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We study the efficiency and distributional effects of financing universal health-insurance coverage, using a computational general equilibrium model of the United States for 1991, with considerable disaggregation among families. Aggregate efficiency losses (primarily from labor supply distortions) range from 0.2 percent to nearly 1 percent of net output. Losses are considerably smaller for a "mandate-with-tax-credit" plan than for full tax finance. All plans redistribute in favor of the poor. The mandate with credit is much better for the highest income groups, but worse for the lower-middle class. The elderly lose in all plans we consider.

able to gather on amnesties in other states. Do tax amnesties generate revenue that In our view, information about the types would not otherwise be collected? Will tax of taxpayers (or nontaxpayers) who paramnesties provide continuing future reve- ticipate in amnesties and the circumnue gains? And is an amnesty appropriate stances that lead them to participate can in the transition to a new tax enforcement be of considerable use in evaluating the regime? Based on economic analysis of the effects of amnesties and for predicting the choice to participate in an amnesty and e-x- prospects for a federal tax amnesty from amination of the characteristics of partic the state results. ipants in Michigan and other states, it ap- Under a tax amnesty, taxpayers are ofpears that amnesties are not particularly fered an opportunity to come forward during a specified period of time and pay preeffective in identifying tax evaders, so that I