic choices of small and middle regional powers. In order to form a more accurate and systematic understanding of regional prosperity and stability, this paper develops an economy-security nexus approach by integrating the interactions of regional actors in both the economic and security realms into a unified framework. From this perspective, East Asian regional order is sustained by a delicate coupling of regional economic and security configurations: 'hot economics' is accompanied with cooperative security interactions. Although China and the United States are not the dominant actors in either field, their relatively benign interactions in both realms collectively play a significant role by shaping the strategic environment for regional actors, allowing them to enjoy a large degree of strategic flexibility and increase their security and prosperity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Referring to the short-term survival of new progressive governments, ‘progressive setback’ has been a remarkable political phenomenon in many East Asian countries during the recent decades. Regarding this phenomenon's background, this paper investigates why and how urban citizens challenged their progressive governments in Thailand, South Korea, and Japan. First, this paper argues that the progressive setback across East Asia reflects the difficulty progressive governments faced in overcoming the legacy of longstanding conservative regimes, which had locked urban citizens into specific modes of subsistence. The progressives invoked the protest of urban populations as their new socioeconomic policies undermined these populations’ traditional basis of subsistence. Second, an investigation of the primary modes of urban subsistence in each country makes the cross-national comparison of progressive setback possible. Urban middle classes in Thailand, as an exclusive group incorporated into the mainstream political economy, engaged in a fierce contest with a progressive government that denied their privileged status in Thai society. In Korea, the self-employed turned to the conservative party since market restructuring programs of the progressive government made it difficult for these self-employed to maintain profits and sustain their livelihood. Finally, Japan's urban workers could not welcome the welfare expansion of the new labor-friendly government, because this class was too dependent upon wage incomes to agree with the consumption tax hike that welfare expansion required as its precondition. This paper implies that the old habits of urban citizens are an important hurdle for East Asia's progressives to overcome. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Following a historical commitment to multilateralism, in the last decade the trade policy initiatives of many states in the Asia-Pacific have turned to bilateralism through the negotiation of free trade agreements (FTAs). The corresponding proliferation of regional FTAs has thus far been understood to result from three broad motivations: a desire to advance trade liberalization beyond World Trade Organization (WTO) disciplines; mercantilistic efforts to secure preferential access to key export markets; and/or attempts to use FTAs to secure non-economic political gains. This paper argues that since the middle of the decade a new motive has emerged – the use of FTAs to improve resource security – particularly by import-dependent resource consumers in Northeast Asia. As yet unexamined in the literature, this paper seeks to document and explain this trend. It analyses the recent emergence of resource security concerns as a new FTA motive; the corresponding shifts in the FTA strategies and initiatives of Japan, Korea and China; and the dynamics of an emerging race for resource-related FTAs between the three governments. Based on this analysis, it demonstrates that resource-related FTAs could potentially improve consumers’ resource security through either the liberalization of trade, the extension of investment protections or broader diplomatic gains with the targeted supplier. However, owing to supplier reluctance to enter into binding policy commitments for resource industries, their track record shows success in only the diplomatic dimension, and the prospects for a strengthening of their effects are poor. As a result, it is argued that while resource concerns have become a key motive for FTA initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region, they have not substantively improved resource security for its import-dependent states and are unlikely to do so in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Large-scale foreign investment in Africa's abundant but largely underutilized arable land has been criticised by international NGOs and social movements as ‘land grabbing’, which limits access of smallholder farmers to land, deprives local people of their livelihoods and threatens local and national food security across the continent. By way of contrast, many host governments and some leading international development agencies regard land-based investments as beneficial for development in terms of providing the necessary capital and technological know-how for modernising the region's neglected agriculture including take-off in agribusiness and agro-industrialisation, which is vital to much needed economic diversification in many African countries. East Asia's participation in the global land rush on Africa is examined from the standpoint of these two different perspectives: while China's growing presence and involvement in trade and investment in mining, energy and infrastructure in Africa is well known, less recognised is its involvement and those of other East Asian countries such as South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam in agriculture through large-scale land acquisitions. The development consequences and policy implications of these foreign land-based investments are analysed from a political economy perspective, which identifies motives, interests and benefits of the different actors and addresses the question of governance in terms of transparency and appropriate institutional arrangements to safeguard land rights and food security. In the bigger picture, the paper argues that the negative consequences of land grab has to be seen alongside the benefits flowing to Africa from growing economic relations with China and other dynamic East Asian economies and learning from the development experiences of those countries. African countries however need to re-assess the current approach and relationship with foreign land-based investors and decide how best this trend can be used to forward their economic and social agendas. