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To maximize productivity, manufacturers must organize and equip their workforces to efficiently handle variable workloads. Their success depends on their ability to assign experienced and skilled workers to specialized tasks and coordinate work on production lines. Worker turnover may disrupt such efforts. We use staffing, productivity, and pay data from within a major consumer electronics manufacturer’s supply chain to study how firms should manage worker turnover and its effects using production decisions, wages, and inventory. We find that worker turnover impedes coordination between assembly line coworkers by weakening knowledge sharing and relationships. Publicly available unit-cost estimates imply that worker turnover accounts for $206–274 million in added direct expenses alone from defectively assembled units failing the firm’s stringent quality control. To evaluate managerial alternatives, we structurally estimate a dynamic equilibrium model (an Experience-Based Equilibrium) encompassing (1) workers’ endogenous turnover decisions and (2) the firm’s weekly planning of its production scheduling and staffing in response. In counterfactual analyses, a less turnover-prone, hence more productive, workforce significantly benefits the firm, reducing its variable production costs by 4.5%, or an estimated $928 million for the studied product. Such benefits justify paying higher efficiency wages even to less skilled workforces; furthermore, interestingly, rational inventory management policies incentivize self-interested firms to reduce rather than tolerate turnover. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management. Funding: The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the data sponsor, and K. Moon gratefully acknowledges support from the Wharton Dean’s Research Fund and the Claude Marion Endowed Faculty Scholar Award of the Wharton School. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4476 .

Industries differ in the extent to which they can offshore their production. I document that industries with low offshoring potential carry a sizeable risk premium compared with industries with high offshoring potential, suggesting that the possibility to offshore affects industry risk. A two-country dynamic trade model in which offshoring allows firms to secure market share against foreign competitors can rationalize the empirical findings. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4393 .

Understanding the drivers of market concentration in the generic pharmaceutical industry is essential to guaranteeing the availability of low-cost generics. In this paper, we develop a structural model to capture the multiple determinants governing manufacturers’ entry decisions; in particular, we focus on how manufacturing complexity and the regulatory environment for generics approval affect concentration in drug markets. We estimate the model using data collated from six disparate sources. We find that manufacturing complexity, as reflected in the number of active ingredients, for example, significantly reduces the likelihood of generics entry. Moreover, the delay in the review process for the generics applications significantly affects the number of firms entering a market. Our policy simulations suggest that a shortened drug approval review time significantly increases the average number of entrants per market and reduces the fraction of markets with no generics entry; however, a notable portion of markets would still lack any generic competition. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4423 .

When multiple retailers hold inventory to satisfy random demand, retailer inventory-sharing strategies can potentially reduce the supply-demand mismatch and increase overall supply chain performance. In this paper, we experimentally investigate alternative inventory-sharing strategies in a two-tier supply chain with an upstream manufacturer and two downstream retailers. In one setting, retailers act as if they are centralized and use a single quantity to fulfill joint demand. In the other, retailers are decentralized and face separate demands, but they can transfer inventory after demands are realized. In this latter decentralized scenario, we also consider whether the manufacturer or retailers have decision authority over the inventory transfer price. One key result is that when the retailers are decentralized and the manufacturer sets the transfer price, both retailers and the manufacturer earn higher profits than in the centralized retailer strategy, which runs counter to theory. We also find that when retailers are decentralized and set their own transfer price, the most equitable distribution of profits is achieved. In an effort to account for these results, we find that a model of fairness captures decisions well. Overall, by investigating how different inventory-sharing strategies affect the distribution of profits in a two-tier supply chain, our results provide guidance to firms considering how, if at all, they should enter such arrangements. This paper was accepted by Jay Swaminathan, operations management. Funding: The authors acknowledge financial support from Cornell University and the University of Virginia. Supplemental Material: The data files and electronic companion are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4323 .

We develop a data-sales model to study the implications of alternative data for financial markets. Investors acquire skills to process the purchased raw data, and developing such skills is costly and involves considerable uncertainty. The data vendor controls the size of the data sample to influence the precision of the information investors can extract from the purchased data. Price informativeness is hump-shaped in skill-acquisition costs although the cost of capital and return volatility are U-shaped in skill-acquisition costs. Similar patterns can arise for skill mean and volatility. Our analysis suggests that the funds and data industries foster each other. This paper was accepted by Agostino Capponi, finance.

Voluntary environmental certification programs have been a popular tool used by governments, industry groups, and nonprofit organizations alike. A central question in the design of such programs is who should pay for them. In a context where firms respond strategically to a certification, the answer to this question is a priori ambiguous and, ultimately, empirical. This paper provides important insights on this question using ENERGY STAR, a voluntary certification program for energy-efficient products, as a case study. I show that firms are highly strategic with respect to this certification and extract consumer surplus associated with certified products via three mechanisms. They offer products that bunch at the certification requirement, differentiate certified products in the energy and nonenergy dimensions, and charge a price premium on certified products. I use these findings to motivate a structural econometric model with firms’ strategic behaviors with respect to product line and pricing decisions and to investigate the incidence of a certification licensing fee to fund the certification program. This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.

