42 results
Search Results
2. The (In)Elasticity of Moral Ignorance
- Author
-
Serra-Garcia, Marta and Szech, Nora
- Subjects
Behavioral and Social Science ,Clinical Research ,information avoidance ,morality ,unethical behavior ,social norms ,moral reminders ,social nudges ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
Ignorance enables individuals to act immorally. This is well known in policy circles, in which there is keen interest in lowering moral ignorance. In this paper, we study how the demand for moral ignorance responds to monetary incentives and how the demand curve for ignorance reacts to social norm messages. We propose a simple behavioral model in which individuals suffer moral costs when behaving selfishly in the face of moral information. In several experiments, we find that moral ignorance decreases by more than 30 percentage points with small monetary incentives, but we find no significant change with social norm messages, and we document strong persistence of ignorance across moral contexts. Our findings indicate that rather simple messaging interventions may have limited effects on ignorance. In contrast, changes in incentives could be highly effective. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.
- Published
- 2022
3. The Pledging Puzzle: How Can Revocable Promises Increase Charitable Giving?
- Author
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Andreoni, James and Serra-Garcia, Marta
- Subjects
prosocial behavior ,charitable giving ,pledging ,intertemporal choice ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
What is the value of pledges if they are often reneged upon? In this paper, we show—both theoretically and experimentally—that pledges can be used to screen donors and to better understand their motives for giving. In return, nonprofit managers can use the information they glean from pledges to better target future charitable giving appeals and interventions to donors, such as expressions of gratitude. In an experiment, we find that offering the option to pledge gifts induces self-selection. If expressions of gratitude are then targeted to individuals who select into pledges, reneging can be significantly reduced. Our findings provide an explanation for the potential usefulness of pledges. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.
- Published
- 2021
4. Can Brands Claim Ignorance? Unauthorized Subcontracting in Apparel Supply Chains
- Author
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Caro, Felipe, Lane, Leonard, and Sáez de Tejada Cuenca, Anna
- Subjects
Prevention ,unauthorized subcontracting ,social responsibility ,compliance ,sustainability ,supply chain management ,empirical operations management ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
Unauthorized subcontracting—when suppliers outsource part of their production to a third party without the retailer’s consent—has been common practice in the apparel industry and is often tied to noncompliant working conditions. Because retailers are unaware of the third party, the production process becomes obscure and cannot be tracked. In this paper, we present an empirical study of the factors that can lead suppliers to engage in unauthorized subcontracting. We use data provided by a global supply chain manager with more than 30,000 orders, of which 36% were subcontracted without authorization. We find that the frequency of unauthorized subcontracting across factories has a pronounced bimodal distribution. Moreover, the degree of unauthorized subcontracting in the past is highly related to the probability of engaging in unauthorized subcontracting in the future, which suggests that factories behave as if they choose a strategic level of unauthorized subcontracting. At the order level, we find that state dependence (i.e., the status of an order carrying over to the next one) and price pressure are the key drivers of unauthorized subcontracting. Buyer reputation and lead time also play a role. Finally, we show that unauthorized subcontracting can be predicted correctly for more than 80% of the orders in out-of-sample tests and for about 70% of suppliers. This indicates that retailers can use business analytics to predict unauthorized subcontracting and help prevent it. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.
- Published
- 2021
5. Nonprofit Organizations’ Financial Obligations and the Paycheck Protection Program
- Author
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Neely, Daniel G, Saxton, Gregory D, and Wong, Paul A
- Subjects
Decent Work and Economic Growth ,COVID-19 ,Paycheck Protection Program ,nonprofit organizations ,financial obligations ,Nonprofit Organizations ,Financial Obligations ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
We examine nonprofit organizations’ involvement in the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). The PPP provided participants with forgivable loans to pay employee salaries, increasing participants’ financial flexibility during the pandemic. We examine the associations between nonprofits’ prepandemic financial obligations (e.g., long-term debt and donor-restricted net assets) and PPP participation and participants’ loan characteristics. First, we find nonprofit organizations participated at a lower rate than other small business industries and that nonprofits with greater financial obligations were more likely to participate in the program. Second, we find financial obligations were positively associated with the loan amount received as a percentage of total payroll costs. Last, although approximately 11% of nonprofits failed to obtain loan forgiveness, we find nonprofits with restricted net assets were more likely to have their loans forgiven. Our results suggest nonprofits with greater debt and donor obligations used the PPP to increase their financial flexibility. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4804 .
- Published
- 2023
6. Incentives and Defaults Can Increase COVID-19 Vaccine Intentions and Test Demand
- Author
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Serra-Garcia, Marta and Szech, Nora
- Subjects
Vaccine Related ,Prevention ,Immunization ,Prevention of disease and conditions ,and promotion of well-being ,3.4 Vaccines ,Good Health and Well Being ,choice architecture ,defaults ,incentives ,COVID-19 ,vaccine hesitancy ,test avoidance ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
Willingness to vaccinate and test are critical in the COVID-19 pandemic. We study the effects of two measures to increase the support of vaccination and testing: defaults and monetary compensations. Some organizations, such as restaurants, fire departments, hospitals, or governments in some countries, have used these measures. Yet there is the concern that compensations could erode intrinsic motivation and decrease vaccination intentions. We show that, in the early stages of the pandemic, both approaches, compensations and defaults, significantly increased COVID-19 test demand and vaccine intentions. Compensations for vaccines, however, need to be large enough because low compensations can backfire. We estimate heterogeneous treatment effects to document which groups are more likely to respond to these measures. The results show that defaults and avoidance of small compensations are especially important for individuals who are more skeptical of the vaccine, measured by their trust in the vaccine and their political views. Hence, both measures could be used in a targeted manner to achieve stronger results. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4405 .
