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"The Sympathizer" is a television series adapted from Viet Thanh Nguyen's Pulitzer Prize-winning novel. The story follows an unnamed protagonist who is a double agent during the Vietnam War, working as a captain in the US-backed secret police of South Vietnam while also being a mole for the Northern communists. The series explores themes of displacement, identity, and the loss of home, as the protagonist navigates between different worlds and struggles to find a sense of belonging. The show's narrative structure is non-linear, jumping between different time periods and locations, and it combines elements of satire, spy thriller, political intrigue, and moral introspection. While the series loses some momentum in later episodes, it ultimately succeeds in portraying the complexities of migration and the absence of a true home. [Extracted from the article]

The article presents information related to political and social conditions in the U.S., during cold war. Sandy Weill, chairman of the Travelers Group, told on CNN in January 1997 that "I think as we look at this world that we are living in, there are opportunities for a lot of terrific things to happen." With the end of the cold war, a number of former KGBers have come forward to tell their spy stories. The most recent debut is that of retired KGB officer Aleksandr Semyonovich Feklisov, who says he was the Soviet intelligence agent who during World War II, personally received information from a member of a spy ring Julius Rosenberg. Feklisov's story highlights a problem that has bedeviled students of the U.S.'s cold war spy cases.

The article presents information on various political developments. Japan has been quick to take advantage of the isolation of China as a result of the cutting of the Burma road. For the first time since 1938 it has launched a number of simultaneous drives against Chiang Kaishek's major bases. On April 30 Gustave Beekman was convicted in County Judge Leibowitz's Brooklyn court on a charge of operating a house of male prostitution. His premises in Pacific Street, Brooklyn, had been raided on March 14 by city detectives and Naval Intelligence officers after having been under surveillance for six weeks by three federal agencies, whose attention had been attracted to the place by the many members of the armed forces visiting it.

In the sinister shadows of the remarkable space vehicles now orbiting the earth, the fuss raised about the espionage activities of the earth-bound U-2 seems a piddling exercise in futility originally, the first American spy-in-the-sky satellite was to be called Sentry, but, to pacify the State Department, this harsh-sounding name was soon dropped and the less sensitive title of Discoverer was substituted. Several test satellites flying under this latter nomenclature have already been placed into polar orbits by the U.S. Air Force during the past year. In addition to that the article presents various other information.

Not just in New York but all around the country people, particularly radical Left political people, feel someone breathing down their necks. In addition to surveillance by the FBI, CIA, Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence, there exists in almost every major city a super secret department of the police, a "Red Squad," dedicated to keeping an eye on the political activities of the citizenry. New York's Red Squad is called the Bureau of Special Services (BOSS). The BOSS has followed the practice of its big brother, the CIA, of hiding budget information in appropriations for other agencies. Even the International Association of Chiefs of Police admits that the BOSS does a lot more than the official mandate specifies.

The article focuses on Aldrich Ames, the most notorious mole in the unhappy history of the C.I.A. During a long interview, Ames declares that he still has secrets to tell. A C.I.A. official looks on, monitoring Ames so he does not let slip any classified information. But the most damning thing he has to share is not classified knowledge about any specific operation but the observations of a cynical spy who hurls at the agency's espionage wing the greatest of insults: It is pointless. Not that there are no intriguing secrets that remain regarding his own case.

Focuses on agreement between secret police of Chile DINA and the U.S.-based Central Intelligence Agency. Information about arms deal between the two intelligence agencies; Plans of DINA to assassinate exiled Chilean leader Orlando Letelier; Evidence of clandestine agreement between the intelligence agencies.

This article presents authors' views on the question of abolishing the intelligence services in the United States. According to one author, the hysterical tracking down of nuclear weapons is useless. After all, they, or their treasured allies, have armed all the world to the teeth. They have neither the money nor the brains to monitor every country on earth, which means, that if some evil dictator in Madagascar wants to nuke or biologically degrade Washington, D.C., there's not much the United States can do about it. Another author suggests that personnel granted access to national security information are subject to intrusive background investigations that often pry into their political, medical and sexual histories, and that in some agencies include polygraphs and random drug-testing. Another author recommends that the intelligence agencies be statutorily prohibited from intentionally collecting or analyzing non-national security information. Analysis of non-national security issues should be conducted by the appropriate policy agency, or a separate analytical agency should be established to analyze such issues.

The article presents herewith, from the "verbatim report of the La Follette Committee on Civil Liberties," the typical sections of the testimony of C.M. Kuhl, a labor spy who had worked for various agencies. Senator La Follette had begun by questioning Kuhl about the companies he had served and the "jobs" he had been assigned to. Senator La Follette begins by asking, "You have been in the business a long time, can you tell us and just describe in your own way how they get these strike-breakers, where they get them, and what kind of men they are?"

The article focuses on the Amerasia case as to its details and the charges that were put against the government for letting the accused escape. The case that happened four years ago has now been opened again by Tyding Senate Committee with its new investigations. The charges accused the government to be infested with communists or fellow travelers who five years ago leaked secret documents to the editor of Amerasia for the benefit of the Soviet Union. The United States Department of Justice bungled, fixed, or whitewashed the Amerasia case so that wicked culprits escaped with trivial or no punishment. The culprits were arrested on the complaint charging them of conspiracy to violate espionage laws.

The article presents an overview of the March 2, 1940 issue of "The Nation." The secret police of totalitarian countries, whether Communist, Fascist, or Nazi, need refer to no statute books in order to investigate, arrest, or imprison. They, and not the law, decide what constitutes a crime. American G-men, are beginning to act on similar principles. American evidence for this statement comes from Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director, J. Edgar Hoover himself. His testimony last November and again in January before the U.S. House Appropriations Committee shows that the FBI is engaging in activities for which it has no legal authorization.

The world at large tends to view the small art-dealing fraternity as rather a precious phenomenon. And so it is. But it takes imagination to exploit the imaginative creations of others into a flourishing trade. Art dealers are not mere commissionaires; they are adventurers on the high seas of luxury and prestige where other adventurers, learning of the treasures in the hold, the millionaire in the cabin, may swoop down and take all before home port is reached. Behind the decorous facade of New York's art galleries runs a network of dark and curious alleys.

This article focuses on socio-political conditions of the U.S. At its September meeting, the Plymouth Monthly Meeting of Friends was unable to achieve unity of feeling on the question of whether to keep or return an award of $5000 received from the Fund for the Republic in recognition of "courageous and effective defense of democratic principles" in having refused to dismiss Mary Knowles, a librarian employed by the William Jeanes Memorial Library. The library is owned and operated by the society. In a suite of the White House Annex, barked from reporters' by secret-service agents, U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon asked fifty-five government contractors to end job discrimination in their plants. With their cooperation, he suggested the U.S. Administration's "civil-rights objectives" could be achieved by 1965, without their cooperation, the Administration might not survive past the 1956 elections.

In October 1991, on the heels of the failed coup, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a law opening the files of all victims of political repression in the Soviet Union since 1917. That law remains the sole legal means for most Russians to gain access to K.G.B. files, their own and those of their relatives. In opening its archives, the K.G.B. now demonstrates a reluctance to reveal secrets that is not solely a legacy of Communism. Even with the Freedom of Information Act, U.S. citizens find that getting a folder from the F.B.I. also frequently involves bureaucratic red tape and delays. But in contrast to the bureau, the K.G.B. permits only victims and their relatives to view "case files," and as a rule it forbids access to operational documents such as surveillance reports and information on prison conditions and informants.

This article presents information on Anatoly Shcharansky, who was by some standards of evidence, certainly by Soviet standards he was guilty of spying for the U.S., for which activity he got a fifteen-year sentence in 1978. As one of the most energetic "refuseniks" of the mid-1970s, the English-speaking Shcharansky had particularly close contact with Robert Toth, at that time Moscow correspondent for the Los Angeles Times. Eager to demonstrate that the Russians were denying exit visas to Russian Jews in civilian jobs on the false ground that they possessed military secrets, Shcharansky furnished Toth with lists of names and workplaces of those who had been refused permission to emigrate. This suggested that the research vessels were actually spy ships.

