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Could a growing transatlantic rift regarding the use of military force outside Europe propel the political break-up of Canada? The first part of the paper argues that, in addition to its liberal-democratic values, Canada's bicultural national identity accounts for much of its Atlanticist international security policy. The second part of the paper examines the prevalence of this Atlanticist strategic culture in the face of two contemporary cases of transatlantic (dis)unity, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in order to assess the potentially disruptive nature of transatlantic discord on Canada's political unity. It finds, somewhat counter-intuitively, that transatlantic unity - rather than disunity - could more probably generate national unity crises in Canada in the event of continuing 'out-of-area' military operations undertaken by NATO allies. This is mainly because of a growing tendency among Quebec's sovereignist political elites' to mobilise Quebecers' distinct attitudes regarding overseas military expeditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the basis of a study of American, British and Canadian records, this article examines the relationship of France to the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty from the perspective of the ‘ABC’ countries, particularly Canada. How did the perceived vulnerability of France influence the approach of the members of the ‘North Atlantic Triangle’ to the justification, timing and contents of the proposed pact? How did France's inclusion in Western Union and its exclusion from the preliminary talks in the Pentagon affect American, British and Canadian attitudes to the development of the draft alternatively known as the ‘Pentagon Paper’ or the ‘State Department Draft’? These questions are addressed, as well as the impact on the later ambassadorial talks of France's priority to immediate rearmament and its determination to include the departments of Algeria within the defensive perimeter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Finally, the article assesses the extent to which France and its requirements influenced the policies and actions of the Canadian government throughout the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Canada's self-image in world affairs has been as a bold internationalist, with its status and responsibility as a middle power and its role as a mediator emphasised. Assessments highlight the transformation of Canada's international relations after the Second World War and contrast its engagement in the United Nations with its performance at the League of Nations. Curiously, these appraisals ignore Canada's first term on the UN Security Council (1948-1949), particularly its response to crises which challenged world peace and the UN's authority. From an examination of unpublished and published papers in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, this article contends that Canada's performance did not correspond with the popular image of its role in world affairs, nor did the government take advantage of this exceptional opportunity to demonstrate its international commitment. Moreover, it also shied away from taking a leading part in advocating the ideals and objectives of the western alliance. Instead, it preferred to play a supporting role as the divisions of the cold war deepened. When the UN Security Council dealt with controversies and clashes, Canada followed the lead of the United States and the United Kingdom, and its priority was to maintain a common outlook and approach within the North Atlantic Triangle. Canada's early post-war foreign policy, as evident in its first term on the UN Security Council, seems remarkably consistent with its longstanding concerns and priorities in world affairs and considerably less indicative of any significant departure in approach or policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the negotiation, implementation and impact of the four-year contract for delivery of Canadian wheat to Britain (July 1946). The notion of such an agreement was controversial within government and industry, not only in Canada and the United Kingdom but also in the United States. This assessment concludes that, in spite of its negative reputation, especially in Canada, the wheat contract met the principal aims of both sides. For the Canadian government especially this episode interwove many of its anxieties and ambitions in an uncertain financial, commercial and political situation after the Second World War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]