Modern digital technology has enabled the emergence of the hybrid workforce in service organizations, where a firm uses on-demand freelancers to augment its traditional labor supply of employees. Freelancers are typically supplied by an electronic platform. How should demand be allocated between employees and freelancers? Under what conditions is the system (comprising the firm and its platform) sustainable in the long run? We investigate these questions in the context of last-mile delivery. We develop a discrete-time, stochastic dynamic program that captures the system’s profit from serving demand and the platform’s growth dynamics. The dynamic model incorporates a service constraint for the platform and a simple version of a stochastic network effect. We find that the answers to our research questions critically depend on two key parameters: the mean and variance of the cross-network effect. We conduct a numerical study with data from a last-mile delivery firm in Vietnam to illustrate our findings. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.

Many innovative products are designed to satisfy the demand of specific target consumers; thus, the innovators will inevitably compete with each other in the product market. We investigate how a profit-maximizing principal should properly allocate her limited resources to support the innovations of multiple potentially competing innovators. We find that, as the available resources increase, the optimal diversification of investment may first increase and then decrease. This interesting nonmonotone pattern is driven by a trade-off between the risk of innovation failure and rent dissipation because of competition. Using this framework, we also analyze a nonprofit principal seeking to maximize the total number of successful innovations, the probability of at least one innovator succeeding, consumer surplus, and total social welfare. A nonprofit principal tends to invest more diversely compared with a for-profit counterpart. This paper was accepted by Sridhar Tayur, entrepreneurship and innovation.

Motivated by challenges facing IT procurement, this paper studies a hybrid procurement model in which a reverse auction of a fixed-price IT outsourcing contract may be followed by renegotiation to extend the contract’s scope. In this model, the buyer balances the needs to incentivize noncontractible vendor investment and to curb the winning vendor’s information rent by choosing the initial project scope and the buyer’s investment in the quality of the project. We find that a buyer may benefit from inducing ex post renegotiation to motivate vendor investment, especially when the winning vendor has high bargaining power and the quality uncertainty is low. Broadening the initial scope reduces information rent but leaves little room for ex post renegotiation and, hence, discourages vendor investment, whereas increasing the buyer’s investment has opposite effects. Interestingly, the two measures can be strategic substitutes or complements depending on the likelihood of the renegotiation and the two parties’ bargaining powers. The buyer may strategically set a low initial project scope and high investment to incentivize renegotiation and vendor investment, which may explain why many IT outsourcing projects start small and allow expansions. Our findings also generate several testable predictions for IT outsourcing. This paper was accepted by Kartik Hosanagar, information systems.

We study anticompetitive horizontal mergers in a dynamic model with noisy collusion. At each instant, firms either privately choose output levels or merge to form a monopoly, trading off the benefits of avoiding price wars against the costs of merging. The potential to merge decreases pre-merger collusion, as punishments effected by price wars are weakened. We thus extend the result of Davidson and Deneckere [Davidson C, Deneckere R (1984) Horizontal mergers and collusive behavior. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. 2(2):117–132.], who analyzed the weakening of punishments post-merger, demonstrating that pre-merger collusion is weakened, in a fully stochastic model. Thus, although anticompetitive mergers harm competition ex post, the implication is that barriers and costs of merging due to regulation should be reduced to promote competition exante. This paper was accepted by Tomasz Piskorski, finance.

We analyze the problem of a buyer who purchases a long-term project from one of several suppliers. A changing state of the world influences the costs of the suppliers. We distinguish between complete contracts conditioning on all future realizations of the state of the world and incomplete contracts renegotiated whenever the state of the world changes. We provide conditions such that incomplete contracting does not pose a problem. If the changing state of the world is publicly observable and the buyer cannot switch between suppliers during the lifetime of the project, the buyer achieves the same surplus irrespective of whether contracts are complete or incomplete. An English auction followed by renegotiation whenever the state of the world changes is optimal. To identify conditions when buyers should consider drafting complete contracts, we extend the analysis by considering private information about the changing state of the world and supplier switching. In both cases, incomplete contracting poses a problem. In a survey of procurement consultants, we confirm that publicly observable states of the world via price indexes play an important role in procurement. Moreover, the consultants confirm that supplier switching is infrequent in procurement practice. Thus, incomplete contracting is less of a problem in a considerable share of procurement projects. However, complete contracts are useful and could be used more often. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