This article presents the author's views on the issue of espionage and politics. In the year 1954 the Australian Prime Minister, R. G. Menzies, announced to a crowded and expectant Parliament that Vladimir Petrov, third secretary of the Soviet embassy at Canberra, had sought and been granted political sanctuary. Petrov, he said, had brought with him a mass of documents that revealed the existence of widespread Soviet espionage in Australia, with contacts in many high government offices. The impact of this announcement was immediate and dramatic. Press and radio alike treated it, as had Mr. Menzies, as a matter of the greatest national importance. The bill was passed by both houses without debate in a few hours.

This article focuses on the case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg which are held in Sing Sing prison awaiting execution. They were given the death penalty having been found guilty of violating the Espionage Act by supplying secret information to Russia. Russia was U.S.' ally in 1944, but under the statute a crime exists if secret information is turned over to a foreign government with reason to believe that the information may be of advantage to the recipient. The charge was not treason. The defendants were not indicted or tried for giving aid to an enemy. In a treason trial, there would have been certain constitutional safeguards.

It is disturbing to see the growing inclination to turn spies into heroes in the U.S. There are sharp differences between the military spy and the political spy. In the first place, a man employed by an army to report on troop movements, fortifications, etc., is going to give facts. What he says can be verified. The political spy, on the other hand, reports conversations and midnight contacts in dark alleys. There is usually no way to check up on him, and his opportunities for falsification are almost unlimited. Another difference is that the military spy does not have the temptation to lie. There is a much greater risk of false testimony from spies than from ordinary men.

Ed Rooney, one of the Chicago Daily News's top reporters, phoned on December 17, 1970, to tell the author that the U.S. Army had been spying on him. According to Rooney, one John M. O'Brien, a former staff sergeant assigned to the 113th Military Intelligence Group in suburban Evanston, Illinois, would soon add his name to a lengthening list of surveillance subjects that he had begun on the previous day with the headline-capturing names of Senator Adlai Stevenson III, former Governor Otto Kerner, and the Reverend Jesse Jackson. For several days after this confirmation that the author had been, as O'Brien put it, "monitored" by the Army, random thoughts kept running through the author's mind. The author turned over in his mind the proposition that no Army that gets caught spying on its own people should be conducting warfare anywhere in the world.

The article focuses on Ignazio Silone, who turned out to be an informer at a considerably greater level of infamy than that of George Orwell, who passed along to the British secret police names of people he suspected of being Communists or fellow travelers. Like Orwell, Silone has been hailed down years as a moral saint, a man who fought Fascism first as a Communist organizer, then as someone who quit the Communist movement long before the great purges of late thirties, writing the enormously influential anti-Fascist novels "Fontamara" and "Bread and Wine." The truly repugnant details of Silone's years as an informer for Fascist prime minister of Italy Benito Mussolini's secret police began to surface in 1996, when a young historian and biographer of Silone, Darlo Biocca, aired documents he had discovered separately.

The article presents information on a Mossad officer Yehuda Gil. Gil was a member of Moledet, a right-wing party hostile to anything resembling a peace process. Yehuda Gil, a sixty three year old officer, retired in 1989 but was still filing intelligence reports to the spy agency because his longtime Syrian mole was regarded as of the highest importance. But there was no such highly placed Syrian source. Gil, noted for his Mossad training course titled "The Lie as Art," was making everything up and furthermore pocketing the money he was meant to be handing over to his agent. At some point Gil aroused suspicions, if not in the bosom of his credulous or complicit overseers in Mossad then among other intelligence agencies chided for lacking the superb Damascus contacts of the legendary Mossad.

