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Could a growing transatlantic rift regarding the use of military force outside Europe propel the political break-up of Canada? The first part of the paper argues that, in addition to its liberal-democratic values, Canada's bicultural national identity accounts for much of its Atlanticist international security policy. The second part of the paper examines the prevalence of this Atlanticist strategic culture in the face of two contemporary cases of transatlantic (dis)unity, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in order to assess the potentially disruptive nature of transatlantic discord on Canada's political unity. It finds, somewhat counter-intuitively, that transatlantic unity - rather than disunity - could more probably generate national unity crises in Canada in the event of continuing 'out-of-area' military operations undertaken by NATO allies. This is mainly because of a growing tendency among Quebec's sovereignist political elites' to mobilise Quebecers' distinct attitudes regarding overseas military expeditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following NATO's historic invocation of Article V in the aftermath of the September 11 (9/11) terrorist attacks, the United States was inundated with Allied offers of moral and practical support for the 'War on Terrorism' declared by the Bush Administration. For the most part such offers were spurned, as the United States chose instead to build ad hoc coalitions on a case-by-case, mission-by-mission basis. The Bush Administration's decision to bypass the alliance reignited a simmering debate over its future, prompting many to once again speak of NATO's imminent 'demise'. This paper suggests that while the US emerged from NATO's two Balkans missions with a belief that its operational freedom and flexibility had been hampered by operating within alliance constraints, coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have raised key questions about whether ad hoc coalitions are the most appropriate mechanisms for conducting such operations. NATO's contributions to post-combat reconstruction and stabilisation have highlighted some of the core advantages to be derived from working through the alliance, but the difficulties it has experienced have also reinforced the urgent need for an accelerated process of transformation and reform. Such a process is likely to be critical to ensuring that NATO can meet the demands of the current security environment, and no longer function simply as a 'toolbox' from which the US will pick and choose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article expands the logic of the club goods theory as a framework for studying North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) politics and argues that NATO should be approached as a heterogeneous club that incorporates several different groups of allies with relatively similar characteristics. The successful decision-making in this club depends exclusively on the capacity of the allies to reach consensus. If the member states agree on a decision, it is usually optimal, while the lack of willingness to accommodate the diverging positions of the allies stimulates solutions outside of the club which for the most part are sub-optimal. The relevance of this model is illustrated with two cases: the negotiations within NATO preceding Operation 'Iraqi Freedom' in 2003 and the decision to start the NATO Training Mission in Iraq in 2004. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]