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This study examines the effect of changes in the number of shipping lines on port charges and profits. A two‐stage noncooperative game‐theoretic model with two ports and multiple identical shipping lines is developed. In the first stage, the ports decide their container handling charges, and in the second stage, the shipping lines decide on the number of calls to make at each port, given the port charges. The model is then applied to the case of competition between two ports in New Zealand, the Port of Tauranga and the Port of Auckland, to derive managerial insights. Our study extends the literature on port competition by incorporating competition between shipping lines. We also demonstrate that a decrease in the number of shipping lines may force ports to increase their handling charges. Furthermore, we show that each shipping line ships more cargo than the industry optimal via the port with lower costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Piracy attack is a serious safety problem for maritime transport worldwide. Whilst various strategic actions can be taken, such as rerouting vessels and strengthening navy patrols, this still cannot completely eliminate the possibility of a piracy attack. It is therefore important for a commercial vessel to be equipped with operational solutions in case of piracy attacks. In particular, the choice of a direction for rapidly fleeing is a critical decision for the vessel. In this article, we formulate such a problem as a nonlinear optimal control problem. We consider various policies, such as maintaining a straight direction or making turns, develop algorithms to optimize the policies, and derive conditions under which these policies are effective and safe. Our work can be used as a real-time decision making tool that enables a vessel master to evaluate different scenarios and quickly make decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]