- Published
- 2023
7. Efficient Implementation of Collective Extended Producer Responsibility Legislation
- Author
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Gui, Luyi, Atasu, Atalay, Ergun, Özlem, and Toktay, L Beril
- Subjects
environment ,regulation ,extended producer responsibility ,recycling ,cost allocation ,Operations Research ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
Extended producer responsibility (EPR) is a policy tool that holds producers financially responsible for the post-use collection, recycling, and disposal of their products. Many EPR implementations are collective—a large collection and recycling network (CRN) handles multiple producers’ products in order to benefit from scale and scope economies. The total cost is then allocated to producers based on metrics such as their return shares by weight. Such weight-based proportional allocation mechanisms are criticized in practice for not taking into account the heterogeneity in the costs imposed by different producers’ products. The consequence is cost allocations that impose higher costs on certain producer groups than they can achieve independently. This may lead some producers to break away from collective systems, resulting in fragmented systems with higher total cost. Yet cost efficiency is a key legislative and producer concern. To address this concern, this paper develops cost allocation mechanisms that induce participation in collective systems and maximize cost efficiency. The cost allocation mechanisms we propose consist of adjustments to the widely used return share method and include the weighing of return shares based on processing costs and the rewarding of capacity contributions to collective systems. We validate our theoretical results using Washington state EPR implementation data and provide insights into how these mechanisms can be implemented in practice. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.
- Published
- 2016
8. Efficient Implementation of Collective Extended Producer Responsibility Legislation
- Author
-
Gui, Luyi, Atasu, Atalay, Ergun, Özlem, and Toktay, L Beril
- Subjects
environment ,regulation ,extended producer responsibility ,recycling ,cost allocation ,Operations Research ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
Extended producer responsibility (EPR) is a policy tool that holds producers financially responsible for the post-use collection, recycling, and disposal of their products. Many EPR implementations are collective—a large collection and recycling network (CRN) handles multiple producers’ products in order to benefit from scale and scope economies. The total cost is then allocated to producers based on metrics such as their return shares by weight. Such weight-based proportional allocation mechanisms are criticized in practice for not taking into account the heterogeneity in the costs imposed by different producers’ products. The consequence is cost allocations that impose higher costs on certain producer groups than they can achieve independently. This may lead some producers to break away from collective systems, resulting in fragmented systems with higher total cost. Yet cost efficiency is a key legislative and producer concern. To address this concern, this paper develops cost allocation mechanisms that induce participation in collective systems and maximize cost efficiency. The cost allocation mechanisms we propose consist of adjustments to the widely used return share method and include the weighing of return shares based on processing costs and the rewarding of capacity contributions to collective systems. We validate our theoretical results using Washington state EPR implementation data and provide insights into how these mechanisms can be implemented in practice.This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.
- Published
- 2016
9. Valuation Uncertainty and Short-Sales Constraints: Evidence from the IPO Aftermarket
- Author
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Patatoukas, Panos N, Sloan, Richard G, and Wang, Annika Yu
- Subjects
short-sales constraints ,valuation uncertainty ,IPO pricing ,equity mispricing ,Short-Sales Constraints ,Valuation Uncertainty ,IPO Pricing ,Equity Mispricing ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
We use the initial public offering (IPO) setting to provide evidence that the combination of valuation uncertainty and short-sales constraints generates significant equity market mispricing. The IPOs that we predict to be most susceptible to overpricing in the immediate aftermarket have first-day returns of +47% and lockup expiration returns of -9%. Our detailed analysis of securities lending market data confirms that these IPOs experience severe short-sales constraints that peak around the lockup expiration. Our paper both explains the anomalous pricing of IPOs and highlights the importance of valuation uncertainty and short-sales constraints in explaining equity mispricing.
- Published
- 2022
10. Childcare Matters: Female Business Owners and the Baby-Profit Gap
- Author
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Delecourt, Solène and Fitzpatrick, Anne
- Subjects
Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Strategy ,Management and Organisational Behaviour ,Decent Work and Economic Growth ,Gender Equality ,Industry ,Innovation and Infrastructure ,gender ,entrepreneurship ,organizational studies ,economics ,inequality ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Operations Research ,Commerce ,management ,tourism and services ,Economics ,Information and computing sciences - Abstract
The previous literature documents that female-owned businesses are less profitable than male-owned businesses, including microenterprises that make up the majority of firms in developing countries. In this paper, we uncover an overlooked gendered constraint for these businesses: childcare.We collect field data through unannounced visits to a sample of microentrepreneurs in select areas of Uganda, combining surveys of business owners and real customers, as well as purchases by confederate buyers (i.e., mystery shoppers). We document that childcare duties in businesses are highly gendered: 37% of female owners bring small children to work, compared with 0% of men. Childcare duties are correlated with a "baby-profit gap,"as businesses where children are present earn 48% lower profits than even other female-owned businesses where a child is not present. Using our rich data, we analyze potential reasons why childcare obligations may affect profits. We find that prices, product quality, and other explanations are not robustly correlated with the presence of a baby. However, we find that women with children in the store are more likely to run out of stock than both men and women who do not have children in the store. Although we caution that our analysis is not causal, we consistently find that childcare duties are associated with profitability and may relate to the wider gender gap in business performance.
- Published
- 2021
11. How Do Travel Costs Shape Collaboration?
- Author
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Catalini, Christian, Fons-Rosen, Christian, and Gaulé, Patrick
- Subjects
scientific collaboration ,geographic frictions ,temporary colocation ,face-to-face meetings ,recombinations of ideas ,travel costs ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
We develop a simple theoretical framework for thinking about how geographic frictions, and in particular travel costs, shape scientists’ collaboration decisions and the types of projects that are developed locally versus over distance. We then take advantage of a quasi-experiment—the introduction of new routes by a low-cost airline—to test the predictions of the theory. Results show that travel costs constitute an important friction to collaboration: after a low-cost airline enters, the number of collaborations increases between 0.3 and 1.1 times, a result that is robust to multiple falsification tests and causal in nature. The reduction in geographic frictions is particularly beneficial for high-quality scientists that are otherwise embedded in worse local environments. Consistent with the theory, lower travel costs also endogenously change the types of projects scientists engage in at different levels of distance. After the shock, we observe an increase in higher-quality and novel projects, as well as projects that take advantage of complementary knowledge and skills between subfields, and that rely on specialized equipment. We test the generalizability of our findings from chemistry to a broader data set of scientific publications and to a different field where specialized equipment is less likely to be relevant, mathematics. Last, we discuss implications for the formation of collaborative research and development teams over distance. This paper was accepted by Toby Stuart, entrepreneurship and innovation.
