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AbstractThis paper examines how Vietnam has navigated U.S.-China rivalry in the Mekong basin while seeking to ensure its security, prosperity, and autonomy. I use the theoretical lens of hedging, defined as an insurance-maximising behaviour under conditions of high uncertainty. While existing scholarship has extensively examined Vietnam’s hedging on maritime security issues and the broader U.S.-China strategic and economic competition, this paper makes an empirical contribution by focusing on the relatively understudied angle of hedging in the Mekong basin context. I argue that Vietnam has hedged by (1) diversifying its Mekong partnerships with both the United States and China and (2) selectively cooperating with China under the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation. These acts aim to minimise Vietnam’s exposure to the long-term consequences of several non-traditional security risks, namely ecological challenges, water insecurity, economic vulnerabilities, and energy insecurity. Vietnam’s Mekong hedging also insures against the traditional security risks of big-power entrapment and military aggression as U.S.-China competition intensifies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThe rise of artificial intelligence (AI), represented by ChatGPT, has triggered a new wave of technological competition between nations. Major powers like China and the United States, backed by abundant resources, dominate the discourse and hold a significant advantage in the AI field. However, as the technological rivalry between these two countries intensifies, AI represents a classic ‘double-edged sword’ for many small and medium-sized countries. Therefore, the core argument of this paper is that the AI policies of small and medium-sized countries are not simply about bandwagoning or depending on major powers. At their core, these policies represent a complex form of technological hedging. External security concerns drive small and medium-sized countries to adopt hedging as a primary strategy, while internal interest preferences influence the varying intensities of this technological hedging. The findings of this paper indicate that small countries’ technological policies can be categorized into three models: strong hedging, medium hedging, and weak hedging. Different paths of technological hedging reflect the rational balance these nations make between security and economic interests in different contexts. The case of AI development in ASEAN also demonstrates the significant imbalance between member states. Singapore is classified as a technological frontrunner, while Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam are categorized as followers. Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Brunei, and the Philippines are considered latecomers in the field of AI. In terms of specific AI policies, Singapore and Vietnam adopt a strong technological hedging strategy, seeking more cooperation and interaction with the U.S. or other countries due to caution and concerns about China’s technological security. Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines follow a medium hedging strategy, while Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Brunei adopt a weak hedging approach. The differences in hedging intensity are primarily due to varying internal legitimacy pathways and the strength of backup resources. ASEAN member states pursue different technological paths based on their own circumstances to promote AI development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China remains reluctant in claiming unilateral economic sanctions as a valid form of statecraft. China has consistently withheld official acknowledgment of its use of unilateral sanctions despite using them in different disputes. This has resulted to observations arguing that China is increasingly approaching the use of sanctions in a stealthier, therefore, more aggressive manner. It begs to ask, how does China's reluctant attitude towards its use of unilateral economic sanctions fit into China's overall foreign policy logic? More specifically, how does China's victimhood discourse justify unilateral sanctions and at the same time, promote a positive identity of itself in light of coercion? This paper argues that China's consistent vague acknowledgment and denial in claiming a direct hand on unilateral sanctions comes from its broad foreign policy objective of maintaining a positive identity through its discourse of victimhood. To uncover this understanding, this paper analyzes China's official positions in six bilateral disputes where China has resorted to unilateral sanctions. While existing observations only stop at 'plausible deniability' as primary explanation for China's vague rhetoric, analyzing China's predication strategies provides a necessary nuancing in terms of how this peculiar behavior remains consistent with China's overall foreign policy logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of 'revisionism' has caught the attention of international relations scholars amid intensifying rivalry between the United States and China. It is a trademark of rising powers, and China was likewise expected to become a revisionist power, intent on changing the status quo. However, history tells us that not all rising powers necessarily become revolutionary states, seeking to overturn the prevailing order and replace it with another through hegemonic wars. This paper presents a novel understanding of revisionism by distinguishing between strategic 'contestation' and 'challenge'. In the context of declining unipolarity, a dissatisfied rising power will contest the rules and principles of issue-specific regimes and demand legitimate adjustments that better reflect the new distribution of power. A challenge emerges when demands are rejected, and a contestation leads to 'deconcentration' and 'delegitimation' of the established order. The establishment of the AIIB can be examined as an example of contested multilateralism that falls short of a challenge. This paper concludes that China is 'contesting', not 'challenging' the liberal international order and suggests a set of countermeasures that the U.S. can think of: selective accommodation, reinforcement of alliances and partnerships, and overcoming domestic challenges such as populism that undermine the liberal values, constitutive of the liberal international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China and the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative have intensified regional great power competition. Seemingly, China and Japan have been competing over the export of infrastructure projects and access to the Southeast Asian market. Against this backdrop, this paper sheds light on recipient states' agency. Specifically, this paper explores how Indonesia has responded to Sino-Japanese competition through the perspective of economic hedging. In the realm of domestic railway development and the need to establish connectivity on Java, why did the Indonesian government decide to work with China to develop the Jakarta-Bandung High-speed Rail project and Japan on the North Java Upgrading Line, as the two lines are not interoperable? Railway policy in Indonesia is strategic and pragmatic. On the one hand, Sino-Japanese competition diversifies Indonesia's options as it continues striving to strengthen infrastructure development. On the other hand, the need continually to strike a balance between the two great powers requires skill and flexibility. Therefore, maintaining policy autonomy and accepting economic costs make-up secondary states' responses to great power competition in turbulent times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political economy impacts and influences a state's military strategy. This article focuses on how the