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Summary: The new institutional literature widely acknowledges the benefits of growth‐enhancing institutions but rarely discusses the path of institutional reform. While good institutions stabilize the structure of exchange and decrease uncertainty in market transactions, institutional reform may involve institutional volatility. If institutional volatility increases uncertainty, it can mitigate the benefits of reform. Using a sample of 89 countries from 2000‐2015, this paper empirically examines the effects of institutional volatility on economic growth. We find that institutional volatility decreases economic growth, particularly during liberalization for countries with low quality institutions and low income. In fact, a one standard deviation increase in volatility decreases growth by about 0.50 percentage points. This finding is robust to multiple estimation techniques and omitted variable bias. Evidence is provided suggesting that this effect is partially mediated through volatility's impact on private investment. These results support prior works that policy makers should pursue economic freedom, but our work indicates they should do so along a stable reform path to maximize economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: Using a dataset for a panel of 118 countries, this paper shows that changes in the level of education of national populations aged 45 to 64 are positively associated with economic growth. An increase of one percentage point in the share of individuals in this age group who attended secondary education is associated with a 1.2% increase in GDP per capita. In contrast, variation in the level of education in younger cohorts is not positively associated with economic growth. These results suggest that investment in education benefits society, but only in the long‐term. Several possible explanations for this finding are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper estimates the effect of individual responsibility on economic development using an instrument derived from rainfall data. I argue that a taste for collective responsibility was adaptive in preindustrial societies that were exposed to high levels of agricultural risk, and that these attitudes continue to influence contemporary social norms and economic outcomes. The link between agricultural risk and collective responsibility is formalized in a model of optimal parental socialization effort. Empirically, I find a robust negative correlation between rainfall variation, a measure of exogenous agricultural risk, and a measure of individual responsibility. Using rainfall variation as an instrument, I find that individual responsibility has a large positive effect on economic development. The relationships between rainfall variation, individual responsibility and economic development are robust to the inclusion of variables related to climate and agricultural and institutional development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the impact of Chinese activities in sub-Saharan African countries with respect to the growth performance of economies in that region. Using a Solow-type growth model and panel data for the period 1991 to 2010, we find that African economies that export natural resources have benefited from positive terms-of-trade effects. In addition, there is evidence for displacement effects of African firms due to competition from China. On the other hand, Chinese foreign investment and aid in Africa does not appear to have a significant impact on African growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary The objective of this paper is to improve our understanding on how the former Italian prime minister formed and kept his exceptional political consensus despite the never-ending series of scandals in which he has been involved. Specifically, we carry out an empirical assessment of the relationship between trust in television and trust towards the prime minister. Many Italian commentators argue that television does not exert any particular bias on public opinion. If the assumption of television's irrelevance were true, one could reasonably expect to find no significant relationship between trust in TV and trust in Mr Berlusconi as prime minister. Contrary to this hypothesis, our empirical analysis shows that trust in television was the strongest predictor of trust in the Italian prime minister in Spring 2011, thus suggesting that Mr Berlusconi's media empire played a key role in the building of his political consensus. This result is based on probit and ordered logit estimates and is robust to different specifications. However, there are three reasons for which this finding could be interpreted as the fruit of a spurious correlation. First, it is difficult to distinguish the effect of trust in television from that of other phenomena that potentially influence trust in the prime minister. To deal with this problem, we include in the main equation a wide set of individual and household control variables. Second, individual effects, such as individuals' exogenous shocks, may be correlated with trust both towards television and the prime minister, thus creating a common bias. Third, as we explain in the paper, it is reasonable to assume the existence of reverse causality. To deal with the last two problems, we turn to instrumental variables ( IV) estimates. When we address endogeneity in IV estimates, trust in television remains the best (most significant and strongest) predictor of trust in the prime minister. By contrast, we find that the dependent variable is significantly and negatively correlated with educational qualification, trust in the judicial system and with a measure of tolerance towards immigrants. Even if these results pass robustness checks and hold in IV estimates, it must be remarked that the cross-sectional design of the research dictates extreme caution in the interpretation of correlations as causal relationships. Nonetheless, the paper contributes to the literature by carrying out the first econometric investigation into the role of television in individuals' political opinions, with a focus on trust towards the Italian prime minister. The relationship between television and political attitudes and beliefs is an important topic for economics, in view of the unquestionable role that political institutions, particularly the government and the prime minister, play in a country's economic performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between trust and economic growth. Taking panel data and using a fixed-effects estimation for a 41-country sample over the time period from 1980 to 2004 and with a total of 129 observations, the paper points out that economic growth is negatively related to an increase in trust. This negative finding is in contrast to most empirical findings using a cross-sectional design. The common knowledge which has governed the nature of discussions in social science and economics for the last ten years, that trust is generally positively related to economic performance, must be seriously questioned. From a policy point of view an increase in trust is crucial for countries with low levels of trust, but can likely be neglected by countries with sufficient levels of trust and may even hamper economic performance in countries with high levels of trust. The relationship is tested in the context of EU countries, OECD countries and developing countries. Interpersonal trust and systemic trust is differentiated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents panel estimates for 18 Western Europe countries to ascertain the separate impacts of domestic and transnational terrorism on income per capita growth for 1971–2004. The paper merges domestic and transnational terrorist events in order to attribute growth impacts to the two broad categories of terrorism. Each additional transnational terrorist incident per million persons reduces economic growth by about 0.4 percentage points. Domestic terrorism has a much smaller effect on growth that is about half this size. Terrorism's negative impact on growth is related to the scale of terrorism in the sample countries in order to give a better idea of what is the average consequence in most sample countries. These negative impacts are shown to stem from domestic and transnational terrorism's adverse influence on investment shares. Counterterrorism efforts also augment government spending, which crowds out growth-promoting investment. We show that the pathway by which domestic and transnational terrorism influences growth differs. For example, transnational terrorism works more through the crowding out of investment, while domestic terrorism works more through the increase in government expenditure increases. A host of sensitivity tests are performed to support our empirical model. Policy recommendations conclude the paper – e.g., measures to curb transnational terrorist attacks have a higher economic payoff than similar measures to reduce domestic terrorist events. Since transnational terrorism has a larger impact on income per capita growth than does domestic terrorism, West European efforts to curb transnational terrorism will have a greater economic dividend than efforts to limit domestic terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on institutions and economic growth shows a close relationship between the quality of institutions and prosperity. This paper examines the impact of institutions on investment, and the resulting impact of investment on growth. The private investment rate of countries with better institutional quality is higher, and the productivity of any given level of investment is greater in countries with better institutions. Models that include various indicators of institutional quality along with inputs such as physical and human capital will generally underestimate the impact of institutional quality on growth because they do not account for the indirect impact of institutions on investment, as is done here. The paper also examines the direction of causality to show that higher institutional quality causes more investment, rather than the other way around. Further, future institutional improvements are more likely to occur against a background of poor economic performance than one of sustained growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explore the relationship between economic growth and governance performance in Asian developing economies. This exploration yields some interesting conclusions. First, notwithstanding its tremendous economic achievements, the state of governance in Asia is not stellar by international comparison. Indeed, the majority of these countries seem to suffer from a governance deficit. Second, contrary to our expectations, data do not suggest any strong positive link between governance and growth: paradoxically, countries that exhibit surpluses in governance on average grew much slower than those with deficits. The paper ends with some conjecture about this apparent paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the recent literature on the role of the state in economic development. It concludes that government incentives to enact sound policies are key to economic success. It also discusses the evidence on what happens after episodes of economic and political liberalizations, asking whether political liberalizations strengthen government incentives to enact sound economic policies. The answer is mixed. Most episodes of economic liberalizations are indeed preceded by political liberalizations. But the countries that have done better are those that have managed to open up the economy first, and only later have liberalized their political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Kyklos is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Both Spanish and French colonial education included several features that restricted education. Many of them persisted long after independence. Against this background, this paper econometrically studies whether in the recent past the colonial legacy still affected schooling in the ex-colonies of these two former colonial powers - and, for comparison, in the ex-colonies of Britain, the third of the former big three colonial powers. Using a large sample of countries and numerous controls, it finds substantial negative effects on both secondary enrollment and average years of schooling in former French and, especially, in former Spanish colonies. The negative effects on females are particularly large. By contrast, there are no effects in former British colonies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that democracy enhances technological change, the most important determinant of long-term economic growth. It first presents an argument on how and why dictators restrict civil liberties and diffusion of information to survive in office, even if this reduces their personal consumption. The argument predicts that autocracies have slower technological change than democracies, which in turn impairs GDP per capita growth rates. These and other implications from the argument are tested empirically, and so are implications from alternative explanations on the association between democracy and technological change. Drawing on an extensive global dataset, with some time series going back to the early 19th century, the paper reports robust evidence that democracy increases not only technology-induced growth but also net economic growth rates. Notably, the results hold when accounting for the endogeneity of democracy, country-fixed effects, and sample-selection bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY The paper presents a model of interest rates structure with direct implications to the saving-investment process. The capital market is divided into private and government sectors, which operate under the constraints of an investment-opportunities function and a cost of capital function. The model provides the government with a degree of freedom to differentiate the lending rate from the borrowing rate. This allows the government to conduct a capital policy aimed at achieving a certain desired level of savings without disturbing the process of capital allocation. The technical operation of the model is based on an institutional structure existing in many developing countries. It allows thereby a direct application for empirical research. The paper is concluded by an empirical testing of the interest rate structure in Israel and of the consistency of the Israeli Government capital policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on probit estimates, this paper analyzes the effects of fiscal consolidation on the probability of sovereign default in the short run. Using a panel of 104 developing countries from 1980 to 2009 and controlling for various economic, fiscal and political factors, we find that fiscal adjustments in general do not significantly reduce the probability of default even if they are large. Instead, the composition of budget consolidation is decisive in reducing default risk. Expenditure based adjustments are