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The tactical Network is one of the major components in DoD Global Information Grid (GIG). The key challenge of quality of service (QoS) management tactical networks is how to deal with negative factors that result from varying network capability demanding and a disadvantaged physical environment. These factors could include network mobility, dynamic network formation, unusual network protocol behaviors, communication channel fading, channel bandwidth fluctuation, as well as platform/application characteristics. This paper investigates the challenges of several well-known QoS management mechanisms in disadvantaged tactical network environments and provides some recommendations on the directions of mitigations and improvements.

The Department of Defense Global Information Grid - Bandwidth Extension (GIG-BE) initiative is to provide a resilient, omnipresent IP-based backbone with no bandwidth constraints. Due to the increased bandwidth demand both in the backbone and at the edge, the local area networks based on 1 and 10 Gigabit Ethernet are viable contenders for the military communication applications, including installation on mobile platforms, and for C4ISR traffic. Unlike conventional LANs that operate in a building/campus controlled environment, the mobile LANs often operate in adverse environment. Temperature fluctuations, mechanical shocks and vibrations, and other environmental factors may affect the link performance and availability. In this paper we use simulation tools to investigate the robustness of the Gigabit Ethernet links in military mobile environments and present the simulation results for system performance variations due to various environmental factors that can adversely affect data transmission characteristics.

The robust and reliable Global Information Grid (GIG) incurs in significant overhead and latency to support its architecture and protocol services. At the same time, mission critical tactical `Edge' networks must seamlessly interface with Tier 3 GIG networks while maintaining deterministic functionality and low latency communications. Isolation between the Edge networks and the GIG's network overhead is critical as it results in improved mission effectiveness. The Boeing Company has defined a GIG Edge network interface architecture to seamlessly interconnect these networks and the GIG. It defines a gateway between a GIG Edge network and current and future military and government networks, information management systems and applications. Our gateway provides for addressing and routing, information assurance, end-to-end QoS, and network services to and across the Edge network. It enables interfacing with Tier 3 networks supporting IGP OSPFv3, provides protocol translation functionality and proxy functions on behalf of active Edge network nodes, supports DiffServ mapping for packet transmissions and IntServ/RSVP-based QoS provisioning for time critical applications, and supports tactical Information Management (IM) services such as data dissemination, QoS, and topology management.

The effort described here is a result of the joint venture between MILSATCOM Systems Wing (MCSW) and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) to demonstrate end to end integration between Transformational Satellite (TSAT) and Defense Information Systems Network(DISN). This paper represents analysis preliminary to the development and execution of technical assessments related to TSAT/DISN peering. The TSAT Global Information Grid (GIG) Border Element (TGBE) is the main gateway between the TSAT and DISN for both circuit and packet traffic. The TSAT network provides satellite communications as part of a global, integrated communications network that enables communications for mobile terrestrial or airborne warfighters. The DISN provides voice, video, transport and IP services with a high-capacity terrestrial network consisting ofrouters and optical switches. The paper will first describe relevant aspects of the TSAT and DISN Architectures in Sections II and III respectively. Then in Section IV, we will describe the TGBE and its role in interconnecting the TSAT Network and the DISN Transport and IP Networks. The paper focuses on establishing a peering relationship between the TGBE and corresponding DISN elements. Key aspects of this peering point will be discussed covering areas such as circuit services, SONET synchronization, routing, QoS, traffic engineering, service level agreements, information assurance, network timing and application layer adaptation.

The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is a core transformational program within the Department of Defense (DoD), critical to extending the Global Information Grid (GIG) to the tactical edge. The Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) was established in 2005 to manage the development of JTRS. One of the JPEO's assigned responsibilities was to expand the approach to systems engineering across the JTRS Enterprise. This paper outlines some of the engineering processes and approaches instituted by the JPEO in the development of JTRS.