To stay competitive, high-technology manufacturers not only frequently source new technologies from their suppliers, but also financially support the development of these new technologies into component products or production tools. We consider a manufacturer that can either source a new but immature technology from a financially constrained supplier, or source a mature technology from an existing supplier if and only if the development of the new technology fails. To support the new technology, the manufacturer can choose to inject capital in the form of an equity or loan. The investment strategy not only affects the new supplier’s development effort and the probability of technical success (PTS), but also affects the existing supplier’s effort to improve the mature technology, which presents the manufacturer with a trade-off. Following the debt financing literature, we find that a loan contract is associated with a cost-shifting effect and often leads to a higher PTS. However, because the manufacturer not only maintains an investment but also a procurement relationship with the new supplier, we find a profit-sharing effect associated with an equity investment, which does not exist in the traditional equity issuance literature. In particular, we show that the profit-sharing effect can dominate the cost-shifting effect and lead to a higher PTS when the new supplier’s technological capability is sufficiently high. Nonetheless, we also show that the strategy that derives a higher PTS does not necessarily generate a higher payoff for the manufacturer. On the one hand, a loan can be preferred even when it leads to a lower PTS because the cost-shifting effect allows the manufacturer to offer a sufficiently low procurement payment while maintaining a sufficiently high PTS. On the other hand, when the existing supplier is very capable of reducing its costs, a loan can over-incentivize the new supplier to exert excessive effort and backfire. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.

Recent advances in information technology, advanced manufacturing (robotics, 3D printing, etc.), and logistics have allowed firms to customize their products to the specifications of individual consumers, who, in turn, prefer these products to standard ones. In the unlikely event that customized products do not match expectations, however, consumers often feel entitled to a return. Should firms offer returns on customized products? We examine this question via a Stackelberg game model, in which the firm (leader) decides the prices and returns policies for its customized and standard products; consumers (followers) decide which product to buy, given the initial noisy valuations and, upon experiencing the product, whether to return it. Both parties act strategically: Forward-looking consumers incorporate the real option value of possible returns into their initial purchasing decisions, and the firm incorporates consumers’ best purchase and return response into its pricing and returns policy decisions. Our model produces three key insights. First, firms can use customized products to induce some consumers who otherwise would buy and return a standard product to switch to lower-return-rate customized products. Second, it may be optimal to offer returns on customized products, despite their lower salvage value. Third, firms can increase profits and reduce (total) returns by offering returnable customized products. This paper was accepted by Duncan Simester, marketing.

Managing the quality of complementary applications is vital to the success of a two-sided platform. While prior research has focused solely on restricting platform access based on a quality threshold, we compare three quality regulation strategies: (1) the platform excludes access to low-quality complementors, (2) it provides a fixed amount of subsidy to high-quality complementors, and (3) it develops its own high-quality applications in addition to those from third-party complementors. Our analyses reveal that the widely adopted exclusion strategy is a special case of the subsidization strategy, and it does not always benefit the platform. In contrast, both subsidization and first-party applications strategies render the platform owner better off, with higher profits, higher average quality, and a larger consumer network, but only subsidization always improves social welfare. In addition, the trade-off between subsidization and first-party applications strategies depends on the development cost of first-party applications and the fraction of high-quality complementors, but the relationship is not monotonic. Our results demonstrate that the platform does not have to sacrifice application quantity for higher application quality. With the right choices, it can profitably improve both measures simultaneously. This research provides concrete guidelines to help platform managers make decisions about regulating the quality of complementary applications. This paper was accepted by Anandhi Bharadwaj, information systems.

I study how much consumers benefit from new products in markets with information frictions. I analyze new products in the U.S. hard drive market, which is characterized by ample product innovation. Using unique click-stream data, I measure the magnitude of two frictions, category consideration and costly search, and show that both play a crucial role in shaping consumer demand. To estimate consumer surplus from new products, I develop a search model that captures both frictions and propose a novel Bayesian estimation method to recover its parameters. I then show that ignoring information frictions leads researchers to underestimate the consumer surplus from new hard drives because it appears that consumers do not value the combinations of attributes these hard drives offer. Partly eliminating frictions, through marketing efforts or market-wide transparency initiatives, can help consumers to more fully internalize the benefits of new product launches. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4729 .

Innovation is a contract-intensive economic activity in a world of incomplete contracts. We show that trust mitigates incomplete contracting and enhances innovation by acting as an informal contracting mechanism. Trust plays an especially important role when formal laws and regulations are lacking, and it promotes innovation by encouraging collaboration and fostering tolerance for failure. Further analyses show that trust also facilitates cross-border technological spillover and innovation collaboration. Overall, our evidence highlights innovation as a key conduit through which trust affects economic growth. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

When confronted with a new product, consumers often find it difficult to predict how it will perform, and such uncertainty reduces consumers’ willingness to adopt the product. In this paper, we consider a market whereby consumers decide when and which product to buy, given that they know the product quality of the incumbent but are uncertain about that of the entrant. We investigate how consumer uncertainty about product quality affects firms’ behavior-based pricing and customer acquisition and retention dynamics. Using a two-period vertical model, we find that, under high-end encroachment, an increase in consumer uncertainty reduces the entrant’s profit and hurts the incumbent’s profit when the quality differential between the products is relatively small, whereas, under low-end encroachment, increasing uncertainty not only benefits the incumbent but also can favor the entrant. An important implication for entrants is that the marketing activities, which aim to reduce consumer uncertainty about product functionalities, may fail to improve profitability. We also find that the entrant lowers the price for uninformed customers and raises the price for repeat buyers under high-end encroachment but lowers the price for all customers under low-end encroachment. We further examine the subsidy strategy and show that, when the entrant’s product has a significant quality advantage and consumer uncertainty is high but not very high, the optimal strategy for the entrant is to acquire all consumers who do not buy from the incumbent by providing subsidies and to drop the low-valuation customers by means of a high price after their uncertainty is resolved. This paper was accepted by Anandhi Bharadwaj, information systems.