- Published
- 2020
12. Are Online Job Postings Informative to Investors?
- Author
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Gutierrez, Elizabeth, Lourie, Ben, Nekrasov, Alexander, and Shevlin, Terry
- Subjects
human capital ,hiring ,disclosure ,job postings ,market reaction ,firm performance ,Human capital ,Hiring ,Disclosure ,Job postings ,Market reaction ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research ,Human capital ,Hiring ,Disclosure ,Job postings ,Market reaction ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
Human capital is a key factor in value creation in the modern corporation. Yet the disclosure of investment in human capital is scant. We propose that a company’s online job postings are disclosures made outside of the investor-relations channel that contain forward-looking information that could be informative to investors about future growth. We find that changes in the number of job postings are positively associated with changes in future performance and that this relation is stronger when postings likely represent growth rather than replacement. Consistent with job postings providing new information to the market, investors react positively to changes in the number of job postings. The market reaction to postings is stronger when firms are likely to be hiring for growth rather than replacement and for firms with low labor intensity (and therefore high marginal productivity of labor). This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.
- Published
- 2020
13. Are Online Job Postings Informative to Investors?
- Author
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Gutiérrez, Elizabeth, Lourie, Ben, Nekrasov, Alexander, and Shevlin, Terry
- Subjects
Accounting ,Auditing and Accountability ,Banking ,Finance and Investment ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Strategy ,Management and Organisational Behaviour ,Decent Work and Economic Growth ,human capital ,hiring ,disclosure ,job postings ,market reaction ,firm performance ,Human capital ,Hiring ,Disclosure ,Job postings ,Market reaction ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Operations Research ,Commerce ,management ,tourism and services ,Economics ,Information and computing sciences - Abstract
Human capital is a key factor in value creation in the modern corporation. Yet the disclosure of investment in human capital is scant. We propose that a company’s online job postings are disclosures made outside of the investor-relations channel that contain forward-looking information that could be informative to investors about future growth. We find that changes in the number of job postings are positively associated with changes in future performance and that this relation is stronger when postings likely represent growth rather than replacement. Consistent with job postings providing new information to the market, investors react positively to changes in the number of job postings. The market reaction to postings is stronger when firms are likely to be hiring for growth rather than replacement and for firms with low labor intensity (and therefore high marginal productivity of labor). This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.
- Published
- 2020
14. Motivating Whistleblowers
- Author
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Butler, Jeffrey V, Serra, Danila, and Spagnolo, Giancarlo
- Subjects
whistleblowing ,fraud ,rewards ,social judgment ,experiment ,K42 ,C92 ,D04. ,Whistleblowing ,experiment. ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
Law-breaking activities within firms are widespread but difficult to uncover, making whistleblowing by employees desirable. We investigate if and how monetary incentives and expectations of social approval or disapproval from the public, and their interactions, affect an employee’s decision to blow the whistle when the social damage from the reported misbehavior is more or less salient. Our analysis also has implications for the design and management of firms’ internal whistleblowing channels. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.
- Published
- 2020
15. Why markdown as a pricing modality?
- Author
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Adida, E and Özer, Ö
- Subjects
pricing ,markdown ,everyday low price ,competition ,regret ,Pricing ,everyday-low-price ,Operations Research ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
Markdown as a pricing modality is ubiquitous in retail whereas everyday low price (EDLP) remains relatively rare (despite its several advantages, such as simplicity). This paper explores whether and why retailers can use either of these pricing modalities as an effective defense against a competitor entering the market with the alternative pricing modality. Various studies have shown that consumers are strategic and heterogeneous in their valuation of a product. Consumers are also shown to be regret-prone, and anticipation of regret affects their purchase decisions. Consumers experience availability regret when they are unable to purchase products due to stockouts and high-price regret when they miss an opportunity to purchase products at low prices. Considering such factors, consumers decide whether, when, and from which retailer to purchase the product. In such a market environment, we find that the possible entry of a competitor should deter retailers from using the EDLP pricing modality but not markdown. We also identify a new reason for the markdown retailer to ration stock (in addition to the reason for discouraging consumers to wait for the markdown). In particular, we show that the markdown retailer can use inventory rationing to preclude a cutthroat competition and bankruptcy after the entry of an EDLP retailer. We also quantify how consumer regret affects both retailers' decisions and resulting profits. In particular, in a competitive market, the EDLP retailer cannot simply disregard consumers' availability and high-price regret (even when it stocks ample inventory and does not discount prices). We show that high-price regret and availability regret have complementary effects on the markdown retailer's rationing strategy and the EDLP retailer's price decision. Finally, using a proprietary price data set from a large department store, we show that ignoring regret factors causes the markdown retailer to leave up to 20% of its profits on the table. In addition, in a competitive market, the markdown retailer rations too aggressively when regret is ignored and, as a result, leaves some of the forgone profit to its competitor-the EDLP retailer. The retail industry is often characterized by its slim profit margins. In such an environment, the aforementioned results also suggest that retailers should seriously consider investing in developing the capacity to estimate and quantify the role of regret in consumers' purchase decisions.
- Published
- 2019
16. Testing by Competitors in Enforcement of Product Standards
- Author
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Plambeck, Erica L and Taylor, Terry A
- Subjects
manufacturing ,environment ,regulation ,policy ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
Firms have an incentive to test competitors' products to reveal violations of safety and environmental standards, in order to have competitors' products blocked from sale. This paper shows that testing by a regulator crowds out testing by competitors, and can reduce firms' efforts to comply with the product standard. Relying on competitor testing (i.e., having the regulator test only to verify evidence of violations provided by competitors) is most effective in large or concentrated markets in which firms have strong brands and high quality, and for standards that are highly valued by consumers. Under those conditions, firms tend to test competitors' products and exert high compliance effort. Conversely, unless compliance is highly valued by consumers, a firm with low quality does not draw testing from competitors, and so does not comply. Enforcing a product standard through competitor testing encourages entry by such low-quality, noncompliant firms and can reduce quality investment by incumbents. Stripping offending products of labels (such as "Energy Star"), instead of blocking them from the market, eliminates the problem of entry by low-quality, noncompliant firms, but may reduce incumbents' compliance efforts.
- Published
- 2019
17. Testing by competitors in enforcement of product standards
- Author
-
Plambeck, EL and Taylor, TA
- Subjects
Operations Research ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
Firms have an incentive to test competitors' products to reveal violations of safety and environmental standards, in order to have competitors' products blocked from sale. This paper shows that testing by a regulator crowds out testing by competitors, and can reduce firms' efforts to comply with the product standard. Relying on competitor testing (i.e., having the regulator test only to verify evidence of violations provided by competitors) is most effective in large or concentrated markets in which firms have strong brands and high quality, and for standards that are highly valued by consumers. Under those conditions, firms tend to test competitors' products and exert high compliance effort. Conversely, unless compliance is highly valued by consumers, a firm with low quality does not draw testing from competitors, and so does not comply. Enforcing a product standard through competitor testing encourages entry by such low-quality, noncompliant firms and can reduce quality investment by incumbents. Stripping offending products of labels (such as "Energy Star"), instead of blocking them from the market, eliminates the problem of entry by low-quality, noncompliant firms, but may reduce incumbents' compliance efforts.
