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I respond to a dilemma for Causal Decision Theory (CDT) under determinism, posed in Adam Elga's paper "Confessions of a Causal Decision Theorist". The treatment I present highlights (i) the status of laws as predictors, and (ii) the consequences of decision dependence, which arises natively out of Jeffrey Conditioning and CDT's characteristic equation. My argument leverages decision dependence to work around a key assumption of Elga's proof: to wit, that in the two problems he presents, the CDTer must employ subjunctive‐suppositional (rather than evidential) transformations of a shared prior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I diagnose the problems facing causal decision theory as a special case of the general phenomenon of decision‐dependence–the possibility that some input into our evaluation of options can be affected by the decision we end up making. I go on to develop a new decision theory, which treats each choice as a tournament between options competing in pairs, and show how it can capture attractive features of the causal view while avoiding the problems generated by decision‐dependence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the debate between evidential and causal decision theory. Reactions to papers by Clark Glymour and Christopher Meek (1994) and by Christopher Hitchcock (1996); Argument that the papers are seduced by a plausible line of thought into a mistaken sympathy for evidentialism; Account of non-causal probabilistic rationality developed earlier with Helen Beebee to deal with causal contexts as well.

A knowledge-based decision theory faces what has been called the prodigality problem (Greco, 2013): given that many propositions are assigned probability 1, agents will be inclined to risk everything when betting on propositions which are known. In order to undo probability 1 assignments in high risk situations, the paper develops a theory which systematically connects higher level goods with higher-order knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we explore the connections between ethics and decision theory. In particular, we consider the question of whether decision theory carries with it a bias towards consequentialist ethical theories. We argue that there are plausible versions of the other ethical theories that can be accommodated by “standard” decision theory, but there are also variations of these ethical theories that are less easily accommodated. So while “standard” decision theory is not exclusively consequentialist, it is not necessarily ethically neutral. Moreover, even if our decision-theoretic models get the right answers vis-à-vis morally correct action, the question remains as to whether the motivation for the non-consequentialist theories and the psychological processes of the agents who subscribe to those ethical theories are lost or poorly represented in the resulting models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It would be good to have a Bayesian decision theory that assesses our decisions and thinking according to everyday standards of rationality—standards that do not require logical omniscience (Garber, 1983; Hacking, 1967). To that end we develop a "fragmented" decision theory in which a single state of mind is represented by a family of credence functions, each associated with a distinct choice condition (Lewis, 1982; Stalnaker, 1984). The theory imposes a local coherence assumption guaranteeing that as an agent's attention shifts, successive batches of "obvious" logical information become available to her. A rule of expected utility maximization can then be applied to the decision of what to attend to next during a train of thought. On the resulting theory, rationality requires ordinary agents to be logically competent and to often engage in trains of thought that increase the unification of their states of mind. But rationality does not require ordinary agents to be logically omniscient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sometimes we make a decision about an action we will undertake later and form an intention, but our judgment of what it is best to do undergoes a temporary shift when the time for action comes round. What makes it rational not to give in to temptation? Many contemporary solutions privilege diachronic rationality; in some "rational non‐reconsideration" (RNR) accounts once the agent forms an intention, it is rational not to reconsider. This leads to other puzzles: how can someone be motivated to follow a plan that is contrary to their current judgment? How can it be rational to form a plan to resist if we can predict that our judgment will shift? I show how these puzzles can be solved in a framework where there are multiple units of agency, distinguishing between the judgments of the timeslice and those of the person over time, and allowing that the timeslice can "self identify", taking the person over time as the relevant unit of agency and doing intrapersonal team reasoning (with a different causal role for intentions than RNR accounts). On my account, resisting temptation is compatible with synchronic rationality, so synchronic and diachronic rationality are aligned. However, either resisting or succumbing to temptation can be instrumentally rational, depending on the unit of agency that is identified with. In order to show why we ought to resist temptation, we need to draw on a non‐instrumental rationale. I sketch possible routes for doing this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: I show that Kavka's toxin puzzle raises a problem for the “Responsibility Theodicy,” which holds that the reason God typically does not intervene to stop the evil effects of our actions is that such intervention would undermine the possibility of our being significantly responsible for overcoming and averting evil. This prominent theodicy seems to require that God be able to do what the agent in Kavka's toxin story cannot do: stick by a plan to do some action at a future time even though when that time comes, there will be no good reason for performing that action (and very good reason not to). I assess various approaches to solving this problem. Along the way, I develop an iterated variant of Kavka's toxin case and argue that the case is not adequately handled by standard causal decision theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses in detail the phenomenon of Bayesian Probabilities used in the decision theories with the help of mathematical examples. Topics include explanation of the phenomena of dominance and coherence in reference to the doxastic states as illustrated in the examples, necessary conditions for coherence, and non-representable coherent states.

The article offers the author's insights on self-frustrating and self-reinforcing decisions. Topics discussed include various theories that imply decision dependence, the development of formal tools that permit people to describe theories of the subjective ought, and the potential that causal decision theory might offer interpretation on what to do in self-frustrating cases.

The article offers the author's insights on what should be done when in the middle of making decision on saving a larger group and a smaller group in medicine. The author explores various cases related to the subject, in which concludes on the significance of identifying if saving could cost next-to-nothing factor. Moreover, he argues on the lunacy on the belief of saving a few or many.

There is a surprising disconnect between formal rational choice theory and philosophical work on reasons. The one is silent on the role of reasons in rational choices, the other rarely engages with the formal models of decision problems used by social scientists. To bridge this gap, we propose a new, reason-based theory of rational choice. At its core is an account of preference formation, according to which an agent's preferences are determined by his or her motivating reasons, together with a 'weighing relation' between different combinations of reasons. By explaining how someone's preferences may vary with changes in his or her motivating reasons, our theory illuminates the relationship between deliberation about reasons and rational choices. Although primarily positive, the theory can also help us think about how those preferences and choices ought to respond to normative reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]