integration of the US political economy in the Indo-Pacific drives US Navy officers and the broader national security state to establish the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Investigating the strategic thought of senior Naval officers shows that they think far beyond military threats and engage with the United States and the Indo-Pacific political economy. Even as the US Navy competes with China's military, its FOIP strategy benefits corporate elites in both China and the US, whose cooperation creates a mutually supportive economic relationship. This argument leads to the finding that the US hegemony in the region is a strategy that avoids a bipolar 'New Cold War' of an entirely de-coupled US and China. The FOIP supported by the US Navy continues to integrate China into regional and global economies, even as it attempts to push back against China by gathering allies and partners. The emphasis on international political economy highlights how the region is a network of 'patchwork' relations, where states rely on one another for economic prosperity. Through investigating speeches and strategic papers from US Naval officials, this paper demonstrates how the US competes and cooperates with China in the context of relations in the region that are in constant flux. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Philippine foreign policy under the Duterte government (2016–2022). During this period, Philippine foreign policy is widely acknowledged to have undergone dramatic shifts, with the government making friendly overtures towards China at the cost of its traditional alliance with the US. From a foreign policy analysis perspective, this paper explicitly focuses on the role of political leadership in guiding national foreign policy. This paper argues that the Duterte government made strategic use of political marketing in promoting its populist foreign policy. Thus, political marketing is used as an analytical lens with which to examine much of the rhetoric and behaviour of the Duterte government, particularly in regard to its response to the US–China rivalry. By engaging in this supposedly diplomatic game, the Duterte government tried to sell its foreign policy promises and outcomes as products even when its rhetoric was at times disconnected from its actual performance. Overall, this paper develops an alternative perspective from which to add to our understanding of the role of populist foreign policy initiatives in a fragile democratic setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'China threat' has been identified as an important driver of Japan's security agenda and discourse. The threat posed by China has been discussed either as a given factor determining the trajectory of Tokyo's security approach, as a product of identity construction, or as an expression of securitizing processes that facilitate institutional and policy change. This paper contributes to this debate by offering an alternative explanation of the process through which the Abe government constructed China as a threat. Building on securitization theory, the paper examines the modes and strategies employed by the Abe Administration to successfully securitize China. The paper argues that, while Beijing was labeled a 'concern' rather than an 'existential threat,' it was still securitized through a process of securitization that involves an association with those domains in which China engages assertively, namely the maritime commons. The paper suggests calling this type of securitizing pattern 'transversal securitization' and explores how this indirect strategy allowed the Abe government to pragmatically pursue its objectives both domestically and at the international level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been the subject of extensive analysis since late 2013. Most of this views it as a manifestation of China's approach to global issues under Xi Jinping, whether economic, geopolitical, or as a bid to reshape globalization. There has so far been less research into the domestic dynamics of the BRI, including at the sub-national level in China. Based primarily on an examination of provincial-level policy documents and research, this paper explores the ways in which policy makers in the southwestern province of Yunnan have responded to the BRI, and what this might mean for the implementation and shaping of the initiative. It identifies the promotion of externally-oriented development as the main response in Yunnan to the BRI, structured around the idea of making the province a 'pivot' to south and southeast Asia. This provincial-level response is shaped by pre-existing policy goals in Yunnan and reflects more continuity than change in policy substance. This is consistent with interpretations of the BRI as an 'omnibus' policy which can incorporate multiple objectives and act as a framework within which provincial actors can compete for influence or which they can use to make progress towards achieving local objectives in the context of national strategy. The paper concludes that in the case of Yunnan and the BRI, broad alignment between provincial and central government objectives suggests that on this issue, Yunnan is more of an 'influencer' and 'interpreter' than 'ignorer' of national policy goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that a peculiar pattern of dependent asymmetry – 'dual dependence', i.e. a combination of internal and external dependence – has come to characterize the structure of China-Myanmar relations since the late 1980s. The hypothesis we present is that shifts in this pattern of dependent asymmetry account for fluctuations in China-Myanmar relations between 2011 and 2021. We test this hypothesis against empirical evidence from what we identify as two shifts in the structure of bilateral relations: for each, we trace how structural changes were perceived in Naypyitaw and Beijing, and how such perceptions oriented an adjustment in their respective policies. Myanmar's reduced external dependence on China in 2011–2012 expanded the set of the potential courses of action available to Myanmar's decision-makers and reduced the set of those available to China; conversely, the opposite happened in 2017–2018, following Myanmar's return to full-fledged external dependence on China. The paper finally speculates that the military coup in 2021 could well represent a third shift in the structure of bilateral relations, further strengthening Myanmar's external dependence on China and constraining the military government's room of manoeuvre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Indo-Pacific region has become a central focus of great power competition. Not surprisingly, a rising China seeks to play an important, if not a leading role in the transformation of Asia's present regional order. The United States, meanwhile, as the unipole, has strong incentives to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. Facing certain structural and domestic constraints, China is disinclined to resort to the strategy of violent revision or subversion historically pursued by previous rising powers. Instead, China has pursued a gradual change of the existing regional order through a combination of internal balancing and external reassurance strategies. Specifically, China's quest for great power status in the region, particularly in response to the Indo-Pacific strategy adopted by the United States since the Trump administration, has prompted its proactive shift to counterbalance the US' vision of order in the region. This paper argues that the balance of power and the balance of alignment constitute two key variables that affect the prospect of Sino-US competition for a preferable regional order. Beijing's balancing strategies have significantly enhanced its economic and military capabilities, reducing the gap with the United States on