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In several U.S. states, legislative districts for the lower chamber are structured as multi‐member districts (MMD) electing two or more individuals. Ten states use MMDs, the most common form is a district that elects two candidates (employed in AZ, ND, NJ, SD). Sometimes, parties in these states field only one strong candidate in districts where they have a registration disadvantage, believing this "single shot" strategy improves the election odds. Our research casts doubt on this tactic. It finds that lone Democrats in a pooled sample of three states see a noted disadvantage by widening the electoral gap by 3.3 percentage points on average, meaning that parties are better off running two candidates regardless of their relative quality. However, this effect varies within states. Republicans do not experience a disadvantage, though fewer Democratic‐leaning states employ this election method. This research has practical implications for party strategy in MMD states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study is the most comprehensive analysis of the election of black state legislators in the American South. We start with the election of Leroy Johnson to the Georgia Senate in 1962, the first African American to win a state legislative seat in the modern South. We also document the election of all subsequent African Americans who were the first to enter their southern state legislative chambers. Next, we assess the factors influencing the election of southern black state legislators from the 1970s through 2015. Because of notable long‐term changes to the southern electorate and alterations in the racial composition of legislative districts, there has been substantial variation in the likelihood of electing black lawmakers. Our final analysis highlights the undeniable reality and broader significance that the increasing share of southern African American state legislators has occurred at the same time that Republican representation has grown at a greater rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legislative responsiveness to constituent demands is integral to the concept of representation. Yet, research on district‐focused legislative behavior and priorities, such as allocating resources to districts, has largely ignored constituent demand as an explanatory variable. In this article, we propose a demand‐based theory of district‐targeted legislative resource allocation. The theoretical model suggests that district demand for legislative resources is determined by the district's relative deprivation of such resources and that legislators have an electoral incentive to respond to district demand due to the credit‐claiming opportunities associated with doing so. These possibilities are tested with region‐wide mass and elite survey data from Latin America, and the results suggest that constituent demand is not only a normatively but also an empirically important predictor of district‐focused legislative behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the legislators who served in the 101st–110th Congresses of the U.S. and discusses the legislative style of the Congress by focusing on the legislators' styles. Topics discussed include the styles that legislators represent in the Congress including district advocates, those who focus on the interest of the district they represent; ambitious entrepreneurs; and policy specialists.

In recent decades, the literature has coalesced around either symmetry or responsiveness as measures of partisan bias in single-member district systems. I argue neither accurately captures the traditional idea of an 'efficient' gerrymander, where one party claims more seats without more votes. I suggest a better measure of efficiency and then use this new measure to reconsider a classic study of partisan gerrymandering. Contrary to the original study findings, I show that the effects of party control on bias are small and decay rapidly, suggesting that redistricting is at best a blunt tool for promoting partisan interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The number of legislators elected in a single district influences many aspects of state legislative elections. However, there is a dearth of research on how district magnitude influences campaign fundraising. We theorize that the greater competition for funds in multimember districts results in candidates raising less money and encourages them to be more entrepreneurial in their fundraising efforts. Specifically, we expect multimember district candidates to raise contributions from more diverse sets of interests than candidates in single-member districts, raise more funds out of state, and create more unique financial constituencies. Using data on candidates for Maryland's House of Delegates in 2006 and 2010, we find support for our hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

