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A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system is studied with unknown parasitic DC-voltage sources at both Alice's and Bob's ends. This paper is the generalization of our earlier investigation with a single-end parasitic source. Under the assumption that Eve does not know the values of the parasitic sources, a new attack, utilizing the current generated by the parasitic dc-voltage sources, is introduced. The attack is mathematically analyzed and demonstrated by computer simulations. Simple defense methods against the attack are shown. The earlier defense method based solely on the comparison of current/voltage data at Alice's and Bob's terminals is useless here since the wire currents and voltages are equal at both ends. However, the more expensive version of the earlier defense method, which is based on in-situ system simulation and comparison with measurements, works efficiently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme offers unconditional security, how- ever it can approach the perfect security limit only in the case when the practical system's parameters approach the ideal behavior of its core circuitry. In the case of non-ideal features, non-zero information leak is present. The study of such leaks is important for a proper design of practical KLJN systems and their privacy amplifications in order to eliminate these problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main points of the UPoN-2018 talk and some valuable comments from the Audience are briefly summarized. The talk surveyed the major issues with the notion of zero-point thermal noise in resistors and its visibility; moreover it gave some new arguments. The new arguments support the old view of Kleen that the known measurement data "showing" zero-point Johnson noise are instrumental artifacts caused by the energy-time uncertainty principle. We pointed out that, during the spectral analysis of blackbody radiation, another uncertainty principle is relevant, that is, the location-momentum uncertainty principle that causes only the widening of spectral lines instead of the zero-point noise artifact. This is the reason why the Planck formula is correctly confirmed by the blackbody radiation experiments. Finally a conjecture about the zero-point noise spectrum of wide-band amplifiers is shown, but that is yet to be tested experimentally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recent IEEE Access Paper by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) proposed a new transient attack against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system. The attack is valid, but it is easy to build a defense for the KLJN system. Here we note that GAA's paper contains several invalid statements regarding security measures and the continuity of functions in classical physics. These deficiencies are clarified in our present paper, wherein we also emphasize that a new version of the KLJN system is immune against all existing attacks, including the one by GAA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical/physical secure key exchange system based on the laws of classical statistical physics to provide unconditional security. We used the LTSPICE industrial cable and circuit simulator to emulate one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the current injection attack, against the ideal and a practical KLJN system, respectively. We show that two security enhancement techniques, namely, the instantaneous voltage/current comparison method, and a simple privacy amplification scheme, independently and effectively eliminate the information leak and successfully preserve the system's unconditional security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce two new Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution schemes which are generalizations of the original KLJN scheme. The first of these, the Random-Resistor (RR-) KLJN scheme, uses random resistors with values chosen from a quasi-continuum set. It is well-known since the creation of the KLJN concept that such a system could work in cryptography, because Alice and Bob can calculate the unknown resistance value from measurements, but the RR-KLJN system has not been addressed in prior publications since it was considered impractical. The reason for discussing it now is the second scheme, the Random Resistor Random Temperature (RRRT-) KLJN key exchange, inspired by a recent paper of Vadai, Mingesz and Gingl, wherein security was shown to be maintained at non-zero power flow. In the RRRT-KLJN secure key exchange scheme, both the resistances and their temperatures are continuum random variables. We prove that the security of the RRRT-KLJN scheme can prevail at a non-zero power flow, and thus the physical law guaranteeing security is not the Second Law of Thermodynamics but the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem. Alice and Bob know their own resistances and temperatures and can calculate the resistance and temperature values at the other end of the communication channel from measured voltage, current and power-flow data in the wire. However, Eve cannot determine these values because, for her, there are four unknown quantities while she can set up only three equations. The RRRT-KLJN scheme has several advantages and makes all former attacks on the KLJN scheme invalid or incomplete. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the effectiveness of determining gas concentrations by using a prototype WO3 resistive gas sensor together with fluctuation enhanced sensing. We have earlier demonstrated that this method can determine the composition of a gas mixture by using only a single sensor. In the present study, we apply Least-Squares Support-Vector-Machine-based (LS-SVM-based) nonlinear regression to determine the gas concentration of each constituent in a mixture. We confirmed that the accuracy of the estimated gas concentration could be significantly improved by applying temperature change and ultraviolet irradiation of the WO3 layer. Fluctuation-enhanced sensing allowed us to predict the concentration of both component gases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]