- Published
- 2019
18. Why Markdown as a Pricing Modality?
- Author
-
Adida, Elodie and Özer, Özalp
- Subjects
Economics ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,pricing ,markdown ,everyday low price ,competition ,regret ,Pricing ,everyday-low-price ,Operations Research ,Commerce ,management ,tourism and services ,Information and computing sciences - Abstract
Markdown as a pricing modality is ubiquitous in retail whereas everyday low price (EDLP) remains relatively rare (despite its several advantages, such as simplicity). This paper explores whether and why retailers can use either of these pricing modalities as an effective defense against a competitor entering the market with the alternative pricing modality. Various studies have shown that consumers are strategic and heterogeneous in their valuation of a product. Consumers are also shown to be regret-prone, and anticipation of regret affects their purchase decisions. Consumers experience availability regret when they are unable to purchase products due to stockouts and high-price regret when they miss an opportunity to purchase products at low prices. Considering such factors, consumers decide whether, when, and from which retailer to purchase the product. In such a market environment, we find that the possible entry of a competitor should deter retailers from using the EDLP pricing modality but not markdown. We also identify a new reason for the markdown retailer to ration stock (in addition to the reason for discouraging consumers to wait for the markdown). In particular, we show that the markdown retailer can use inventory rationing to preclude a cutthroat competition and bankruptcy after the entry of an EDLP retailer. We also quantify how consumer regret affects both retailers' decisions and resulting profits. In particular, in a competitive market, the EDLP retailer cannot simply disregard consumers' availability and high-price regret (even when it stocks ample inventory and does not discount prices). We show that high-price regret and availability regret have complementary effects on the markdown retailer's rationing strategy and the EDLP retailer's price decision. Finally, using a proprietary price data set from a large department store, we show that ignoring regret factors causes the markdown retailer to leave up to 20% of its profits on the table. In addition, in a competitive market, the markdown retailer rations too aggressively when regret is ignored and, as a result, leaves some of the forgone profit to its competitor-the EDLP retailer. The retail industry is often characterized by its slim profit margins. In such an environment, the aforementioned results also suggest that retailers should seriously consider investing in developing the capacity to estimate and quantify the role of regret in consumers' purchase decisions.
- Published
- 2019
19. Fostering Public Good Contributions with Symbolic Awards: A Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment at Wikipedia
- Author
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Gallus, Jana
- Subjects
economics ,behavior and behavioral decision making ,public good provision ,awards and motivation ,natural field experiment ,Wikipedia ,online community management ,Field Experiment ,Symbolic awards ,Awards ,Public Goods ,Retention ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
This natural field experiment tests the effects of purely symbolic awards on volunteer retention in a public goods context. The experiment is conducted at Wikipedia, which faces declining editor retention rates, particularly among newcomers. Randomization assures that award receipt is orthogonal to previous performance. The analysis reveals that awards have a sizeable effect on newcomer retention, which persists over the four quarters following the initial intervention. This is noteworthy for indicating that awards for volunteers can be effective even if they have no impact on the volunteers’ future career opportunities. The awards are purely symbolic, and the status increment they produce is limited to the recipients’ pseudonymous online identities in a community they have just recently joined. The results can be explained by enhanced self-identification with the community, but they are also in line with recent findings on the role of status and reputation, recognition, and evaluation potential in online communities. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2540 . This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.
- Published
- 2017
20. The Threat of Exclusion and Implicit Contracting
- Author
-
Brown, Martin and Serra-Garcia, Marta
- Subjects
economics ,microeconomic behavior ,behavior and behavioral decision making ,finance ,corporate finance ,implicit contracting ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
Implicit contracts can mitigate moral hazard in labor, credit, and product markets. The enforcement mechanism underlying an implicit contract is the threat of exclusion: the agent fears that he will lose future income if the principal breaks off the relationship. This threat may be very weak in environments where an agent can appropriate income-generating resources provided by the principal. For example, in credit markets with weak creditor protection, borrowers may be able to appropriate borrowed funds and generate investment income without requiring further loans. We examine implicit contracting in a lending experiment where the threat of exclusion is exogenously varied. We find that weak exclusion undermines implicit contracting: it leads to a more frequent breakdown of credit relationships as well as to smaller loans. Data, as supplemental material, are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2572 . This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.
- Published
- 2017
21. Bundled Payment vs. Fee-for-Service: Impact of Payment Scheme on Performance
- Author
-
Adida, Elodie, Mamani, Hamed, and Nassiri, Shima
- Subjects
Health Services ,Clinical Research ,healthcare ,payment models ,bundled payment ,fee-for-service ,coordination ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
Healthcare reimbursements in the United States have been traditionally based on a fee-for-service (FFS) scheme, providing incentives for high volume of care, rather than efficient care. The new healthcare legislation tests new payment models that remove such incentives, such as the bundled payment (BP) system. We consider a population of patients (beneficiaries). The provider may reject patients based on the patient’s cost profile and selects the treatment intensity based on a risk-averse utility function. Treatment may result in success or failure, where failure means that unforeseen complications require further care. Our interest is in analyzing the effect of different payment schemes on outcomes such as the presence and extent of patient selection, the treatment intensity, the provider’s utility and financial risk, and the total system payoff. Our results confirm that FFS provides incentives for excessive treatment intensity and results in suboptimal system payoff. We show that BP could lead to suboptimal patient selection and treatment levels that may be lower or higher than desirable for the system, with a high level of financial risk for the provider. We also find that the performance of BP is extremely sensitive to the bundled payment value and to the provider’s risk aversion. The performance of both BP and FFS degrades when the provider becomes more risk averse. We design two payment systems, hybrid payment and stop-loss mechanisms, that alleviate the shortcomings of FFS and BP and may induce system optimum decisions in a complementary manner. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.
- Published
- 2017
22. Competing for Attention in Social Communication Markets
- Author
-
Iyer, Ganesh and Katona, Zsolt
- Subjects
Behavioral and Social Science ,Basic Behavioral and Social Science ,Reduced Inequalities ,marketing ,advertising and media ,social media ,social networks ,Social Networks ,Social Communication ,Participation Inequality ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
We investigate the incentives for social communication in the new social media technologies. Three features of online social communication are represented in the model. First, new social media platforms allow for increased connectivity; i.e., they enable sending messages to many more receivers, for the same fixed cost, compared to traditional word of mouth. Second, users contribute content because they derive status- or image-based utility from being listened to by their peers. Third, we capture the role of social differentiation, or how social distance between people affects their preferences for messages. In the model, agents endogenously decide whether to be a sender of information and then compete for the attention of receivers. An important point of this paper is that social communication incentives diminish even as the reach or the span of communication increases. As the span of communication increases, competition between senders for receiver attention becomes more intense, resulting in senders competing with greater equilibrium messaging effort. This in turn leads to lower equilibrium payoffs and the entry of fewer senders. This result provides a strategic rationale for the socalled participation inequality phenomenon, which is a characteristic of many social media platforms. We also show that social differentiation may enhance or deter sender entry depending on whether it can be endogenously influenced by senders. Finally, we examine how the underlying network structure (in terms of its density and its degree distribution) affects communication and uncover a nonmonotonic pattern in that increased connectivity first increases and then reduces the entry of senders.
- Published
- 2016
23. Competing for attention in social communication markets
- Author
-
Iyer, G and Katona, Z
- Subjects
marketing ,advertising and media ,social media ,social networks ,Social Networks ,Social Communication ,Participation Inequality ,Operations Research ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
We investigate the incentives for social communication in the new social media technologies. Three features of online social communication are represented in the model. First, new social media platforms allow for increased connectivity; i.e., they enable sending messages to many more receivers, for the same fixed cost, compared to traditional word of mouth. Second, users contribute content because they derive status- or image-based utility from being listened to by their peers. Third, we capture the role of social differentiation, or how social distance between people affects their preferences for messages. In the model, agents endogenously decide whether to be a sender of information and then compete for the attention of receivers. An important point of this paper is that social communication incentives diminish even as the reach or the span of communication increases. As the span of communication increases, competition between senders for receiver attention becomes more intense, resulting in senders competing with greater equilibrium messaging effort. This in turn leads to lower equilibrium payoffs and the entry of fewer senders. This result provides a strategic rationale for the socalled participation inequality phenomenon, which is a characteristic of many social media platforms. We also show that social differentiation may enhance or deter sender entry depending on whether it can be endogenously influenced by senders. Finally, we examine how the underlying network structure (in terms of its density and its degree distribution) affects communication and uncover a nonmonotonic pattern in that increased connectivity first increases and then reduces the entry of senders.
- Published
- 2016
24. Asymmetric Effects of Favorable and Unfavorable Information on Decision Making Under Ambiguity
- Author
-
Peysakhovich, Alexander and Karmarkar, Uma R
- Subjects
Basic Behavioral and Social Science ,Behavioral and Social Science ,decision analysis ,risk ,economics: microeconomic behavior ,utility-preference ,applications ,choice functions ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
Most daily decisions involve uncertainty about outcome probabilities arising from incomplete knowledge, i.e., ambiguity. We explore how the addition of partial information affects these types of choices using theoretical and empirical methods. Our experiments in both gain and loss domains demonstrate that when such information supports a favorable outcome, it strongly increases valuation of an ambiguous financial prospect. However, when information supports an unfavorable outcome, it has significantly less impact. We find that two mechanisms drive this asymmetry. First, unfavorable information decreases estimates of a good outcome occurring but also reduces aversive uncertainty. These factors act in opposition, minimizing the effects of unfavorable information. Second, when information can be subjectively interpreted, unfavorable information is less likely to be integrated into evaluations. Our findings reveal mechanisms not captured by traditional models of decision making under uncertainty and highlight the importance of increasing the salience of unfavorable information in uncertain contexts to promote unbiased decision making. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2233 . This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, behavioral economics.
- Published
- 2016
25. Asymmetric Effects of Favorable and Unfavorable Information on Decision Making Under Ambiguity
- Author
-
Peysakhovich, Alexander and Karmarkar, Uma R
- Subjects
decision analysis ,risk ,economics: microeconomic behavior ,utility-preference ,applications ,choice functions ,Operations Research ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
Most daily decisions involve uncertainty about outcome probabilities arising from incomplete knowledge, i.e., ambiguity. We explore how the addition of partial information affects these types of choices using theoretical and empirical methods. Our experiments in both gain and loss domains demonstrate that when such information supports a favorable outcome, it strongly increases valuation of an ambiguous financial prospect. However, when information supports an unfavorable outcome, it has significantly less impact. We find that two mechanisms drive this asymmetry. First, unfavorable information decreases estimates of a good outcome occurring but also reduces aversive uncertainty. These factors act in opposition, minimizing the effects of unfavorable information. Second, when information can be subjectively interpreted, unfavorable information is less likely to be integrated into evaluations. Our findings reveal mechanisms not captured by traditional models of decision making under uncertainty and highlight the importance of increasing the salience of unfavorable information in uncertain contexts to promote unbiased decision making.Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2233.This paper was accepted by Teck-Hua Ho, behavioral economics.
- Published
- 2016
26. Object Salience in the Division of Labor: Experimental Evidence
- Author
-
Raveendran, Marlo, Puranam, Phanish, and Warglien, Massimo
- Subjects
organization design ,division of labor ,decomposability ,experiments ,Organization Design ,Division of Labor ,Decomposability ,Experiments ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
When we engage in the process of division of labor, there are typically multiple alternatives, but insufficient knowledge to choose among them. Under such conditions, we propose that not all alternatives are equally likely to be pursued. In particular, when we engage in the process of division of labor for novel and nonrepetitive production, we argue that we display a tendency to perceive and select object-based task partitions over activity-based partitions. We experimentally investigate how the salience of objects over activities manifests itself in individuals and groups engaged in division of labor for the assembly of strongly or weakly decomposable products. We draw implications for organization design as well as the impact of technological change on organizations. This paper was accepted by Jesper Sørensen, organizations.