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines prospects for solidarity, defined as an ethos of collective responsibility that works across a political community's normative values and policy decisions, as a unifying idea that can inspire and promote steps toward regional political community across East Asia. Just as the European Union's (EU) founders and its past and present visionaries have appealed consistently to an inclusive, transnational model of solidarity in framing and pursuing European integration, notions of solidarity also contain important affinities with prospects for building an East Asian community. First, the paper examines how the idea of solidarity has evolved in European political thought and especially how solidarity has emerged repeatedly as one of the important concepts throughout the political development of the EU. Then, the paper turns to East Asia and considers the relevance of solidarity as an important principle in aspirations and endeavors toward the creation of an East Asian community. We base our analysis upon a variety of sources, including statements and speeches from key political actors, scholarly books and articles, and news accounts and commentaries. We illustrate how earlier manifestations of solidarity in East Asia have often been cast in ways that set the region apart from the rest of the world and have framed particular groupings of Asian countries in opposition to the West, and we argue that a redeployment of solidarity is needed in East Asia that instead emphasizes an ethos of collective responsibility among the principal national actors and external stakeholders within the region and beyond. In contrast with interpretations that suggest that the conditions for developing East Asian community are inescapably distinct from the circumstances in Europe during the second half of the twentieth century, we argue that the idea of solidarity has great potential to advance regional collaboration in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

High economic growth rates, the revolution in telecommunications and the end of the Cold War have brought about rapid and profound changes to the domestic as well as regional environments of Northeast Asian governments. The maritime sphere, where increasingly militarized state boundaries delineate political authority and economic activities link increasingly interdependent communities therein, bears high significance for the study of regional cooperation. This paper looks at how the maritime sphere of Northeast Asia is represented in common political and academic discourses of international relations. It finds that maritime affairs are firmly cast in the language of national security, and that empirical evidence against perceived threats and related security imperatives is often neglected if not completely ignored. The paper argues that the maritime space, due to its special character, has become the stage on which the consequences of modernity appear particularly strong. The relentless quest to develop and control the ocean clashes with the notion of the sea as a space of global trade and communication flow. At the same time, the ocean as an entity itself is excluded from the discourse because it is irreconcilable with the conception of the international system of sovereign territorial units. As a result, the maritime sphere is seen as a dividing element between nations rather than a connecting element, and salient environmental problems of the maritime space remain low on political and academic agendas. This is also a consequence of mainstream methods of political science that continue to reproduce discourses of territorial division and fail to offer alternative approaches suitable for the study of contemporary Northeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's behaviour in East Asian financial cooperation has overall changed from passively responding to external pressures to taking proactive initiatives, which are highlighted by Chinese elites as evidence of a sense of responsibility. China has taken varied positions towards proposals for Asian financial regionalism, from 'silent' objection, to lukewarm or superficial support, to enthusiastic participation and substantial contribution, and this variance has not always taken place in a chronological order. Despite much speculation over the trajectory of China's role in East Asian regionalism, there has not been a study focused on China's policymaking towards East Asian financial cooperation. Therefore, this paper fills the gap by analysing the factors and policymaking processes that have led to those varied positions. It argues that China, recognising the momentum in the region to enhance cooperation, has replaced the blunt dismissals of proposals, particularly those from Japan, with a more subtle approach that is aimed at ensuring China's influence and promoting the image of a responsible great power; that the extent to which it can contribute to this process is mainly constrained by its economic conditions, particularly the financial institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the notion that subjective economic perceptions as well as objective economic conditions affect electoral outcomes has long been explored in advanced democracies and new democracies, evidence of the link between the economy and elections has been rarely found in East Asian countries. As economic issues have become salient since the 1997 financial crisis, political leaders' capacity to manage the economy has become one of the most important criteria in electoral choice in East Asia. This paper examines how economic issues influenced the results of the 2007 presidential election in South Korea. By making use of the 2007 Presidential Election Panel Study, this study examines the continuity of and changes in the Korean voters' electoral behavior. This study describes the political situation in the post-1997 financial crisis period under two liberal governments in Korea and introduces the processes and characteristics of electoral campaigns in the 2007 presidential election. This paper then explores the link between the economy and vote choice, focusing on whether economic issues were salient among the electorate, whether retrospective or prospective economic voting was prevalent among Koreans, and how the voters supported Lee Myung