Search

In order to minimize the risk of infection during the Covid-19 pandemic, people are recommended to keep interpersonal distance (e.g., 1 m, 2 m, 6 feet), wash their hands frequently, limit social contacts and sometimes to wear a face mask. We investigated how people judge the protective effect of interpersonal distance against the Corona virus. The REM model, based on earlier empirical studies, describes how a person’s virus exposure decreases with the square of the distance to another person emitting a virus in a face to face situation. In a comparison with model predictions, most participants underestimated the protective effect of moving further away from another person. Correspondingly, most participants were not aware of how much their exposure would increase if they moved closer to the other person. Spectral analysis of judgments showed that a linear ratio model with the independent variable = (initial distance)/(distance to which a person moves) was the most frequently used judgment rule. It leads to insensitivity to change in exposure compared with the REM model. The present study indicated a need for information about the effects of keeping interpersonal distance and about the importance of virus carrying aerosols in environments with insufficient air ventilation. Longer conversations emitting aerosols in a closed environment may lead to ambient concentrations of aerosols in the air that no distance can compensate for. The results of the study are important for risk communications in countries where people do not wear a mask and when authorities consider removal of a recommendation or a requirement to wear a face mask. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present evidence from a pre-registered experiment indicating that a philosophical argument - a type of rational appeal - can persuade people to make charitable donations. The rational appeal we used follows Singer's "shallow pond" argument (1972), while incorporating an evolutionary debunking argument (Paxton, Ungar and Greene, 2012) against favoring nearby victims over distant ones. The effectiveness of this rational appeal did not differ significantly from that of a well-tested emotional appeal involving an image of a single child in need (Small, Loewenstein and Slovic, 2007). This is a surprising result, given evidence that emotions are the primary drivers of moral action, a view that has been very influential in the work of development organizations. We found no support for our hypothesis that combining our rational and emotional appeals would have a stronger effect than either appeal in isolation. However, our finding that both kinds of appeal can increase charitable donations is cause for optimism, especially concerning the potential efficacy of well-designed rational appeals. We consider the significance of these findings for moral psychology, ethics, and the work of organizations aiming to alleviate severe poverty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]