the one hand and attracted certain regional states to join China-led regional initiatives on the other. However, owing to the complex balancing dynamics in the region and the agency of small and middle powers, the balance of alignment supports neither American nor Chinese dominance of Asia. Contrary to the 'new Cold War' narrative, the contest for order does not entail dividing the region into two rival blocs, but rather creating certain overlapping groupings and coalitions led by the two great powers. It consequently also signifies that the current order transition under a new bipolarity will be prolonged and relatively stable compared to the Cold War bipolarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper challenges the notion that Chinese maritime coercion in the East and South China Seas (ESCS) is best described as a grey zone strategy. The 'grey zone' notion raises two issues. Conceptually, it adds little to the existing literature on maritime coercion. Practically, it creates confusion over the understanding of maritime coercion by blurring the distinction between military and constabulary activities. The paper articulates this difference to elucidate the functional correlation between Beijing's strategic objectives and maritime claims. Within this context, the grey zone construct is particularly problematic since it uncritically assumes that the use of force is designed to remain below the threshold of war. By contrast, the paper argues that Chinese maritime claims to control 'rights and interests' are a function of a broader strategic intention to project military power within and beyond the confines of the ESCS, whilst preventing others to do the same. Thus, Chinese maritime coercion (military and constabulary) increases strategic competition and the risk of war, and is therefore better described as part of a 'hybrid' strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interpretations of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) mostly agree that it is a policy opening that offers some remedies for China's economic and security challenges, as well as reflects China's increasing regional and global ambitions. This paper argues that the multiple drivers characterizing the BRI result from the multiple identities of China as a developing country struggling with several sources of instability and macroeconomic problems and, simultaneously, a regional and an emerging power, and finally a major global power with significant economic capacity to shape the global economic order. The paper aims to substantiate the entanglement of the defensive and ambitious motivations behind the BRI by examining the background against which the Chinese Communist Party leadership has suggested it. In so doing, it draws on Chinese official policy documents and statistics, speeches from Chinese leaders and existing social-scientific research on the transformation of China's economic and political landscape in recent years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For forty years, the East Asian regional order has delivered widespread peace and prosperity. That order faces possible upending by an economically and militarily more powerful China and a decreasingly robust and engaged United States. While accepting the possibility that such structural shifts could upend the regional order, this paper contends that three powerful counterweights are working to counter disruptive conflicts and to foster peaceful change, namely strong and rising economic interdependence, expanding institutionalization, and active preservation efforts by number of other Asian states, particularly the region's middle powers. This article analyzes the contribution of these three forces to creating the existing order and to their roles in its continuation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Challenging a popular view that China's rise will lead the United States and China to fall into the 'Thucydides trap'—a possible hegemonic war between the two—this paper proposes an 'institutional peace' argument, suggesting that the ongoing international order transition will be different from previous order transitions in history. Instead of using military means to change the international order, China and the United States have relied on various institutional balancing strategies to compete with one another for an advantageous position in the future international order. The discussion on the institutional competition between China and the US around the AIIB and the ARF-related multilateral security architecture supports the 'institutional peace' argument: institutional competition in the form of institutional balancing strengthens the dynamics and utility of international institutions, encourages states to offer new public goods, and could lead to a more peaceful order transition in the international system. However, this institutional peace argument is constrained by two caveats: the continued validity of the MAD nuclear deterrence and a limited degree of ideological antagonism between the US and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to provide an answer to the question which has hitherto not been significantly explored in the relevant academic scholarship: Why did China block India's (and other countries) attempts to designate Masood Azhar – head of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM/Jaish) as terrorist under UN Security Council 1267 committee rules? According to the extant literature, China's actions are explained broadly by India-China rivalry and India-Pakistan rivalry resulting in a strategic and 'all weather partnership between China and Pakistan against their common enemy India. This study argues that China's actions are also explained by its New (Asian) Security Concept and the ensuing China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), domestic (in)stability in Pakistan and China's geo-strategic interests. China is deeply perturbed by the socio-economic-political instability in Pakistan. China was concerned that if Masood Azhar was designated as a terrorist under UNSC 1267 Committee rules, Jaish and other terrorist organizations would take up arms against the Pakistani state (as in the past) which will create further instability in Pakistan and undermine CPEC and China's geo-strategic interests. Thus, the paper provides a more comprehensive and nuanced grasp of China's reluctance to designate Masood Azhar as a terrorist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explore whether the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has become an instrument of power led by China to fulfill her geopolitical interests. After an investigation of the AIIB's power structure, institutional design, and its 34 approved projects, this study finds that although the AIIB deviates to some extent from international standards while considering loan decisions, the bank itself does not appear to be a norm challenger so far. Instead, it has become more cooperative and inclusive, with a shifting focus towards mutually beneficial cooperation and reform of the international financial system. This paper argues that the AIIB's current configuration results from the decrease in China's status deficit—the gap between China's recognized international financial status and its own perception of its financial power. Quantitative and qualitative evidence shows that when the idea of the AIIB was first conceived, China's status deficit was large, which meant that in a global power struggle the AIIB was more likely to be manipulated by a dissatisfied China. As the AIIB evolved, China's international financial status gained positive recognition and the AIIB received wider acceptance; China's status deficit shrank. As a result, the AIIB has become a reform-minded multilateral financial institution that has made concessions to establish rules and has