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one important exception. The surrender could not "prejudice the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler."' Later that day, Tokyo transmitted its qualified acceptance of the Potsdam terms of surrender to the Allies. Diplomats in Moscow, London, and Washington interpreted the Japanese offer to their own advantage during hastily convened meetings around the world and around the clock between Friday, August 10, and Tuesday, August 14. The five-day diplomatic marathon in Washington ended the war againstJapan, but it opened new levels of mistrust and hostility with the Soviet Union.2 President Harry Truman and

The most important foundation for attacks on the decision of President Harry S. Truman to use atomic bombs againstJapan is the claim that conventional bombing and naval blockade had brought Japan to the point of surrender by the summer of 1945, that Truman knew this, and that he dropped the bombs to intimidate the Soviet Union, not to end the war. This "early surrender" counterfactual hypothesis comes from publications of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS). The USSBS was headed in Japan, and its official reports edited and controlled, by Paul H. Nitze. This article examines the evidence on which Nitze claims to have based his "early surrender" hypothesis. The USSBS began as an effort by strategic bombing advocates to establish their craft as the ultimate arbiter of all future

THE SIGNIFICANT CHANGE in the spirit that American presidential administrations exhibited toward Latin America in the 1930s may, upon closer examination, not justify the euphemistic term "Good Neighbor." The United States surrendered the right to intervene at the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936, refrained from interference in the internal affairs of the small Caribbean republics, and freed the five protectorates established prior to and during World War I. This surrender of the most imperialistic aspects of earlier relations won considerable goodwill throughout the Caribbean region and South America. The United States was no longer the threatening and dangerous neighbor. During the first three decades of the century, the situation had been significantly different. The states in the Caribbean area occupied the role of clients, and the United States dominated their foreign relations. Their economies became little more than appendages dependent upon the financial resources and markets of their powerful northern neighbor. Sharp differences in culture, social structure, and values made their yoke heavier. The very success of the Anglo-Saxon oriented Yankee society gave rise to feelings

The term "legislative apportionment" signifies the distribution of representatives among permanently established units of government, allocated with more or less exactness upon an equality of population. The two factors of territory and population have long survived as the bases of apportionment. The ancient and simple geographical area plan of representation and the single-member district have been almost uniformly applied both to congressional districting and to legislative districting. Equality of district populations has likewise been considered necessary, and perhaps an exaggerated emphasis has been placed upon the importance of a mathematically accurate arrangement. Where counties or other governmental units are given equality of representation, regardless of population, the territorial basis of apportionment becomes decidedly unsatisfactory. As population, wealth, industry, and commerce are concentrated in a few localities the over-representation of the rural sections of the state results in extreme discrimination against urban areas. Rural minorities have been unwilling to surrender their favored position, and have watched with fear and jealousy the growth of urban and metropolitan communities. In many states, the conflict over apportionment has been almost entirely one between rural and urban interests. The maintenance and protection by constitutional provisions of anti-urban gerrymanders have made it difficult promptly to remedy the existing situation. The artificiality of many districts is thus perpetuated, nor has it been greatly affected by the requirement for a periodic reapportionment of seats in

IT IS NOT EASY to assess the role of the United States in the ancient rivalry for power and position in the South Seas. Indeed, it may be questioned whether the United States has now, or ever has had, any policy in that area apart from a reasonably well-defined policy which has been applicable in all parts of the Far East. It is abundantly clear that the United States is, today, in East Asia; it is less clear that this country has ever been "of" East Asia. Among the three great Western powers which are now fighting to maintain the position and prestige of the West in the East, the United States is relatively a newcomer. It may also be a transient. It was but little more than forty years ago that the United States acquired the Philippine Islands and thus became a colonial power in the Far East. And, barring a repudiation of pledges and a reversal of well-established policies, the United States will withdraw from the Philippines at some future date-presumably in July, 1946.' This anticipated withdrawal from the Philippines will signalize the end of the brief American empire in Asia. It is very unlikely that it will be followed by any diminution in our concern with what transpires in that part of the world. American interests and the foundations of American Asiatic policy antedate by many years the acquisition of the Philippine Islands; and the interests of American citizens and the basic principles of our Far Eastern policies may be expected to continue substantially unchanged after 1946. The United States thus occupies an unique position in East Asia, for it is not unreasonable to assume that the Asiatic policies of Great Britain and of the Netherlands are primarily conditioned by the possession of great Asiatic empires, nor is it improbable that their concern with the affairs of the Far East would be greatly reduced if they were to surrender their possessions in southeast Asia and in the neighboring archipelagoes. The interest of American citizens, and therefore of their government