- Published
- 2016
27. Object Salience in the Division of Labor: Experimental Evidence
- Author
-
Raveendran, Marlo, Puranam, Phanish, and Warglien, Massimo
- Subjects
organization design ,division of labor ,decomposability ,experiments ,Organization Design ,Division of Labor ,Decomposability ,Experiments ,Operations Research ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
When we engage in the process of division of labor, there are typically multiple alternatives, but insufficient knowledge to choose among them. Under such conditions, we propose that not all alternatives are equally likely to be pursued. In particular, when we engage in the process of division of labor for novel and nonrepetitive production, we argue that we display a tendency to perceive and select object-based task partitions over activity-based partitions. We experimentally investigate how the salience of objects over activities manifests itself in individuals and groups engaged in division of labor for the assembly of strongly or weakly decomposable products. We draw implications for organization design as well as the impact of technological change on organizations.This paper was accepted by Jesper Sørensen, organizations.
- Published
- 2016
28. Brand Performance Volatility from Marketing Spending
- Author
-
Fischer, Marc, Shin, Hyun S, and Hanssens, Dominique M
- Subjects
Clinical Research ,revenue/cash-flow volatility ,marketing volatility ,econometric models ,marketing metrics ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
Although volatile marketing spending, as opposed to even-level spending, may improve a brand’s financial performance, it can also increase the volatility of performance, which is not a desirable outcome. This article analyzes how revenue and cash-flow volatility are influenced by own and competitive marketing spending volatility, by the level of marketing spending, by the responsiveness to own marketing spending, and by competitive response. From market response theory, we derive propositions about the influence of these variables on revenue and cash-flow volatility. In addition, we extend the Dorfman–Steiner theorem to derive the optimal level and volatility of expenditures if volatility effects are taken into account. Based on a large sample of 99 pharmaceutical brands in four clinical categories and four European countries, we test for the empirical relevance of the propositions and assess the magnitude of the different sources of marketing-induced performance volatility. We find broad support for the predicted volatility effects. Volatility elasticities are significant and may be as large as 1.10 for cash-flow variance with respect to marketing responsiveness. The findings imply that common volatility-increasing marketing practices such as price promotions or volatile advertising plans may be effective at the top line, but they could turn out to be ineffective after all costs are taken into account. Optimal marketing volatility needs to trade off sales effectiveness and extra costs resulting from marketing volatility. This paper was accepted by Pradeep K. Chintagunta, marketing.
- Published
- 2016
29. The Influence of Software Process Maturity and Customer Error Reporting on Software Release and Pricing
- Author
-
August, Terrence and Niculescu, Marius Florin
- Subjects
software quality ,software reliability ,software security ,software economics ,software process maturity ,network effects ,software error reporting ,diffusion of innovation ,CMM ,software release ,software pricing ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
Software producers are making greater use of customer error reporting to discover defects and improve the quality of their products. We study how software development differences among producers (e.g., varying levels of process maturity) and software class and functionality differences (e.g., operating system versus productivity software) affect how these producers coordinate software release timing and pricing to optimally harness error reporting contributions from users. In settings where prices are fixed, we characterize the optimal release time and demonstrate why in some cases it can actually be preferable to delay release when customer error reporting rates increase. The manner in which a firm's optimal release time responds to increases in software functionality critically hinges on whether the added functionality enhances or dilutes user error reporting; in both cases, the effect of added functionality on release timing can go in either direction, depending on both firm and product market characteristics. For example, when processing costs are relatively large compared with goodwill costs, firms with lower process maturity will release earlier when per-module error reporting contributions become diluted and release later when these contributions become enhanced. We also examine how a firm adapts price with changes in error reporting levels and software functionality, and finally, we provide implications of how beta testing influences release timing. This paper was accepted by Lorin Hitt, information systems.
- Published
- 2013
30. The Influence of Software Process Maturity and Customer Error Reporting on Software Release and Pricing
- Author
-
August, Terrence and Niculescu, Marius Florin
- Subjects
software quality ,software reliability ,software security ,software economics ,software process maturity ,network effects ,software error reporting ,diffusion of innovation ,CMM ,software release ,software pricing ,Operations Research ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
Software producers are making greater use of customer error reporting to discover defects and improve the quality of their products. We study how software development differences among producers (e.g., varying levels of process maturity) and software class and functionality differences (e.g., operating system versus productivity software) affect how these producers coordinate software release timing and pricing to optimally harness error reporting contributions from users. In settings where prices are fixed, we characterize the optimal release time and demonstrate why in some cases it can actually be preferable to delay release when customer error reporting rates increase. The manner in which a firm's optimal release time responds to increases in software functionality critically hinges on whether the added functionality enhances or dilutes user error reporting; in both cases, the effect of added functionality on release timing can go in either direction, depending on both firm and product market characteristics. For example, when processing costs are relatively large compared with goodwill costs, firms with lower process maturity will release earlier when per-module error reporting contributions become diluted and release later when these contributions become enhanced. We also examine how a firm adapts price with changes in error reporting levels and software functionality, and finally, we provide implications of how beta testing influences release timing.This paper was accepted by Lorin Hitt, information systems.
- Published
- 2013
31. Does a Manufacturer Benefit from Selling to a Better-Forecasting Retailer?
- Author
-
Taylor, Terry A and Xiao, Wenqiang
- Subjects
supply chain contracting ,asymmetric information ,forecasting ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
This paper considers a manufacturer selling to a newsvendor retailer that possesses superior demand-forecast information. We show that the manufacturer's expected profit is convex in the retailer's forecasting accuracy: The manufacturer benefits from selling to a better-forecasting retailer if and only if the retailer is already a good forecaster. If the retailer has poor forecasting capabilities, then the manufacturer is hurt as the retailer's forecasting capability improves. More generally, the manufacturer tends to be hurt (benefit) by improved retailer forecasting capabilities if the product economics are lucrative (poor). Finally, the optimal procurement contract is a quantity discount contract. Copyright © 2010 INFORMS.
- Published
- 2010
32. Does a manufacturer benefit from selling to a better-forecasting retailer?
- Author
-
Taylor, TA and Xiao, W
- Subjects
Operations Research ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
This paper considers a manufacturer selling to a newsvendor retailer that possesses superior demand-forecast information. We show that the manufacturer's expected profit is convex in the retailer's forecasting accuracy: The manufacturer benefits from selling to a better-forecasting retailer if and only if the retailer is already a good forecaster. If the retailer has poor forecasting capabilities, then the manufacturer is hurt as the retailer's forecasting capability improves. More generally, the manufacturer tends to be hurt (benefit) by improved retailer forecasting capabilities if the product economics are lucrative (poor). Finally, the optimal procurement contract is a quantity discount contract. Copyright © 2010 INFORMS.