Bak across age groups, regions, and parties in the 2007 presidential election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines economic regionalism in East Asia with a focus on the key issues in harmonizing bilateral free trade agreements. The ASEAN+1 free trade agreements with China, South Korea and Japan represent the first attempts to structure cooperation in trade across Southeast and Northeast Asia. It is therefore important to examine the coverage of these agreements and the extent to which they actually liberalize trade. This study focuses on major choices made in the negotiation of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and the ways in which these choices help or hinder the consolidation of economic regionalism. The results achieved in the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement are limited at best. The agreement does establish some new areas of cooperation among the signatories but fails to address important issues for regionalism such as labor mobility. It also makes limited progress in harmonizing and liberalizing rules of origin. The ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement applies product-specific rules to fewer categories of goods than most of Japan's bilateral agreements with ASEAN members but those rules in place are still very restrictive. Moreover, the parties to the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement have the option of applying the rules of their bilateral agreement if it provides more favorable treatment. Thus, there is no guarantee the more liberal terms of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement will be applied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the shift in East Asia from a focus on multilateral trade liberalization through the WTO to a pragmatic approach since 1999 favouring bilateral and regional FTAs while continuing to support the WTO system. It is argued that such FTAs are a second-best option compared to WTO agreements. However, while economists may seek the ideal solution, governments will focus on the politically attainable, especially as new multilateral agreements require lengthy negotiations beyond the life span of governments. As the WTO negotiating process has become bogged down, even once sceptical governments in East Asia are turning to FTAs. It is contended that such FTAs could form a lattice network within and across regions. In this context, the paper discusses the underlying security rationale for the conclusion of FTAs, highlighting the nexus between security interests and international economic policy in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given its potentially global significance and the attention that there tends to be towards things that go wrong, it is hardly surprising that most of the literature dealing with economic events in East Asia during recent years has concentrated on the crisis period of 1997 and 1998. This work has sought to gain a better understanding of why such crises occur and how best they can be handled if and when they do. Less attention has been paid to the more recent post crisis period. To what extent and within what time frame did countries in the region recover from the crisis, and, if there has been a recovery, can it be sustained? Drawing on the available evidence, this paper attempts to answer these questions. By implication, however, it also has something to say about the vulnerability of the region to subsequent crises and briefly considers what needs to be done to reduce this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the roles of co-chairs in international negotiations. This study attempts to fill the research gap by scrutinizing co-chairs' effectiveness, defined as an ability to shape agreement details in one's direction, to better understand chairs' and co-chairs' influence in negotiations. I argue that a co-chair's effectiveness is not a function of resource possession, but is rooted in its resource management, or ability to convert the existing resources into bargaining influence. To validate my argument, I analyze the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) negotiation rounds from 2005 to 2010, focusing on the members' financial contributions and vote shares. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper posits four ranked, generic goals of state foreign policy, maps them against the American ‘pivot,’ and concludes with possible handicaps of that shift. Drawn broadly from realism and liberalism, those abstract goals are as follows: national security, economic growth, prestige among the community of states, and the promotion of cherished national values. Applying this framework specifically to Northeast Asia, the USA, regarding security, is likely to increasingly ‘hedge’ China, and its North Korean client, with regional allies, off-shore balancing, and a shift toward AirSea Battle. On trade, the USA will continue its decades-long effort to reduce Asian mercantilism by tying Asian traders into multilateral, neoliberal rule sets. Regarding prestige, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ is a growing challenge to US soft power which the pivot seeks to refute. In addition, on values, the USA will continue to nag especially China to conform to US standards of law and human rights. The USA will continue to push the broad liberalization of Asian polities and economies. The democratic peace and liberal trade are the ideological frame and motivation of the pivot. Nevertheless, significant US handicaps may slow the pivot: American cultural distance from Asia means little public support and understanding of its necessity; strong regional allies will tempt the USA toward offshore balancing on the cheap; and the dire US budget shortfall will reduce the resources necessary to fund it. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper compares the current global financial crisis with the one that struck East Asia a little more than a decade ago. The analysis reveals some striking and surprising differences between the two periods. Whereas the first crisis had a catalytic impact on Asian regionalism this one may not. Despite East Asia generally and China in particular seeming to emerge stronger relative to the US from the current crisis, the impact of the second crisis on Europe reminds us that there is nothing inevitable about the course of regional integration. Not only are Europe's economic problems likely to diminish whatever enthusiasm there was for initiatives such as a common currency in Asia, but China may also find itself increasingly playing a global rather than a regional role. In short, crises can have very different impacts and provide an important insight into the interconnected dynamics of regional and global processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global financial crisis of 2008-09 presented a critical challenge to East Asian regional financial cooperation. Over a decade of efforts to reduce regional vulnerability to financial crisis and contagion were confronted with the worst global economic crisis since the 1930s. The results for East Asia were mixed. On the one hand, no economies were forced to submit to IMF-led bailouts, as had happened so painfully in 1997-98. On the other hand, the most highly-developed component of the project of ASEAN+3 financial regionalism - the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which set up a system of emergency liquidity provision - appeared irrelevant, as the central banks of South Korea and Singapore prioritized the establishment of new swap agreements with the United States as a means of ensuring dollar liquidity instead of relying on their Chiang Mai partners. Nonetheless, in May 2009, the ASEAN+3 finance ministers agreed to a substantial expansion and 'multilateralization' of the initiative. This paper critically addresses whether CMI has been transformed into an 'Asian Monetary Fund' and argues that the events of 2008-10 make substantial additional movement in that direction unlikely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global financial crisis has shattered many illusions, one of which being that sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are properly treated as arms-length investment institutions subject only to global standards of good governance. In fact, in a number of East Asian countries SWFs have acted as 'insurers of last resort' for their nation-states underwriting financial stability and social welfare. In this paper, we explain how and why this came to pass, arguing that this role serves to sustain the legitimacy of the nation-state as well as justify the separation of SWF assets from the public interest in current consumption and spending. Focusing upon the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC), we suggest that the prospect of recurrent financial crises was an important prompt for its establishment in 1981, reinforced by the experience of many East Asian countries in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The formal constitution of the GIC, the mechanisms by which its reserves are returned to the government in crisis, and the role of different sections of the political elite in managing those assets are explained. Referencing the principles of best-practice fund governance and the Santiago Principles underwriting the legitimacy of SWFs, we also consider the governance of the GIC, especially as regards its investment processes. Implications are drawn for the experience of Western countries, particularly the UK and the USA, wherein the failure of their banking systems has put untold pressures on current and future living standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article challenges the view that democratisation is a recipe for regional disorder in East Asia. This view is not supported by evidence. Critics of democratisation fail to consider a number of mitigating factors that may check the destabilising consequences of democratisation while accentuating its peace-causing effects. These factors are not necessarily other liberal forces, like economic interdependence, or regional institutions, although these do matter. Certain dynamics associated with democratisation, such as focus on economic rebuilding for regime legitimation, positive nationalism ('democratic pride'), involvement of civil society, etc., may lessen the potential for inter-state conflict. These mitigating factors do not necessarily correspond with the normative and institutionalist logic underpinning the democratic peace theory, and they have been largely overlooked by the critics of that theory. After identifying them, this paper shows that the East Asian experience does not show that democratisation leads to greater conflict between states. On the contrary, democratisation might create better prospects for cooperative peace in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the potential of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) to catalyze a process of economic and political integration in East Asia. The analysis first illustrates APT participants' projected views of APT's opportunities and limitations and then assesses the motives and objectives driving APT cooperation. Following a review of the major achievements of APT, the study gives an outlook on APT's relevance and prospects. The findings of the article are that most APT states do not advocate ideas of distinctive pan-East Asian regionalism, but rather take an Asia-Pacific perspective. Only Malaysia and China appear to be promoting more exclusive forms of East Asian regionalism. Within APT, China is aggressively pushing a strong China-ASEAN axis, whereas Japan is seeking to balance China's efforts and step up its political and economic cooperative profile in the region. A look at the achievements of APT does not suggest a rapid spread of pan-East Asian regionalism. On the contrary, the proposed ASEAN-China FTA proposal has triggered fierce competition between Japan and China and thus divided APT even further. Moreover, it is not at all certain whether the ASEAN-China FTA plan is going to work out in the end, due to objections from various ASEAN members, including a somewhat capricious Malaysia. Whereas pan-East Asian integration efforts are unlikely, the APT process is attractive enough to keep Japan and China, who are competing for influence in Southeast Asia, committed to the APT process. Regardless of APT's internal fragmentation, its dynamic has already begun to change the political and economic landscape of East Asia. Thus, ASEAN has been able to enhance its leverage vis-à-vis Japan and China, profiting from their strategic opposition. Japan's reluctance to discuss trade liberalization with ASEAN members already appears to be crumbling, as it is struggling to preclude Chinese domination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article poses the question of why, after having consistently pursued an isolationist strategy of avoiding security ties with partners other than the US, and having followed the US