Involving suppliers deep in the supply chain is critical for the success of environmental and social responsibility (ESR) initiatives. Administering ESR programs throughout a complex supply network, however, is challenging. In this paper, we apply a multiunit bilateral bargaining framework to coordinate ESR investments in a general supply network and analyze to what extent an ESR initiator should directly engage the higher-tier suppliers as opposed to delegating that responsibility to the first-tier suppliers. Our bargaining framework not only generalizes the conventional Shapley value approach by allowing the flexibility of modeling imbalanced power distribution among the firms but also provides an explicit way of implementing the resulting gain sharing among the firms through negotiated contract terms. We show that the eventual structure of ESR negotiation relationships can be derived by finding a shortest path tree in the supply network with the arc cost defined as the logarithm of the negotiating parties’ relative bargaining power. These developments allow us to analyze ESR implementation in generally extended supply networks. We find that the ESR initiator tends to delegate ESR negotiations to a supplier that is strong in negotiations with higher-tier suppliers. When the supply network is complex (i.e., wide and deep), directly engaging all suppliers can lead to a larger gain by the initiator than fully delegating the negotiations with higher-tier suppliers to the first-tier ones. However, as the network gets increasingly complex, the ESR initiator tends to directly engage a reduced percentage of higher-tier suppliers. We further extend our analysis to situations where the ESR relationships are sequentially formed in a decentralized manner, where the benefit of ESR depends on the collective choice of the firms’ investment levels, where multiple ESR programs are implemented in the network, and where ESR investments depend on the negotiation relationships. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, operations management.

Both traditional retailers and e-tailers have been implementing omnichannel strategies such as buy online, pick up at store (BOPS). We build a stylized model to investigate the impact of the BOPS initiative on store operations from an inventory perspective. We consider two segments of customers, namely store-only customers who only make purchases offline and omni-customers who strategically choose between offline and online channels. We show that BOPS may either benefit or hurt the retailer depending on two fundamental system primitives: the store visiting cost and the online waiting cost. If the online waiting cost is relatively low and the store visiting cost is even lower, BOPS can induce omni-customers to migrate from online buying to BOPS, leading to demand pooling at the brick-and-mortar (B&M) store. Such demand pooling provides two benefits for the retailer: it reduces the overstocking cost, and after inventory reoptimization, it results in a higher fill rate at the B&M store, which benefits existing customers and potentially attracts more customers to the store. In contrast, if both store visiting and online waiting costs are relatively high with the latter even higher, introducing BOPS can result in demand depooling as a result of the migration of the omni-customers from offline purchasing to BOPS. This leads to a lower fill rate after inventory reoptimization, likely the result of a lower profit margin under BOPS, which turns away store-only customers and hurts the retailer. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.

We study how the presence of a monthly revenue-based quota impacts a retailer’s profits when prices are negotiated by a salesperson. Using transaction level data for refrigerators, we first provide reduced-form evidence that prices are impacted by the quota: the negotiated discounts are approximately 3.8% higher if the salesperson is 10% closer to reaching the quota in the final week of the month. Guided by this result, we specify and estimate a demand model that identifies the impact of the quota through two forces: the effort salespeople expend in order to sell the product and their bargaining position. Results indicate that, as salespeople get closer to reaching their quota, their effort increases regardless of the week, and their bargaining position weakens (i.e., they offer lower prices), but only in the final week of the month. We use these results to analyze the impact of the quota and find that, holding salespeoples’ total compensation fixed, eliminating quotas results in 8% lower profit for the retailer. This decrease stems primarily from the reduction in effort that outweighs any benefit from strengthening the salespeoples’ bargaining position. The change in profit is economically meaningful because eliminating both price negotiation (i.e., moving to fixed pricing) and the quota results in an up to 36% reduction in profit. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing.

We study a buyer’s problem of auditing suppliers within an existing network to ensure social responsibility compliance. The buyer suffers economic damages if a violation at a supplier is exposed (whether by the media, regulator, or nongovernmental organization). To avoid damages, the buyer may audit the network to identify noncompliance. If a supplier fails an audit, the buyer must take one of two costly actions: either rectify the supplier or drop the supplier (along with any dependent suppliers). Dropping a supplier changes the network topology, reducing competition and thereby increasing the buyer’s input cost arising from an equilibrium. We show that the buyer’s optimal dynamic auditing policy has two subphases: the buyer will first audit and drop some suppliers before either auditing and rectifying all remaining suppliers or halting auditing altogether. By halting, the buyer tolerates some noncompliance in the network (“see no evil, hear no evil”). Within the audit-and-drop subphase, when auditing only in the upper tier, the buyer always audits a least valuable unaudited supplier, yielding greater balance in the network. When the buyer audits both tiers, it might choose a supplier other than the least valuable. The buyer may choose a supplier in a pivotal position to help ascertain the viability of a portion of the network (“litmus test”). In extensions, we find that when violations in tier 1 carry a higher penalty for the buyer, the buyer may audit and rectify only tier 1 suppliers; when audits may be inaccurate, the buyer more likely tolerates a greater level of noncompliance. This paper was accepted by Charles Corbett, operations management.