How THE emperor of Japan personally intervened in favor of surrender is by now an oft-told story.' Less familiar are the details of how the diehard militarists attempted to thwart the emperor's original decision until he was forced to intervene the second time. The following are a few of these less generally known details," which incidentally comprised the last episodes in the traditional feud between the Foreign Office and the army. They help to explain why it required almost five days from the time of Japan's offer to surrender to the time that surrender really became a certainty. The emperor's initial decision had been rendered at the now famous midnight session of the Imperial Council' on August 9 to io, 1945. By early morning of August o, Japan's formal offer to surrender was on its way to the Allied capitals through neutral diplomatic channels. This formal offer, however, failed to assure peace. The original draft of this note had read that the Japanese government was ready to accept the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945' as the basis for surrender "with the understanding that the said Declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the status of the Imperial Family." At the insistence of Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma,' presi

IN THE LAST DAYS Of August, 1945, certain events of historical interest took place almost unnoticed in the extraordinary atmosphere created by the genesis of atomic warfare and the collapse of the Japanese empire. Among these events was the capitulation of Truk in the East Caroline Islands. This Japanese fortress had hindered the forces of the United States during the early years of the war in the Pacific, and, even in the last two years of fighting it continued to be something of a menace. Truk has become a fairly familiar name in recent years, but its past is cloudy and obscure. After two centuries under Spanish control, centuries of almost complete neglect, Truk was sold to Germany in 1899.' During the first year of World War I, Japanese forces landed at Truk where they remained in possession.2 The area was renounced by Germany in the Treaty of Versailles." On December 17, 192o, Japanese occupation was confirmed when the Council of the League of Nations declared Japan to be the mandatory power in the former Pacific Ocean island possessions of Germany, north of the equator.' Prior to Japanese occupation, little was known about Truk beyond the fact that it was a complex atoll of over a hundred coral and volcanic islands, surrounded by a great reef, and that it was situated between 70 and 8o N. Lat., and between 1510o and 1520o E. Long." After the landings by Japanese imperial forces in 1914, the area became more and more difficult to enter. By 1930 it was almost entirely sealed off from the commerce and the curiosity of other nations. In reports to the League of Nations, Japan repeatedly asserted that the entire Japanese garrison had been withdrawn after the war in accordance with treaty requirements, the last troops having embarked in April, 1922." Thereafter, the Japanese government declared, the mandate islands remained com

THREE DAYS after the Spanish fleet was destroyed in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, Commodore George Dewey and his victorious American squadron, amid the shattered hulks of the enemy vessels, were in complete control of the bay and in a position to take the city at any time. The United States commander, however, lacking a sufficient force to occupy the city effectively, decided to await the arrival of supporting troops before demanding the surrender of Manila. A cablegram was sent to the Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, requesting the necessary reinforcements. Naturally, President William McKinley and Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, were quite willing to co5iperate in following up the naval victory because they realized the magnitude of the results. The victorious commodore was promoted to rear admiral, and Major General Wesley Merritt was appointed commander of an American expeditionary force which was to go to the aid of Dewey. Troops destined for the Philippine expedition were sent to the newly established Camp Merritt near San Francisco, and that region was the scene of feverish training activity during the months of May, June, July, and August.' Three transports, the City of Pekin, the City of Sydney, and the Australia, finally cleared the port of San Francisco on May 25, carrying the Ist California and 2d Oregon regiments of volunteer infantry, five companies of the 14th United States Infantry, and a detachment of the Ist California Field Artillery. The force, commanded by Brigadier General Thomas M. Anderson, consisted of 115 officers and 2,386 enlisted men. Meanwhile the Charleston, which was being overhauled at the Mare Island

