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The scholarly literature on US–UK relations has been marked by recurrent debate over the health and utility of the special relationship, recently enlivened by the policy tensions and political turbulence of the Trump presidency. The literature has also seen a social and cultural 'turn', with a growing focus on the broader linkages between the two countries' societies and cultures. However, there has been limited analysis of public opinion in Britain in recent scholarly research. This article examines the 'image of America' in British public opinion in the twenty-first century, across recent Republican and Democratic presidencies. It uses data from the annual Pew Global Attitudes survey series and Transatlantic Trends survey series to undertake systematic analysis of these quantitative data sources. It examines the following areas: the performance and policies of presidents from Bush to Biden, the US and its people, the state of bilateral relations, and NATO. It examines aggregate-level opinion and also pays close attention to views across different societal groups, based on demographic characteristics, party support and left–right ideology. The paper makes a significant and distinctive contribution to scholarly research into US–UK relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Britain emerged from the Second World War with a huge aviation industry dedicated primarily to military production. During the war, in agreement with the USA, Britain used US transport aircraft, thereby giving the USA a huge potential advantage in post-war civil aviation. Nevertheless, during the war Britain charted a course of aircraft development that would allow new, competitive civil aircraft to be in place by 1950. Under the Labour government of 1945–51, Britain imposed a "Fly British" policy to encourage production of civil aircraft and required the national airlines to buy British aircraft. However, American competition, the demands of rearmament and the tightly controlled ordering process for civil and military aircraft made the production of British civil aircraft costly and uncompetitive. Faced with changing technology, rising costs and the development of US jet aircraft, the British aviation industry was forced into a radical consolidation by the Macmillan government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the period following the First World War, air power theorists argued a future war would be decided from the air. Bombing aircraft would fly with impunity over an enemy's territory and so disrupt the means of sustaining war and economy that popular revolt would force surrender on its government. Britain was at the forefront of developments in this area and the creation of the Royal Air Force, the world's first air force independent of either army or navy, stimulated demand for a similar unified air service in the United States. This debate was played out with particular drama in US public life, and transatlantic intellectual currents had an important bearing on the outcome. The campaign for a US Air Force on the British model was led by the flamboyant General William 'Billy' Mitchell of the US Army Air Service. In Britain, the RAF had absorbed the Royal Navy's air arm and the US Navy was determined to avoid a similar fate, creating a predictable and bitter struggle between the Navy, Mitchell and his followers. Mitchell was unsuccessful in his campaign, though later revered as the 'father' of the US Air Force, while the Navy retained control of its air arm but struggled to shake off its opponents' caricature of the organisation as resistant to innovation as represented by air power and obsessed with the retention of the outmoded battleship as the principal capital unit. We argue, by contrast, that the US Navy was an exemplary learning organisation closely interested in the development and application of technology, and mindful of the impact of technological innovation on doctrine. We argue that debates played out at the Naval War College, literally in the case of wargames, in the years of the Mitchell controversy laid the foundations for the success of US Naval aviation in World War Two. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are successive UK governments so staunchly committed to the 'special relationship' with the US? One common answer - a part of an answer at least - evokes the role of identity and identification. The UK supports the US because the UK's ruling elite believe that the Americans and the British are birds of a feather. This article examines this hypothesis from a 'national identity as a variable' framework developed in constructivist International Relations theory. The main argument presented is that UK support for the special relationship is rooted not simply in elite beliefs but rather in a wider societal acceptance of the global hegemony of 'American' democratic neoliberalism. Multiple national identity discourses exist, but none of them calls on Westminster and Whitehall to chart a path that would be at odds with a world centred on Washington, DC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Lord Salisbury passed the above remark in November 1961 it was at a moment of intense frustration for the British Foreign Office during the Congo crisis as the UN accelerated their efforts to restore territorial integrity to the Central African state by ending the secession of Katanga. The British viewed UN actions as a threat to their political and economic interests in the Congo and in Central Africa but crucially, also found that they were at loggerheads with the United States. This article examines Anglo-American relations at two key junctures in March and December 1961 when Britain successfully appealed to the United States to intervene in order to stall UN actions in the Congo. The cooperation between President John F. Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to constrain UN Congo policy reflects the centrality of the organisation in Anglo-American relations at the time and also highlights an understudied aspect of the relationship between the London and Washington. It will be shown that the crisis put a strain on the Anglo-American relations, leading to efforts by the British to play on the Cold War fears of the Americans by urging them to limit the actions of the UN. It is argued that the changing nature of the organisation helped to foster tensions in the Anglo-American relationship, exposing inherent differences of opinion about how American Cold War objectives should be balanced against the British agenda for decolonisation. The two incidents highlighted here reflect how the crisis became a challenge for Anglo-American relations and ultimately reveal the waning influence of the United States and the UK within the UN at the time. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]