This paper investigates empirically the effect of market power on dynamic pricing in the presence of inventories. Our setting is the auto retail industry; we analyze how automotive dealerships adjust prices to inventory levels under varying degrees of market power. We first establish that inventory fluctuations create scarcity rents for cars that are in short supply. We then show that dealers’ ability to adjust prices in response to inventory depends on their market power, that is, the quantity of substitute inventory in their selling area. Specifically, we show that the slope of the price–inventory relationship (higher inventory lowers prices) is significantly steeper when dealers find themselves in a situation of high rather than low market power. A dealership with high market power moving from a situation of inventory shortage to a median inventory level lowers transaction prices by about 0.57% ceteris paribus, corresponding to 32.5% of dealers’ average per-vehicle profit margin or $145.6 on the average car. Conversely, when competition is more intense, moving from inventory shortage to a median inventory level lowers transaction prices by about 0.35% ceteris paribus, corresponding to 20.2% of dealers’ average per-vehicle profit margin or $90.9. To our knowledge, we are the first to empirically show that market power affects firms’ ability to dynamically price. This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.

We study the impacts of social interactions on competing firms’ quality differentiation, pricing decisions, and profit performance. Two forms of social interactions are identified and analyzed: (1) market-expansion effect (MEE)—the total market expands as a result of both firms’ sales—and (2) value-enhancement effect (VEE)—a consumer gains additional utility of purchasing from one firm based on this firm’s previous and/or current sales volume. We consider a two-stage duopoly competition framework, in which both firms select quality levels in the first stage simultaneously and engage in a two-period price competition in the second stage. In the main model, we assume that each firm sets a single price and commits to it across two selling periods. We find that both forms of social interactions tend to lower prices and intensify price competition for given quality levels. However, MEE weakens the product-quality differentiation and is benign to both high-quality and low-quality firms. It also benefits consumers and improves social welfare. By contrast, VEE enlarges the quality differentiation and only benefits the high-quality firm, but is particularly malignant to the low-quality firm. It further reduces the consumers’ monetary surplus. Such impact is consistent, regardless of whether the VEE interactions involve previous or current consumers. We further discuss several model extensions, including dynamic pricing, combined social effects, and various cost structures, and verify that the aforementioned impacts of MEE and VEE are qualitatively robust to those extensions. Our results provide important managerial insights for firms in competitive markets and suggest that they need to not only be aware of the consumers’ social interactions, but also, more importantly, distinguish the predominant form of the interactions so as to apply proper marketing strategies. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing.

Inspired by self-replicating three-dimensional printers and innovative agricultural and husbandry goods, we study optimal production and sales policies for a manufacturer of self-replicating innovative goods with a focus on the unique “keep-or-sell” trade-off—namely, whether a newly produced unit should be sold to satisfy demand and stimulate future demand or added to inventory to increase production capacity. We adopt the continuous-time optimal control framework and marry a self-replication model on the production side to the canonical innovation-diffusion model on the demand side. By analyzing the model, we identify a condition that differentiates Strong and Weak Replicability regimes, wherein production and sales, respectively, take priority over the other and fully characterize their distinct optimal policies. These insights prove robust and helpful in several extensions, including backlogged demand, liquidity constraints, stochastic innovation diffusion, launch inventory decision, and exogenous demand. We also find that social marketing strategies are particularly well suited for self-replicating innovative goods under Strong Replication. This paper was accepted by Victor Martínez de Albéniz, operations management.

Prior research suggests portfolio entrepreneurs—businesspeople who run more than one firm simultaneously—launch more successful ventures than their single-business counterparts. However, their ventures are less likely to survive. In an attempt to reconcile this paradox, this paper presents a framework in which portfolio entrepreneurs’ main advantage is not a superior ability to select the best business opportunities ex ante, but rather the ability to redeploy human and capital resources across businesses ex post, which reduces the sunkenness of their investments in new projects. This redeployment option facilitates their exit from new businesses that fail initial market tests. Thus, portfolio entrepreneurs’ heterogeneous termination decisions explain a greater portion of new firm performance differential than ex ante opportunity selection. We test these ideas using a longitudinal data set of more than 5,700 entrepreneurs and find consistent evidence. Portfolio companies do not show systematically higher performance at the time of entry; a performance difference emerges only over time, as the selection effect and resource redeployment occur. This paper was accepted by Ashish Arora, entrepreneurship and innovation.

