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This article analyses the reaction to Garibaldi in Ireland during the Risorgimento, a reaction which, in its negativity, generally contrasted with the Italian's heroic depiction elsewhere. Attitudes towards Garibaldi reflected existing religious divisions in Ireland, with Protestants supporting him and Catholics condemning his actions in Italy. The study examines ballads, pamphlets and newspapers to illustrate the pro-papal fervour felt in Ireland and the strength of anti-Garibaldi feelings. The decision of Irishmen to form a battalion to fight in defence of the Papal States in 1860 reveals that, ultimately, denigration of Garibaldi became a badge of Irish nationalism. The study highlights the position of Britain in understanding the relationship between Ireland and Italy in these years, pointing out Irish nationalists' bafflement over Britain's support for Italian unification while it denied similar rights to Irish subjects. The article demonstrates how, in this context, domestic and tactical considerations coloured responses to Garibaldi in Ireland, with Irish issues projected onto the Italian situation, thus leading to entrenched and extreme attitudes towards the Italian soldier. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the image of Empire developed in public discourse in Italy during the late Liberal period and Fascism by placing it in the context of representations of the British Empire, with which Italian imperial ambitions were compared. There is a continuity in seeing the British Empire as the expression of industrial and commercial modernity and its resultant strength, but what in the Liberal period was seen as an unparalleled superiority became under Fascism a supremacy acquired in a particular period but now exhibiting signs of decline, which Fascism should contest and surpass. Admiration of the British was mixed with disparagement: key figures expressed a competitive resentment towards Britain and its dominant international position, seeing it as the epitome of ‘modern’ imperial power against which Fascism was destined to be measured. In the 1930s signs of the British Empire's decline were sought, developing the idea in Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire that British domination would also rise and fall, and announcing the replacement of the ‘British order’, founded on commercial modernity and the strength of money and capital, by Fascism's new civilisation, with its authentic heritage of imperial romanità. This competitiveness towards Britain, which historiography has principally seen as a component of foreign policy (as was clear over Ethiopia), has additional significance when seen as an element of political culture that relates to the concept of the State. The autonomy and strength of the State were an important feature of Fascism's self-representation and of its legal culture, and in this light the possession of an empire came to be seen as an essential aspect of statehood and power. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article focuses on Italian foreign and security policy (IFSP). It looks at three examples of the country's policy-making which reveal its poor results as a security provider, namely: Italy's tardy reaction to the violence in Libya in 2011, its prompt reaction to the Lebanon crisis in 2006, and its efforts to be included in the diplomatic directorate, the P5+1, approaching relations with Iran in 2009. The article considers whether government action has bolstered the reliability of IFSP and also discusses the country's FSP in terms of its basic differences from that of its partners in the European Union, France, Britain and Germany, envisaging how Italy could react to build more credibility. Italy's policy is observed through a three-pronged analytical framework enriched by concepts of the logic of expected consequences. The article concludes that IFSP is predictable, but it must still reveal that it is reliable, and explains why this is the case. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the changing attitude of the Sicilian statesman Francesco Crispi towards Britain between the 1850s and the end of the century. While Crispi had enormous admiration for Britain, and recognised that Italy had much to learn from its political system, he also acknowledged that the British constitution was the product of a long process of historical evolution and could never be imitated slavishly in Italy. From the end of the 1870s in particular, Crispi felt that Italy could not concede the degree of freedom permitted in Britain until the state had completed its work of what he called ‘political education’. As prime minister in the 1880s and 1890s Crispi looked to an aggressive foreign policy to strengthen Italy's beleaguered institutions, and he counted on British support to achieve this. The refusal of Britain to back him in the way he hoped left him perplexed and ultimately disillusioned about what he had felt was a special friendship between the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines French-Italian relations focusing in particular on economic exchanges and French perceptions of Italy as revealed in parliamentary debates and in the French press. The analysis suggests that in the eyes of the French, Italy is a two-faced Janus, rich in both defects and positive qualities. Except perhaps for the shrewdest observers, it is difficult for the French