1. (ANTI)-Anti-Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis.
- Author
-
Carter, J. Adam and Czarnecki, Bolesław
- Subjects
- *
THEORY of knowledge , *AGENT (Philosophy) , *INTELLECT , *ABILITY , *PHILOSOPHY - Abstract
Anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudpaes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti-intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge-how to φ. John Bengson and Marc Moffett and Carlotta Pavese have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for different reasons, that anti-intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument-by-counterexample to the anti-intellectualist's sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti-intellectualism remains unscathed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF