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Although not always apparent, generating theories about organizational phenomena inevitably involves philosophical questions. The latter are concerned with the meaning of the concepts researchers use to describe, interpret, explain, and, in general, understand organizational phenomena. A philosophical approach to organization studies aims to scrutinize, critique, and clarify key concepts, modes of thinking, research practices, as well as assumptions about reality and ways of justifying knowledge claims. Similar to other institutionalized practices, organizational research legitimates and takes for granted certain ways of engaging with, and talking about, the world, leading inevitably to some closure of meaning. Philosophical inquiry can counteract such closure by questioning commonly accepted meanings and fostering an inquisitive mindset that allows us to perceive the world anew. The aim of this Special Issue is to further develop and critically enhance the existing endeavours that explicitly incorporate philosophical approaches in organization studies. Specifically, the objective is to promote a more philosophically oriented approachin the field, focusing on both critical analysis and the development of innovative conceptual advancements. In this Introduction, we not only introduce the featured papers but, also, reflect on the broader purpose of philosophy, its relationship to organization studies, and how it can inform and enrich the field.

The practice-driven perspective in organizational institutionalism has proposed that what actors say and do is decisive for the enactment of practices in everyday situations. However, this perspective has predominantly considered the role of doings and has disregarded the distinct role of sayings used in everyday situations. Our theoretical argument proposes the co-constitutive coexistence of sayings and doings in the enactment of practices that explains why and when doings inform specific sayings and why and when sayings prefigure specific doings. Theorizing this coexistence reveals when it is that sayings bolster the reproduction and stabilization of doings, when they contribute to change, and when sayings cannot coordinate doings because actors literally cannot understand one another. We argue that the consideration of the coexistence of sayings and doings is relevant for practice-driven institutionalism, as it enables the differentiation of the situated impact of doings and sayings on the development of practices. To develop this argument, we build on insights from the embodiment perspective within the philosophy of mind (i.e. philosophy of embodiment), which suggests that the body and its sensorimotor states in practices play an instrumental role in cognition and language use.

Sensemaking provides a compelling account of how meaning emerges by theorizing the organizational enactment of order. In this paper we question the underlying assumption that making sense is equivalent to ordering. We draw from Hannah Arendt’s work to argue that restricting sense to ordering as a means of addressing practical concerns is limiting, and even dehumanizing, and that the most profound forms of sense may emerge from disrupting rather than restoring order. In questioning the intimacy between sense and order, we also question the commonsense view that organization seeks practical settlements, certainty and reliability. Following Arendt, we pursue the question of what it means to organize for plural opinion-making, a condition she conceptualizes as sensus communis. The upshot is to flip sensemaking on its head: rather than meaning being generated through organizing, and certain types of disruption merely triggering it, sense is made through disruption, with certain types of organizing enabling it.

How does agency emerge eventfully in processes of organizational becoming? This article aims to address this question by developing a process theory of agency based on Gilbert Simondon’s philosophical writings on individuation as a communicative phenomenon and Brian Massumi’s writings on affect. This theory views agency as an affective force, expressed as a communicative event, that governs the transition from one process of individuation to another, producing an enhanced ability to act and potentially leading to a collective process of transindividuation that is essential to organizational becoming. In turn, this article not only offers novel theoretical as well as methodological insights for organizational research, but also highlights researchers’ ethical responsibilities toward those whose individuation is precarious and who may not be able to partake in certain processes of organizational becoming.

In organization studies, the prevailing understanding of freedom has revolved around a specific concept of autonomy. However, we propose an alternative and normative concept of freedom, drawing inspiration from the philosophy of Hegel and a reinterpretation of his ideas by Robert Brandom. We begin by diagnosing the liberal conceptions of freedom as opportunity and autonomy that shape the predominant understanding of freedom at work within organization studies. We then follow Hegel and conceive freedom as the expansive realization of oneself through the commitment to meaningful constraints. In contrast to the dominant liberal notions of freedom, Hegel allows us to understand professional commitments and communal obligations at work as the medium of freedom. We argue that concrete freedom at work requires (a) that workers see their work as intrinsically valuable and (b) that neither they nor their employers are unconditionally free to define norms for how work is to be organized and pursued. We then demonstrate the theoretical implications of shifting from the liberal conceptions of freedom prevalent in organization studies to a Hegelian conception of freedom. The Hegelian theory leads to a more nuanced understanding of worker decision-discretion, motivation and the meaningfulness of work. Additionally, it has implications for research on bureaucracy and institutional logics. We end by considering the limits of the empirical applicability of our Hegelian theory, and by highlighting its normative value for practitioners and critical management scholars.

Many scholars of organizations see social enterprise as a promising approach to advancing social justice but neglect to scrutinize the normative foundations and limitations of this optimism. This article draws on Rawlsian political philosophy to investigate whether and how social enterprises can support social justice. We propose that this perspective assigns organizations a duty to foster institutional capacity, a concept we define and elaborate. We investigate how this duty might apply specifically to social enterprises, given their characteristic features. We theorize six different mechanisms through which social enterprises might successfully discharge this duty. These results affirm the value of conversation between organizational studies and political philosophy and shed new light on debates regarding social enterprise, institutional theory, and several other topics.

Organizational change research has shown how change processes in organizations connect sequentially to form a trajectory of change through time; however, research has yet to offer an understanding of how ongoing organizational change integrates more distant change processes across time to shape the organization’s long-term trajectory. To better understand the dynamics between ongoing change and the shaping of trajectories, we refer to change processes as turning points, arguing that turning points are immanent to – and formative of – trajectories. We define turning points in terms of their definitional, directional and curvilinear features, which we relate to the shaping of organizational change trajectories. Drawing on Deleuze’s concept of the fold and the distinction between actual and singular events, we theorize how actors connect past and future turning points of the trajectory as singular events into enacting the actual events of the current turning point. Inspired by Deleuze’s conception of the fold, we then develop a theoretical framework for the shaping of organizational change trajectories at turning points. This framework contributes to current change research by explaining how ongoing change processes give shape to trajectories of change that subsequently shape the ongoing process of change. It also contributes to the literature by proposing a more dynamic and central role of continuity in change. Finally, our use of Deleuze’s concept of the fold enables us to suggest how theorizing actors’ movement through time may extend current process views of time.