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We develop an empirical model of the market for mobile services in the USA based on providers' response functions. Guided by a duopoly model, we obtain our empirical response functions from an approximation of quarterly response data on smartphone subscriptions by sigmoid functions of time. The robustness analysis suggests that our model fits the data well and outperforms the regression model. Further, we demonstrate that our empirical response functions satisfy the conditions for semi-cyclic contractions which guarantee the existence, uniqueness and stability of long-run equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We studied a supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers and multiple retailers. We use the Cournot–Stackelberg game, the Market–Stackelberg game, and the Market–Nash game to simulate the situation where the upstream seller's market dominance power gradually decreases while the downstream buyer's market power increases. The equilibrium decision and supply chain performance under the three models are compared and analyzed, as well as their responses to external market changes such as demand fluctuation and market competition intensity. The research shows that (1) in a seller-dominated supply chain, the increase in buyer power reduces market equilibrium production and wholesale price; (2) in the face of strong demand fluctuations, equivalent power between upstream and downstream can contribute to the stabilization of production and wholesale prices; (3) when market demand fluctuation is small, market power brings a higher profit level, and supply chain participants would like to actively compete for market power. However, when the demand fluctuates greatly, the profit advantage brought by market dominance is no longer significant, and there is no need to spend much to fight for market dominance; (4) the fierce competition of upstream suppliers will induce upstream to give up the competition for market dominance, and make the market power less attractive to downstream retailers. While the fierce horizontal competition downstream will stimulate both suppliers and retailers to actively compete for market power, (5) sufficient market competition will improve total supply chain profit, so encouraging competition is conducive to the overall economic development of society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the monopolistic competition model of Dixit–Stiglitz–Krugman with additive separable utility and transport costs of "iceberg types". The production costs are not necessary linear. We study two concepts: market equilibrium and social optimality. There are well-known facts in the closed economy under monopolistic competition: (1) "in market equilibrium, the elasticity of revenue equals the elasticity of total costs" and (2) "in social optimality, the elasticity of utility equals the elasticity of total costs". Moreover, earlier Prof. Sergey Kokovin (HSE University, Russia) generated the idea that (3) "the search for equilibrium is equivalent to the problem of optimization, but revenue, not utility". For the case of several countries, it turns out that facts (1) and (2) and prediction (3) remain mostly true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The uniqueness of equilibrium in bargaining games with three or more players is a problem preventing bargaining theory from general real world applications. We study the uniqueness of bargaining equilibrium in a bargaining game of two sellers and two buyers, which has instances in real-world markets. Each seller (or buyer) wants to reach an agreement with a buyer (or seller) on the division of a pie in the bargaining game. A seller and a buyer will receive their agreed divisions if they can reach an agreement. Otherwise, they receive nothing. The bargaining game includes a finite number of rounds. In each round, a player can propose an offer or accept an offer. Each player has a constant discounting factor. Under the assumption of complete information, we prove that the equilibrium of this bargaining game is the same division of two pies. The ratio of division as a function of the discount factors of all players is also deduced. The result can be extended to a bargaining game of n-sellers and n-buyers, which reveals the relevance of bargaining equilibrium to the general equilibrium of a market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated the existence and uniqueness of coupled best proximity points for some cyclic and semi-cyclic maps in a reflexive Banach space. We found sufficient conditions, ensuring the existence of coupled best proximity points in reflexive Banach spaces and some convexity types of conditions, ensuring uniqueness of the coupled best proximity points in strictly convex Banach spaces. We illustrate the results with examples and we present an application of one of the theorems in the modeling of duopoly markets, to have an existence of market equilibrium. We show that, in general, the iterative sequences can have chaotic behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we tested the benefit of using Markov-Switching (M-S) models to forecast the views of the 26 most traded stocks in the US in a Black–Litterman (B–L) optimal selection context. With weekly historical data of these stocks from 1 January 1980, we estimated and simulated (from 7 January 2000, to 7 February 2022) three portfolios that used M-S views in each stock and blended them with the market equilibrium views in a B–L context. Our position was that the B–L optimal portfolios could generate alpha (extra return) against a buy-and-hold and an actively managed portfolio with sample portfolio parameters (à la Markowitz, SampP). Our results suggest that the outperformance of the B–L managed portfolios holds only in the short term. In the long-term, the performance of the B–L portfolios, the SampP, and the market portfolio are statistically equal in terms of returns or their mean–variance efficiency in an ex-ante or ex-post analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]