sought collaboration with its counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the doctrine of 'keeping a low profile (KLP), attaining some achievement (ASA)' was developed, there has been much attention and study of the KLP, but little discussion of the ASA. However, it is exactly how the ASA has been observed that can well reflect Chinese perception of its global role. In the paper, the ASA is treated as a continuum or a fluid concept with changing values. There have been significant adjustments in the official expression of the ASA doctrine since the 2008 global financial crisis, from the original 'attaining some achievement' to 'proactively attaining achievement' around 2011, 'striving for achievement' in 2013, and 'striving for achievement in a new era' in 2017. Along with these changes, there have been roughly three rounds of debates on the ASA among Chinese scholars. While they generally agree on more proactive diplomacy in attaining achievement, scholars have debated on what achievements to attain and how to attain these achievements. While the ultimate goal is defined officially as Chinese rejuvenation, specific and interim goals of 'striving for achievement' in scholarly debates have targeted mainly China's strategic capability, institutional power and normative power. Chinese scholars have also debated on the general principles, diplomatic style and tactics that China should follow by focusing on three relationships: the relationship between the KLP and the ASA, the Sino-US relationship, and the relationship between China and the international system. The author provides an analytical framework and thorough examination of the development of the ASA doctrine, and presents the scholarly debates along its development path, in the hope that this study may facilitate the understanding of the outside world on how China perceives its global role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes the growing human rights gap between China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other side and analyses its impact on cross-strait relations. Since Xi Jinping's ascent to power in the People's Republic of China in 2012/2013 and the elections of Donald Trump in the US and Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016, the relationship between China and the other two countries has worsened. The US and Taiwan have a similar view on human rights in the PRC. The increasing repression and authoritarianism of the PRC leads to a human rights gap in the Taiwan Strait that increases the divide and the tensions between both sides. The failure of the PRC to address in its proposal for a peaceful unification the concerns of the Taiwanese for their democracy and human rights pushes Taiwan further away. The similar assessment of the PRC's authoritarian threat by the US and Taiwan strengthens the bond between both, based on the shared values of democracy and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On May 26th, 2015, China published its 10th Defense White Paper which integrated 'open seas protection', along with 'offshore waters defense', into its naval strategy. This shift in naval strategy, albeit largely anticipated, raises a series of important questions about China's maritime ambitions. This article seeks to analyze the causes, nature and challenges of China's latest shift in naval strategy, and its implications for Sino-US maritime relations. The article argues that China's latest shift in naval strategy is a logical corollary of the tension between China's expanding global interests and its asymmetric approach to sea power, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides the necessary stimulus and justification for such a shift. China's new naval strategy, the paper contends, denotes that it will develop a Mahanian blue-water navy and a basic network of overseas bases in the years ahead. Those two developments are expected to pose a series of significant challenges for China's foreign policy. The article argues that China's new naval strategy presents both challenges and opportunities for China and the world. To accomplish 'open seas protection', China will probably have to modify its policies on a range of issues, and moderate its competitive stance in the near seas. Although China's new naval strategy need not be interpreted in a competitive framework, it does present China with a stark choice: either it pursues more friendly attitudes towards its maritime ambitions by modifying its current policy, or it will be increasingly confronted by a coalition of hostile states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By comparing three Chinese pillar industries, automobile, petroleum, and machinery, this paper analyzes how the development of uneven institutional configurations bred sectoral variation in transitional China. In 1994, at the dawn of the Chinese socialist market economy, the State Council issued guidelines for national industrial policy and proposed the enactment of similar growth-promoting policies for all pillar industries. The level of policy enactment and the resulting outcomes, however, vary significantly across the industries. Previous literature on China's rapid industrialization has sought to build a single model encompassing China as a whole, and has emphasized either the state's institutional capacity or China's unique governance mechanisms. This study investigates China's industrialization by taking account of the uneven development of institutional capacity amid macro institutional reforms. Every idea and institution evolved at a different pace in these reforms, and the incremental nature of the reforms further deepened the gaps between sectors. This paper argues that, due to this uneven development, the Chinese state was not strong enough to be considered a developmental state until at least the early 2000s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China's aid has increased, so has scrutiny by the international development and foreign policy community. Despite recognition that foreign aid policy is a result of domestic political contests, the existing literature tends to overlook Chinese debates about the purpose of aid, and how that purpose should be achieved. This paper argues that examining these debates shows that Chinese aid is not a well-considered element of an overarching strategy. Rather, where foreign aid is considered relevant vis-à-vis China's goals, its use is hotly contested. Competing actors' varying agendas, rather than any coherent strategy, underpin inchoate aid projects. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper examines the political-economy of capital controls in China. We argue that the global policy context influences domestic political debates over capital controls, which, in turn, can shape public attitudes toward the subject. Policy entrepreneurs on each side of the capital controls debate can point to capital account policies in other countries as evidence for the desirability of their position. This issue framing strategy, in turn, influences domestic preferences on capital controls. We present qualitative evidence showing that the international policy context features heavily in domestic political debates about capital controls in China. Next, using original survey data, we show that information about other countries' policy choices influences mass public attitudes about capital controls in China. The evidence indicates that growing global use of capital controls can strengthen public support for this policy. More broadly, these findings suggest that a complete understanding of policy diffusion requires greater attention to the role played by domestic policy entrepreneurs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Food is a tireless referent in international relations studies about China and its ties with the rest of the world. This