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This natural field experiment tests the effects of purely symbolic awards on volunteer retention in a public goods context. The experiment is conducted at Wikipedia, which faces declining editor retention rates, particularly among newcomers. Randomization assures that award receipt is orthogonal to previous performance. The analysis reveals that awards have a sizeable effect on newcomer retention, which persists over the four quarters following the initial intervention. This is noteworthy for indicating that awards for volunteers can be effective even if they have no impact on the volunteers’ future career opportunities. The awards are purely symbolic, and the status increment they produce is limited to the recipients’ pseudonymous online identities in a community they have just recently joined. The results can be explained by enhanced self-identification with the community, but they are also in line with recent findings on the role of status and reputation, recognition, and evaluation potential in online communities. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2540 . This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.

We conduct a large-scale natural field experiment with a Fortune 500 company to test several light-touch approaches to attract minorities to high-profile positions. A total of 5,000 prospective applicants were randomized into treatments that vary a small portion of recruiting materials. We find that self-selection at two early-career stages exhibits a substantial race gap. We then show that this gap can be strongly influenced by several treatments, with some closing the race gap and increasing application rates of minorities by 40% and others being particularly effective for minority women. These effects are not accompanied by any declines in application rates of majority group job seekers. In addition, we do not find that endorsing the "business case" for diversity reduces the race gap or raises application rates by minorities or women. The heterogeneities we find by gender, race, and career stage shed light on the underlying drivers of self-selection barriers among minorities. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: The authors thank the Brigham Young University College of Family, Home, and Social Science for generous research support. This research was funded in part by the Lowe Institute of Political Economy at Claremont McKenna College as well as the Australian Research Council Future Fellowship grant Nr. 190100252. Christina Rott thanks the School of Business and Economics, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, for research support through the Hermine Weijland Fellowship. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4909. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the behavior of an individual avoiding peer information from a natural field experiment of charity crowdfunding. The unique experimental design enables us to employ an instrumental variable strategy to identify how the behavior influences individual giving to and promotion of charity campaigns. We find that, even with free access, 89% of individuals chose not to seek peer information. These individuals were less likely, whereas their peers were more likely to give and help promote in the past. The behavior would reduce the total distribution of campaigns by 8.5% and the total donation amount by 7.7%. A stylized model is used to illustrate how the pressure from peer comparison drives the individuals not to seek the information and how this behavior could influence giving and promoting behaviors of a group of marginal individuals. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: The project was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72103110]. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4807. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a large-scale natural field experiment, we partnered with a microlending company in Kyrgyzstan that asked over 180,000 of its clients for donations to social projects as a form of corporate philanthropy. In a 2 × 2 design, we explored two main (preregistered) hypotheses about giving by the poor. First, based on a conjecture that the poor are more price sensitive than the rich and in contrast to previous studies, we hypothesize that matching incentives induce crowding in of out-of-pocket donations. Second, we hypothesize that our population cares about their proximity to the charitable project. We find evidence in favor of the former hypothesis but not the latter. Previous studies of charitable giving focus on middle- or high-income earners in Western countries, neglecting the poor, although the lowest-income groups are often shown to contribute substantial shares of their income to charitable causes. Our results challenge the evidence in the extant literature but are in line with our theoretical model. The implications for fundraising managers are that the optimal design of fundraising campaigns crucially depends on the targeted groups and that donation matching is successful in stimulating participation in poorer populations. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: Financial support was from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [Grant 280092119] and the Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung [Grant 100018_189152]. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4702. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gift-giving customs are ubiquitous in social, political, and business life. Legal regulation and industry guidelines for gifts are often based on the assumption that large gifts potentially influence behavior and create conflicts of interest, but small gifts do not. However, scientific evidence on the impact of small gifts on business relationships is scarce. We conducted a natural field experiment in collaboration with sales agents of a multinational consumer products company to study the influence of small gifts on the outcome of business negotiations. We find that small gifts matter. On average, sales representatives generate more than twice as much revenue when they distribute a small gift at the onset of their negotiations. However, we also find that small gifts tend to be counterproductive when purchasing and sales agents meet for the first time, suggesting that the nature of the business relationship crucially affects the profitability of gifts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study a large-scale (n = 50,000) natural field experiment implemented by the U.S. Social Security Administration aimed at increasing the timely and accurate self-reporting of wages by Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients. A letter reminding SSI recipients of their wage reporting responsibilities significantly increased both the likelihood of reporting any earnings and the total earnings reported. However, the specific letter content—providing social information or highlighting the salience of penalties—had no systematic effect. We develop a conservative estimate that the letters generated roughly $5.91 in savings per dollar spent, highlighting the value of such a nudge in this important context. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4645. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate behavioral reactions toward exogenous changes of implicit norm-relevant information in a natural field setting where customers are free to choose if and how much to pay for a service. Customers' voluntary payments are significantly affected by subtle information cues: cues that signal a high rather than a low payment norm increase payments by some 27%. Consistent with the conjecture that this effect is in large part driven by customers' uncertainty about the actual norm, responses are mitigated when explicit norm-relevant information is provided. Additional treatments suggest that the reactions to the cues are not driven by mere saliency but by the information deduced from the cues in the presence of uncertainty. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2937. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the results of two natural field experiments at a dental clinic. Guided by a simple theoretical model, we exogenously vary deadlines and associated rewards for arranging checkup appointments. Our data show strong and systematic effects of deadlines on patients' behavior. Imposing deadlines induces patients to act earlier and at a persistently higher frequency than without a deadline. We further document that individuals systematically respond to deadlines even if these are not tied to explicit rewards. Several of our findings suggest that individuals' responses to deadlines are shaped by limitations in memory and attention. Our results illustrate that deadlines can be a powerful management tool to encourage timely task completion and to increase the cost effectiveness of performance-contingent rewards. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics and decision analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In corporate practice, incentive schemes are often complicated even for simple tasks. Hence, the way they are communicated might matter. In a natural field experiment, we study a minimally invasive change in the communication of a well-established incentive scheme-a reminder regarding the piece rate at the beginning of the shift. The experiment was conducted in a large firm where experienced managers work in a team production setting and where incentives for both quantity and quality of output are provided. While the treatment conveyed no additional material information and left the incentive system unchanged, it had significant positive effects on quantity and on managers' compensation. These effects are economically sizable and robust to alternative empirical specifications. We consider various potential mechanisms, but our preferred explanation is that the treatment raised the salience of incentives. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates two channels of prosociality: indirect reciprocity and charitable giving. We conducted a natural field experiment in a hair salon in Hamburg, Germany, over the course of four months. In the baseline, we collected data on customers' tips-a scenario absent indirect reciprocity and donations. In two treatments we had the hairdresser collect donations to a charity. In one treatment the hairdresser pointed out the opportunity to donate. Our data indicate that the voluntary activity of collecting donations in the salon led to greater tips for the hairdresser and significant donations. In the second treatment, the hairdresser unconditionally donated to the charity before the customers could. This donation did not increase tips further compared with the collection-only treatment. Our data indicate that indirect reciprocity works in the field. We find evidence that indirect reciprocity and charitable giving work as complements. Data, as supplemental material, are available at . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With a large nationwide retailer, we run a natural field experiment to measure the effects of energy use information disclosure, customer rebates, and sales agent incentives on demand for energy-efficient durable goods. Although a combination of large rebates plus sales incentives substantially increases market share, information and sales incentives alone each have zero statistical effect and explain at most a small fraction of the low baseline market share. Sales agents strategically comply only partially with the experiment, targeting information to more interested consumers but not discussing energy efficiency with the disinterested majority. These results suggest that seller-provided information is not a major barrier to energy-efficiency investments at current prices in this context. Data, as supplemental material, are available at . This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Socially responsible investment is increasingly prevalent in financial markets and is characterized by the integration of financial and nonfinancial objectives. This paper investigates the influence of wealth concerns and moral concerns on individual investors' decisions to invest responsibly. We conduct a unique natural field experiment of investors in an online banking context, wherein we frame responsible investment with regard to either wealth or morality and study investors' subsequent behavior. We find that wealth framing is more effective than moral framing for both information search and investment behavior. Our study contributes to the literature by providing real-life insight into how prosocial decision making in financial markets can be promoted. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a natural field experiment designed to measure other-regarding preferences in the market for taxis. We employed testers of varying ethnicity to take a number of predetermined taxi journeys. In each case, we endowed them with only 80% of the expected fare. Testers revealed the amount they could afford to pay to the driver midjourney and asked for a portion of the journey for free. In a 2 × 2 between-subjects design, we vary the length of the journey and whether a business card is elicited. We find that (1) the majority of drivers give at least part of the journey for free, (2) giving is proportional to the length of the journey, and (3) 27% of drivers complete the journey. Evidence of outgroup negativity against black testers is also reported. In order to link our empirical analysis to behavioral theory, we estimate the parameters of a number of utility functions. The data and the structural analysis lend support to the quantitative predictions of experiments that measure other-regarding preferences, and they shed further light on how discrimination can manifest itself within our preferences. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent discoveries in behavioral economics have led to important new insights concerning what can happen in markets. Such gains in knowledge have come primarily via laboratory experiments-a missing piece of the puzzle in many cases is parallel evidence drawn from naturally occurring field counterparts. We provide a small movement in this direction by taking advantage of a unique opportunity to work with a Chinese high-tech manufacturing facility. Our study revolves around using insights gained from one of the most influential lines of behavioral research-framing manipulations-in an attempt to increase worker productivity in the facility. Using a natural field experiment, we report several insights. For example, conditional incentives framed as both "losses" and "gains" increase productivity for both individuals and teams. In addition, teams more acutely respond to bonuses posed as losses than as comparable bonuses posed as gains. The magnitude of this framing effect is roughly 1%: that is, total team productivity is enhanced by 1% purely due to the framing manipulation. Importantly, we find that neither the framing nor the incentive effect lose their significance over time; rather, the effects are observed over the entire sample period. Moreover, we learn that repeated interaction with workers and conditionality of the bonus contract are substitutes for sustenance of incentive effects in the long run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstracts of articles within the issue are presented including "Do Women Avoid Salary Negotiations? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment" by Andreas Leibbrandt, John A. List, "Threshold Effects in Online Group Buying" by Jiahua Wu, Mengze Shi and Ming Hu and "Do Tips Increase Workers' Income?" by Oz Shy.

We study the incentive effects of granting supervisors access to objective performance information when agents work on multiple tasks. We first analyze a formal model showing that incentives are lower powered when supervisors have no access to objective measures but assess performance subjectively by gathering information. This incentive loss is more pronounced when the span of control is larger and incentives are distorted toward more profitable tasks. We then investigate a field experiment conducted in a bank. In the treatment group, managers obtained access to objective performance measures, which raised efforts and profits. We find that the effects are driven by larger branches and lower margin products. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the contagious switching behavior related to a consumer's choice of wireless carriers, that is, that a consumer is more likely to switch wireless carriers if more of their contacts from the same carrier have switched. Contagious switching (or a positive network effect) can be driven by information-based social learning, as well as other mechanisms related to network size. Although previous marketing literature has documented the social-learning effect, most of the applications studied involve products in which consumers usually do not enjoy any direct benefits from a large network other than from information-based social learning. We explore the importance of the social-learning effect relative to other mechanisms that may also lead to the network effect. We propose a dynamic structural model with interpersonal interactions. To model the social-learning effect, a consumer uses feedback from his or her contacts who have switched from a focal carrier to update his or her quality expectations of alternative carriers. Our model further accounts for two unique aspects of consumer strategic learning: (i) the individual's perception on the signal of alternative carriers from contacts who switch is systematically different according to whether the signal comes from a loyal contact; and (ii) that the perceived noisiness of the signal on alternative carriers from a contact who has switched depends on the strength of the relationship between the individual and the contact. The remaining network effect not captured through social learning is modeled as a function of the size of the network. We solve the model with a two-step dynamic programming algorithm, with the assumption that a consumer is forward-looking and decides whether to stay with the same service carrier in each period by maximizing the total utility received from that day onward. We apply the proposed model to the data set of a mobile network operator in a European country. We find that churning/switching behavior is contagious in the network context and that one-third of general network effects can be attributed to social learning. We also detect strategic learning by consumers from their contacts in two ways: the experience signal on alternative carriers from a more loyal contact who has switched from the focal carrier is perceived to be more positive than that from a less loyal contact; and the social-learning effect is stronger from an individual's closest contacts. The simulation analysis demonstrates the value of our model in helping a company prioritize its customer relationship management effort. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What motivates the rich and powerful to exhibit generosity? We explore this important question in a large field experiment. We solicit donations from 32,174 alumni of an Ivy League university, including thousands of rich and powerful alumni. Consistent with past psychology research, we find that the rich and powerful respond dramatically, and differently than others, to being given a sense of agency over the use of donated funds. Gifts from rich and powerful alumni increase by 100%–350% when they are given a sense of agency. This response arises primarily on the intensive margin with no effect on the likelihood of donating. Results suggest that motivating the rich and powerful to act may require tailored interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Performance measurement systems (PMSs) are used to diagnose and remediate problems, termed the "decision-facilitating" or feedback role of management control. We examine whether use of PMSs by individual decision makers is associated with better performance. Experimental studies have isolated individual-level effects of feedback on decision quality; however, it is difficult to extend these findings to natural settings. Archival and survey studies offer evidence on the association between the presence of PMSs and performance but have had limited success in measuring decision makers' actual use of PMSs and addressing endogeneity of the decision to use PMSs. We use unobtrusively collected data on actual PMS use in 30 K–12 charter schools over three years to test whether teachers who make greater use of two PMSs are associated with greater growth in student learning. We find that teachers' use of PMSs is associated with increased student learning, consistent with the premise that PMSs facilitate teacher interventions and improve student outcomes. The results are both statistically and materially significant, and they are better explained by PMS use than by selection effects of better teachers using PMSs. Consistent with the organization's focus on "at-risk" students, the strongest effects of teachers' use of one PMS are concentrated among the lowest-performing students. In sum, we find broad support for the thesis that the feedback role of PMSs is associated with meaningful performance improvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The gender difference in competitiveness has been cited as an important factor driving the gender gap in labor market outcomes. Using a field experiment with more than 35,000 university students, I explore the impact of compensation scheme on willingness to apply for a job. I find that competitive compensation schemes that depend on relative performance disproportionately deter women from applying. I do not find the same deterrence effect under a compensation scheme in which students face uncertain payoffs independent of performance. I also test the impact of describing the job as helping a charity, and this increases the willingness to apply but does not affect the gender gap. My findings are important for managers, who need to understand the impact of different compensation schemes on the share of women recruited for a job posting. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3107. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the results from a 2.3-million-person field experiment that varies whether or not a job seeker sees the number of applicants for a job posting on a large job-posting website, LinkedIn. This intervention increases the likelihood that a person will finish an application by 3.5%. Women have a larger increase in their likelihood of finishing an application than men. Overall, adding this information to a job posting may offer a light-touch way to both increase application rates and alter the diversity of the applicant pool. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2994. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We conduct a laboratory experiment in which participants can make donations to real charities. We vary whether the experimenter provides matching funds for any such donations, and whether there is individual or team competition for these matching funds. Our results indicate that providing matching funds for all donations does increase donations from 23% to 33% of the endowment. While individual competition for matching funds had nearly the same effectiveness as matching all donations, by far the most effective approach was to form (anonymous) teams that competed for matching funds; this led to donations of 47% of the endowment. We appeal to the notion of group identity to explain our results—participants seemed to be reluctant to "let down their team" in a competition. Our results can be seen as providing support for the notion that combining group identity and competition creates a motivation that can potentially be harnessed effectively for prosocial purposes. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many online retailers provide real-time inventory availability information. Customers can learn from the inventory level and update their beliefs about the product. Thus, consumer purchasing behavior may be impacted by the availability information. Based on a unique setting from Amazon lightning deals, which displays the percentage of inventory consumed in real time, we explore whether and how consumers learn from inventory availability information. Identifying the effect of learning on consumer decisions has been a notoriously difficult empirical question because of endogeneity concerns. We address this issue by running two randomized field experiments on Amazon in which we create exogenous shocks on the inventory availability information for a random subset of Amazon lightning deals. In addition, we track the dynamic purchasing behavior and inventory information for 23,665 lightning deals offered by Amazon and use their panel structure to further explore the relative effect of learning. We find evidence of consumers learning from inventory information: a decrease in product availability causally attracts more sales in the future; in particular, a 10% increase in past claims leads to a 2.08% increase in cart add-ins in the next hour. Moreover, we show that buyers use observable product characteristics to moderate their inferences when learning from others; a deep discount weakens the learning momentum, whereas a good product rating amplifies the learning momentum. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a lab-field experiment designed to systematically assess the external validity of social preferences elicited in a variety of experimental games. We do this by comparing behavior in the different games with several behaviors elicited in the field and with self-reported behaviors exhibited in the past, using the same sample of participants. Our results show that the experimental social preference games do a poor job explaining both social behaviors in the field and social behaviors from the past. We also include a systematic review and meta-analysis of previous literature on the external validity of social preference games. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2908. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rank-order relative-performance evaluation, in which pay, promotion, symbolic awards, and educational achievement depend on the rank of individuals in the distribution of performance, is ubiquitous. Whenever organizations use rank-order relative-performance evaluation, people receive feedback about their rank. Using a real-effort experiment, we aim to discover whether people respond to the specific rank that they achieve. In particular, we leverage random variation in the allocation of rank among subjects who exerted the same effort to obtain a causal estimate of the rank response function that describes how effort provision responds to the content of rank-order feedback. We find that the rank response function is U-shaped. Subjects exhibit "first-place loving" and "last-place loathing": that is, subjects work hardest after being ranked first or last. We discuss implications of our findings for the optimal design of performance feedback policies, workplace organizational structures, and incentives schemes. Data and the supplementary web appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2907. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many jobs are connected to a prosocial mission—namely, to a social purpose beyond profit maximization. I use three laboratory experiments to investigate if employers can use the mission to economize on monetary incentives. In my first experiment, I exogenously vary whether the agents' effort generates a donation to a charity of their choice (matched mission), generates a donation to a charity chosen by another subject (random mission), or generates no donation (no mission). I find that the mission, whether matched or random, increases effort compared to the no-mission condition. Consistent with the theory, nonmotivated principals exploit the agents' motivation by offering lower piece rates, whereas very motivated principals pay higher piece rates to boost the donation. I find no difference in the effort and piece rate between the matched- and random-mission conditions. In my second experiment, I use a selected pool of motivated subjects but still observe no difference between these two treatments. In my third experiment, I explore whether the effect of mission-matching may arise through gift exchange: principals decide between choosing the mission or delegating the choice to the agent. I do not find evidence that agents who are delegated the mission choice reciprocate with higher effort. These findings suggest that while a prosocial mission allows for economizing on monetary incentives, there are no further gains from increasing the quality of the mission-matching. Data and the supplemental material are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2903. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We experimentally test how effort responds to wages—randomly assigned to accrue to individuals or to a charity—in the presence of expectations-based reference points or targets. When individuals earn money for themselves, higher wages lead to higher effort with relatively muted targeting behavior. When individuals earn money for a charity, higher wages instead lead to lower effort with substantial targeting behavior. A reference-dependent theoretical framework suggests an explanation for this differential impact: when individuals place less value on earnings, such as when accruing earnings for a charity instead of themselves, more targeting behavior and a more sluggish response to incentives should result. Results from an additional experiment add support to this explanation. When individuals select into earning money for a charity and thus likely place a higher value on those earnings, targeting behavior is muted and no longer generates a negative effort response to higher wages. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2870. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a model and derive behavioral predictions for a multiproduct sales force subject to goals set based on past performance. We test these predictions using a field experiment in which 53 salespersons from a Chilean beverage company face exogenous variations in monthly sales goals. Confirming our predictions, we found that (1) absent strategic considerations—no goal ratcheting—salespersons increase (decrease) sales in the product category for which the return to effort increases (decreases), (2) including strategic considerations behavior reverses: salespersons who expect high goal ratcheting decrease (increase) sales in the category for which the return to effort increases (decreases), (3) sales did not change for the average salespersons, reflecting heterogeneity in the expectations of goal ratcheting rather than unresponsiveness to incentives. Our study points at the importance of the dynamics of incentive design, in particular, the importance of understanding the dynamics of goal setting in firms. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2861. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tests of gift exchange, wherein agents receive excess wages which are noncontingent on performance in one-shot settings, have yielded contradictory evidence: they sometimes find effort boosts, consistent with gift exchange, whereas they sometimes find no effort increases, consistent with a standard model. We identify eight confounds that could have led to the mixed evidence—agent disutility from being viewed as selfish, small samples, insufficient wage raises, an effort ceiling, fatigue, selection of abler workers, reemployment concerns, and peer effects—and run a comprehensive test addressing them. Our test consisted of a field experiment hiring workers for a data entry job, followed by laboratory games assessing their prosocial behavior. After addressing these confounds, we find that behavior during the field test was consistent with a standard model: workers did not repay fixed wage raises with an effort boost, but they did raise effort in response to a piece rate. The piece-rate scheme was also more efficient: the effort boost came at lower expense than paying fixed wage raises. Further, workers who behaved prosocially in laboratory games did not behave prosocially in the field. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2801.. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]