IN FEBRUARY, 1945, the Big Three Powers concluded an agreement at Yalta which has been much maligned but too little studied. Criticism has ranged from calling the protocol a conspiratorial sellout to the Soviet Union to labeling it the naive compromising of American interests by a sick President. Of those attacking the accord none has been more vehement or more influential than Patrick J. Hurley, who, in testimony before a congressional investigating committee in 1951, suggested that Yalta was little less than cowardly surrender to the Communists-a move aided and abetted by such "influential" State Department officials as Alger Hiss. Hurley's statements were, of course, of unusual import, since during February, 1945, and subsequent months he was United States Ambassador to China and learned early of the terms of the secret agreement; he likewise played a role in implementing it. The purpose of this essay is to discuss and analyze that role in the light of the ambassador's later statements.

It may seem to be almost a commonplace to comment on the fact that the admission of new states is frequently incidental to political issues far remote in locality from the territories involved. In considering the admission of the youngest state of the union, however, more than passing interest is aroused, since the process consumed more than one quarter of a century and comprehended a whole series of issues nation wide in their ramifications. Solid opposition, strange alliances with unexpected champions, conservative fear of the possibilities of Western domination, irritation at the persistence of the demands, and finally complete surrender coupled with whole hearted welcome form a series of climaxes rivaling the fabrications of writers of fiction. The demand for statehood had its inception in the middle eighties, coming in its greatest insistence from Arizona politicians themselves. The national Democratic victory of 1884 roused a false hope among Western office seekers, but President Cleveland followed precedent and distributed territorial offices among Eastern politicians bluntly remarking that if he were to favor Arizonans he must see different material than had yet shown itself at Washington.' That the desire for office was a most vital motive is further indicated by the fact that following the Republican victory of 1888 the fifteenth territorial legislature memorialized President Harrison asking him to distribute his patronage among citizens of Arizona.2 The politicians of the territory found fertile soil for their

ACCORDING TO THE commonly accepted story, Japan chose to spurn the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, which called upon her to surrender, and thereby brought down upon her head the atomic bombing and the Russian declaration of war against her. A close examination of the Japanese response to the Potsdam Declaration will show, however, that the Japanese government never intended to reject the Potsdam Declaration. Its policy was that of mokusatsu, which was quite a different thing from rejection.' The subsequent course of events predicated on the assumption that Japan had rejected the Potsdam Declaration represents a tragedy of errors for which the major responsibility must be attributed to the inexcusable bungling of the Japanese officials. But some measure of responsibility also rests upon the more excusable but unfortunate deficiency in perception on the part of the Western allied leaders and upon the calculated reluctance of the Russian authorities to share their information with their Western allies.

the English reading public, but this fact could be no cause of dissatisfaction to people born much too soon to dream of the cable or the radio. No press associations gathered the news, but letters in large numbers reached English newspapers from observers in all the colonies, many of whom were regular correspondents. Official reports from both home and colonial officials provided additional information. Finally, the columns of the newspapers furnished a free outlet for the expression of public opinion in regard to the origin, justification, and conduct of the war. In the space allotted it will be possible to give only a hasty account of the role played by English newspapers during this period. As early as September, 1753, English readers were apprised of the alarm of Robert Dinwiddie and the other colonial governors because of reports of French plans to occupy the upper Ohio country and incite the Indians to attack along the entire frontier line.' By the spring of 1754 it was definitely known that the French had erected a chain of forts from Lake Erie toward the forks of the Ohio, and it was predicted that "this breach of faith will be attended with very serious consequences." The surrender of Ensign Ward at the headquarters of the Ohio was reported two months later, to be followed soon by the news of George Washington's skirmish with the French and of his disheartening defeat at the Great Meadows." This disaster produced many comments. One Virginia correspondent laid the "miscarriage" to the practice of "treating the French troops with a contempt they never deserve'.' "I hope,' the writer continued, "the loss we have met with will be of no very bad consequence, but only confirm us in the opinion of uniting with the other colonies