- Published
- 2010
33. Incentives for Retailer Forecasting: Rebates vs. Returns
- Author
-
Taylor, Terry A and Xiao, Wenqiang
- Subjects
forecasting ,supply chain contracting ,rebates ,returns ,endogenous adverse selection ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
This paper studies a manufacturer that sells to a newsvendor retailer who can improve the quality of her demand information by exerting costly forecasting effort. In such a setting, contracts play two roles: providing incentives to influence the retailer's forecasting decision and eliciting information obtained by forecasting to inform production decisions. We focus on two forms of contracts that are widely used in such settings and are mirror images of one another: a rebates contract, which compensates the retailer for the units she sells to end consumers, and a returns contract, which compensates the retailer for the units that are unsold. We characterize the optimal rebates contracts and returns contracts. Under rebates, the retailer, manufacturer, and total system may benefit from the retailer having inferior forecasting technology; this never occurs under returns. Although one might conjecture that returns would be inferior because its provision of "insurance" would discourage the retailer from forecasting, we show that returns are superior. © 2009 INFORMS.
- Published
- 2009
34. Incentives for retailer forecasting: Rebates vs. Returns
- Author
-
Taylor, TA and Xiao, W
- Subjects
Operations Research ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
This paper studies a manufacturer that sells to a newsvendor retailer who can improve the quality of her demand information by exerting costly forecasting effort. In such a setting, contracts play two roles: providing incentives to influence the retailer's forecasting decision and eliciting information obtained by forecasting to inform production decisions. We focus on two forms of contracts that are widely used in such settings and are mirror images of one another: a rebates contract, which compensates the retailer for the units she sells to end consumers, and a returns contract, which compensates the retailer for the units that are unsold. We characterize the optimal rebates contracts and returns contracts. Under rebates, the retailer, manufacturer, and total system may benefit from the retailer having inferior forecasting technology; this never occurs under returns. Although one might conjecture that returns would be inferior because its provision of "insurance" would discourage the retailer from forecasting, we show that returns are superior. © 2009 INFORMS.
- Published
- 2009
35. Implications of Renegotiation for Optimal Contract Flexibility and Investment
- Author
-
Plambeck, Erica L and Taylor, Terry A
- Subjects
Industry ,Innovation and Infrastructure ,renegotiation ,biform games ,bargaining ,contract manufacturing ,capacity pooling and allocation ,quantity flexibility contracts ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
In a stylized model of biopharmaceutical contract manufacturing, this paper shows how the potential for renegotiation influences the optimal structure of supply contracts, investments in innovation and capacity, the way scarce capacity is allocated, and firms' resulting profits. Two buyers contract for capacity with a common manufacturer. Then, the buyers invest in innovation (product development and marketing) and the manufacturer builds capacity. Finally, the firms may renegotiate to allow a buyer facing poor market conditions to purchase less than the contractual commitment and a buyer facing favorable conditions to purchase more. We show that renegotiation can greatly increase the firms' investments and profits, provided that the contracts are designed correctly. Failing to anticipate renegotiation leads to contracts that allow too much flexibility in the buyer's order quantity, and perform poorly relative to contracts designed to anticipate renegotiation. We provide clear conditions under which quantity flexibility contracts with renegotiation coordinate the system. Where quantity flexibility contracts fail, employing tradable options improves performance. © 2007 INFORMS.
- Published
- 2007
36. Implications of Breach Remedy and Renegotiation Design for Innovation and Capacity
- Author
-
Plambeck, Erica L and Taylor, Terry A
- Subjects
renegotiation ,bargaining ,contract manufacturing ,capacity pooling and allocation ,renegotiation design ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
A manufacturer writes supply contracts with N buyers. Then, the buyers invest in innovation, and the manufacturer builds capacity. Finally, demand is realized, and the firms renegotiate the supply contracts to achieve an efficient allocation of capacity among the buyers. The court remedy for breach of contract (specific performance versus expectation damages) affects how the firms share the gain from renegotiation, and hence how the firms make investments ex ante. The firms may also engage in renegotiation design, inserting simple clauses into the supply contract to shape the outcome of renegotiation. For example, when a buyer grants a financial "hostage" to the manufacturer or is charged a per diem penalty for delay in bargaining, the manufacturer captures the gain from renegotiation. "Tradable options," which grant buyers the right to trade capacity without intervention from the manufacturer, return the gain from renegotiation to the buyers. This paper proves that, under surprisingly general conditions, the firms can coordinate their investments with the simplest of supply contracts (fixed-quantity contracts). This may require renegotiation design, and certainly requires that the firms understand the breach remedy and set their contract parameters accordingly. © 2007 INFORMS.
- Published
- 2007
37. Implications of renegotiation for optimal contract flexibility and investment
- Author
-
Plambeck, EL and Taylor, TA
- Subjects
Operations Research ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
In a stylized model of biopharmaceutical contract manufacturing, this paper shows how the potential for renegotiation influences the optimal structure of supply contracts, investments in innovation and capacity, the way scarce capacity is allocated, and firms' resulting profits. Two buyers contract for capacity with a common manufacturer. Then, the buyers invest in innovation (product development and marketing) and the manufacturer builds capacity. Finally, the firms may renegotiate to allow a buyer facing poor market conditions to purchase less than the contractual commitment and a buyer facing favorable conditions to purchase more. We show that renegotiation can greatly increase the firms' investments and profits, provided that the contracts are designed correctly. Failing to anticipate renegotiation leads to contracts that allow too much flexibility in the buyer's order quantity, and perform poorly relative to contracts designed to anticipate renegotiation. We provide clear conditions under which quantity flexibility contracts with renegotiation coordinate the system. Where quantity flexibility contracts fail, employing tradable options improves performance. © 2007 INFORMS.
- Published
- 2007
38. Implications of breach remedy and renegotiation design for innovation and capacity
- Author
-
Plambeck, EL and Taylor, TA
- Subjects
Operations Research ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
A manufacturer writes supply contracts with N buyers. Then, the buyers invest in innovation, and the manufacturer builds capacity. Finally, demand is realized, and the firms renegotiate the supply contracts to achieve an efficient allocation of capacity among the buyers. The court remedy for breach of contract (specific performance versus expectation damages) affects how the firms share the gain from renegotiation, and hence how the firms make investments ex ante. The firms may also engage in renegotiation design, inserting simple clauses into the supply contract to shape the outcome of renegotiation. For example, when a buyer grants a financial "hostage" to the manufacturer or is charged a per diem penalty for delay in bargaining, the manufacturer captures the gain from renegotiation. "Tradable options," which grant buyers the right to trade capacity without intervention from the manufacturer, return the gain from renegotiation to the buyers. This paper proves that, under surprisingly general conditions, the firms can coordinate their investments with the simplest of supply contracts (fixed-quantity contracts). This may require renegotiation design, and certainly requires that the firms understand the breach remedy and set their contract parameters accordingly. © 2007 INFORMS.