in opposing regional security multilateralism, did Japan suddenly reverse course and get out in front of the US with its first post-war regional security initiative. This article addresses this question by tracing the internal debates, policy process and motivations that drove Japan to reverse its position, a process that transformed Japan into the leading champion of regional security multilateralism in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the devastating experience of the Asian financial crisis more than ten years ago, East Asia launched regional economic cooperation efforts. East Asia's mixed response to the global financial crisis a decade later, however, reveals how certain impetuses that gave rise to unified efforts to regional institution building in East Asia at the time of the AFC derived, fundamentally, from the region's defensive desire as it positioned itself within the harsh global economic and political environment of that time. The GFC triggered reorganization of global economic governance by discrediting neoliberal principles, introducing a new global governance structure and allowing reliance of domestic stimuli for economic recovery. Those shifts, in turn, led to the loss of East Asia's basic mandate towards regional cooperation. In other words, the focus of solving the region's economic vulnerability has now moved from regional arrangement to national and global stages. In particular, the East Asian governments now see less of a need to counterweight the predominant neoliberal voice through unified regional voice as the expansion of the forum to discuss global economic governance to G20 and IMF reform to provide East Asia more representation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction to the journal is presented in which the author explains the issue's focus on East Asian food insecurity, noting such topics as population growth, urbanization, and the globalization of food production and distribution.

Over the last two decades, China has experienced one of the most dramatic and sustained periods of economic growth in world history. China's use of economic statecraft provides an important venue in which to examine the role of unacknowledged ‘coercive diplomacy’ within the context of China's ‘peaceful rise discourse.’ In contrast to Western countries, which have overtly used sanctions and other forms of economic coercion, China has publicly denied any such policies while at the same time quietly pursuing them. China's denial of using coercive economic statecraft has muted the reactions of neighboring publics and government, but it cannot entirely forestall them. Without seriously undermining China's ‘peaceful-rising’ image, a more explicit statement from Beijing regarding its coercive economic measure could provide deterrence and assurance to China's neighbors in resolving the disputes. This article first surveys existing literature on economic statecraft focusing on the coercive aspects of such strategies. Second, it presents an in-depth case study on how China uses economic leverages over its neighbors in East Asia: North Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Finally, it highlights the limits of China's economic statecraft within the constraints of China's ‘peaceful rise’ discourse. It concludes with implications for Asian politics and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines conditions under which states in East Asia engage in the development of regional institutions. It assumes that crucial external events and shocks, which produce specific historical breakpoints – critical junctures – constitute a significant breakpoint at which the regional states willingly elevated a path to develop regional institutions to a new level. The analysis of the development of regional institutions for a free trade area and food stock for emergency revealed that regional states in East Asia changed their views on the evolving reality created by external shocks and such changes led to the creation of new regional institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Diffusion scholarship expects little adaptation of core elements of policy models. However, the empirical reality is different; diffusion of even highly regarded models, such as the Silicon Valley venture capital (VC) policy model, results in marked adaptation. This article demonstrates why the Silicon Valley VC model is necessarily adapted differently by policy-makers in the geographically, ethnically and economically proximate states of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. More specifically, these policy-makers' interventionist orientations, private sector financing preferences and international versus domestic firm promotion biases drive contextually rational – and unique – adaptations of the Silicon Valley VC policy model. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

East Asia's renewable energy (RE) sector has grown faster than any other region's since the mid-2000s. It is argued that renewables formed an integral part of the region's new industrial policies and new developmentalism, which are founded on new configured forms of state capacity shaped in response to various challenges, primarily climate change, energy security, globalisation and global neo-liberalism. By studying the recent progress of East Asia's RE sector, we gain useful insights into these key developments in East Asia's political economy and the region's prospects for transition towards low carbon development. This analysis considers how and why different approaches to RE policy emerged in East Asia, to what extent the promotion and expansion of East Asia's RE sector is part of a new industrial policy paradigm and new developmentalism, and what the study of East Asian policies on promoting renewable energy can tell us about the region's broader approach to low carbon development. Although the promotion of renewable energy has been a fundamental part of East Asia's recent macro-development plans and new developmentalism generally, these same plans suggest that East Asian states will simultaneously continue to significantly promote high carbon and ecologically damaging industrial activities, thus undermining the low carbon credentials of East Asia's new developmentalism. The path to meaningful low carbon development will be very long and will take many decades to achieve. However, it is contended that by maintaining and improving their various forms of state capacity over time, the East Asian states will be well positioned to sustain the significant growth of their renewable energy sectors and thereby further strengthen the low carbon development orientation of their new industrial policies, macro-development plans and strategic economic thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

If the assessment of ASEAN's success in the past is difficult, speculations on whether ASEAN will be a success will be close to impossibility. Yet this is what is intended in this article. However, this is done by first defining robust criteria of success of conflict prevention. Conflict prevention is successful if conflicts and battle deaths can be avoided, either by means of conflict resolution or transformation, or simply by means of conflict avoidance. By starting with this criterion the article will argue that ASEAN peacefulness cannot be explained by durable objective conditions. Instead, it is built on imagined realities. The imagined realities of the ASEAN Way are getting more difficult to sustain due to their interaction with material and normative/institutional developments. Many of the constructed foundations of the ASEAN Way are unsustainable in the new realities where communication has become easy and uncontrollable, and societies have become wealthier and more democratized. However, the article will show that evidence of existing conflict violence suggests that ASEAN has started to reformulate its approach to conflict prevention and that this has largely been successful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political economists have long noted that the prospects for trade liberalization diminish in a climate of economic recession. A stagnant economy intensifies the burden of adjustment for non-competitive sectors and polarizes domestic trade politics. Not surprisingly, the global financial crisis has raised concerns of a substantial protectionist backlash, through the imposition of national measures that circumvent WTO disciplines such as anti-dumping or tied stimulus packages. The impact of economic crisis on regional integration is, however, more ambiguous and has not been explored systematically. On the one hand, policymakers may be pressed to renege on trade liberalization commitments on all fronts - also weakening the momentum to negotiate or implement free trade agreements (FTAs). On the other hand, policymakers may be tempted to 'insulate' their region from adverse global trends and may see FTAs as more amenable to political manipulation that shelters inefficient sectors. In order to shed light on the connection between external crisis and regionalist drive, this article assesses three main challenges East Asian elites confront in devising a regional trade bloc capable of acting as a growth locomotive: institutional fit, multilateralization, and architectural design. The track record of East Asian governments of negotiating FTAs to score diplomatic points abroad and ensure political survival at home - at the expense of maximizing economic gains through far-reaching liberalization - does not bode well for the magnitude of this challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a staggering decline in battle deaths in East Asia. Several recent studies have testified to this trend by referring to it as East Asian Peace. The decline in traditional conflict battle deaths does not, however, constitute peace. It could be possible that battle deaths have merely moved to less traditional types of conflict. The purpose of this article is to see whether the decline in battle deaths has brought about genuine peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The gradual institutionalization of defence diplomacy is becoming an increasingly prominent and potentially important feature of security dialogue in the Asian region. This stands in marked contrast to Asia's recent history, where across the region multilateral defence or military interactions have traditionally been regarded with suspicion. This article examines the emergence of Asia's most prominent exercise in defence diplomacy: the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD). Within a relatively short space of time, this forum has developed into one of the most important opportunities for regional defence ministers and senior military officers to meet and exchange views on security issues. Yet despite its growing standing, the SLD has received virtually no scholarly attention. The article begins by reviewing the origins and development of the SLD, before outlining its operating modalities. It seeks to account for the apparent appeal of the SLD, measured in terms of its capacity to consistently attract high-level representation and favourable reviews. The article explores how the SLD might develop in the future and outlines some of the challenges it faces, including the rise of potentially competing mechanisms for defence diplomacy in East Asia. The article closes by outlining a number of areas for further research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criticism of the developmental state can be divided into two categories. One is the neoliberal position that criticizes the efficacy of the developmental state model itself. According to this view, the developmental state was not an important factor in East Asian development and the adoption of industrial policy would in fact be detrimental to developing countries. A second critical position concedes that a degree of achievement was indeed attained by the developmental state in the past, but argues that the developmental state model is no longer a viable option today. This position holds that the high level of government intervention in successful East Asian countries more or less contributed to their economic development, but that this policy is no longer feasible. While deepening globalization in the world economy is regarded as inimical to the developmental state, some also argue that the developmental state model could only have worked during the Cold War and could not function in today's international political and economic climate. Despite these negative observations, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate the viability of the developmental state model. First, the article supports the statist position by broadening the scope of the argument: developmental states exist not only in Northeast Asia, but also in Southeast Asia, and the East Asian authoritarian regimes had a role in economic development. Second, this article directly counters new criticism of the developmental state. It