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Drawing on Harrod, Kalecki and Kaldor, this paper seeks to revive the view that ceteris paribus firms reduce investment if they have already built up high capacities relative to their assessment of the normal potential of their markets. This reaction introduces a fundamental stabilizing mechanism into the economy. The paper adapts the idea to a growth context and applies it to the neo‐Kaleckian baseline model with its Harrodian instability. It demonstrates that, in principle, a sufficiently strong feedback could stabilize the steady state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper explores the matrix demand multiplier in Sraffian frameworks and shows that it involves an autonomous demand‐transfer payments curve, which exhibits formal similarities with the well‐known consumption (wage)‐growth (profit) curve in steady‐state capital and growth theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT This paper explains the existence of intersectoral wage differential in a developing economy in terms of trade union behavior in the formal sector industry and analyzes its role in predicting the outcomes of trade and investment reforms on welfare. It provides theoretical explanations of certain real life phenomena e.g. why the developing countries are yearning for foreign capital despite the standard immiserizing result and why these countries are not reducing the tariff rates beyond certain levels although they have chosen free trade as their development strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that Harrodian instability is an instance of what Hicks in his book Capital and Growth (1965) called static instability, related to the direction (and not to the intensity) of the disequilibrium adjustment process. We show why such instability obtains in demand‐led growth models in which the ratio of capacity creating private investment to output ratio is given exogenously by the aggregate marginal propensity to save. We also show that Sraffian Supermultiplier model overcomes the Harrodian instability and that its demand‐led equilibrium is statically stable. It is explained that the latter results do not follow from the presence of autonomous non‐capacity creating expenditure component as such but from its presence within a model in which investment is driven by the capital stock adjustment principle (i.e., the flexible accelerator). Finally, we argue that, although being statically stable, the equilibrium growth path of the Sraffian Supermultiplier model can be dynamically stable or unstable depending on the intensity of the reaction of investment to demand. We then provide a discrete time sufficient condition for the dynamic stability of such equilibrium that implies that the marginal propensity to invest remains lower than the marginal propensity to save during the adjustment process, a modified Keynesian stability condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This rejoinder is a rebuttal of the claims made by Dávila‐Fernández, Oreiro, and Punzo (in press) in their comment on Lavoie (). All three points that they make are mistaken: I did not pretend that the introduction of autonomous noncapacity expenditures would on its own allow the neo‐Kaleckian growth model to converge toward the normal rate of capacity utilization; the 'Keynesian' message is not eliminated when investment expenditures are essentially induced in a neo‐Kaleckian model; and the equations that they provide to endogenize the normal rate of capacity utilization are meaningless. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following an analysis of the relation between a standard Steindlian model of stagnation and Steindl’s own analysis, we modify the standard model by introducing endogenous changes in the mark-up and a reformulation of the investment function. These extensions, which address significant weaknesses of the standard model, find support in Steindl’s writing and leave intact some of Steindl’s key results. In a further extension, we add a labour market and analyse the stabilizing influence of a Marxian reserve-army mechanism. The implications of the extended model for the effects of increased oligopolization are largely in line with Steindl’s predictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]