not successful while revenue based adjustments lower the probability of default in the following year by 36 to 55 percent. This finding also holds when economic growth is low or government debt is high as well as when IMF lending is taken into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent years have seen a significant focus in the literature on growth and development on the idea that legal and political institutions are the key determinant of economic development. The main finding of this paper is that the focus on the primacy of legal and political institutions may be misplaced and that business-friendly economic policies (proxied for here by the World Bank's Doing Business indicator) are the key determinant of the level of income per capita. We find that a country's Doing Business rank dominates a range of measures of legal and political institutional quality as an explanatory variable for income per capita. We also find the Doing Business rank to be a key explanatory variable for economic growth and that previous findings assigning a significant role to educational attainment are not robust to the inclusion of this new indicator in growth regressions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a novel analysis about the capabilities of academic researchers and academic poverty. Adopting the capability approach, which Amartya Sen developed to address concerns such as poverty, inequality and development, we shift the focus of analysis and discussion around evaluating academic research and academics in the social sciences from measures of so-called 'quality', 'impact' or 'excellence' to the capabilities of academics. For us, the conceptualization and evaluation of academic research is a question about what academics have reasons to value, and about their ability to achieve valuable beings and doings. It is also about determining what might constitute academic poverty, and what academics are required to do in order to avoid that poverty. Relating our analysis to debates around universities, in particular about quasi-market pressures, we identify the possibility of basic capabilities in academic research, namely: the capabilities that are necessary to fulfill basic academic needs. Our proposition is that there is academic poverty when an academic researcher is not capable of fulfilling basic academic needs, such as: adhering to standards of coherence, robustness and rigour; searching for and disseminating the spirit of the truth. Moreover, if the academic has the capabilities to fulfill those basic academic needs and yet chooses not to do so, she renders herself in a state akin to academic poverty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: A substantial literature exists on the effects of military expenditures on economic growth, yet no study has analyzed the effects of military occupation other than in anecdotal cases. This paper uses a panel of 214 countries from 1950 to 2013 to study how economic growth is impacted by different forms of military occupation. Transformative occupations aim to establish institutions to promote stability once the occupation ends, while subdual occupations are more malevolent in their objectives. Our results show that transformative occupations produce positive growth in occupied countries after the occupation period concludes. Separating these effects into the short run and long run, we find that while countries subject to a subdual occupation experience a short‐run increase in growth at the end of the occupation, countries with transformative occupation experience long‐run increases in growth. These findings are robust to the inclusion of traditional drivers of growth. Policy implications suggest that regional conflicts that are solved using military intervention may have lasting effects on growth as long as the intentions of the occupying force are transformative in nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the tax administrative burden and its effect on new firm formation. It is well recognized that entrepreneurship and new firm formation are critical factors in determining economic growth and development. New firm entry into the marketplace enhances welfare in two distinct ways: 1) by promoting innovation, productivity and economic growth and 2) by increasing competition, which lowers prices and expands output. It is also well documented that barriers to entry reduce the likelihood that new firms will enter various sectors. We argue that the burden imposed by tax codes and tax compliance constitutes a barrier to entry that has been neglected in the previous literature. We use data from the World Bank to measure the administrative burden that the complexity of tax policy imposes on new firms. Additionally, we use a measure of new firm formation - entry density. Our data cover 118 countries over a period of six years. We find that the entry rate is significantly reduced by the tax administrative burden and that this effect is unrelated to general taxes on corporate profits and is robust to the inclusion of several important control variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows evidence of strong heterogeneity in the relationship between government size and growth, depending on the quality of public sector institutions. Focusing on a wide sample of developed and developing countries over the period 1981-2005, we find that government size reduces growth when bureaucracy quality is low, whereas no significant effect is observed for sufficiently high levels of bureaucracy quality. The results hold both in cross-section and panel data analyses and are robust to a large number of robustness checks. These findings have important implications for assessing the role of government size in economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the incidence of education on the determination of personal income has been well documented by scholars, the same is not true when it comes to the effects of education on economic growth, where different data sets and models have yielded contradictory results. This paper shows that a democratic environment is favourable to the impact of education on economic growth, even if democracy itself may not have a direct effect. This can be at least part of the explanation for why education alone, when observed in a cross section of countries, has shown mixed effects on growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY While previous research has looked at the determinants of the quality of institutions, not much research has been done that looks at the determinants of institutional change. This paper examines what determines the probability of an improvement in political freedoms. Several path-dependent variables, such as the history of political freedom, are clearly influential. In addition to that, economic openness and improvements in ethnolinguistically similar neighbouring countries turn out to significantly influence the probability of improvement. In Africa, an improvement of political freedom is associated with a 20.1% increase in the probability of improvement in neighbouring countries, keeping everything else constant. This result is robust to the inclusion of different variables, as well as different estimation techniques. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY The observation that some immigrants choose not to integrate into the host society has caused political controversies across European states. This paper hypothesizes that immigrants can exploit social networks of different scales in order to substitute for costly integration. Using a novel dataset of Turkish households in Berlin, which was specifically collected for this analysis, we investigate the determinants of integration as well as the impact of integration and networks on households' economic success. We find evidence that integration promotes income even after accounting for potential endogeneity bias. Using endogenous switching regression model, we test whether local ethnic networks can be successfully used to generate household income. In line with the view that there is a trade-off between integration and the establishment of ethnic contacts, we find that local ethnic and familial networks increase the income of unintegrated migrants, while transnational networks decrease it. Moreover, education is more income improving for integrated than non-integrated immigrants and remaining closely integrated within their own ethnic group is more economically advantageous for poorer households. These results provide evidence that integration is the rational strategy for better-off immigrants while it may be too costly for poorer immigrants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the fact that large welfare states are vulnerable to free-riding, the idea that universal welfare states lead to higher trust levels in the population has received some attention and support among political scientists recently. This paper argues that the opposite direction of causality is more plausible, i.e. that populations with higher trust levels are more prone to creating and successfully maintaining universal welfare states with high levels of taxation where publicly financed social insurance schemes. The hypothesis is tested using instrumental variable techniques to infer variations in trust levels that pre-date current welfare states, and then using the variation in historical trust levels to explain the current size and design of the welfare state, and finally comparing the explanatory power of trust to other potential explanatory factors such as left-right ideology and economic openness. To infer variation about historical trust levels, we use three instruments, all used previously in the trust literature: the grammatical rule allowing pronoun-drop, average temperature in the coldest month and a dummy for constitutional monarchies. Using cross-sectional data for 77 countries, we show that these instruments are valid and that countries with higher historical trust levels have significantly higher public expenditure as a share of GDP and also have more regulatory freedom. This finding is robust to controlling for several other potential explanations of welfare state size. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individual country experience with trade liberalisation has been mixed. This paper examines the relationship between liberalisation and growth for a sample of 75 liberalising countries. To consider the importance of heterogeneity in the growth response to liberalisation this paper employs quantile regression methods which allow the coefficient on liberalisation to vary across the conditional growth distribution. The results suggest that countries experiencing the lowest rates of growth benefit most from liberalisation. The results also suggest that while such countries benefit most in the long-run they are the most likely to suffer from short-run negative effects of liberalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a surprising gap in the economic literature on social capital. First, we lack studies addressing the effects of social capital on those facets of development that can contribute in making growth more sustainable in the long run, like, for example, human development and social cohesion. Second, it is still unclear what type of networks may exert a positive effect on the different dimensions of development. In particular, the literature has not yet provided a rigorous assessment of the role of strong family ties, that are generally referred to as a form of bonding social capital causing backwardness. This paper investigates the relationship between the three types of social capital so far identified by the literature (i.e. bonding, bridging and linking), and the “quality” of economic development, as expressed by human development and an index of social well-being summarizing the state of health of urban ecosystems, public services, gender equality, and labour markets. The empirical analysis is articulated in two stages carried out by means of a multivariate analysis and of a structural equations models analysis. The results suggest that the linking social capital shaped by voluntary organizations has significantly positive effect on human development, but is irrelevant for social well-being. The bonding social capital shaped by strong family ties negatively affects human development, but significantly fosters the quality of life, mainly through a reduction of workers' precariousness. The bridging social capital of weak ties connecting friends and acquaintances follows the pattern of bonding social capital: it is reinforced by strong family ties and has significantly negative effect on human development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While economic policy liberalization is a key to higher overall growth, reforms are often not implemented due to a fierce opposition from politically powerful prospective losers from reforms. In this respect, it is frequently claimed that economic crises can help overcome resistance to policy liberalization. Furthermore, political authorities not constrained by democratic checks and balances are supposed to be more decisive and are thus expected to carry out market-friendly policy change in times of crises more easily. Rules of democratic participation and checks and balances may however also be good for policy reform, as they can serve as an institutional mechanism for peaceful conflict resolution. The paper investigates empirically the interaction between economic growth performance and political institutions in producing free-market reform. We explore whether political regime types shape systematically government policy responses to good or bad growth performance, employing panel econometric techniques and using recently updated data for economic reform and political institutions. Contrary to conventional wisdom we find that a bad growth performance is conducive to reforms in democracies, but not in autocracies. Democracies not only carry out more liberal economic policies in general, but they are also more responsive to economic growth crises. Democratic rule seems to be favorable for policy liberalization, but a very good growth performance weakens liberalization incentives considerably. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper applies an alternative approach to assess whether foreign aid promotes economic growth in developing countries, based on the concept of temporary growth accelerations suggested by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik. In addition to aggregate aid, we differentiate between major aid categories, including grants, loans and so-called short-impact aid. It turns out that aid flows have a small but significantly positive effect on the conditional probability of growth accelerations. This result holds across different estimation methods. However, the significance of results crucially depends on the criteria applied to identify growth accelerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies yield diverging outcomes on the governance-growth relationship. In this paper we construct a new index of governance using a latent variable approach and test whether this index is related to growth with varying samples of countries and different conditioning variables. The results show that our index has a positive and significant impact on economic growth. This conclusion is fairly robust for various samples and conditioning variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Structural Funds are the most intensively used policy instrument by the European Union to promote economic growth in its member states and to speed up the process of convergence. This paper empirically explores the effectiveness of European Structural Funds by means of a panel data analysis for 13 countries in the European Union. We show that – on average – Structural Funds are ineffective. For countries with a ‘proper’ institutional framework, however, Structural Funds are effective. The latter result is obtained for a wide range of conditioning variables, such as openness, institutional quality, corruption and indicators for good governance. It is robust to a wide range of robustness tests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Kyklos is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Kyklos is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Kyklos is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

SUMMARY Does export instability interfere with economic development? Work by M cB ean answers in the negative. He finds no systematic relationship between instability and economic growth. This paper asks three questions about M cB ean's work: (1) Has he measured the relevant variables appropriately? (2) Were special factors at work in the period he studied (1950-58) ? (3) Was his sample of countries representative? It presents a broader statistical analysis, using a different index of instability, two decades of data, and more countries. In general, the findings do not contradict M cB ean. But calculations using different time periods (1950-66 and 1956-67) do produce some evidence of interference. Furthermore, the paper finds one new relationship-a strong inverse connection between instability and the level of investment in developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY The present paper uses 'optimality analysis' in order to evaluate the case for protection. It has been found that the general principles of optimal government intervention remain inviolate both in the 'static' welfare-economics world and in the context of 'growth'. The vast existing literature on the subject has been critically examined in order to drive home to the reader the main message of the present paper: that arguments for using protection as a primary instrument to remove domestic distortion, arising either from external economies, monopoly elements in production or a rural-urban wage differential, or from a differential in the rates of transformation between present and future goods are in effect arguments for providing subsidies on domestic production. Also protection is a wasteful policy in order to promote saving and investment. Instead it is far better to achieve this objective more directly by using appropriate fiscal policies. However, under certain conditions, protection may prove beneficial by attracting foreign investors to set up joint projects in the country. The novelty of the general approach of this paper lies in relating the argument to T inbergen's'targets-and-instruments' approach. More emphasis is given in the paper to the infant-industry argument and the use of tariff to attract foreign capital. This last and the growth-promotion-through-saving argument are the two new topics, not covered in the existing literature, that have been discussed at length in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY This lecture on some problems araising from the international economic relations of developing countries, delivered in a developing country aims at giving a concise compendium of the principal propositions and findings of recent international trade theory. Particular emphasis is lied on the importance of pulling together commercial policy, foreign exchange policy and fiscal policy (internal taxes and subsidies) in a comprehensive scheme which was qualified by H arryH. B ell, Research Director of the UNCTAD, as a 'unified theory of protection'. In fact, the author, who is working in the praxis of international monetary and financial questions but likes personally to make 'excursions' to international trade theory and public finance, felt compelled to break down the artificial compartmentalization between the various sub-disciplines of political economy. A first attempt of this kind necessarily cannot go down into all details and necessarily rests to be completed. On this conceptual background the paper deals with the influence of inflation on development, fixed versus floating rates, tariff arguments, the attempt to construct a scientific tariff, the costs of selfsufficiency, the combined net effective rate of protection, quantitative restrictions and monetary trade biasing, the question whether import restriction or export promotion, invisibles in a unified theory of protection, capital movements and multiple exchange rates, the influence of the taxation system on relative prices and exchanges and last but not least the skeleton of a typical reform program. Admittedly, in praxis there will be as long difficulties concerning the application of the projected scientific system of protection as long as no one seems to have elaborated a satisfying empirical method in which tariffs, exchange rates and fiscal instruments are all expressed in terms of comparable units on a comparable scale. But does this matter? Praxis will follow theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY It is the purpose of the present paper to replace the traditional theory of industrial stages by a better model based on the criteria of capital and control. In constructing the new model we became aware of the fact it is necessary to distinguish between 'capital'-intensive and 'capital'-extensive industries and again within the latter between those which worked for local consumption and for the export trade, respectively. Only for the 'capital'-extensive industries working for the export trade something like stages in the industrial development can be discovered. In fact, the stage reached in these industries in the eighteenth century brought them organizationally close to the older 'capital'-intensive industries, so that for that period we subsume both under the head of protofactory. The protofactory of the model based on capital and control shows the essential characteristics of the factory, although in reality there were some elements distinguishing the protofactory from the full-fledged factory. In the second section of the paper we describe in detail the organizational features of the protofactory after clearing up the etymological confusion in that ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Der Beitrag zielt darauf ab, die traditionelle Theorie der industriellen Stufen durch ein auf den Kriterien ≪Kapital≫ und ≪KontroIle≫ basierendes, besseres Modell zu ersetzen. Beim Aufbau dieses neuen Modells zeigte sich die Notwendig-keit einer Unterscheidung zwischen kapitahntensiven und kapitalextensiven Industrien, welche letztere wiederum unterteilt werden mussen in solche, die fiir den einheimischen Verbrauch arbeiten, und solche, die fiir den Export produ-zieren. Nur fiir die im Export tatigen kapitalextensiven Industrien lasst sich so etwas wie Stadien der industriellen Entwicklung entdecken. In der Tat brachte das Stadium, welches diese Industrien im 18. Jahrhundert erreicht hatten, sie organisatorisch in enge Verbindung zu den alteren, kapitahntensiven Industrien, so dass fiir jene Periode beide unter dem Oberbegriff'Ur-Fabrik' (protofactory) zusammengefasst werden konnen. Das auf ≪Kapital≫ und ≪K.ontrolle≫ aufge-baute Modell der Urfabrik bringt wesentliche Merkmale der Fabrik zum Aus-druck, obwohl sich in Wirklichkeit die Urfabrik von der fliigge gewordenen Fabrik in einigen Punkten unterschied. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit werden die organisatorischen Grundziige der Urfabrik im Detail beschrieben; zuvor wird die in diesem Bereich herrschende etymologische Verwirrung geklart. Abschliessend wird gezeigt, dass weder der im organisatorischen Aufbau der Industrie tatige Geschaftsmann noch der zeit-genossische Okonom erfasst hatten, was sich vor ihren Augen abspielte. Es brauchte Jahrzehnte, bis der Industrielle die Notwendigkeit regelmassiger Ab-schreibungen erkannte, und der klassische Okonom lehrte noch lange die inverse Korrelation zwischen Lohn und Profit und die Vcrschiebbarkeit des Kapitals von Industrie zu Industrie, nachdem diese beidenfiir das putting-out system typischen Wesensziige mit dem Erscheinen der Urfabrik verschwunden waren. RÉSUMÉ Cet article a pour but, de remplacer la théorie traditionelle des stades industriels par un modèle meilleur, basé sur les critères de capital et de contrǒ1e. En construisant ce nouveau modèle, nous nous rendons compte de la nécessité, de distinguer entre industries intensives en capital et celles extensives en capital et ces dernieres de nouveau, en celles qui travaillent pour la consommation interne, et celles qui produisent pour l'exportation. C'est uniquement pour les industries extensives en capital produisant pour l'exportation, qu'on peut d^couvrir des soi-disants stades du developpement industriels. En fait, le stade atteint dans ces industries au dix-huitieme siecle les amenait du point de vue de I'organisation en relation étroite avec les industries plus vieilles et intensives en capital, de facon a ce que pour cette periode, les deux pouvaient ětre résumés sous le terme de ≪protofabrique≫. La protofabrique du modele, basee sur le capital et le contrdle met en relief les principales caracteristiques de l'usine, malgre que la protofabrique se distingue en realite en beaucoup de points de l'usine evoluée. Dans la deuxieme partie de cet article, les elements organisateurs de la protofabrique sont decrits en detail, apres avoir eclairci les confusions etymologiques. Finalement l'auteur montre, que ni le commercant actif dans le developpement organisateur de l'industrie, ni l'economiste classique contemporain ont saisi ce qui se deroulait devant leurs yeux. II a fallu des dixaines d'annees jusqu'a ce que I'industriel reconnaisse Futility d'amortisations regulieres, et l'econome classique enseignait encore longtemps la correlation inverse entre le salaire et le profit et Pajustement du capital d'une industrie a l'autre, malgre que ces deux faits typiques par le 'putting-out system', avaient disparu avec l'apparition de la protofabrique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

SUMMARY In recent years there has been a great development of interest in the principles and the problems of rational decision-making and rational action. Economists, mathematicians, statisticians, logicians, engineers, and philosophers have all addressed their efforts to various phases of the general problem of rationality. This paper attempts a provisional synthesis of their basic results so far, in the form of a suggested preliminary definition of rationality that is sufficiently general to be applicable in all circumstances. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Beitrag zu einer allgemeinen Definition des rationalen Handelns In den letzten Jahren ist ein zunehmendes Interesse an den Grundlagen und den Problemen der rationalen Entschlussfassung und rationalen Handelns festzustellen. Ökonomen, Mathematiker, Statistiker, Logiker, Ingenieure und Philosophen haben ihre Anstrengungen auf verschiedene Phasen des allgemeinen Problems des Rationalen gerichtet. Die vorliegende Studie macht den Versuch einer vorläufigen Synthese der bisherigen grundlegenden Ergebnisse in Form einer vorläufigen Definition des Rationalen, die genügend allgemein ist, um unter jeglichen Bedingungen anwendbar zu sein. RÉSUMÉ Recherche ď une définition générate de ľ ction rationnelle. Durant ces dernières années, ľ intéret s'est fortement accru pour les principes et les problèmes relatifs à la décision rationnelle et àľ action rationnelle. Des économistes, des mathématiciens, des statisticiens, des logiciens, des ingénieurs et des philosophes ont concentrés leurs efforts sur les différentes phases du probléme général de la rationalité. La présente étude constitue un essai de synthèse provisoire des résultats fondamentaux obtenus jusqu'ici, sous la forme ď une définition préliminaire de la rationalité, par ailleurs suffisamment générale pour etre applicable dans toutes les circonstances. The general definition of rationality, to be usable for 'practical' decisionmaking, must take full cognizance of each of the following characteristics of the 'real' world, at least: the time-dimension of action and of the consequences of the action; the multitudinous side-effects of an action; the inevitable uncertainty of the 'actor' in connection with the alternatives of action open to him and the consequences of each of these; the costs of information-gathering; the costs of performing logical operations; the variety of the value-criteria of different actors; the changes in the value-criteria of any given actor over time; and the 'tastes' of the actor in relation to time-preference, risk-taking, logical processes, and the facing of uncertainty. The definition of rationality should specify the course of action which, in the light of all these factors, is the 'best' one. The present suggested definition outlines a 'rational' procedure for choosing one from among the set of all known possible actions, where the word 'action' refers to a particular time-sequence of (a) acting (in the usual sense), (b) information-gathering, and (c) logical analysis. The procedure consists, roughly, of these four steps: (1) the specification of the set of known possible actions; (2) the determination, for each of the actions, and using all available relevant information, of the set of all possible consequences of that action and their respective probabilities; (3) the evaluation, in the light of the relevant value-criteria, of each of the possible consequences of each of the possible actions; and (4) the derivation from (3) of the 'correct' action to be adopted. In carrying out these steps we employ a logical construction patterned after those of Carnap, Hempel and Oppenheim. For the sake of greater understandability, the definition is presented in two stages. The appendix to this paper contains a (grossly oversimplified) illustration of the application of the definition. Die allgemeine Definition des Rationalen - soil sie für praktische Entschlüsse verwendbar sein - muss zumindest folgende Charakteristika der 'realen' Welt voll berücksichtigen: die Zeitdimension einer Handlung und der Konsequenzen der Handlung; die zahlreichen Nebenwirkungen einer Handlung; die unvermeidliche Ungewissheit des Handelnden mit Bezug auf die ihm offenstehenden alternativen Handlungen und auf die Folgen jeder dieser Handlungen; die Kosten