American politics scholars typically conceptualize representation narrowly as mass-elite policy responsiveness, with many studies identifying factors that hinder that relationship. These findings contrast with the high reelection rates in American legislatures. I show that policy is only one of several dimensions through which legislators provide representation. I unify policy, service, allocation, and descriptive representation in a model of legislators' priorities and then test it with survey experiments administered to 1,175 state legislators. I posit that legislators systematically emphasize different dimensions to further the goal of reelection. Results show that legislative institutions, district demand, and individual traits structure legislators' strategic representational priorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Incumbents tend to win with higher margins in less ideologically constrained districts. I argue that incumbents are advantaged by this electoral landscape in part because they work harder to cultivate a personal vote. Utilizing data on earmarks, I find that despite winning with a larger margin of victory, these incumbents act much like their colleagues who narrowly escaped electoral defeat. By more accurately measuring perceptions of electoral vulnerability, we also see stronger evidence linking district marginality to distributive politics. Such incentives appear to stem not from the risks of position taking, but from the weaker party attachments among constituents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Chile's two-member legislative districts we show there are two groups of swing voters, one group for the first seat won by the governing coalition, another for the second. We build a model that allows us to identify the relative prevalence of these voters across communities. Using data on the allocation of discretionary agricultural loans, we find that communities with relatively many voters pivotal for the first seat receive more loans than they otherwise would have, but we find no systematic advantage for districts that are pivotal for the second seat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I demonstrate that multimember districts form a basis for collaboration between two legislators. In order to maximize the limited incumbency advantages they possess, legislators from multimember districts form coalitions in an effort to generate greater credit-claiming opportunities and policy benefits for their district. In order to test this conception, I utilize a natural experiment and an opportunity to observe institutional change in North Carolina's elimination of multimember districts during the 2000-2002 redistricting cycle. Coupled with cross-sectional analysis of several states that use both single-member and multimember districts, empirical evidence strongly corroborates my conception of multimember districts as a basis for collaboration between representatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political dynasties, families in which multiple members have held elected office, commonly feature in the U.S. Congress. I explored the electoral origins of this phenomenon and determined that members of political dynasties have a significant advantage over first-generation politicians in open-seat House elections. Using an original dataset containing candidate- and district-level covariates for all candidates in open-seat House contests between 1994 and 2006, I found that dynastic politicians enjoy "brand name advantages," giving them a significant edge over comparable nondynastic opponents. In contrast, hypotheses concerning potential advantages stemming from past political experience and fundraising ability yield null results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explored the extent to which legislators respond to redistricting-induced demographic shifts in their constituencies. Our analyses focused on the behavior of members of the House of Representatives who served in the terms preceding and following the redistricting that took place in the early 2000s (namely, the 107th and 108th Congresses). We investigated how demographic shifts relate to the content of legislators' subsequent agendas (the legislation that members introduce and cosponsor) and the nature of members' voting patterns (their interest group voting scores). Our results indicate that responsiveness is widespread, but important variation exists in the patterns for agenda activities and roll-call voting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the use of the model on responsiveness in redistricting in the U.S. Reason for the high turnover rates observed in the House during the 1990's; Examination of the effect of changes in the Democratic composition of U.S. House districts on roll-call conservatism; Effect of generational gap between senior members and their junior counterparts; Comparison between the original Glazer and Robbins study on the matter and the updated research findings.

Focuses on the election of representatives in multimember district elections in the U.S. Diversity of a state's House delegation; Reason for the increase in the diversity of a state's House delegation; Implication for the state shifts from general-ticket to single-member districts.

Presents abstracts related to politics and government published in the November 1999 issue of "Legislative Studies Quarterly." "Measuring the Electoral and Policy Impact of Majority-Minority Voting Districts," by David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran; "Do Female MPs Substantively Represent Women? A Study of Legislative Behavior in Canada's 35th Parliament," by Manon Tremblay; "Position Effects in Multimember Districts: The New Hampshire House of Representative, 1972–1994," by Robert Darcy.

Examines the rise of careerism in the U.S. House of Representatives. Combination of the desire of incumbents to serve in the House for long periods; Different factors influencing electoral safety; Partisan advantage in the district increasing the probability of renomination.

Focuses on the incumbency advantage in U.S. state legislative elections. Method for computing the incumbency advantage in multimember districts; Increase in the incumbency advantage in states using multimember districts; Advantage for legislators with the ability to perform casework services for constituents.

The article presents abstracts on topics concerning political science, which include supply-side perspective on congressional redistricting, research on the problems of constituency control in the U.S., issues related to U.S. politics and public policy.