How does public data shape the relative performance of incumbents and entrants in the private sector? Using a simple theoretical framework, I argue that public data reduces investment uncertainty, facilitates the discovery of new market opportunities, and increases the relative market share of new entrants relative to incumbents. I shed light on these predictions by estimating the impact of public data from Landsat, a U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration satellite mapping program, on the discovery rates of new deposits by incumbents (seniors) and entrants (juniors) in the gold exploration industry. I exploit idiosyncratic timing variation and cloud cover in Landsat coverage across regions to identify the causal effect of public data on the patterns of gold discovery. I find that Landsat data nearly doubled the rate of significant gold discoveries after a region was mapped and increased the market share of new entrants from about 10% to 25%. Public data seem to play an important, yet relatively underexplored, role in driving performance differences across firms. This paper was accepted by Ashish Arora, entrepreneurship and innovation.

We develop a model to capture the novelty of innovation and explore what it means for the nature of market competition and quality of innovations. An innovator decides not only whether to innovate but how boldly to innovate, where the more novel is the innovation—the more different it is from what has come before—the more uncertain is the outcome. We show in this environment that a variant of the Arrow replacement effect holds in that new entrants pursue more innovative technologies than do incumbents. Despite this, we show that the new entrant is less likely to disrupt an incumbent than the incumbent is to disrupt itself, and less likely to fail in the market. We extend the model to allow the incumbent to acquire the entrant postinnovation and show that this reverses the Arrow effect. The prospect of acquisition makes innovation more profitable but simultaneously suppresses the novelty of innovation as the entrant seeks to maximize her value to the incumbent. This reversal suggests a positive role for a strict antitrust policy that spurs entrepreneurial firms to innovate boldly. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.

Brand valuation methods have traditionally focused on the value a brand generates via its ability to enhance demand and accordingly profitability. However, this paper explores how a brand can generate value for a firm through the ability to deter entry of new competitors. In this respect, we distinguish between a brand's "direct effect" on demand and its "strategic effect" on the behavior of rival firms. We investigate this within the context of the U.S. stacked chips category using a dynamic model that endogenizes brand building and entry decisions. We find that up to 63% of a brand's value can be attributed to its ability to deter entry. We find that an increase in industry-wide effectiveness of advertising can decrease the value of a firm's brand because, despite enabling more effective brand building, it can weaken the firm's ability to deter entry. Finally, we find that the threat of entry impacts the value of the firm and the value of the brand in qualitatively different ways; as the threat of entry increases, the value of the firm necessarily decreases, but the value of the brand can increase because the ability to use the brand to deter entry becomes more important.

Using the market for initial coin offerings (ICOs) as a laboratory, we provide evidence that entrepreneurs use retention to alleviate information asymmetry. The underlying technology and the absence of regulation make the ICO market well suited to study this question empirically. Using a hand-collected data set, we show that ICO issuers that retain a larger fraction of their tokens are more successful in their funding efforts and are more likely to develop a working product. Moreover, we find that retention is a stronger signal when markets are crowded, and investors do not have as much time to conduct due diligence. This paper was accepted by Will Cong, Special Issue of Management Science: Blockchains and crypto economics. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4631 .

The digital content industry is rapidly growing, and many platforms host a vast amount of content that is produced by independent producers. A major source of revenue for these platforms is advertising. However, advertising revenue depends on the number of active customers who visit the platform and enjoy content created by content producers. Therefore, major platforms provide incentives for content producers to encourage high-quality content creation. A commonly used incentive is ad revenue sharing. In this paper, we study how such sharing incentives are affected by the nature of competition among various producers, the size of customer base, and the type of customers. We also examine the implications for profits and welfare and extend the analysis to consider the case when the platform allows consumers to directly donate to the producers. Our results show that increased producer competition can lead to higher compensation for the producers, higher content quality, and higher producers’ profits. We also show that allowing consumers to donate to producers can lead to a higher commission rate and better-quality content. However, increased consumer generosity may lead to lower profits for content producers. In addition, we find that asymmetry among producers can sometimes benefit the platform. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing.

We investigate the economic and environmental implications of jointly implementing leasing and modularity, two prominent circular economy strategies, and their interaction. We develop a durable goods model to obtain insights for firms considering the use of these strategies. We first analyze the effect of adopting leasing on a firm’s product architecture choice. We find that a modular product architecture is more attractive under leasing only if off-lease products depreciate to a greater extent. We next analyze the effect of adopting a modular product architecture on the firm’s business model choice. We find that adopting a modular architecture can cause a leasing firm to switch to selling but will not lead a selling firm to switch to leasing. Building on these results, we show that leasing a modular product is preferred by the firm only under limited conditions (i.e., when production costs are low, off-lease products are in relatively better condition, and when there is a large difference between depreciation levels of different modules). Finally, we show that jointly implementing leasing and modularity can also lead to higher environmental impact than only adopting leasing or modularity in isolation. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.

