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We analyze a hand-collected sample of bribery cases from around the world to describe how the payment of bribes affects shareholder value. The net present value of a bribe conditional on getting caught is close to zero for the median firm in our sample. However, controlling for industry, country, and firm characteristics, a $1 increase in the size of the bribe is associated with an ex ante $6–$9 increase in the value of the firm, suggesting a correlation between the size of bribes and the size of available benefits. Proxies for information disclosure appear significant in explaining these benefits with more disclosure associated with lower benefits. However, this result is driven by democratic countries where bribe-paying firms receive smaller benefits relative to the bribes they pay. Information disclosure is not significant in autocratic countries. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

Corporations often transact in their own mispriced stock. This activity, known as equity market timing, can generate substantial profits and increase the long-term stock price. We challenge a closely related popular view that market timing always benefits firm shareholders. Opportunistic financing maneuvers by a firm can negatively affect its uninformed stock owners because of adverse selection and the change in the firm’s short-term price, whereas the long-term returns do not accumulate to departing stockholders. The negative effect of market timing on stockholders increases with the share turnover. Furthermore, the effect of timing is asymmetric: shareholders prefer that the firm corrects underpricing rather than overpricing. Our theory can be used to better interpret the observed stock issuance and repurchase activities of firms. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

We investigate the impact of a firm’s compensation consultant choice on executive compensation by examining shifts in consultant choice stemming from a 2009 U.S. Securities Exchange Commission requirement that firms disclose fees paid to compensation consultants for both consulting and other services. We show that the disclosure rule change acted as a separating device distinguishing firms likely to have used compensation consultants to extract rents from shareholders from firms that were likely to have used consultants to optimally set pay. We conclude that not all multiservice consultants are conflicted, while not all specialist consultants are guardians of shareholder value. Our study provides a more nuanced view of the association between compensation consultant choices and executive pay. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.

I examine the dynamics of oligopolies when firms derive subjective value from market leadership. In equilibrium, prices alternate in tandem between high levels and occasional price wars, which take place when market leadership is at stake. The stationary distribution of market shares is typically multimodal; that is, much of the time, there is a stable market leader. Even though shareholders do not value market leadership per se, a corporate culture that values market leadership may increase shareholder value. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2725 . This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.

This study examines 171 brand licensing announcements and subsequent changes in the licensor firms' shareholder values using the event study method. We find that although brand licensing announcements lead to positive abnormal returns on average, nearly 44% of the announcements in our sample are followed by negative abnormal returns. We argue that investors react more favorably to a brand licensing announcement when they believe (i) the brand has greater ability to stimulate licensee product sales (and thus generate higher royalties for the licensor) and (ii) the licensor firm has greater ability to limit licensee opportunism (and thus limit brand dilution and its adverse effect on sales of other products marketed under the brand name). In line with our hypotheses related to a brand's ability to stimulate licensee product sales, the study's findings suggest that investors react more favorably to announcements involving brands with greater brand fit and greater brand breadth. However, investors appear to react less favorably to announcements involving brands with higher advertising investments. In line with our hypotheses related to a licensor firm's ability to limit licensee opportunism, the study's findings suggest that investors react more favorably to announcements involving larger licensors; however, investors' reactions do not appear to be influenced by licensor firms' licensing experience. This paper was accepted by Pradeep Chintagunta, marketing.

One central business activity that companies increasingly outsource is the information systems (IS) function. Previous research has shown that outsourcing of back-office IS generally has a positive effect on shareholder value of the outsourcing firm. Much less is known about the performance implications of outsourcing of another important IS function, namely, front-office customer relationship management (CRM) systems, where the vendor uses its own personnel and software to perform several CRM tasks. Previous, largely anecdotal evidence shows that the performance implications of outsourcing CRM range from very negative to very positive. To address this unsatisfactory state of knowledge, we provide and empirically test a contingency perspective on the performance implications of outsourcing CRM processes. We do so using the event-study methodology. The results are largely consistent with our contingency model. CRM outsourcing is more beneficial to firms that are high on information technology capabilities and low on marketing capabilities, and less beneficial when it concerns presales CRM. Similarly, although vendor economic distance has a positive influence on the outsourcing firm's shareholder value, vendor cultural distance has a negative influence. These effects are in turn significantly moderated by the type of CRM process outsourced. This paper was accepted by Sandra Slaughter, information systems.

