GOVERNMENT size, PUBLIC sector, BUREAUCRACY, ECONOMIC development, DEVELOPING countries
Abstract
This paper shows evidence of strong heterogeneity in the relationship between government size and growth, depending on the quality of public sector institutions. Focusing on a wide sample of developed and developing countries over the period 1981-2005, we find that government size reduces growth when bureaucracy quality is low, whereas no significant effect is observed for sufficiently high levels of bureaucracy quality. The results hold both in cross-section and panel data analyses and are robust to a large number of robustness checks. These findings have important implications for assessing the role of government size in economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
This paper explores whether the probability of being punished after losing power leads dictators to restrain their level of predation and, thus, increase economic growth. To do so, a simple model of predatory rule is developed, and the consequences of an increasing probability of punishment after loosing power explored. New data on dictators' post-exit fate have permitted to estimate the predicted probability of punishment taking place by using multinomial logit. Outgoing dictators' strength and the international context are shown to be the main determinants of post-exit scenarios. The probability of punishment is proven to have a positive and significant effect on the rate of growth of GDP under alternative specifications of growth regressions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]