to come to terms with all the subtleties and complexities of the real Italy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the British perceptions of contemporary Italy and Italian politics. Through the use of a number of sources (parliamentary debates, governmental documents, newspaper articles and interviews) it argues that Italy is not perceived, within Great Britain, as a great power within the European system nor it is viewed as a peripheral actor. Rather, it suggests that Italy seems to have finally found in the post-Cold War scenario its proper role-a European middle power, with important responsibilities within a regional sub-system. A frequent request-and expectation-coming from British politics and society is that Italy should take on more international responsibilities, even in the sphere of defence-as the different readings of Italy's role and leadership in Afghanistan and Lebanon reveal. However, Italy's ability to play this role is believed to be hampered by several factors: its uncertain political situation, its unwillingness to engage in military operations, its reluctance to respect international commitments and its structural economic problems. As a result, further possibilities of cooperation with other international partners as well as its potential for autonomous action on the international stage are, in several cases, precluded. Moreover, if the relations between Italy and the UK are usually seen in a positive way, and Italy is viewed as a reliable partner, the nature of the cooperation between the two countries is often considered to be fragile and based on short-term common interests and strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses how Spanish perceptions of Italian domestic politics and its international role have changed over the last decade. The first part of the article presents an overview of the most significant fields of cooperation between the two countries and of the images of Italy in Spanish politics. There follows the reconstruction of non-institutional perceptions through an analysis of articles concerning Italy published by two major Spanish newspapers. The article concludes that the traditional image of Italy as a positive model to imitate has faded away and a more competitive attitude has emerged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American attentive foreign policy elite's perceptions of Italy as a foreign policy actor appear inconsistent with Italy's global role. The paradox of Italy's global status as a middle-power and the absence of status within the American foreign policy community raises three questions: What role should we expect Italy to play in American foreign policy calculations given its structural position in the international system? What role does Italy play in aiding or hindering American foreign policy objectives within the transatlantic community? Is there a disjunction between the American elite's subjectively low expectations for Italy as a foreign policy actor and Italy's objective importance for the successful realisation of American foreign policy objectives? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Italy's relationship with Germany has undergone substantial changes over the last 20 years. Since 1989, the two countries, traditional allies and partners in the EU and NATO, have experienced a number of tensions. A crucial problem for Germany lies in its incapacity to accept fully Italy's ambitions to be a leading European power. In domestic terms, the perception of Italy has been heavily overshadowed by the figure of Silvio Berlusconi who has allowed familiar stereotypes to survive and impeded a sober analysis of Italy's changed preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses Canadian perceptions of Italy at the governmental and societal levels. It argues that Canadians pay relatively little attention to things Italian and that their images of Italy are somewhat stereotypical. Italian politics do not receive much attention and when they do, domestic political aspects prevail over foreign policy ones. The Canadian press represents Italy as a country with a cultural and artistic past, an economic system that finds it difficult to adjust to globalisation and hence destined to decline, a corrupt political system and last, but not least, a society exhibiting many curious, and even bizarre, streaks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Italian security policy literature reveals, usually implicitly rather than explicitly, two distinct strains of analysis. One set of explanations, rooted in realist theory, views Italian foreign policy behaviour by reference to its power position. A second set of arguments, rooted in liberalism, assumes that policy-makers are ultimately influenced by domestic institutional factors in deciding foreign policy issues. The purpose of this article is to offer a theoretical contribution to the ongoing debate on continuity and change in Italian foreign policy. While neorealist and liberal theories have been widely used to explain the development of Italian international behaviour, neither approach has yet provided a full explanation of Italian security policy since the end of the Cold War. In contrast to these theories, it is argued that Italy has built its foreign policy on the basis of cultural considerations involving conflicting strategies of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews De Gasperi's foreign policy in