As many studies have shown, regulation is only as effective as its implementation in real life. One aspect of reorganization of the electricity and telecommunications sectors in the last two decades has been the attempt to create competition in these areas. However, opportunities for competition are meaningless without creation of competition "on the ground", consumers actually choosing between providers and being able to transfer, and there are powerful interests opposed to that. The former incumbent has an incentive to make the process of transferring away from it as cumbersome and inefficient as possible, keeping its customers hostage. On the other hand, competitors have an incentive to engage in aggressive, often questionable selling practices that may deprive consumers of choice, a practice of "taking hostages". Yet economic and political studies focus on the struggle to create opportunities for competition, competition "on the books", without looking at the implementation of such policy in practice, "in action". Drawing on research in three countries, the UK, France and Sweden, this paper asks how regulators handle these issues and achieve industry compliance. The paper concludes that the regulators expected competition to be achieved naturally from liberalization. Faced with industry intransigency, agencies initially did not consider enforcement actions, preferring persuasion and bargaining. Even when those strategies failed, regulators did not resort to coercive measures. Only public pressure and criticism resulted in enforcement action, showing the importance of giving voice to actors other than industry in these areas, moving from unidirectional to multidirectional accountability. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]