paper addresses two contemporary issues. First, why is China so sensitive about grain self-sufficiency? Second, why does there seem to be a lack of effective dialogue between epistemic communities in China and outside over China's overseas agricultural activities? The first part of the paper reviews the development of China's agricultural sector and underlines the importance of China's contribution in stabilizing the world food markets. Next, it explores the ideational sources of Chinese food insecurity, in spite of its success in attaining high levels of self-sufficiency in grain. The third part of the paper reviews the evolution of China's overseas agricultural activities and analyzes the factors that contribute to a mismatch of understanding about the political implications therein. The paper concludes by proposing a couple of conceptual road maps for securitizing food as a referent in debates about China's security environment and Chinese international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research seeks to reconceptualise the process of marketizing central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) in the Chinese petroleum industry by interpreting their institutional establishment and reconstruction, and the change in their institutional context. The enterprise reform of state-owned oil companies, and the partial market liberalization initiated in the 1980s, have not pushed the petroleum sector toward the trajectory of the neoliberal free market. On the contrary, the state's ascendency has been reconsolidated, and the institutional practice adhered to has made market-shaping possible. The state's role is not fixed; rather, it has varied following the marketization process of the CSOEs. The state has reconstructed its role to strengthen its authority in the market, using market mechanisms to effectively improve its power to construct a flexible economic governance structure. In such a structure, where the state and market have mutually shaped each other, the combination of the two seemingly conflicting concepts of marketization and economic security has, to some degree, fostered the development of state-owned oil companies and expanded the scale of their asset-holding. The paper contributes to the broader discussion of state-market relationships and the institutionalization of energy governance with regard to China's integration into the global capitalist economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the international relations (IR) 'polarity' concept as a lens to view the shifting great power dynamics in artificial intelligence (AI) and related enabling technologies. The article describes how and why great power competition is mounting in within several interrelated dual-use technological fields; why these innovations are considered by Washington to be strategically vital, and how (and to what end) the United States is responding to the perceived challenge posed by China to its technological hegemony. The following questions addressed in this paper fill a gap in the existing literature: Will the increasingly competitive U.S.-China relationship dominate world politics creating a new bipolar world order, as opposed to a multipolar one? Why does the U.S. view China's progress in dual-use AI as a threat to its first-mover advantage? How might the U.S. respond to this perceived threat? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how Chinese elites understand the proper role of their nation vis-à-vis its 'periphery' and how this self-understanding shapes Chinese strategic policy toward neighboring states. It makes two specific arguments. First, after 2012 China began to understand itself as responsible for actively managing and shaping its periphery. Xi Jinping has overseen an evolution in China's neighborhood strategy that has changed from mere engagement to proactive efforts to shape regional order. Efforts to achieve this goal have come primarily through: institution-building and regional integration via the 'Belt and Road Initiative', strategic partnerships, normative binding, and developmental statecraft. Second, managing newly emerged power asymmetries between China and its neighbors is now a crucial task of Beijing's peripheral policy. The emerging China-led regional order relies on norms that are hierarchical, transactional, and reflect status distinctions. Xi Jinping's neighborhood strategy rests on an asymmetric bargain: respect China's core interests in exchange for benevolence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines China's motivations for trilateral aid cooperation in the context of its seemingly assertive diplomacy in recent years. Previously known for its preference for bilateral aid delivery, China, however, is increasingly conducting trilateral cooperation with western donor states and UN agencies. By employing constructivism and cognitive learning theories, this paper focuses on two perspectives: China's calculation of national interests and international engagement, and is structured around two case studies: UNDP's advisory role for China on development cooperation, and China–US trilateral aid cooperation. It argues that strategically, China is putting growing emphasis on its identity as a growing great power in the development sector, using trilateral cooperation to build its global image. Technically, China's four-decade long external engagement has promoted changes in its ideas about aid cooperation, thus reinforcing its desire for cognitive learning to improve its aid performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The political-economic evolution of post-Mao China has been portrayed as a historically inevitable embrace of neoliberalism; as an exemplification of the East Asian developmental state and as an extension of Soviet New Economic Policy-style state capitalism. This paper evaluates these portrayals through a broad historical and geographical framework. It examines the position of China as a new state after 1949. It then places the shifting logics of socioeconomic regulation in China in relation to (1) the global neoliberal hegemony since the 1980s and (2) the concomitant shifts in the economic policies of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In so doing, the paper demonstrates how the Communist Party of China creatively adapted and re-purposed regulatory logics from the Washington Consensus and East Asian policies to consolidate its own version of Leninist state-led development. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Maintaining global peace as China rises is a key strategic goal of Western liberal democracies. Compared to other western liberal democracies, New Zealand's response to the ‘rise of China’ is notable for its absence of security and political frictions and for the achievement of a series of diplomatic ‘firsts’. Can this be explained only by material concern over the national economic interest as China's role in the global economy increases or do ideational factors also underlay how New Zealand engages China? This paper employs the ontological security framework to demonstrate how New Zealand identity as a ‘small trading nation’ and ‘good international citizen’ has shaped its turn to Asia and response to the ‘rise of China'. It first analyses the origins of New Zealand's outward facing identity and resultant foreign policy positions long before China became an important aspect of New Zealand trade policy. It then shows how New Zealand seeks ontological security as a ‘small trading nation’ and ‘good international citizen’ in its relations with China and how China has responded to this type of engagement. The paper illustrates the importance of ideational factors in Western liberal democracies’ responses to the ‘rise of China’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Severe natural disasters encourage the international