With the increased requirements for SIPRNET and JWICS access, secure network connectivity has become increasingly pervasive throughout the Department of Defense. The increased deployment of secure networks has resulted in an evolution of secure network architectures and the Information Assurance methods and tools used to protect them. Specifically, new technological advances in the ability to monitor and protect fiber optic cables and connections possess huge potential for cost savings and enhanced protection of critical networks and C4ISR facilities. With the accelerated development and deployment of C4ISR applications on the Global Information Grid, warfighters are developing a strategic dependence upon the availability and integrity of secure networks. While encryption has been used for decades to protect the confidentiality and non-repudiation of national security information (NSI), encryption alone provides no coverage or protection against threats to network availability and integrity. Through recent developments in intrinsic fiber monitoring technology, critical connections can now be proactively monitored to detect any threats or physical attacks on the network WITHOUT degrading network performance or restricting network bandwidth. Using the principles of the Defense in Depth strategy, intrinsic fiber monitoring provides a very agile and scalable protection methodology that can be used by itself or in combination with cryptographic equipment to provide the required protection of classified networks and the ability to withstand the ever-increasing threats to the networks.

Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is a new way of operating a network system, and as with all new technologies, it comes with its share of challenges. Of particular difficulty is the challenge of securing a service-oriented system. Due to the intentionally decentralized nature of this system, data flows in all directions and needs to be protected at all times. Additionally, to implement access control it must be first defined somewhere, and the rest of the system needs to be aware of the rules and respect them. Since there are many resources in such a system, it becomes cumbersome to require users to authenticate themselves every time they attempt to access a new resource. "Single Sign On" (SSO) functionality, where a user's credentials are promulgated throughout the Global Information Grid (GIG) to reach all desired services, is a desirable capability but problematic. Additionally, in an SOA all of these security functions are implemented in XML, which brings its own set of problems. This paper will address the security challenges for a SOA. We will describe the problems stemming from the fact that XML is not inherently secure, resulting in special vulnerabilities in the security protocols. We will present strategies for mitigating these vulnerabilities to defend against replay attacks, encryption problems and policy considerations.

The Global Information Grid (GIG) is a large and complex undertaking that is intended to integrate virtually all of the information systems, services, and applications in the US Department of Defense (DoD) into one seamless, reliable, and secure network. In order to achieve the GIG vision of ubiquitous and reliable communications, the GIG will need to support mobility, security and survivability over a core infrastructure built from components of different services and organizations within the US. This paper defines a number of concepts associated with the GIG and discusses two architectural options for constructing the core of the GIG: the striped core and the black core. In all cases, we assume traffic flows are protected in the core using IPsec or similar protocols. While a striped network simplifies the interconnection of core component by making traffic visible at the interconnection point, decrypting and re-encrypting to allow interconnection of core components complicates the end-to-end problem of IPsec gateway discovery, of network routing and of quality of service. As well, decrypting at intermediate nodes compromises the protection of traffic afforded by end-to-end IPsec encryption. We show by example that a black core provides greater flexibility in exploiting network connectivity than a striped core.

TIPSOTS provides a roadmap to transform existing link-based satellite networks into IP-based networks as part of integration into the Global Information Grid (GIG). TIPSOTS provides a Net-Centric operational capabilities using IP-packet switched bandwidth-on-demand based architecture. TIPSOTS architecture defines the various components that makeup the Wideband network and control in addition to developing standards for shared access IP modems for use over existing satellites including the Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS). TIPSOTS Services address capabilities needed for layer 3, the IP-packet layer, as IP-based networks require management above and beyond the capabilities of a layer 2 network. Such requirements, similar to those envisioned by the Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program, include demand assigned multiple access, QoS-based allocation of resources and constellation wide improvements in utilization through integrated network management. Additionally, the Army requires communication on the move (COTM) as part of their vision for "total information dominance".