In a view of the fact that in modern realities of post-industrial information society, the share of intangible assets in the companies' value has significantly increased. The monetized value of an organization's reputation is a part of such assets which is mainly determined by external communications had arised an issue of ensuring reputation security that has become especially relevant. One of justifications for need to apply crisis communication management is also changed direction of modern business. The reason for the change in modern concepts of effective business management was the new criteria for the service sector efficiency, which is a consequence of intense competition inherent in this highly profitable field of activity, which increases the importance of reputation issues. In turn, the abstract concept of a company's reputation is formed by specific parameters that are important for target audiences and are expressed in the numerical characteristics of the value of intangible assets. Considering the fact that intangible assets often make up a significant part of the companies' value and determine their financial performance, the issues of managing the value of these assets represent one of the most responsible tasks of modern management. There is a definition of the concepts of crisis, crisis communication and communication management as an integral component of crisis management of an organization is given in the terminology of leading Russian and foreign academics. The paper shows the successful result which is critically dependent on communication management effectiveness. Thus, the subject of the study is crisis communication management; the goal is to build a model for analyzing the effectiveness of managing crisis communications. The achieving method of that is to use a mathematical apparatus similar to the apparatus of multi-discriminant analysis (MDA) of Professor Edward Altman. The scientific novelty consists in the application of numerical methods for analyzing the effectiveness of crisis communications, and the result is in describing a model for analyzing the effectiveness of managing crisis communications. The use of the model for analyzing effectiveness of crisis communication management would provide an organization with the opportunity not to lose the achieved level of capitalization, provided that the reputation/communication component is effectively used in its crisis management.

The topic of the research is the phenomenon of ecosystems created by banks, as well as related technological innovations introduced by credit institutions in order to increase their efficiency and obtain new opportunities for cooperation with non-financial organizations. One of the strategically important management decisions which affect the bank's business model is to determine the specifics of ecosystem growth. The study's goal is to figure the optimal balance between traditional activities and non-banking services of credit institutions. This suppose to strengthen their position in the face of penetration of digital competitors into banking operations (Internet banks, financial and large technology companies, telecoms). The theoretical and methodological basis of the research was formed by the scientific works of foreign scientists and experts on improving the efficiency of banking institutions. There were used methods of qualitative and quantitative analysis of scientific publications, analytical materials of well-known consulting companies, statistical data. As a result, the author found a technological transformation is required using such approaches to customer service (retail and corporate) that reflect their needs in banking with the intensive use of relevant competencies in cash management, means and risks. That will cause to protect the banking business from digital competitors and increase its market capitalization. All these measures will be able to induce clients to use more extensively the banks opportunities and help them to increase investments in their core business, thereby contributing to its growth. The author concludes that being developed ecosystems, it is advisable for banks to focus on services close to their core work, as well as on increasing the efficiency of their own activities and providing new services. Meanwhile, the marketplaces development within the banking ecosystems does not give the latter advantages in the competition in the banking services market.

We propose a dynamic structural corporate model in which firms face imperfect capital markets and frictional product markets. We highlight the importance of the endogeneity of firms' short-term cash flows and the endogeneity of the marginal value of liquidity in determining the interactions between investment, financing and product price setting decisions. Our primary goal is to develop a financial theory of markups to advance the understanding of two related questions in Macro Finance. One is how financial frictions affect firms' markups, and the other is how nominal frictions impact managers' financial decisions and firms' values. The model implies several testable predictions: (1) financially constrained firms are more inclined to increase their desired markups of products; (2) firms facing larger price stickiness tend to issue less external equity and conduct less big payouts; (3) a large part of the cost from price stickiness is induced by financial frictions; and (4) the impact of price stickiness on firms' investment ratios is ambiguous, due to the countervailing forces of precautionary cash holdings and the change in the cost of capital.

Research and development (R&D) collaborations between an innovator and her partner are often undertaken when neither party can bring the product to market individually, which precludes value creation without a joint effort. Yet, the uncertain nature of R&D complicates the monitoring of effort, and the resulting moral hazard reduces a collaboration’s value. Either party can avoid this outcome by acquiring the capability that is missing and then taking sole ownership of the project. That approach involves two types of risks: one related to whether the other party’s capability will be acquired and one related to how well it will be implemented (if acquired). We find that the extent of these two risks determines the optimality of delaying contracting or of signing contracts with buyout and buyback options, a baseball arbitration clause, or a novel reciprocal option. Baseball arbitration and reciprocal option clauses are unique in two ways. First, unlike typical options with predetermined strike prices, they allow either party to determine the buyout price at the time of their offer. Second, they allow the offer’s recipient to “turn the tables” on the other party. Although baseball arbitration and reciprocal option contracts both address inefficient joint development and product allocation, they exhibit their own inefficiencies that stem from the two parties’ strategic behavior. The best choice of contract is determined by trade-offs between these inefficiencies. Our model explores the similarities between the baseball arbitration and reciprocal option clauses, and we propose a modification to the reciprocal option contract that would increase its profitability. This paper was accepted by Terry Taylor, operations management.

