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The provision of goods and services is routinely accepted as a primary source of power for legislative leaders, yet few studies analyze how these goods influence members' behavior, or even whether they do. This study tests the hypothesis that the distribution of goods generates an exchange between leaders and followers, increasing the leaders' power over the legislative process. Specifically, the study examines how the distribution of campaign assistance by the past two Speakers of the California Assembly affected support for their positions on major roll-call votes. The findings indicate that recipients of contributions are no more likely than nonrecipients to support the Speaker on these votes.

This article argues that legislative leaders are rational goal-seeking actors but, unlike other legislators, they are motivated preeminently by the desire to retain power. To test this argument, the article examines the strategy used by California Assembly Speaker Willie Brown in distributing campaign support from 1982 to 1986. The findings indicate that Brown has followed a strategy different from the one traditionally associated with congressional leaders but that both act rationally to retain power. The difference in strategy is attributed to the state's control of reapportionment, which puts pressure on the Speaker to maximize his party's position in the Assembly.