The article focuses on the political debate related to Intelligence department in the U.S. as of May 19, 1984. On May 3, 1984, there came the first call from a lawmaker for the resignation of William J. Casey as Director of Central Intelligence. Representative William F. Goodling is a member of the Intelligence Committee and a Republican says that nobody can trust Casey. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, made peace with Casey on April 26, 1984. According to Moynihan, the U.S. must respect international law and regards the 1983 Congressional vote to build the MX missile as a mistake.

Editorial. Focuses on 'moles,' the term for top secret agents who penetrate into the upper reaches of the intelligence hierarchy of a rival nation. Presence of moles in nations' command posts; Soviet moles in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

For days, witnesses, members of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee and director Robert Gates himself quarreled about the intelligence-production process at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Two former analysts at the Office of Soviet Analysis credibly maintained that Gates blocked reports that challenged the hardline view and that he promoted shoddy intelligence that supported the Russians-are-coming position, such as a paper that argued that the Soviet Union backed the 1981 assassination attempt against the Pope. The hearings disclosed that within the CIA., analysts who strayed from the reigning dogma worried about being labeled Communist apologists.

This article focuses on the book "Capturing a Locomotive: A History of Secret Service in the Late War," by William Pittenger. This book is founded upon what was unquestionably one of the most remarkable of the minor incidents of the War. The story has been briefly told several times before it is to be found in "Rebellion Record" and in other publications. The author has himself told the story once before, in a book entitled "Daring and Suffering; or, the Great Railroad Adventure."

The article presents a list of books. "Pride and Prejudice," by Jane Austen, "Out of the Jaws of Death," by Frank Barrett, "His Life's Magnet," by Theodora Elmslie, "The Career of Columbus," by Charles Elton, "Secret Service Under Pitt Longmans," by W.J. Fitzpatrick, "Four Destinies," by T. Gautier, "The Woodman Harpers," Jules de Glouvet, "Materials for French Composition," by C.H. Grandgent, "Cholera Facts and Conclusions As to Its Nature. Prevention and Treatment," by H. Hartshorne, "Charming to Her Latest Day," by Alan Muir, and "A Treatise on Epidemic Cholera," by A.B. Palmer.

For a long time Heinrich Himmler, head of Germany's secret service Gestapo, has demanded an aviation section for his S.S. guards. Nazi field marshal Hermann Goring refused. At the first evidence of increasing dissatisfaction following the reverses in the east, Himmler renewed his demand, asking German dictator Adolf Hitler to support it. This time Goring yielded. The question is settled. Should the German people rise, they will be bombed from the air as if they were living in London, Coventry, or Kharkov.

This article focuses on William John Burns, whose recent activities in the Seymour case in New York have kept him "head-lined" in the newspapers and who is well known in Washington, where for several years he was a member of the Secret Service detailed for special work. There is no single key to the secret of Burns's success, which has many phases. First, he makes it so rigid a rule to take nothing for granted. If the trail of a forgery, for instance, seemed to lead into the White House, not even the President could escape scrutiny. Finally, he does not attempt a capture till he feels sure that he has got his quarry past the possibility of escape.

Owing to the increase of espionage in Switzerland, the political police are showing renewed activity in 1915. Within a week, sixty persons suspected of being spies or known to be such have been arrested and sent to Berne for trial. There may seem little to attract spies to Switzerland, especially to Geneva, where they are very numerous. The Swiss frontier from Verrières to Schafflhausen is not altogether inaccessible to civilians. Many of the military preparations there are perfectly well known.

The article discusses German espionage. The outbreak of World War I was accompanied by active proceedings taken by the British police against the horde of spies in a variety of disguises living in Great Britain on the pay of an avowedly friendly Power. They were promptly and sharply dealt with. The cleverest, most highly placed, and therefore most valuable spy remains at large. During his frequent visits to Great Britain, the Kaiser, treated as an honored guest, enjoyed exceptionally full opportunity of spying out the land. Military maneuvers arranged for his pleasure enabled him with trained eye to gauge the value of the forces.