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The ‘mineness’ of thoughts has often been accepted as indubitable in philosophy. However, the symptom of thought insertion in schizophrenia seems to be an empirical counterexample to the dictum that every introspected thought is one's own. We present a thorough conceptual analysis of mineness of thought, distinguishing between ownership and authorship (thought agency). We argue that it is indeed a conceptual truth that introspected thoughts are owned by the introspector. However, there are everyday and pathological cases of thoughts, for which we do not ascribe authorship to ourselves. To explain inserted thoughts, however, we need an additional factor which is constituted by the lack of control over inserted thoughts (as with intrusive thoughts in patients suffering from OCD). We present a review of empirical data on thought control and thought insertion in the light of the conceptual analysis. We conclude with a summary of the most important future direction of research.

How it is that one’s own thoughts can seem to be someone else’s? After noting some common missteps of other approaches to this puzzle, I develop a novel cognitive solution, drawing on and critiquing theories that understand inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia as stemming from mismatches between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Considerable attention is paid to forging links between the first-person phenomenology of thought insertion and the posits (e.g. efference copy, corollary discharge) of current cognitive theories. I show how deficits in the subconscious mechanisms regulating inner speech may lead to a ‘fractured phenomenology’ responsible for schizophrenic patients’ reports of inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations. Supporting work on virtual environments is discussed, and lessons concerning the fixity of delusional belief are drawn.

The comparator-model, originally developed to explain motor action, has recently been invoked to explain several aspects of the self. However, in the first place it may not be used to explain a basic self-world distinction because it presupposes one. Our alternative account is based on specific systematic covariation between action and perception. Secondly, the comparator model cannot explain the feeling of ownership of thoughts. We argue—contra Frith and Campbell—that thoughts are not motor processes and therefore cannot be described by the comparator-model. Rather, thoughts can be the triggering cause (intention) for actions. An alternative framework for the explanation of thought insertion in schizophrenics is presented.