argues that the developmental state model is still an effective development strategy in the post-Cold War period and even in the era of globalization: the model was useful in East Asia, and could be useful beyond East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the efforts of the past decade, maritime piracy remains of international concern today. Countries need to cooperate actively at both the regional and international levels to eradicate the problem effectively. In particular, the nature of the threat in the Asia-Pacific region suggests that coastal states - countries that possess sovereignty over the pirate-infested waters but lack the law-enforcement resources - have to turn to resource-rich extra-regional powers for assistance. Unfortunately, cooperation between such disparate countries has traditionally been impeded by sovereignty sensitivities, as best exemplified by Malaysia's and Indonesia's hostile responses to the United States' Regional Maritime Security Initiative in 2003. Faced with this apparent dilemma, a new phenomenon has emerged. National coast guard agencies, instead of their military naval counterparts, have become attractive alternatives for promoting international cooperation against non-traditional security threats, such as maritime piracy. Spearheaded by the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG), coast guards from various countries have imparted training expertise, conducted joint exercises, hosted low-publicity multilateral meetings, and even transferred security equipment across international borders. Together they have succeeded in promoting cooperation without arousing the sovereignty sensitivities often associated with such cooperation. This article analyzes the evolution of coast guard cooperation in Asia, highlighting in particular the Japanese Coast Guard's success in this endeavor. With the general alignment of regional and global power interests in Southeast Asia, coast guard agencies hold promise for extra-regional powers wishing to help eradicate maritime piracy in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Developmental State (DS) has been central to East Asia's rapid economic development over the last three decades. This analysis reviews the origins of the concept of the DS, the broader theoretical battles that provide the context in which the concept has been used, and the conditions that facilitated the emergence of the DS itself. The way in which the changing events in East Asia have influenced analyses of the DS will also be addressed with special attention paid to the onset of globalization, the end of the Cold War, and the impact of the Asian financial crisis. Finally, an assessment is undertaken of analyses of the DS that have appeared in the pages of The Pacific Review over the last twenty years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Security studies of East Asia focus on questions of inter-state war and peace, the distribution of power in the region, and the ways regional institutions mitigate the role of relative power balances and alliance structures. Debate on these issues has become increasingly sophisticated and has evolved theoretically, a process to which The Pacific Review has contributed by providing an important outlet for discussion of specifically Asian issues and by fostering the discussion of regional institutions. The security studies debate on East Asia, however, remains centred on examination of a relatively limited range of independent variables and security threats. Although the field has been redefined to include consideration of so-called 'non-traditional' security issues, work on East Asia has often made the case for non-traditional security studies largely on normative grounds. Further, much of the actual organized violence that has claimed and threatened lives, in particular the region's extensive civil conflicts and state violence against civilians, remains outside the purview of mainstream security studies of the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of East Asia as a region is relatively new. Until the appearance of the abortive East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) idea, which was put forward by Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia in the early 1990s, there was no strong conceptual framework for regionalism in East Asia as a whole. At that time, the idea of an integrated East Asia, joining Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia in regional unity, was not yet firmly enough established to gain the consensus necessary to form a regional institution based on the larger framework. Following the constructivist approach, which emphasizes the significance of analysing how regional 'togetherness' can be strengthened and how this influences the formation of a regional institution, this article examines how and why the first proposal for East Asian regionalism, EAEC, failed to be realized, and then analyses the successful establishment and development of ASEAN+3. The article stresses the significance of the emergence and increasing acceptance of the concept of East Asia, and identifies factors such as the Asian financial crisis and the development of regionalism in other regions which helped to promote the self-other distinction necessary for the formation of an East Asian identity. Further, it emphasizes that the strengthened bond among the countries of the region can be attributed partly to the successful establishment of the ASEAN+3 meetings. The article also highlights Japan's growing involvement in ASEAN+3, an approach which contrasts sharply with its lukewarm attitudes towards EAEC. Japan's push for the promotion of ASEAN+3 can be seen as a major factor behind the development of this regionalism. Finally, this article discusses whether a truly East Asia regional institution such as an East Asian Free Trade Agreement is likely to emerge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that there is a distinct and longstanding regional structure in East Asia that is of at least equal importance to the global level in shaping the region's security dynamics. Without considering this regional level neither 'unipolar' nor 'multipolar' designations can explain East Asian international security. To make this case, I deploy regional security complex theory both to characterize and explain developments in East Asia since the end of the Cold War. The shift from bipolarity to unipolarity is well understood in thinking about how the ending of the Cold War impacted on