Various commentators have praised the WorldCom and Enron settlements for holding outside directors personally liable, arguing that heightened director liability will induce greater board oversight. This paper shows that the connection between director liability and board behavior is more subtle, because directors have multiple means to respond to an increase in liability exposure: They can increase oversight to prevent accounting manipulation and/or reduce performance-based CEO pay to mitigate the CEO's ex ante incentive to engage in manipulation. These two decisions are interrelated, implying that the effects of director liability on board oversight and CEO incentive pay are ambiguous. In particular, the model predicts that, for firms in which board oversight is difficult and costly (e.g., large firms with complex business operations), a stricter legal environment for directors leads to a lower level of board oversight, lower CEO incentive pay, and lower shareholder value.

Interorganizational alliances are widely recognized as critical to product innovation, particularly in high-technology markets. Many new product development (NPD) alliances tend to be asymmetric, that is, they are formed between a larger firm and a smaller firm. As is the case with alliances in general, asymmetric alliances also typically result in changes in the shareholder values of the partner firms. Are the changes in shareholder values of the partner firms significant? Are asymmetric NPD alliances win-win or win-lose partnerships? Are the gains or losses symmetric for the larger and smaller partner firms? What factors drive the changes in shareholder values of the partner firms? These important questions remain largely unexplored as evidenced by the dearth of empirical research on the effect of asymmetric NPD alliances on shareholder value and on the apportionment of this value between the partner firms. We develop and empirically test a model of short-term changes in shareholder values of larger and smaller firms involved in NPD alliances, using the event study methodology on data covering 167 asymmetric alliances in the information technology and communication industries. In this model, we examine alliance, firm, and partner characteristics as potential determinants of the changes in shareholder values of the partner firms due to an NPD alliance announcement. Our model accounts for selection correction, potential cross-correlation across the residuals from the models of firm value changes for the larger and smaller firms, and unobserved heterogeneity. The results suggest that both the partners experience significant short-term financial gains, but there are considerable asymmetries between the larger and smaller firms with regard to the effects of alliance, partner, and firm characteristics on the gains of the partner firms. The results relating to alliance characteristics suggest that while a broad scope alliance enhances the financial gains for the larger firm, a scale R&D alliance (relative to a link alliance) contributes positively to the financial gains for the smaller firm. With regard to partner characteristics, while partner alliance experience positively influences the financial gains for the larger firm, it has no significant effect on the financial returns for the smaller firm. Further, partner innovativeness is positively associated with the financial gains for the larger firm, but partner reputation is unrelated to the financial gains of the smaller firm. Regarding firm characteristics, the magnitude of the financial gains accruing from a firm’s own alliance experience is considerably higher for the smaller firm than it is for the larger firm. We outline the implications of the research findings for future research and management practice.

This paper investigates a market-valuation-based hypothesis for employee stock options (ESOs). It examines how market valuation has affected the decision to grant ESOs, the amount of options granted, and the distribution of options among executives and rank-and-file employees. I find strong empirical evidence that firms with high market valuation and high probability of future overvaluation are more likely to adopt ESOs and grant more options to their employees. Furthermore, when top executives perceive the current market valuation is high, they grant a smaller portion of options to themselves relative to rank-and-file employees. All these results are consistent with the theoretical predictions from the model of Zhang (2002), which argues that ESOs can be used as a method to sell overvalued equity.

This paper documents the long-run stock price performance of firms with effective Total Quality Management (TQM) programs. The winning of quality awards is used as a proxy for effective TQM implementation. We compare stock price performance of award winners against various matched control groups for a five-year implementation period and a five-year postimplementation period. During the implementation period there is no difference in the stock price performance, but during the postimplementation period award winners significantly outperform firms in the various control groups. Depending on the control group used, the mean outperformance ranges from 38% to 46%. Our results clearly indicate that effective implementation of TQM principles and philosophies leads to significant wealth creation. Furthermore, our results should alleviate many of the concerns regarding the value of quality award systems. Overall, these systems are valuable in terms of recognizing TQM firms and promoting awareness of TQM.