- Published
- 2007
39. The process of innovation assimilation by firms in different countries: A technology diffusion perspective on e-business
- Author
-
Zhu, K, Kraemer, KL, and Xu, S
- Subjects
technology diffusion ,innovation assimilation ,assimilation process ,e-business ,competition ,firm size ,technology integration ,international perspective ,Operations Research ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
This paper extends our previous studies on the assimilation of Internet-based e-business innovations by firms in an international setting. Drawing upon theories on the process and contexts of technology diffusion, we develop an integrative model to examine three assimilation stages: initiation → adoption → routinization. The model features technological, organizational, and environmental contexts as prominent antecedents of this three-stage assimilation process. Based on this model, we hypothesize how technology readiness, technology integration, firm size, global scope, managerial obstacles, competition intensity, and regulatory environment influence e-business assimilation at the firm level. A unique data set of 1,857 firms from 10 countries is used to test the conceptual model and hypotheses. To probe deeper into the influence of the environmental context, we compare two subsamples from developed and developing countries. Our empirical analysis leads to several key findings: (1) Competition positively affects initiation and adoption, but negatively impacts routinization, suggesting that too much competition is not necessarily good for technology assimilation because it drives firms to chase the latest technologies without learning how to use existing ones effectively. (2) Large firms tend to enjoy resource advantages at the initiation stage, but have to overcome structural inertia in later stages. (3) We also find that economic environments shape innovation assimilation: Regulatory environment plays a more important role in developing countries than in developed countries. Moreover, while technology readiness is the strongest factor facilitating assimilation in developing countries, technology integration turns out to be the strongest in developed countries, implying that as e-business evolves, the key determinant of its assimilation shifts from accumulation to integration of technologies. Together, these findings offer insights into how innovation assimilation is influenced by contextual factors, and how the effects may vary across different stages and in different environments. © 2006 INFORMS.
- Published
- 2006
40. The Process of Innovation Assimilation by Firms in Different Countries: A Technology Diffusion Perspective on E-Business
- Author
-
Zhu, Kevin, Kraemer, Kenneth L, and Xu, Sean
- Subjects
technology diffusion ,innovation assimilation ,assimilation process ,e-business ,competition ,firm size ,technology integration ,international perspective ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services ,Operations Research - Abstract
This paper extends our previous studies on the assimilation of Internet-based e-business innovations by firms in an international setting. Drawing upon theories on the process and contexts of technology diffusion, we develop an integrative model to examine three assimilation stages: initiation → adoption → routinization. The model features technological, organizational, and environmental contexts as prominent antecedents of this three-stage assimilation process. Based on this model, we hypothesize how technology readiness, technology integration, firm size, global scope, managerial obstacles, competition intensity, and regulatory environment influence e-business assimilation at the firm level. A unique data set of 1,857 firms from 10 countries is used to test the conceptual model and hypotheses. To probe deeper into the influence of the environmental context, we compare two subsamples from developed and developing countries. Our empirical analysis leads to several key findings: (1) Competition positively affects initiation and adoption, but negatively impacts routinization, suggesting that too much competition is not necessarily good for technology assimilation because it drives firms to chase the latest technologies without learning how to use existing ones effectively. (2) Large firms tend to enjoy resource advantages at the initiation stage, but have to overcome structural inertia in later stages. (3) We also find that economic environments shape innovation assimilation: Regulatory environment plays a more important role in developing countries than in developed countries. Moreover, while technology readiness is the strongest factor facilitating assimilation in developing countries, technology integration turns out to be the strongest in developed countries, implying that as e-business evolves, the key determinant of its assimilation shifts from accumulation to integration of technologies. Together, these findings offer insights into how innovation assimilation is influenced by contextual factors, and how the effects may vary across different stages and in different environments. © 2006 INFORMS.
- Published
- 2006
41. Partnership in a Dynamic Production System with Unobservable Actions and Noncontractible Output
- Author
-
Plambeck, Erica L and Taylor, Terry A
- Subjects
Operations Research ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
This paper considers two firms that engage in joint production. The prospect of repeated interaction introduces dynamics, in that actions that firms take today influence the costliness and effectiveness of actions in the future. Repeated interaction also facilitates the use of informal agreements (relational contracts) that are sustained not by the court system, but by the ongoing value of the relationship. We characterize the optimal relational contract in this dynamic system with double moral hazard. We show that an optimal relational contract has a simple form that does not depend on the past history. The optimal relational contract may require that the firms terminate their relationship with positive probability following poor performance. We show how process visibility, which allows the firms to better assess who is at fault, can substantially improve system performance. The degree to which process visibility eliminates the need for termination depends on the nature of the dynamics: If the buyer's action does not influence the dynamics, the need for termination is eliminated; otherwise, termination may be required.
- Published
- 2006
42. Channel Coordination Under Price Protection, Midlife Returns, and End-of-Life Returns in Dynamic Markets
- Author
-
Taylor, Terry A
- Subjects
Operations Research ,Information and Computing Sciences ,Commerce ,Management ,Tourism and Services - Abstract
This paper examines three channel policies that are used in declining price environments: Price protection (P) is a mechanism under which the manufacturer pays the retailer a credit applying to the retailer's unsold inventory when the wholesale price drops during the life cycle; midlife returns (M) allow the retailer to return units partway through the life cycle at some rebate; and end-of-life returns (E) allow the retailer to return unsold units at the end of the life cycle. Under declining retail prices, if the wholesale prices and the return rebates are set properly, then EM (i.e., midlife and end-of-life returns) achieves channel coordination. However, such a policy may not be implementable because it may require the manufacturer to be worse off as a result of coordination. If P is used in addition to EM and the terms are set properly, then PEM guarantees both coordination and a win-win outcome. If the retail price is constant over time, then EM is sufficient to guarantee both coordination and a win-win outcome.
- Published
- 2001
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