As a new general-purpose technology, robots have the potential to radically transform employment and organizations. In contrast to prior studies that predict dramatic employment declines, we find that investments in robotics are associated with increases in total firm employment but decreases in the total number of managers. Similarly, we find that robots are associated with an increase in the span of control for supervisors remaining within the organization. We also provide evidence that robot adoption is not motivated by the desire to reduce labor costs but is instead related to improving product and service quality. Our findings are consistent with the notion that robots reduce variance in production processes, diminishing the need for managers to monitor worker activities to ensure production quality. As additional evidence, we also find that robot investments predict improved performance measurement and increased adoption of incentive pay based on individual employee performance. With respect to changes in skill composition within the organization, robots predict decreases in employment for middle-skilled workers but increases in employment for low- and high-skilled workers. We also find that robots predict not only changes in employment but also corresponding adaptations in organizational structure. Robot investments are associated with both centralization and decentralization of decision-making authority depending on the task, but decision rights in either case are reassigned away from the managerial level of the hierarchy. Overall, our results suggest that robots have distinct and profound effects on employment and organizations that require fundamental changes in firm practices and organizational design. This paper was accepted by Lamar Pierce, organizations.

Revenue management has evolved over the years from its origins in the airline industry into a much broader discipline that analyzes algorithmic methods for demand and marketplace management, but many outside of the discipline are not aware of this transformation. The field’s transition tracks the widespread adoption of algorithmic decision-making techniques by businesses in a wide variety of industries over the last decade. We study this evolution in the field’s breadth of research, with a particular focus on revenue-management papers that study online marketplaces such as e-commerce retailing, digital advertisement, and ride-hailing markets for urban transportation. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, Special Section of Management Science: 65th Anniversary.

In after-sales product support, both literature and practice have highlighted the advantages of paying for performance under performance-based contracts (PBC) over the more traditional transaction-based contracts (TBC) that tie supplier payments to each repair incident. Although PBC is believed to better align incentives in the supply chain when the supplier’s private effort is difficult to verify, emerging technologies can make the repair process more transparent, which can eliminate the supplier’s moral hazard problem. Meanwhile, fast growth of service outsourcing for established products makes information asymmetry with regards to product failure rates a new challenge for maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) operations. To analyze this changing environment, we build a stylized adverse selection model and explore which contract is more efficient in dealing with information asymmetry. We assume that equipment failure rates are only known by the customer, whose outside options are type dependent. The uninformed supplier has to design appropriate mechanisms to overcome the disadvantages of this information structure while maximizing profits. We show that the two contracts demonstrate different screening ability, and TBC may be preferred over PBC. Type-dependent outside options can lead to countervailing incentives, making PBC immune to information asymmetry and enabling it to achieve the first-best outcome. When the differential of outside options has a relatively stronger effect compared with the differential of failure rates, TBC can bring the supplier a higher ex ante payoff than PBC. Our paper brings to light a heretofore unknown advantage of TBC, and we demonstrate when these contracts are likely to be observed in the third-party MRO market. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management. Funding: This work was supported by the Fishman-Davidson Center at the Wharton School, Erasmus Research Institute of Management, and the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 71801228]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4606 .

When a supplier fails to comply with social and environmental standards, the buyer’s reputation suffers. Reputation costs can typically be very high for the buyer, whereas the supplier’s liability is often limited. Conventional procurement strategies such as dual sourcing mitigate the buyer’s operational risk, but they often do so at the expense of increasing its reputation risk and sourcing costs. In this paper, we propose a risk-sharing contract for managing the buyer’s reputation concerns. We find that by sharing some of the supplier’s operational loss, the buyer may (in some conditions) decrease its reputational risk, but this has to be balanced against an increase in the operational risk. Risk sharing also reduces sourcing costs because the buyer takes on some of the worst-case loss of a wealth-constrained supplier. These results suggest that risk sharing can be superior, as a procurement strategy, to conventional approaches such as dual sourcing or penalty contracts. This is true when reputation and sourcing costs are a significant concern and operational costs are not that high. Under some conditions, the buyer may choose risk sharing even if it increases reputation risk in order to reduce procurement costs. This paper was accepted by Victor Martínez-de-Albéniz, operations management.

In many industries, multiple independent complementors supply the individual components of a system. In this paper, we develop a formal model to examine the tensions and tradeoffs that result when a firm—either one of the complementors or a de novo entrant—takes competition to the system level by launching an integrated offering that combines the multiple components. A complementor who takes competition to the system level becomes a competitor to itself at the system level. As a consequence, the task of maintaining the competitiveness of the multiple-component system rests on the shoulders of the remaining complementor. We show that this allows the integrator to earn additional profits at the expense of the complementor—that is, it can raise the price of its component and thereby squeeze the margin of its complementor. We find that this squeezing effect can be so strong that offering an integrated system is profitable even if the system itself is unprofitable. Interestingly, when analyzing the possibility of entry by a de novo integrator who does not suffer from self-cannibalization, we show that an incumbent complementor may nevertheless have stronger incentives to launch an integrated offering. This is because the incumbent's ability to benefit from squeezing its complementor and earn additional profits on cannibalized sales leads to an entrant's disadvantage when taking competition to the system level. We also discuss defense strategies for complementors to shield themselves against the consequences of integration by their complementor. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.