community to donate humanitarian aid (materials and personnel) to the affected country, which is critical for its human security. Some authoritarian regimes, however, rationally reject such aid despite the dire situation of their people. When an authoritarian regime decides whether to accept foreign humanitarian aid for severe natural disasters or not, it considers two political factors: (1) the risk and (2) the need to accept aid, which is a type of exogenous shock that may threaten the stability of the regime and its survival. This paper considers the factors of risk (regime type, domestic struggle, and international pressure) as inherent and contingent determinants of regime stability, and the need factors by looking at the different types of sources from which the regime gains its legitimacy (electoral mandate, economic development, or ideology). If the risk is less and the need is more, the regime is more likely to accept the aid, otherwise not. The two authoritarian regimes hit by severe natural disasters - the 2008 Sichuan earthquake in China and the 2008 Cyclone Nargis-caused floods in Myanmar - are considered as salient cases for the external variation between authoritarian regimes. This paper also finds some critical internal variation within an authoritarian regime and its differing responses during the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and two other disasters - the 1976 Tangshan earthquake and the 2010 Qinghai earthquake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which editor discusses various articles within the issue on topics including academic thinking affects and is affected by policy making in China, conceptions of the shifting nature of the global order and massive change in the nature of international relations (IR).

This paper examines China's corruption in the context of its changing central—local relations. It contends that it is not so much decentralization as the incompleteness of power devolution that has contributed to the spreading of corruption in China. The incompleteness can be seen in the development of the double identity of local government as both a state political agent and a local economic principal. As state agents, local governments obtain increased discretionary power to make and implement policies and, at the same time, they also assume the role of local economic principals to protect, promote and even directly manage local economies. The dual identity places both broad discretionary power and immediate economic benefits within easy reach of local officials. Focusing on two prevalent forms of corruption in China today, illegal land transfers and 'little money lockers', the paper shows how the deep involvement of local officials in economic affairs, coupled with unbridled discretionary power, provides opportunities and incentives for corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to contribute to an understanding about the major changes in China–ASEAN economic relations after establishment of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) in 2010. First, China's merchandize trade balance with ASEAN has shifted from deficit to surplus since 2012. This reflects China's improving comparative advantage in manufacturing production vis-à-vis ASEAN as a whole. Second, with China's wage hike, ASEAN investors can no longer take advantage of China's cheap labor force. Concurrently, China's investment in ASEAN has been increasing and become more diversified, ranging from energy to manufacturing and services. Singapore has remained the most important investment destination for Chinese investors and the largest foreign investor in China among ASEAN countries. Third, China has comparative advantages in providing construction, telecommunications, computer and information services and other business services to ASEAN. On the other hand, ASEAN, led by Singapore, has opportunities in the financial services and tourism markets in China. Finally, the development of economic regionalism, notably the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and Trans-Pacific Partnership, will remain critical for the CAFTA's relevance in regional economic integration, as well as China–ASEAN relations in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multilateralism has become an increasingly significant part of Asia's international relations. This paper critiques the premise that there are two phases of regional multilateralism, pre- and post-global financial crisis and instead argues that there has been one long 25-year expansion phase. Initially, this was prompted by the risks and opportunities of globalization but was adapted as a strategy to manage a changing regional order. More recently, regional multilateralism has taken on competitive characteristics reflecting Asia's more contested dynamics. The US and its allies are trying to use multilateralism as part of their broader strategy to sustain the prevailing regional order. China is also attempting to use multilateralism as a part of its efforts to change the region to one more in line with its interests and values. Multilateralism has become a sublimated form of contestation over the form and function of Asia's international order. A key consequence of this will be to weaken the policy impact of existing institutional efforts and to promote zero-sum approaches to international policy among many Asian states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the manifestation and trends of hybrid warfare in the Asia-Pacific region through the lenses of the following three key hybrid actors: China, North Korea and ISIS affiliates in Southeast Asia. This article explains why the hybrid approach can be such an attractive strategic option for both state and non-state actors in the Asia-Pacific. Finally, this paper will address the impact of how the constant pushing of boundaries in hybrid warfare can lead to unintended consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vying for high-speed railway projects overseas has become a prominent feature of China's diplomacy in recent years, including in Southeast Asia. These efforts have been widely depicted within the premises of the China Threat narrative – as a part of Beijing's agenda to alter the power balance in Southeast Asia at the expense of the economic, political, and security well-being of countries in the region. This paper challenges such interpretations and concludes that these projects do not have either the intention or capacity to facilitate such a hostile and far-reaching agenda toward the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The government of Hong Kong has been trying to reform the territory's health care financing system since the early 1990s and is finally on the verge of succeeding. The objective of this paper is to assess the reform efforts and explain the causes of repeated failures and eventual success. It will argue that the government's fortunes changed only after it abandoned the core reform goal and decided to pursue peripheral objectives. It will explain the abandonment with reference to the peculiar political system in Hong Kong that makes it difficult for the government to adopt substantial policy reforms in the face of even moderate opposition. The reason for the government's policy incapacity is the existence of liberalism in a non-democratic setting, which allows the government to neither suppress opposition nor mobilize popular support. This has been illustratively evident in its health care reforms when its proposals to improve the system's fiscal sustainability invariably met an early death because they imposed costs on employers, the population or both. The current proposal has fared better not only because it addresses a simpler peripheral problem but also because it offends almost no one and pleases many among the powerful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why is the British Virgin Islands a bigger source of foreign direct investment into China than the USA, the European Union and Japan combined? Why is there 10 times more investment from China in the Caymans Islands than there is in the USA? This paper argues that these flows represent the efforts of Chinese and foreign investors to reduce governance and measurement transaction costs. Investors avail themselves of efficient institutions in offshore centers that are absent locally. These institutional attractions include the ease of raising capital on foreign stock markets, access to reliable courts, and more flexible and sophisticated financial products. Existing explanations of these capital movements, characterizing them as criminal money or tax arbitrage, are insufficient. Evidence is drawn from government statistics, private legal advice and interviews in offshore financial centers. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Through a case study of Taiwan, this paper seeks to address recent debates surrounding the transformation of developmental states in East Asia. Whilst a number of authors have cited the Taiwanese state as being both cautious and resilient in the midst of global restructuring, this paper seeks to critically engage with such arguments by highlighting the dynamic and mutually constitutive relations between the forms of social relations that underpin late development and the wider geopolitical system in which such development occurs. Specifically, Taiwanese industrialisation can be viewed as an outcome of the US intervention in the Chinese civil war and subsequent exclusion of China from the regional political economy in the period between the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Kuomintang (KMT)'s retreat to Taiwan established the basis for the autonomous developmental state, and the US underpinned this state through military protection, aid and access to its own domestic market. However, the relative decline of US hegemony and the readmission of China into the international system have posed significant challenges to Taiwan's developmental state. The US sought to redress its trade imbalance with East Asia by placing pressure on Taiwan to liberalise its political economy. Furthermore, the very process of development itself served to undermine the autonomy of the state as it came under pressure from new social forces. Taiwan has more recently been faced with a dilemma of closer integration with the mainland or the maintenance of its de facto economic and political independence at the risk of becoming isolated from the global trading system. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China's behaviour in East Asian financial cooperation has overall changed from passively responding to external pressures to taking proactive initiatives, which are highlighted by Chinese elites as evidence of a sense of responsibility. China has taken varied positions towards proposals for Asian financial regionalism, from 'silent' objection, to lukewarm or superficial support, to enthusiastic participation and substantial contribution, and this variance has not always taken place in a chronological order. Despite much speculation over the trajectory of China's role in East Asian regionalism, there has not been a study focused on China's policymaking towards East Asian financial cooperation. Therefore, this paper fills the gap by analysing the factors and policymaking processes that have led to those varied positions. It argues that China, recognising the momentum in the region to enhance cooperation, has replaced the blunt dismissals of proposals, particularly those from Japan, with a more subtle approach that is aimed at ensuring China's influence and promoting the image of a responsible great power; that the extent to which it can contribute to this process is mainly constrained by its economic conditions, particularly the financial institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reexamines the conventional wisdom that characterizes Sino-Japanese energy relations as predominantly competitive, but views Sino-Japanese environmental relations as essentially cooperative. Using sociological theories of risk, it is argued that Sino-Japanese cooperation is more likely in both the energy and environmental areas when common risks are perceived and relative gains are minimized. Despite their many conflicting strategic, political, and economic interests, as energy importers who are vulnerable to supply interruptions in the Middle East and competitors for global energy supplies, China and Japan share common risks to their energy security. Consequently, there actually may be increasing opportunities for China and Japan to address their common concerns through bilateral and multilateral cooperative practices, such as common positions on pricing or energy conservation initiatives. Although one would expect China and Japan to highlight their mutual interests in tackling environmental problems such as air pollution, in fact relative gains often impede cooperation. Japan increasingly views China as an economic competitor and is reducing environmental aid, while China continues to set a priority on economic growth, which sets limits on the use of costlier Japanese green technologies. By examining a selection of scholarly articles, reports and newspaper articles by Chinese and Japanese analysts, as well as material from interviews in Beijing and Tokyo in May-June 2007, the paper shows how environmental and energy issues in Sino-Japanese relations may be framed as threats, requiring counter-measures, or common risks, which can be addressed through cooperative practices. Lastly, the paper discusses the possibility of the development of an energy security 'risk community' as cooperative practices develop between China and Japan. Nonetheless, conflicting political interests, strategies, and self-images, accentuating relative gains, may provide obstacles to their cooperation in both energy security and environmental protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold War, the international arena has witnessed two concurrent worldwide trends. One is the gradual prevalence of universalism under the banner of human civilization; the other is the gradual revival of nationalism globally under exactly the same heading. Both trends are evident in China, a country which in the twenty-first century is perceived universally as a rising nation. However, does Chinese nationalism necessarily pose a threat to the world? By examining two debates on the Chinese intellectual response towards Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations in the early twenty-first century, this paper investigates the status of Chinese nationalism. It questions whether it is a fixed set of ideas embraced by a solid entity, or whether it possesses multiple layers with dual elements contributing to both security and insecurity internationally. The paper argues that three separate nationalist processes are occurring concurrently but independently of each other: the construction of civic nationalist values; the development of an international relations strategy assigning responsible power to China; and the detection of alleged anti-Chinese conspiracies. The effect of the first two would be to encourage regional peace, and they could offset fervent nationalist expression. A somewhat counter-intuitive result of Chinese nationalism might be that it also becomes a stabilizing force within and outside China's borders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines US, Japanese, and European political economy approaches to China, and their effect on US-Japan and US-EU relationships. Great powers with a greater security concern in dealing with another major country care more about power while those with less of a concern are preoccupied with