This research tests the hypothesis that Japanese Lower House (multimember) districts with more open seats attract more strong challengers. Lower House incumbents are reelected at higher percentage rates than challengers are elected. Using data for the 10 most recent elections to the Lower House (1963-90), measures appropriate to the medium-sized district, single-entry ballot electoral system were constructed for the proportion of open seats and the effective number of strong challengers in each district. Analysis shows that strong challengers enter district races in proportion to the opportunities presented by open seats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multimember districts (MMDs) were widespread in U.S. state legislatures as recently as 1970, yet little information is available about them. We provide information about their frequency, distribution, types, and sizes, the degree to which they are contested, and the extent to which incumbents run in them and are reelected. We then indicate how to calculate vote margins in MMDs. The method is to create pseudo-pairs by matching the Democratic candidate who has the highest vote with the Republican candidate who has the lowest vote, the Democratic candidate who has the second highest vote with the Republican who has the second-lowest vote, and so on. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Measures of partisan bias and of responsiveness are used to evaluate the effect of partisan control of the districting process on the seat-vote relationship during the 1970s and 1980s. Data are drawn from 15 states that used single-member districts only. Contrary to what might be expected, neither bias nor responsiveness is consistently higher in states where one party controlled the districting process, and neither bias nor responsiveness increases following a partisan redistricting. The values of both measures vary widely in states under one-party control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effects of reapportionment on partisan balance and on the reelection of incumbents should be expected to differ, depending on whether the reapportionment process was effectively controlled by one party or was bipartisan or nonpartisan. These hypotheses are tested in 15 state legislatures for the post-1980 redistricting. Partisan effects are most likely to occur where the process is highly partisan. Even then, however, the partisan gains are likely to be short term and to dissipate after two or three elections. Incumbents who run appear more likely to get reelected in the years following an election, whether the process was controlled by one party or was bipartisan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because of recent Supreme Court decisions involving a more permissive stance toward a "rational state poIicy" (Brown v. Thompson) and the challenge of partisan gerrymandering (Davis v. Bandemer), state legislatures and reapportionment commissions are left with nebulous guidelines for the next round of reapportionment plans, This article reviews some of these issues of representation in light of a specific electoral technique known as the "floterial district." Floterials are not widely understood, but they reemerged in several states in 'the reapportionment plans of the 1980s- and there is some speculation that floterials will be considered by more states in the 1990s. With this in mind, I discuss the specific nature of floterials and pose some problems (framed as puzzles) in the use of floterials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper adds to the growing literature on state legislative election outcomes. The empirical focus is on Washington state house elections for 1976 through 1984. Explanatory variables include measures of partisan strength, campaign expenditures, incumbency, and legislative performance. Separate models are developed for contests between Democrats and Republicans and for incumbents and challengers. As has been reported for other states, partisan strength, campaign expenditures, and incumbency are strongly related to Outcomes in Washington state legislative elections. Legislative performance variables are weak and inconsistent correlates of election outcomes. The power and consistency of empirical relations over numerous elections and different districting schemes is impressive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the effectiveness of the Congressional Black Caucus's (CBC's) Action-Alert Communications Network, designed to persuade nonblack legislators to support CBC policy objectives. The network, which targets legislators who represent districts in which blacks compose 15% or more of the population, substitutes sanctions for incentives. The premise is that if blacks in those districts were effectively mobilized they could put electoral pressure on their representatives, to get them to support CBC policy objectives. The network was activated on five issues during the 96th and 97th Congresses. While the CBC was successful on three of the five issues, the success could not be attributed to the effectiveness of the networking strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many political observers have argued that citizens in congressional districts coinciding with natural community boundaries will more often recall or recognize the names of the incumbent and challenger candidates. Despite the plausibility of this argument, there is surprisingly little evidence to support it, and none that estimates the magnitude of the effect controlling for possible confounding variables. We find a strong relationship between candidate familiarity and the congruence of community and district boundaries. Our results suggest differences in the context of elections in the different types of districts; challengers, in particular, are disadvantaged in noncongruent districts. The relationship between congruence and awareness occurs because of the effect of community-district congruence on the structure of the mass media markets. Our results also suggest that the preservation of community boundaries in redistricting merits more attention than the Supreme Court has heretofore given it, and they provide some of the factual evidence upon which future decisions may be based. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the constituency resource allocations of members of the New Zealand Pailiament, a legislature with both strong party discipline and small legislative districts. Close constituency contact is the norm in spite of (or perhaps because of) a lack of resources. Legislators return to their districts often or reside in their districts, handle casework personally, and make frequent local appearances. Cabinet ministers and older, more senior MPs are less likely to follow a pattern of close constituency contact; younger, less senior MPs are more Likely to do so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies have demonstrated that members of "appropriate" congressional committees are no better able to attract new federal spending within the jurisdiction of these panels to their districts than are non-members of these committees. In this study it is further shown that there are also no differences in the ability to prevent losses of existing federal activities in the district. It is revealed, however, that when such losses do occur, they are compensated either the following year or in some other segment of the budget during the same year. Congressional cooperation and the growth of uncontrollable spending are cited as causes of this trend, which is not deemed likely to change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on interviews with 36 congressmen and with party leaders in their respective districts, district parties were categorized according to their degree of organization and extent of activity. The relationships between congressmen and their parties were examined both in district-based activities and in House-based activities. Types of party organization were strongly related to in-district activities, but much less so to in-House activities. Of the four types of district party organization, the Atomistic party most exposed the congressman to policy communications from the district party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses several reports published within the issue including one by Mark Franklin, Alison Baxter and Margaret Jordan on the correlates of dissent in the early 1970s, by Edward Crowe on the party loyalty coercion with party leaders in the British' House of Commons, and another by Richard G. Niemi, Lynda W. Powell and Patricia L. Bicknell on the analysis of congressional districting effects in the U.S. Congress.