the light of his recently published writings and speeches. Research has been carried out into the stages of his youth and his internal exile, seeking elements of continuity that would re-emerge later on in De Gasperi's policies as Foreign Minister, and his Atlantic and European policies. The key moments of De Gasperi's international political action, in particular the talks he took part in concerning the Italian Peace Treaty, membership of the Atlantic Pact and promotion of European integration, help to cast light on the characteristics of De Gasperi's political style. Above all, three elements are emphasised: responsibility, loyalty, and a capacity for renewal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines whether Italian foreign policy has undergone significant and substantial changes under the second Prodi government. The first part identifies the variables affecting continuity and change in a country's foreign policy and addresses the question of the conditions under which one can expect changes as a result of a change in government, and the conditions under which continuity is instead more likely. The second part looks at the second Prodi government's foreign policy on a number of topical issues, most of which were also faced by the Berlusconi government, to see to what extent the Prodi government's approach to foreign policy indeed changed from that of its predecessor. The article concludes that the Prodi government did not change Italian foreign policy in any substantial manner; differences existed only in the way the new government occasionally chose to present and justify its policies publicly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early 1990s Italy has been engaged in promoting peace and stability in the Balkans with a growing amount of political, economic and military resources. At the beginning of the process of Yugoslav dissolution, the Italian polity was torn apart by a set of political and financial scandals that prevented the development of an assertive foreign policy. Over time, however, Italy was able to play a more relevant and constructive role. This article traces Italy's policy towards the Balkans from its modest beginnings to the present day, focusing on four key political/economic events: the war in Bosnia, the Telekom Serbia affair, the war in Kosovo and the support given to the nascent Albanian democracy. Generally speaking, Italy has provided a positive, although modest, contribution to bringing peace and stability to the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims at studying the reasons for the new way of looking at the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by the Italian political world: the mutual recognition of Israel and the Vatican, the visit to Jerusalem by the leader of the formerly fascist party, Mr. Gianfranco Fini, and the beginnings of a movement of interest towards the Jewish State also within the political left. From a historical viewpoint, anti-Semitism in Italy found its origins in the Church's attitude toward the 'deicide people'. Beginning with WWI, to this position was added the worry that the Holy Places might fall under Jewish control. From those times dates the Holy See's evermore manifest liking for the Arab populations of Palestine. Nowadays the line of conduct of the Church has as its basic objective the defense of Christian minorities in the Middle East, and for this reason it maintains dialogues with all actors in the region. The weight of the Church influenced also the attitude of the Italian State, even though from its inception the latter had to make adjustments because of other international requirements. This multiple subordination caused the different republican governments to always keep an official equidistant stance among the conflicting parties in the Near East. Behind this apparent neutrality, however, the feelings of benevolence for the Arab countries and the Palestinians have gradually intensified. Italian leaders have been trying to conduct a Mediterranean policy on the borders of the Western alliance, and their feelings have been oriented in consequence. During the 1970s, the governments went as far as to conclude a secret pact with Palestinian terrorists, to avoid terror acts on the Peninsula in exchange for some freedom of action. And in the mid-eighties the Craxi government did not hesitate to challenge the US in order to guarantee the continuity of that line of conduct. On that occasion Craxi, speaking in Parliament, compared Arafat to Mazzini. The end of the Yalta-established order has modified the traditional data of Italian foreign policy. However, the increased attention paid to Israel has also other causes: the changed attitude of the Church after the civil war and the Syrian occupation in Lebanon, events which both caused difficulties for the consistent Christian minorities; the hope that the Oslo process could reward the Italian 'clear-sightedness'; last, but not least, the quarrelsome internal politics that make the Palestine conflict a mirror of the Roman conflicts. Lastly, the article connects the recent goodwill for Israel with the threats of Islamic terrorism in Italy. A political opinion trend would revisit the Middle Eastern conflict as the upturned perspective of a 'clash of civilizations' already existent nowadays. And a possible act of terrorism in Italy might give to this opinion a mass basis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]