calculations for wealth. China's rise and its actions have posed a far greater security challenge to the United States and Japan and are driving the two countries closer together. The political economy game involving China reveals a dominant welfare motive among the advanced market economies. The ambition to transform China politically has diminished. China's integration into the global market makes a relative gains approach difficult to implement. Globalization simply limits the ability of a state to follow a politics-in-command approach in the absence of actual military conflict, which explains why the political economy approaches of the United States, Europe, and Japan are not that different in the scheme of things. China's own grand strategy to reach out to the world to outflank the US-Japan alliance has also contributed to a divergent European policy toward China although there are severe limitations to Beijing's ability to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's agricultural biotechnology policy has undergone a profound transformation over the last decade, from a strongly promotional to a more precautionary approach. From the 1980s onwards, China invested heavily in biotechnology development and in the early 1990s emerged as the leading biotech country in the developing world. In the late 1990s, however, it halted the authorization of new genetically modified crops and introduced stringent safety regulations. This paper investigates this policy shift and argues that international factors have played a central role. Two trends, in particular, are identified as key sources of the move towards greater precaution: China's ongoing international socialization, particularly in the context of the international scientific debate on biosafety and the negotiations on a biosafety treaty; and the growing globalization of agriculture and trade, which has exposed China to international competitive forces and trade restrictions in food trade. As the case of genetically modified food in China shows, political integration and economic globalization can work together to promote a strengthening of the domestic environmental policy agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central question of this paper is whether China can go beyond simple technological transfer and toward innovation in this age of globalization. By adopting an institutionalist perspective, this paper argues that China has developed a dualist model during its economic transitional period in which the foreign sector has been isolated from domestic firms, while the domestic industrial sectors have also failed to develop organic linkages among themselves to facilitate technological learning and generate innovation. This paper discusses four major institutional arrangements that deeply influence China's technological development – the institutional logic of economic reform, the state's industrial policy, the financial system and the industrial structure. It suggests that, owing to these institutional elements, China has neither developed economies of scale, as compared with the South Korean case, nor has it built up a network-type of economy similar to its Taiwanese counterpart in order to generate the mechanisms needed for technological innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the expansion and deepening of globalization, as well as China's entry into the World Trade Organization, the nexus between economic growth and national security has gained prominence in China since the mid-1990s. How to ensure socio-economic security while maintaining its robust economic growth is now the most serious concern of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government. This paper addresses three questions: first, it explores why and how the transformation of economic growth and national security as two separate logics to a single domain evolved conceptually over the past two decades in China; second, what kinds of insecurities are generated by China's robust economic growth coupled with the expansion and deepening of globalization, and in which way and to what extent do they challenge China's government: third, what kinds of mechanisms or policy instruments have been adopted by China's government to address emerging economic insecurities while maintaining robust economic growth. The paper concludes that in the case of China, globalization has posed new challenges to economic security, but given that economic insecurity has its particular salience in individual countries, national institutional adjustment or adaptation becomes increasingly important for each country to govern in the interests of economic security while maintaining economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When external eyes turned to China 30 years ago (if they did at all), the focus was still on the extent to which it might be breaking away from its socialist economic past. And though we did not know it at the time, intra-elite debates over how far (and to where) reforms should go would eventually play some part in shaping what happened in Tiananmen Square in 1989; events that would place China on the verge of international isolation. This paper traces the evolution from isolation to a position where some in China now think it is now second only to the USA in the ranking of world powers. It will focus on how scholarship on China in the journal has changed over the years, but also on some of the constants and recurring questions and issues that have inspired research over the years. In addition, notwithstanding a very real and very large shift in China's global power capabilities, it will suggest that asking if China matters, or more correctly, how China matters in different issue areas, remains a very useful intellectual exercise today. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The year 2015 marked the 25th anniversary of the publication of Robert Wade's seminal book Governing the Market (GTM). In his book, Wade elaborates an approach stressing the role of the state in economic development. As the consequences of the Great Recession are forcing many governments and the International Financial Institutions themselves to put into question their ideological stance on unfettered free markets, the anniversary marks the occasion to review the concept of the developmental state (DS) through Wade's GTM approach and re-assess its validity in the twenty-first-century global political economy. Are policy measures historically implemented by the DS still feasible (and desirable) in a globalized era dominated by global value chains? With an eye to the peculiar Chinese experience in the past decades, the paper argues that the key principles in GTM – as properly understood – are still useful as policy prescriptions, as they show how developing countries could successfully start their economic take-off. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How to understand and explain the evolutions as well as predict the future directions of bilateral relations between the United States and China has become an imperative task for both policy makers and academic scholars. Borrowing insights from neoclassical realism, this paper suggests a three-stage, perceptual model of ‘threat–interest’ to explore the dynamics of Sino–US relations from 1949 to 2015. It argues that the nature of US–China relations, either cooperation or competition, is mainly shaped by the perceptions of leaders regarding security threats and economic interests between the two nations. How to manage their perceptions regarding each other and how to find a balance between cooperation and competition are the key issues for leaders in both the United States and China to manage bilateral relations in the future. The next decade or two may be the best or the worst times for US–China relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]