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Abstract: This paper consists of two parts. The first concerns the logic of vagueness. The second concerns a prominent debate in metaphysics. One of the most widely accepted principles governing the ‘definitely’ operator is the principle of Distribution: if ‘p’ and ‘if p then q’ are both definite, then so is ‘q’. I argue however, that epistemicists about vagueness (at least those who take a broadly Williamsonian line) should reject this principle. The discussion also helps to shed light on the elusive question of what, on this framework, it takes for a sentence to be borderline or definite. In the second part of the paper, I apply this result to a prominent debate in metaphysics. One of the most influential arguments in favour of Universalism about composition is the Lewis‐Sider argument from vagueness. An interesting question, however, is whether epistemicists have any particular reasons to resist the argument. I show that there is no obvious reason why epistemicists should resist the argument but there is a non‐obvious one: the rejection of Distribution argued for in the first part of the paper provides epistemicists with a unique way of resisting the argument from vagueness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has seemed natural to model phenomena related to vagueness in terms of graded membership. However, so far no satisfactory answer has been given to the question of what graded membership is nor has any attempt been made to describe in detail a procedure for determining degrees of membership. We seek to remedy these lacunae by building on recent work on typicality and graded membership in cognitive science and combining some of the results obtained there with a version of the conceptual spaces framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the precisificational theories and incoherent sort of vagueness, and the commonsense moderate view of composition. Among the cases of vagueness discussed include the cloudishly arranged simples and homogenous cases of borderline composition. It also explores several objections on proto-cloud, an object of cloudishly arranged simples, which include simplicity, the sharpness of boundary between non-being and being of composition, and the explanatory role of composition.

In this paper I develop a framework for understanding ontic vagueness. The project of the paper is two-fold. I first outline a definitional account of ontic vagueness - one that I think is an improvement on previous attempts because it remains neutral on other, independent metaphysical issues. I then develop one potential manifestation of that basic definitional structure. This is a more robust (and much less neutral) account which gives a fully classical explication of ontic vagueness via modal concepts. The overarching aim is to systematically investigate the puzzling question of what exactly it could be for the world itself to be vague. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's insights regarding the views of David Liebesman and Matti Eklund on indeterminacy argument. It states that indeterminacy argument presents the idea of precisification. It notes on the claim of Eli Hirsch regarding candidate meanings wherein the author disregards the existence of any candidate meaning.

The article presents a philosophical argument defining identity and refuting the scholastic construction of a vague identity. The author presents a definition of identity wherein phenomena are classified and also discusses why the typological concept of vagueness is interesting but philosophically impossible.

The article discusses semantic nihilism, the concept that semantic ideas such as truth and implication cannot be applied to statements and expressions that contain vagueness. The author argues that speakers often ignore vagueness in ordinary speech to express an approximation of the truth. Supervaluationism assigns statements truth values matching the intuition of ordinary speakers but does not always correctly represent the intuited truth of a statement.

This article presents a discussion of vagueness, "Unrestricted Composition" and the philosophy of time in terms of its temporal parts. The author critiques the theory of David Lewis and his position on Unrestricted Composition, which posits that all objects are part of a greater whole. The author then relates the views of Theodore Sider about time and Sider's discussion of Lewis.

There is no doubt that some sentences are vague. Naturally, then, questions arise about the nature of vagueness. In particular, the question about wherein vagueness lies. There have been three views. The most popular view, the linguistic view, places vagueness in language, specifically, in reference relations between words and their referents. According to this view, vagueness is a form of referential indeterminacy—a vague term is a term that has more than one candidate referent, none of which the term exclusively refers to. One minority view of vagueness is what may be called the worldly view.

Comments on Stephen Schiffer's theory of vagueness. Nature of vagueness; Schiffer's notion of vagueness-related partial beliefs; Characteristics of a vague predicate; Improvements to Schiffer's theory of vagueness; Alternative to Schiffer's vagueness proposal.

Analyzes Stephen Schiffer's claims about the psychological aspects of the philosophical problem of vagueness. Schiffer's reasons for taking vagueness to be a psychological notion; Nature of Schiffer's concept of vagueness-related partial belief.

Analyzes vagueness-related partial belief (VSB). Distinction between VSB and standard partial belief; Problems of vagueness; Arguments in support of vagueness as a psychological notion; Semantic and epistemic theories of vagueness.

Responds to Stephen Schiffer's arguments questioning the notion of vagueness as semantic indecision (VSI). Semantics of vagueness; Justification deriving from VSI for distinguishing two levels of content; Distinction between a level of reference and a level of sense required by VSI.

Replies to various analyses of semantic accounts of vagueness. Application of supervaluationist semantics; Psychological account of vagueness; Arguments for vagueness-related partial beliefs.

Analyzes Stephen Schiffer's application of the concept of vagueness-related partial belief (VPB) to explain the notion of borderline case. Notion of borderline case defined in terms of VPB; Requirements for an adequate of treatment of higher order vagueness; Formation of VPB under epistemic conditions.

Presents a critique of Stephen Schiffer's notion of vagueness-related partial belief. Distinction between standard partial belief and vagueness-related partial belief; Reformulation of Schiffer's analyses; Proneness of Schiffer's analyses to counterexamples.

Examines vagueness in causation. Accounts of causation that demonstrate causal failings of precise events; Competing conceptions of vagueness; Problems for precise causation.

Discusses questions about incommensurability between theories. Areas in philosophy in which issues about commensurability play a role; Sources of philosophers' resistance to incommensurability and the extent to which they can overcome such resistance; Accounts of vagueness.