The U. S. Department of Defense (DoD) is in the initial phase of building the Global Information Grid (GIG), a private secure internetwork connecting a number of its joint and service-specific IP networks. Two of these networks are the Automated Digital Network System (ADNS) and the Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT). ADNS provides network services and entry into the Defense Information System Network (DISN) for U.S. Navy ships, submarines and shore facilities. ADNS is the Navy's primary tactical wide area network (WAN) and intends to provide optimal use of the bandwidth assigned by the system to Unclassified, Secret, Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), and Joint and Coalition networks. TSAT provides the space-based backbone transport segment of the future DISN. It is a joint, global network of geo-synchronous satellites and IP-enabled terminals. The interface between TSAT and the ADNS system represents a variation of the traditional provider-customer relationship developed in the commercial sector.

This paper presents a methodology that is designed to assess and analyze tactical communications networks to determine whether or not they are in compliance with DoD guidance regarding network centric warfare. The methodology is part of the Department of Defense (DoD) capability-focused, effects-based, Information Technology (IT) and National Security System (NSS) interoperability process. The focus of the paper is on the assessment and analysis phase of this process. The Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T) is used as an example to illustrate the methodology. The WIN-T program establishes a single integrating net-centric framework to design, develop, produce, and field the Army tactical Global Information Grid (GIG). Challenges faced by WIN-T in conducting tactical communications in a Net-Centric Environment (NCE) are described and WIN-T's solutions to those challenges are presented. A conclusion is drawn that support for the net-centric warfare concept requires the development of an integrated Operational, Systems, Technical, and All Views architecture that adequately addresses all internal and external system information exchanges. It is essential that this architecture be employed and updated throughout all phases of system development and refinement.

The Global Information Grid (GIG), is a large and complex undertaking that is intended to integrate virtually all DoD information systems, services, and applications into one seamless, reliable, and secure network. The GIG Transport Segment will be comprised of multiple different network types, each implementing a QoS solution that best fits the network's user needs. Each QoS solution implements different QoS mechanisms across the data, control, and management functional planes and may be reliant on network hardware that is not implemented GIG-wide. Interoperability challenges between these different QoS solutions need to be documented and analyzed to facilitate the delivery of traffic end-to-end across multiple GIG networks. This paper will provide an overview of the GIG Transport Segment, describe network-to-network interface connections, categorize different types of QoS solutions that are being applied to GIG networks, and discuss inter-domain challenges associated with interconnecting these types of solutions.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has immediate and critical need for differentiated services for voice, video and data with the plannedphase out of Defense Information System Agency (DISA) Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) service. The DoD requirements are unique, they comprise highly granular precedence requirements in addition to exacting service differentiation. This is an immensely complex environment given that hundreds of heterogeneous network domains and mixed data flows exist in the Global Information Grid (GIG). This paper examines a practical, scalable, prioritized delivery model that comprises a two-tier concept for differentiated services. It provides rationale for not using dynamic, signaled resource reservation mechanism for guaranteeing services. In the proposed model, all GIG traffic is classified into two basic priority categories, first, the high-priority traffic, this cannot be subject to any Quality of Service (QoS) mechanism that will hinder its prioritized delivery across the network and second, all other traffic, this latter traffic can be subject to QoS mechanisms for service differentiation and resulting delivery. Finally, it is noted that the findings of this analysis may have implications for the design of networks on the Internet at large.

The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) family of radios will provide networking capability across the Department of Defense (DoD) by hosting networking waveforms designed to their intended operating environments. Additional networking functionality beyond what the service acquisitions and waveforms are currently developing will be required within JTRS to provide interconnectivity among the networked waveforms and with the other Global Information Grid (GIG) components (e.g. WIN-T). The JTRS family must provide a common IP convergence layer for all hosted networked waveforms. In this paper, we will present the JTRS Common Network Services (CNS) as a solution for this seamless interoperability in the JTRS. CNS provides interoperability by interconnecting disparate waveform networks at the IP layer. This will allow the military to plan and execute joint missions that deploy a wide variety of platforms, weapons systems and surveillance equipment, across services and with waveforms designed for their specific operating environments. In contrast to waveforms that operate at layer 1, 2 and sometimes at layer 3, CNS operates at layer 3 and above. This paper will describe the CNS and discuss challenging aspects of their implementation in a network environment of constantly moving platforms.