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The aim of this paper is to empirically evaluate the electoral competition in the Brazilian election for Congress. The evaluation focused on the regional dimension of electoral competition, what is sustained by concepts such as informal electoral districts (AMES, 2001; 2003) or political hamlets (HUNTER AND POWER, 2007; ZUCCO, 2008). This paper considers electoral results from 1994 to 2010 and uses the imbalance index (TAAGEPERA, 1979) in a timing frame perspective as basic criteria because the Effective Number of Parties does not capture the decentralization of electoral competition. Results suggests that the personal and regional political control is not the rule of political competition in Brazil; the informal district theory lacks of empirical support and, the politicians that are successful in avoiding competition do not always get elected and vary in their power over electorate through time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the possible impacts of the privatization process implemented by the Brazilian former President, Fernando Henrique, over the attitudes and opinions held by Brazilian electorate regarding the presence of the state in the economy. Te paper uses a post-electoral survey from 2002 -- The ESEB (Brazilian Electoral Study) data-base -- supported by CAPES Foundation. The inquiry carried out in the paper centers on different patterns found in the answers given by the respondents when asked which sector -- either government or private one -- should be in charge of providing different products and services. The study found out an impressive degree of coherence in the answers given by the respondents, which were used to propose a scale for different attitudes regarding the privatization process. Furthermore, it was possible to establish significant correlation between this attitude and the electoral campaign and the declared vote of the respondent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the main themes in democratic theory is the process through which citizens control the activity of its representatives. In this paper we analyze the Brazilian political system in general terms and the 1998 and 2006 election in particular in order to argue that the processes of vertical accountability in the electoral gaps empower citizens in the sense of punishing and rewarding their representatives in the electoral moment. The importance of this work is guaranteed by the political context experienced by the country in the last couple of years before the 2006 election. A significant number of politicians had been involved in corruption scandals that resounded in the Brazilian society in a very negative way. Despite of the costs of information, limited time to be concerned with politics, and the huge social inequality allied to poverty, we show that voters have been able to punish those that had been involved in scandals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we investigate the patterns of electoral volatility, at the individual level, in the 2010 Brazilian presidential elections. We explain variation in vote intention before the first round between candidates José Serra, Marina Silva, and Dilma Rousseff. A special emphasis is given to the effects of perceptions of corruption and abortion, two hot campaign issues, to explain the final result of the first round. The analysis is based on the first Brazilian Electoral Panel Study (BEPS), which has three waves of interviews with the same nationally representative sample, allowing for measures of how voters changed their minds during the electoral campaign. Results indicate that perceptions about corruption, primed by the eruption of corruption scandals, more than the debate on abortion, stimulated a loss of votes for Dilma Rousseff. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the impact of political sophistication on citizens' political preferences. After defining the concept and measurement of political sophistication, panel survey data from Caxias do Sul and Juiz de Fora in 2002 are used to assess its main determinants in the Brazilian context. Next, the article tests four hypotheses derived from existing scholarship about the effects of political sophistication on individual preferences and information processing. The four hypotheses tested are: 1) more politically sophisticated citizens are more ideologically constrained in their political attitudes then less sophisticated individuals; 2) more sophisticated citizens present more stable attitudes over time than less sophisticated individuals; 3) more sophisticated citizens acquire more political information over time than less sophisticated individuals, and; 4) more sophisticated citizens tend to express opinions more frequently than less sophisticated individuals. The analyses in the paper provide strong support for all four hypotheses. Finally, the article discusses some implications of the results for the study of public opinion and elections in Brazil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analises the determinants of vote for Dilma Rousseff in the first and second rounds of the 2010 Brazilian presidential elections, based on various political, economic and social indicators. The study tests the traditional hypotheses about vote choice in Brazil, such as sociotropic economic voting, party identification, government evaluation, perceptions of corruption and religion. Our contribution comes from the adition of a new explanation for vote choice: perceptions of social mobility. Therefore, the present study captures a political effect of the upward social mobility of sectors of the Brazilian population, the so called "new middle class". The article uses data from the CSES Brazilian Electoral Study (ESEB). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many scholars have written on money and elections, especially on how expenditures can explain the performance of the candidate. Our paper aims at describing some features of finance campaign for the Brazilian National Congress in 2002 and 2006, based on the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) data. We tried to capture: a) donations and expenditures variation of incumbents and challengers; b) regional variations, given the socioeconomic cleavages of the electoral district, that may affect donations and expenditures; c) cameral variations, given the incongruent character of the Brazilian bicameralism; d) party variations, that is, if there are candidates that cost "more" or "less", depending on party affiliation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to investigate one of the main roles of political parties in a representative democracy: to organize and to control the production of representation. In order to do that, two internal party processes will be examined: the setting and maintaining of the party's organizational structure and the candidate selection for the Camara dos Deputados in the state of Sao Paulo for the PFL, PP, PMDB, PSDB and PT parties. The analysis is based on the idea that the more control political parties have over these two processes, the more vital are their party organizations in the representative dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]