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What does science tell us about memory phenomena such as false and repressed memories? This issue is highly pressing as incorrect knowledge about these memory phenomena might contribute to egregious effects in the courtroom such as false accusations of abuse. In the current article, we provide a succinct review of the scientific nature of false and repressed memories. We demonstrate that research has shown that about 30% of tested subjects formed false memories of autobiographical experiences. Furthermore, this empirical work has also revealed that such false memories can even be implanted for negative events and events that allegedly occurred repeatedly. Concerning the controversial topic of repressed memories, we show that plausible alternative explanations exist for why people claim to have forgotten traumatic experiences; explanations that do not require special memory mechanisms such as the unconscious blockage of traumatic memories. Finally, we demonstrate that people continue to believe that unconscious repression of traumatic incidents can exist. Disseminating scientifically articulated knowledge on the functioning of memory to contexts such as the courtroom is necessary as to prevent the occurrence of false accusations and miscarriages of justice. ispartof: MEMORY vol:30 issue:1 pages:16-21 ispartof: location:England status: published

In the current experiments, we attempted to elicit nonbelieved memories (NBMs) using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm. Furthermore, by using this approach, we explored the consequences of nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants received several DRM wordlists and were presented with a recognition task. After the recognition task, participants' statements were contradicted by giving them feedback about true and false items. In this way, we succeeded in eliciting nonbelieved true and false memories. In Experiment 2, participants were also involved in a modified perceptual closure task after receiving belief-relevant feedback. In this task, participants received degraded visual representations of words (e.g., false and true) that became clearer over time. Participants had to identify them as fast as possible. We also measured dissociation, compliance, and social desirability. We found that undermining belief had contrasting consequences for true and false memories. That is, nonbelieved true memories were identified more slowly whereas nonbelieved false memories were identified more quickly. We did not find any relation between our individual differences measures and the formation of NBMs.

One vexing problem that many researchers face when attempting to publish their research in prominent, peer-reviewed scientific journals is that data are more likely to be published when they reveal...

One of the problems facing all scientific disciplines nowadays is the general requirement that in order to be published in prominent peer-reviewed outlets, the data being presented must contain sta...

It is without question that our memory system evolved through a process of natural selection. However, basic research into the evolutionary foundations of memory has begun in earnest only recently. This is quite peculiar as the majority, perhaps even all, of memory research relates to whether memory is adaptive or not. In this Special Issue of Memory we have assembled a variety of papers that represent the cutting edge in research on the evolution of memory. These papers are centred on issues about the ultimate and proximate explanations of memory, the development of the adaptive functions of memory, as well as the positive consequences that arise from the current evolutionary form that our memory has taken. In this introductory article we briefly outline these different areas and indicate why they are vital for a more complete theory of memory. Further we argue that, by adopting a more applied stance in the area of the evolution of memory, one of the many future directions in this field could be a new branch of psychology that addresses questions in evolutionary legal psychology.

In the first part of this article, I describe a variety of cases that I have been involved with that led to my becoming an expert witness. These cases range from questions about children’s memory for being raped, to remembering an ear-witnessed murder, to preventing future false memories. In the second part of this article, I reflect on some of the remarkable feats of remembering that complainants exhibit in court, ones that contradict much of what the scientific study of memory has shown to be true. Along the way, I argue that until this scientific knowledge becomes part of a “culture of memory” familiar to triers of fact (judges, jurors), police, and laypeople, memory experts will continue to be an inexorable part of the legal process when memory serves as the main or only evidence.

Across five experiments we examined the role of valence in children's and adults' true and false memories. Using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm and either neutral or negative-emotional lists, both adults' (Experiment 1) and children's (Experiment 2) true recall and recognition was better for neutral than negative items, and although false recall was also higher for neutral items, false recognition was higher for negative items. The last three experiments examined adults' (Experiment 3) and children's (Experiments 4 and 5) 1-week long-term recognition of neutral and negative-emotional information. The results replicated the immediate recall and recognition findings from the first two experiments. More important, these experiments showed that although true recognition decreased over the 1-week interval, false recognition of neutral items remained unchanged whereas false recognition of negative-emotional items increased. These findings are discussed in terms of theories of emotion and memory as well as their forensic implications.

The effects of associative strength on rates of 7- and 11-year-old children's true and false memories were examined when category and Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists were used to cue the same critical lure. Backward associative strength (BAS) was varied such that the category and DRM lists had the same strength (DRM=category), DRM lists had more BAS (DRM>category), or category lists had more BAS (DRM

We are pleased to announce that Professor Mark L. Howe, Department of Psychology, University of Lancaster, UK, has joined the journal and taken the post of joint Editor with Martin A. Conway. Mark ...