1. ARE INTENTIONS REASONS?
- Author
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BRUNERO, JOHN
- Subjects
- *
INTENTION , *ATTITUDE (Psychology) , *EXPECTATION (Psychology) , *PHILOSOPHERS , *PHILOSOPHY , *REASONING , *THOUGHT & thinking , *JUDGMENT (Logic) , *ANALOGY - Abstract
This paper presents an objection to the view that intentions provide reasons and shows how this objection is also inherited by the more commonly accepted Tie-Breaker view, according to which intentions provide reasons only in tie-break situations. The paper also considers and rejects T. M. Scanlon's argument for the Tie-Breaker view and argues that philosophers might be drawn to accept the problematic Tie-Breaker view by confusing it with a very similar, unproblematic view about the relation between intentions and reasons in tie-break situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2007
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