zusätzlicher Information; die Kosten des logischen Vorgehens; die Mannigfaltigkeit der Wertkriterien der verschiedenen Handelnden; die Rnderungen in den Wertkriterien eines Handelnden im Zeitverlauf; die Einstellung des Handelnden hinsichtlich Zeitpräferenz, Risikobereitschaft, logische Verfahren und Ungewissheit. Die Definition des Rationalen sollte jenen Ablauf des Handelns aufzeigen, der im Lichte aller dieser Faktoren der 'beste' ist. Die hier vorgeschlagene Definition skizziert ein 'rationales Verfahren für die Wahl einer Handlung unter all den bekannten möglichen Handlungen, wobei das Wort 'Handlung' sich auf eine besondere Zeitfolge von Handeln (im üblichen Sinn), Information und logischer Analyse bezieht. Das Verfahren besteht, grob gesprochen, in folgenden vier Schritten: I. Spezifikation der bekannten möglichen Handlungen; 2. Bestimmung aller möglichen Folgen und der Wahrscheinlichkeit dieser Folgen für jede der Handlungen, unter Verwendung aller verfügbaren relevanten Informationen; 3. Wertbestimmung jeder möglichen Folge von jeder der möglichen Handlungen auf Grund der relevanten Wertkriterien; und 4. Ableitung der 'richtigen' vorzunehmenden Handlung aus 3. Bei der Ausführung dieser Schritte wird eine logische Konstruktion verwendet nach dem Muster von Carnap, Hempel und Oppenheim. Im Interesse einer grössern Verständlichkeit wird die Definition in zwei Stufen entwickelt. Der Anhang enthält eine (stark vereinfachte) Illustration über die Anwendung der Definition. Une définition générale de la rationalité - pour qu'elle soit utilisable pour des decisions pratiques - doit pour le moins tenir pleinement compte de chacune des caractéristiques suivantes du monde 'réel': la durée de ľ action et des conséquences de ľ action; la multitude des effets connexes ď une action; ľ inévitable incertitude de celui qui agit en ce qui concerne les alternatives qui s'offrent à lui et les conséquences de chacune de ces actions; le coǔt des informations complémentaires; le coǔt de ľ exécution logique des opérations; la diversite des criteres-valeur, suivant l'opinion de ceux qui agissent; les modifications dans le temps des critères-valeur ď un exécutant donné; la préférence que marque celui qui agit quant au temps, au risque, à la procédure logique et àľ incertitude. La définition de la rationalité devrait spécifier le déroulement de ľ action, qui, à la lumière de tous ces facteurs, apparaǐt comme 'la meilleure'. La définition proposée ici esquisse une procédure rationnelle pour le choix ď une action parmi toutes les actions reconnues possibles; en ľ occurrence, le mot action se rapporte à une suite chronologique a) ď actions (au sens usuel), b) ď informations et c) ď analyses logiques. Grosso modo, le processus comprend les quatre étapes suivantes: I° la spécification des actions connues possibles; 2° la détermination pour chacune des actions, et en utilisant toutes les informations disponibles entrant en ligne de compte, de toutes les conséquences possibles et de leurs probabilityés respectives; 3oévaluation, à la lumière des critères-valeur entrant en ligne de compte, de chacune des conséquences possibles de chacune des actions possibles; et 4o la déduction de 3o de ľ action 'correcte'à exécuter. En exposant ces étapes, ľ auteur utilise une construction logique calquée sur celles de Carnap, Hempel et Oppenheim. Afin ď etre mieux compréhensible, la définition est présentée en deux paliers. Ľ annexe à cet article contient un exemple (considérablement simplifyé) de ľ application de la définition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines whether both demand and productivity bias are necessary for the explanation of the structural change in economic development. Insufficiency of productivity bias alone; Restriction of homothetic demands.

This paper offers an integrated analysis of the forces shaping the emergence of the African slave trade over the early modern period. We focus our attention on two questions. First, why most of the increase in the demand for slaves during this period came exclusively from western Europeans. Second, and of most relevance for present-day development outcomes, why was the overwhelming majority of slaves of African origin. Technological differences in manufacturing technology, the specificities of sugar (and other crops') production, and the cultural fragmentation of the African continent all play a role in the analysis. Supporting evidence for each of our claims is provided from a broad corpus of relevant literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we concentrate on FDI and argue that the contrasting FDI policies in Brazil and India can be traced back to differences in the respective colonial (or semi-colonial) experiences of the two nations during the 19th century. Our comparative analysis of FDI in Brazil and India shows the importance of historical and institutional awareness in gaining an understanding of the manner in which each society perceived the role of foreign investments in their societies. By doing this, we gain an understanding of the reasons these countries adopted different attitudes and policies towards foreign capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Institutional quality has been increasingly identified as crucial for economic development. In line with previous work which has explored the determinants of good institutions, this paper examines the impact of economic and social inequalities between ethnic groups on government quality. I hypothesize that greater inequalities between groups will tend to undermine institutions both because they tend to legitimize corruption in the eyes of disadvantaged groups and because of the efforts of better-off groups to maintain their privileges. Based on a panel of 29 developing countries, I find that socio-economic ethnic group inequalities reduce government quality, something which suggests the convenience of policies that can level the playing field in ethnically heterogeneous societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does capitalism perform better when embedded in certain cultures? Given the wide range of economic outcomes, we address potential causes for the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of institutional constraints. This paper argues that culture matters for the success of capitalist institutions, specifically economic freedom. We claim that different cultures may raise or lower the productivity of economic institutions by either constraining or supporting these rules. We analyze this relationship empirically by examining how the interaction between economic freedom and culture affects economic growth. Our results suggest that culture does, indeed, enhance the effectiveness of capitalism and its subsequent impact on growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper first analyzes the question why did Czarist Russia and Ottoman Turkey fall behind the West? It is argued that interstate rivalry forced West European rulers to respect the private property rights of producers and subjects earlier and to a greater degree than czars or sultans ruling over huge contiguous territories ever had to. Incentives to work were better in Europe than elsewhere. The mobilization of available knowledge for productive purposes was easier than elsewhere. Limited government implied less political obstacles to innovation. Comparatively secure private property ownership in the means of production made the establishment of scarcity prices and the rational allocation of resources easier than elsewhere. Whereas the Western past