East Asia. Less written about in Western security literature are the parallel developments at the regional level. Prominent among these are the relative empowerment of China in relation to its neighbours, and the effect of this, as well as of the growth of regional institutions, and the attachment of security significance to East Asian economic developments, in merging the security dynamics of Northeast and Southeast Asia. How China relates to its East Asian region, and how the US and China relate to each other, are deeply intertwined issues which centrally affect not only the future of East Asian, but also global, security. With the notable exception of some crisis between China and Taiwan, this whole pattern looks mainly dependent on internal developments within China and the US. Also significant is whether the basic dynamic of interstate relations in East Asia is more defined by the Westphalian principle of balancing, or by the bandwagoning imperative more characteristic of suzerain-vassal relationships. The main probability is for more of the same, with East Asian security staying within a fairly narrow band between mild conflict formation and a rather odd and weak sort of security regime in which an outside power, the US, plays the key role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the influence of globalization on a state's trade policy and politics through the study of Japan-China trade friction over safeguards. Two hypotheses are presented: the state shows transformative capacity to formulate trade policy for maintaining overall interest of national industries in rapidly evolving international marketplaces, and division in trade policy preferences among societal actors due to globalized corporate activities has a critical influence on a state's trade policy. In the two case studies, the Japanese government showed different responses to demand for invoking safeguard measures. In the textile case, the government maintained a stance against the measures, stressing the need for structural reform. In the agricultural case, the government invoked emergency import curbs on farm products rather swiftly after an import surge became a serious problem. In addition to the different degree of support from political circles, policy preferences of government agencies concerned produced this difference. While the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) took into account the evolving influence of China on Japanese industries, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) handled the issue from a purely domestic standpoint. Division in policy preferences among societal actors also differed in the two cases. In the textile case, opposition from producers engaging in operations in China impeded a petition itself or helped to create public opinions against import restrictions. In the agricultural case, trading houses, main actors engaging in the development and imports of Chinese products, did not implement overt opposition activities because of their interests in desirable relations with the agricultural groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

pragmatic and long-term approach to financial market reform, with greater sensitivity to political risks and constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines policy networks in South Korea and Taiwan during the democratic era. Policy networks are the core mechanisms of developmentalism in the two countries. However, democratization affects policy coordination differently in the two countries. By focusing on policy networks as their core mechanisms of developmentalism, this article shows that the fate of developmental states in the democratic period is not fixed. The Korean state fails to maintain policy networks, thus becoming less developmental. Its economic policies become inconsistent, short-term-oriented, over-politicized and poorly monitored. Meanwhile, Taiwan further develops policy networks, so becoming more developmental. These two contrasting experiences of network management and policy choice help account for the differential impacts of the financial crisis on South Korea and Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why, in July 1991, did Japan suddenly reverse years of opposition to regional security multilateralism in East Asia, and propose a multilateral security dialogue? This study argues that two factors largely account for the so-called Nakayama proposal. First, after the Gulf War and in the midst of Soviet collapse, Japan concluded that it would have to play a larger international security role. Second, Japan realized that as a consequence it would need to expand its efforts to reassure Asian countries mistrustful of Japanese military power as a result of historical experience. Japanese policy-makers thus came to conceive of a multilateral security dialogue as a means for reassuring Asian countries about its plan to send troops overseas to participate in United Nations peacekeeping. Secondary factors contributing to Japan's decision to promote security multilateralism include the declining Soviet threat, fear of American withdrawal, and competition from other countries with differing conceptions of what form security multilateralism should assume. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Capitalist diversity is doomed in a global economy and the coming century will see ever more countries adapting their institutions to resemble more closely the Anglo-American model. Or so many believe. But to what extent have the ideological and institutional fundamentals of East Asian developmental states been eroded and in what measure is change being driven by an external-economic logic? Five propositions are developed in the light of the catch-up process, the sources and outcomes of financial liberalization, the Asian financial crisis, and Japan's bank crisis. The article concludes that the East Asian experience offers little comfort to those who expect that liberalization will lead to 'normalization'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on foreign direct investment and corporate restructuring in East Asia. Emergence of newly industrializing countries; Competitive advantages of multinational corporations; Business environment; Increase in the production costs.

Examines the role of the state, networks and politics in shaping the nature and direction of economic development and regional cooperation in East Asia. Disintegrative forces of domestic and international polities; Relation between politics and markets.