was feudal, the Russian or Turkish past was patrimonial or even sultanistic. Feudalism is a much better starting point for establishing the rule of law and safe property rights than patrimonialism. The second issue has been the question why Czarist Russia could outperform Ottoman Turkey. Here the political consequences of the Muslim tolerance of slavery and polygyny matter. Being slaves, many members of Ottoman ruling elites were at the mercy of their owner, the sultan. Therefore, they became tools of arbitrary rule. Moreover, the practice of polygyny generated downward social mobility and political instability and thereby added another obstacle to the establishment of safe property rights for producers or merchants. The final issue is the economic prospects of Russia or Turkey. Economic freedom is better in Turkey than in Russia. Moreover, Russia is graying, whereas Turkey may look forward to a growing labor force. Although a rich endowment in natural resources seems to favor Russia, the resource curse has prevented other resource rich countries from developing. Therefore, the Turkish prospect looks much brighter than the Russian one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are three positions concerning the economic effects of human rights discussed among economists. Some economists argue that only property rights matter for economic growth and basic human rights can even make the legal system less efficient. Others argue that negative rights are generally welfare increasing while positive rights tend to reduce income and growth over time. Yet a third group of economists argues that elements of all groups of human rights are a precondition for making productive use of one's resources and are thus efficiency-enhancing. Based on a cross-country analysis, the effects of different groups of human rights on economic growth are estimated in this paper. The transmission channels through which the different rights affect growth are identified by estimating their effects on investment and overall productivity. Basic human rights have indeed a positive effect on investment, but do not seem to contribute to productivity. Social rights, in turn, are not conducive to investment in physical capital but do contribute to productivity improvements. None of the four groups of rights covered in this analysis ever has a significant negative effect on any of the economic variables included. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses a game theoretic model to explain empirical research which has revealed higher relational satisfaction among married couples than cohabiting couples, as well as among married couples who did not cohabit before marriage. Despite these findings, in recent decades cohabitation rates have dramatically increased in both Europe and the United States. Instrumental variables estimations on data from 28 industrialized countries and 50 U.S. states show cohabitation strongly correlated with increases in women's labor force participation, where a 10 percent increase in women's labor force participation results in a 6.4 to 14.6 percent increase in cohabitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores whether the probability of being punished after losing power leads dictators to restrain their level of predation and, thus, increase economic growth. To do so, a simple model of predatory rule is developed, and the consequences of an increasing probability of punishment after loosing power explored. New data on dictators' post-exit fate have permitted to estimate the predicted probability of punishment taking place by using multinomial logit. Outgoing dictators' strength and the international context are shown to be the main determinants of post-exit scenarios. The probability of punishment is proven to have a positive and significant effect on the rate of growth of GDP under alternative specifications of growth regressions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyzes the relationship between economic freedom, property rights, and innovation in socialism[1]. It demonstrates that the property rights approach offers an effective explanation of the factors that affect the rate of economic change. The line of reasoning in the paper is exampled by reference to the Yugoslav economy. Relative to other East European countries, the Yugoslav economic system is quite interesting for study of socialism[2]. Yugoslav institutions are supposed to simulate * The first version of this paper was given at the Interlaken Conference of Analysis and Ideology in 1986. A version of this paper will be published in the proceedings of the Liberty Fund Symposium on Economic, Political and Civil Freedom -- I want to thank ARMEN ALCHIAN, STEVE WIGGINS and the managing editors of Kyklos for many valuable comments. The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation's research grant is gratefully acknowledged. ** Professor of Economics and Director, Center for Education and Research in Free Enterprise at Texas A&M University. 1. Property rights are defined as behavioral relations among men that arise from the fact of scarcity. Freedom is taken to mean that the interaction between an individual's search for ways of achieving more utility and the prevailing institutional arrangements triggers changes in property rights. 2. The Yugoslav system's basic characteristics are: (l) The state owns capital goods held by the business firms (it makes some people feel better to call it social ownership). This preserves the character of socialism and reflects the ruling elite's dogmatism. (u) Employees govern their respective firms through Worker's Councils, the highest organs of management. This is what sets the Yugoslav system apart. Workers are supposed to control allocation of resources. (m) Employees own returns from their firms' capital. Workers' Councils decide how to allocate profit between firms' wage funds, reinvestments of earnings, and other uses of... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we show that the existing low estimates of the cost of protection have failed to consider altogether or inappropriately the effects on the cost of protection of economic growth and the historic expansion of world trade at a rate greater than real output. We argue that if such growth is incorporated into models of the cost of protection, the net present value of costs readily becomes very large. The paper follows the basic approach used by M. Feldstein [1979], who showed that in a growing world the welfare cost of any steady rate of inflation approaches infinity as long as the rate of economic growth exceeds the discount rate.
We review the traditional estimates of the cost of protection. They are shown to provide extremely low estimates in a static analytical framework. We then argue that the cost of protection grows at the rate at which international trade expands because it prevents exploitation of the opportunity for gains from trade growing at that rate. In the post-war years trade has grown much more rapidly than real output. The growth-rate is also much greater than any of the commonly used rates of social discount. It therefore follows that the present value of the cost of protection is very large. Precise estimates depend on the length of protection and the size of any social benefits it provides. While no empirical estimates are presented, the analytical approach suggests a way for resolving what many economists perceive to be the puzzle of existing estimates of extremely low costs of protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]